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Abstract 
 
This study examines legislature-executive relations in the presidential system. The 
relationship between the legislature and the executive is pivotal to any constitution and is 
one of the central characteristics of a model of government. The need for separation of 
the roles, powers and personnel of the executive and the legislature capable of instituting 
harmonious inter-organ relations as well as ensure independence of the legislature in 
order to achieve the common goal of governance, underpinned the adoption of 
presidential system in Nigeria. The nature of legislature-executive relations in the 
presidential system has, however, attracted wide variety of viewpoints both about 
conflicts and cooperation and whether benefits or liabilities result from either.  It is on 
this basis that the study examines the nature, causes and consequences of legislature-
executive relations in two of Nigerian states - Lagos and Ogun between 1999 and 2011. It 
investigates the extent of legislature’s independence in its constitutional processes in the 
face of the executive’s influence in the two states. The study engages a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods, while data were gathered from primary and 
secondary sources. A well structured, closed and open-ended questionnaire was 
administered on 300 respondents selected through a combination of simple random and 
purposive sampling techniques from the legislature, executive, academia, civil society 
organisations, political parties and mass media from Lagos and Ogun States. In addition, 
in-depth non-scheduled structured interviews were conducted on selected political actors 
in the two states. Data gathered were analysed using percentile, measures of central 
tendency and content analysis. While the success of the presidential system depends on 
healthy legislature-executive interactions, findings reveal that a noxious pattern of 
legislature-executive relations conditioned by such socio-political and economic culture 
as rent-seeking, manipulations, impositions, patronage and political clientelism, among 
others, existed in Lagos and Ogun States. This nature of relationship is not only injurious 
to democratic consolidation, but also treacherous to their political development.  Besides, 
while the legislature’s independence is fundamental to presidential democracy, the 
executive’s domination and meddlesomeness in the legislative business of the Assembly 
in the two states hampered the institution from performing the crucial role of citizens’ 
representation through legislation and oversight. The inability of the legislature to 
meaningfully impact on policy process and perform its oversight role on the executive 
portends a reversal from democratic to quasi-dictatorial governance. Consequently, the 
study emphasizes the need to address those factors that encouraged the subordination of 
the legislature under the executive. These include, among others, the implementation of 
the self-accounting and service commission laws, institutionalization of the practice of 
party democracy, well-defined ideology and manifesto by political parties which must be 
the legal compass for elected party members to help both the executive and the legislature 
to pursue a joint agenda and the explicit specifications in the constitution, of the 
expectations of both the executive and the legislature regarding the legislative review of 
the annual appropriation bill. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background to the Study 
Governance is imperative for the social, political and economic progress of every country 
(Fabbrini, 1995; Ogundiya, 2010) and is indispensable for the achievement of the noble 
objectives of a state (Oburota, 2003). Governance is viewed in terms of process and 
structure. Thus, Gill (2002) views it as the processes, structures and organizational 
traditions that determine how power is exercised, how stakeholders have their say, how 
decisions are taken and how decision-makers are held to account. Ogundiya (2010) in a 
very concise and succinct manner sees governance as consisting of two essential elements 
of the state, namely, the structure of the state and the procedures of the legislative, 
judicial, executive and administrative bodies at all the tiers of government. Since 
governance is both a structure and a process, the onus is on every state to adopt a model 
of governance whose structure and process it considers suitable for the achievement of its 
noble objectives. 
 
Governance is recognized as the most critical challenge for political and socio-economic 
development in Africa, and particularly in Nigeria. Morethan fifty years after Nigeria 
gained political independence in 1960, the country is still faced with the problem of 
adopting the right model of governance. At the dawn of its political independence, 
international attention had shifted to Nigeria as a country that would possibly make giant 
strides toward sustainable democracy and good governance, development in Africa. Such 
hopes were not misplaced, given the abundance of human and natural resources in the 
country. Paradoxically, Nigeria plunged into conflicts, which have rocked the foundation 
of the country since independence due to the foundations as well as consolidated 
deficient social, economic, political, and developmental structures laid from the 
beginning, arising from the colonial origin of the Nigerian state (Akinboye & Anifowose, 
1999). The Westminster-style parliamentary government that the First Republican 
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Constitution bequeathed to Nigeria enthroned a system regarded by scholars as 
confrontational and conflict generating as the Prime Minister shared power with the 
President and there was no complete separation of powers between the Executive and the 
Legislature. The executive was part of, and derived its power from being included in the 
legislature. Consequently, the system was exposed to instability (Dudley, 1982; 
Nwabueze, 1985; Aniagolu, 1993; Eteng, 1997; Ogowewo, 2000; Momoh, 2000; 
Akinwumi, 2004). 
 
The restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria on October, I979 after thirteen years of military 
rule would inevitably have been a landmark of great significance for Nigeria. What has 
given it quite exceptional importance is the fact that Nigeria, turning its back on the 
Westminster model, chose to adopt a new political structure – “the Washington model” of 
executive presidential and gubernatorial government. The presidential system adopted 
was modeled after that of the United States of America. The euphoria that greeted the 
decision to opt for the presidential system revealed the hope that it would usher in clean 
political governance in the Second Republic. Unlike the preceeding military regime, the 
Second Republic was anchored on the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. It was predicated on a presidential single executive system of democratic 
governance. The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) was mandated by the 
government to produce a constitution that would discourage institutionalized opposition 
to the government in power and, instead, to develop a consensus in politics and 
government (Aiyede, 2005). 
 
The report of the 1977/78 Constituent Assembly clearly stated some of the reasons for the 
adoption of the presidential system. These include, inter alia, the need for unity, energy, 
and dispatch inherent in the single executive system – The President, and a provision for 
a clear separation of the roles, personnel and powers of the executive and the legislature 
capable of harmonious inter-organ relations as well as ensure the independence of the 
legislature so as to enhance the performance of both the executive and legislative organs 
of government.  Thus, while each arm is vested with power over some defined activities 
of government, in many respects, however, conjugal efforts and collaboration are 
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constitutionally required for the exercise of power (Dudley, 1982 & Fasagba, 2009). In 
this new system, there is a clear separation between the executive and the legislature, the 
executive deriving its power from the direct popular vote of the electorate and from the 
constitution (Ekweme, 2005). The political bureau of 1987, the 1989 Constitution, the 
1994 Constitutional Conference and the 1999 Constitution all supported the retention of 
presidential system as a model of government for Nigeria despite the acrimonious politics 
of the Second Republic.  
 
The new 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria came into force with effect 
from 29 May, 1999, the date of the military handover of governance to a democratically 
elected civilian regime. The document is based on the 1979 presidential constitution, with 
some amendments, and provides that Nigeria shall be a Federation made up of 36 States 
and a Federal Capital Territory (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(CFRN), 1999). Following the adoption of the presidential system in Nigeria, therefore, 
no one arm of government is superior to the other, neither is any subordinate to the other. 
Each organ is independent within its own sphere of influence. Section 4 of the 1999 
Constitution vests the legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the 
Legislature - the National Assembly, a bicameral legislature, consisting of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives at the Federal level; it also vests the legislative powers of a 
State of the Federation in the House of Assembly of the State, a unicameral legislature. 
Section 5, on the other hand, vests the executive powers of the Federation in the President 
at the Federal level and the executive powers in a State in the Governor of the State. 
Section 6, however, vests the judicial powers of the Federation and a State therein in the 
Judiciary, consisting of the Courts established for the Federation and the States by virtue 
of the provisions of the Constitution (CFRN, 1999).  
 
As noted by Oshio (2004), although the 1999 Constitution vests the governmental powers 
on the three separate arms of government, the division of powers is not created to 
institutionalise isolation of any arm of government. Thus the definition of powers to each 
arm only ensures an interlocking system of checks and balances rather than an absolute 
separation of powers, which is impracticable. This is evident under the Nigerian 
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constitutional arrangement. The President has power to veto any bill passed by the 
legislature but the legislature can impeach the President. Also, the President‟s 
nominations for appointment of Justices to the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria are subject to confirmation by the Senate. The legislature exercises oversight 
functions, including the power over public finance and the power of investigation. On the 
other hand, the courts exercise the power of judicial review over executive and legislative 
actions. In essence, therefore, the separation of powers operationally involves a sharing 
of the powers of government, a system of checks and balances which allows each arm of 
government to defend its position in the constitutional framework of government. It 
needs flexibility, understanding and cooperation among the arms of government with 
each arm recognizing the limits and enforcing them. In this way, the purpose of 
government is fulfilled through contributions from all the arms of government as partners 
in progress. 
 
The relationships between the legislature and the executive are one of the key defining 
characteristics of the functioning of any political system (Kopecky, 2004). It is central to 
the constitutional and political system of any territory and has been at the forefront of 
parliamentary debate in recent times (Winetrobe, 2000). These relationships are complex, 
depending on a range of formal and informal practices. The constitutional prerogatives 
vested in legislatures and the executive are, of course, most important because they 
structure the interactions between the two powers (National Democratic Institute (NDI), 
2000). However, numerous informal rules and conventions, such as the customs 
concerning nomination of members of the cabinet following an election, practicality, 
precedent, habit, and the influence of political parties are very important as well (Bernick 
& Bernick, 2008).  The variation of these circumstances across countries of the world 
accounts for the wide differences in how political power is shared and the relative 
influence each branch of government has over policy formulation (NDI, 2000). 
 
Constructive relationships between the executive and the legislative arms of government 
are essential to the effective maintenance of the constitution and the rule of law (Holme, 
2007). In recent years, however, the character of these relationships has changed 
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significantly, both because of changes in governance and because of wider societal 
changes. Scholars have been expressing a wide variety of viewpoints on executive-
legislative relations, both about conflict and cooperation, whether one or the other 
dominates, and whether benefits or liabilities result from either (King, 1976; Madison, 
1992; Magill, 2001; Kopecky, 2004). While some see conflict between the executive and 
legislature as a necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and controlling 
government, others view it as contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, 
thus making government ineffective (Madison, 1992; Aiyede, 2005; Dulani & Donge, 
2006 & Mbah, 2007). 
 
 The fact that Nigeria operates a federal constitution means the replication of the separate 
arms of government both at the federal and the state level of government. Following the 
federal model, each state‟s executive and legislature derive their powers from the 
constitution. The head of the executive branch at the federal level is the President of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and at the state level, it is the Governor. The legislative body 
at the federal level is the National Assembly consisting of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives while at the state level, it is the State House of Assembly. The executive 
branch at the state level is separate both in function and personnel from the State House 
of Assembly. However, for the purpose of government, these two institutions of 
government are expected to operate in an atmosphere of cordial relationship. In essence, 
flexibility, understanding and cooperation between the Governor who is the chief 
executive and the State House of Assembly in the process of governance are mostly 
desired for effective governance at the state level. That is why over the years, scholars of 
intra-governmental relations at the state political system are very keen at expanding the 
frontiers of knowledge on the nature and implications of the relationship between the 
chief executive or governor and the legislatures. Of particular academic interest has been 
the extent to which legislatures maintain viable, independent positions in public policy-
making in the face of influence of the chief executive – the governor particularly, in a 
presidential system (Bernick & Wiggins, 1981; Cheibub, 2007). 
 
6 
 
These findings therefore necessitate an assessment of the nature of legislature-executive 
relations at the state level of Nigeria‟s presidential system of governance. Such diagnosis 
will bring to limelight the nature of legislature-executive relations in the federating units 
of Nigerian presidential system and the factors engendering such relationship with a view 
to bringing to the fore valid modalities for improving legislature-executive relations, 
especially as the country undergoes a process of democratic consolidation. Against the 
backdrop of this study, therefore, this research examines the dynamics, nature, causes and 
consequences of the relationship between the executive and the legislature in the 
Nigeria‟s presidential model of governance with particular reference to Lagos and Ogun 
States between 1999 and 2011.  
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The legislature and the executive in the presidential system adopted by Nigeria are each 
vested with powers over some defined activities of government. In many respects, joint 
efforts and collaborations are constitutionally required in the exercise of their power. This 
is to enhance the performance of the organs, ensure harmonious inter-organ relations and 
guarantee the independence of the legislature (Dudley, 1982 & Fasagba, 2009). The 
nature of legislature-executive relations in the presidential system, however, has over the 
years, attracted wide variety of viewpoints both about conflict and cooperation, whether 
one or the other dominates, and whether benefits or liabilities result from either. While 
some see legislature-executive conflict as a necessary and beneficial precondition to 
limiting and controlling government (Madison, 1992; Magil, 2001), others view it as 
contributing to gridlock over major public policy decisions, thus making government 
ineffective (King, 1976; Kopecky, 2004). The relationship between the legislature and the 
executive in Nigeria has been characterized by mutual suspicion, acrimony and political 
rivalry (Aiyede, 2005; Nwannekanma & Ogbodo, 2010). Despite the unequivocal 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution aimed at rectifying the problems identified with 
legislature-executive relations in the preceding republics, managing executive-legislature 
relations has been the single most problematic issue both at the centre and the state level 
since  the country‟s return to civil rule in 1999 (Abonyi, 2006).  
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The principle of separation of powers is one unique feature of presidential democracy. At 
the same time, the branches are expected to serve as checks on each other as a preventive 
measure against absolute or abuse of power. Consequently, Nigeria leaders, when 
adopting the presidential system in 1979, had envisaged a strengthened legislature that 
can function as an effective check on the executive as well as an active, vigorous partner 
in the making of public policy (Aiyede, 2005). The singular nature of the office of the 
chief executive and his responsibility of managing the machinery of government have 
however, been argued to give him the opportunities and competitive advantage over the 
legislature and hence continues to exert executive dominance (Rosenthal et.al., 2003). 
Moreover, executive‟s involvement in the legislative process has been argued to 
undermine legislature‟s independence to perform its role of citizens‟ representation 
(Bernick & Wiggins, 1991; Edosa & Azelama, 1995; Bernick & Bernick, 2008).  
 
The legislature is seen as occupying fundamental place in the presidential democratic 
governance and performing crucial role of citizens‟ representation through legislation and 
oversight functions for the advancement and well being of the citizenry (Anyaegbunam, 
2000; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). These real roles in contemporary times have, however, 
become debatable and controversial. While the legislature in some political system is 
seen to have wide powers and exercises real power, the institution in some others have 
declined in power to a mere rubber stamp assembly for legitimizing the decisions made 
elsewhere (Ball, 1977; Heywood, 2007; Lafenwa, 2009). Some parliaments have even 
abdicated their responsibilities in fulfillment of some other interests (Adebo, 1988; Saliu 
& Mohammad, 2010; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). It is even argued that legislative 
institutions in Nigeria are underdeveloped and hence incapable of performing this crucial 
role (Omoweh, 2006; Lafenwa & Gberevbie, 2007; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). In line with 
this controversy, Ray (2004) avers that a general study of the position and working of the 
legislature in the present century would reveal that, barring few important and striking 
exceptions, legislatures have declined in certain important aspects and particularly in 
respect of powers in relation to the executive arm of governments.  
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It is, therefore, imperative at this juncture, to examine the nature of legislature-executive 
relations in the country‟s presidential system and to ascertain how well and how far the 
Nigerian legislatures have been able to perform their roles in the face of executive‟s 
dominance. This research, therefore, investigates the nature of the relationship between 
the two branches of government in two of Nigeria‟s federating units – Lagos and Ogun 
States.  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
The questions that this study seeks to address are: 
1) What is the extent of executive‟s interference in the legislative process of the 
Lagos and Ogun States‟ Houses of Assembly between 1999 and 2011? 
2) What is the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States 
between 1999 and 2011? 
3) What factors accounted for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011? 
4) What are the implications of the pattern of legislature-executive relations on the 
governance of Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011? 
5) What are the ways of improving legislature-executive relations in Lagos and 
Ogun States? 
 
1.4. Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this study is to examine the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
and Ogun States of Nigeria‟s Presidential system between 1999 and 2011. Following this 
goal, the specific objectives are to: 
1) examine the extent of executive‟s interference in the legislative process of the 
Lagos and Ogun States House of Assembly between 1999 and 2011; 
2) explore the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States 
between 1999 and 2011;  
3) investigate the factors responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations 
in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011;  
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4) examine the implications of the pattern of legislature-executive relations on the 
governance of Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011;  
5) proffer ways of improving legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun 
States. 
 
1.5. Research Propositions 
This study is predicated on the following propositions: 
 Executive‟s interference in the legislative process undermines the legislature‟s 
roles of citizens‟ representation through legislation and oversight in Lagos and 
Ogun States.  
 The relationship between the executive and the legislature in Lagos and Ogun 
States has been more of power struggle than being responsive partnership in 
governance. 
 The economic and socio-political conditions in Lagos and Ogun States have 
greater consequences for legislature-executive relations than the institutional 
design factors of the presidential system in the States.  
 Acrimonious legislature-executive relationship is inimical to the principle of 
separation of powers in a presidential democratic system.  
 
1.6. Justification for the Study 
The presidential model of democratic governance has become a prominent institutional 
design in Nigerian Constitutions since its adoption in 1979. The relationship between the 
executive and the legislature in the Nigeria‟s presidential system has, however, been 
characterized by unhealthy rivalry, mutual suspicion and competition for supremacy. The 
Fourth Republic, did not witness any change in the often acrimonious relationship. 
Despite the majorly unambiquous provisions in the 1999 Constitution aimed at rectifying 
some of the problems identified with legislature-executive relations in the preceding 
republics, since 1999, inter-branch relationship in Nigeria has been characterized by 
gridlocks over major public policy decisions and struggles in a climate of partisanship 
and distrust, with these major political institutions relating with each other as adversaries, 
not as responsible partners in governing. 
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The confrontational and conflictual experience of the inter-branch relations in Nigeria‟s 
presidential democratic governance over the years seem to be contrary to the popular 
postulation that an underlying principle of competition and rivalry among the branches 
serve as means of limiting and controlling government. However, very little empirical 
research has been undertaken to flesh out and assess the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature in Africa and especially in Nigeria (Ferguson, 2003; 
Burnell, 2004; Wang, 2005). Furthermore, available studies of legislature-executive 
relations in Nigeria have largely focused on the relationship between the two organs at 
the federal level (Awotokun, 1998; Aiyede & Isumonah, 2002; Aiyede, 2005; Dunmoye, 
2005; Mbah, 2007; Lafenwa & Gberevbie, 2007). The nature and implications of this 
relationship at the State level of the federation have largely been neglected. As observed 
by Okoosi-Simbine (2010), there remains a substantial dearth of information on the 
activities and performance of these institutions at the state level in Nigeria.  
 
This study is, therefore, both timely and significant. A detailed analysis of this 
phenomenon will reduce the dearth of knowledge in this area. In addition, the suggestions 
and recommendations proffered in this study will help improve inter-branch relationships 
in Lagos and Ogun States.  Finally, this work will be useful to scholars who may wish to 
carry out further research on the relationship between the executive and the legislature in 
Nigeria. 
 
The choice of Lagos and Ogun States is informed firstly, by the desire to select two states 
operating under the same institutional design but with different internal political 
influences, experiences and constraints. This informed the choice of Lagos and Ogun 
States. The two states have operated under the various presidential constitutions since 
1979 when the institutional framework was first introduced in Nigeria. However, while 
Lagos State experienced a relatively cordial inter-branch relationship during the study 
period (1999 – 2011), Ogun State was riddled with conflictual inter-branch relationship 
during that period. The choice of these two states therefore, provides intellectual platform 
to explore the nature, factors and consequences for both cooperative and conflictual 
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legislature-executive relations which is the focus of this study. Furthermore, the time 
frame of the study falls within the period when each of these two states belonged 
differently to each of the two dominant political parties in igeria - Peoples‟ Democratic 
Party (PDP) and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). While Lagos State was within the 
period controlled majorly by ACN, Ogun State was mostly controlled by PDP 
particularly, between the period 2003 and 2012. The two states were however, under the 
defunct Alliance for Democracy (AD) between 1999 and 2003.  
 
In addition, while the two states consist of a homogenous people of the Yoruba 
extraction, Ogun State is made up of six sub-ethnic groups viz, Egba, Ijebu, Remo, 
Egbado, Awori and Egun. The language of the majority of the people of Ogun State is 
Yoruba but this is, however, broken into distinct linguistic characteristics.  These 
comprise of Egba speaking people in Abeokuta North, Abeokuta South, lfo, Ewekoro, 
Obafemi Owode, Odeda and Ado Odo/Ota LGAs; Egbado speaking people in Yewa 
North, Yewa South, lmeko Afon and lpokia LGAs. Ijebu speaking people in ljebu East, 
ljebu North, ljebu Northeast, ljebu-Ode, Odogbolu and Ogun Waterside LGAs; the Remo 
dialectical group is found in Sagamu, Remo North and Ikenne LGAs. Other dialectical 
groups in the state include Oyo (Owu), Awori, Ikale and llaje. The Egun people are from 
Dahomey (Benin Republic) with their kin across the international boundary to the west 
live. The study of the legislature-executive relations in these two states therefore, 
provides an interesting opportunity for interrogating the dynamics, pattern and 
implications of multi-party structure and socio-political dynamics on the subject matter.  
 
Added to the aforementioned factors is the advantage of distance and accessibility which 
the two states portend for the study.  
 
It is expected that this study be limited in some ways. Firstly, this study of legislature-
executive relations in the presidential model of government is limited to Lagos and Ogun 
states in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011. Secondly, though the historical background to 
legislature-executive relations in the country is relevant to this study in order to bring out 
the stages of the subject matter, the scope is between 1999 and 2011. While, the study of 
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the legislature-executive relations in these two constituent states of Nigeria‟s federation 
offers an interesting opportunity for interrogating the subject matter, a further study 
involving all the three tiers of government across the whole federation should, however, 
be more desired.  
 
1.7. Delimination of the Study 
This study focuses primarily on legislature-executive relations in the presidential system 
of government, specifically Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, between 1999 and 2011. 
Lagos state was created on May 27, 1967 and occupies a total land mass of 3, 577 square 
kilometers part of which consists of 787 square kilometers of lagoons and creeks. 
Administratively, the State is divided into twenty (20) Local Government Councils 
(LGCs) and thirty-seven (37) Local Council Development Areas. These LGCs are Epe, 
Ikorodu, Ibeju-Lekki, Eti-Osa, Ojo, Amuwo-Odofin, Badagry, Alimosho, Ifako-Ijaiye 
and Agege, Lagos Island, Lagos Mainland, Shomolu, Kosofe, Surulere, Apapa, Ikeja 
(administrative headquarters), Oshodi-Isolo, Ajeromi and Mushin. In terms of 
geographical spread, the state ends to Badagry on the West, eastward to Lekki and Epe 
and northward to Ikorodu. Towards the south, the state stretched over 180 kilometres 
along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. The state‟s population according to 2006 
estimation is 9,113,605. 
 
Ogun State, on the other hand, was created in February 3, 1976 out of the former Western 
State. It is bounded in the south by Lagos state and the Atlantic Ocean. Towards the 
eastern frontier of the state is Ondo state while Oyo state borders the state northward. The 
State consists of a homogenous people of the Yoruba extraction, but within the 
population are sub-groups with distinct linguistic characteristics. Notable among these 
are the Egbas, the Ijebus, the Remos and the Yewas formerly known as the Egbados. In 
terms of political administration, the State is made up of twenty (20) Local Government 
Areas, including Abeokuta South; Abeokuta North; Ado-Odo/Ota; Yewa North; Yewa 
South; Ifo; Ijebu East; Ikenne; Obafemi Owode; Odeda; Odogbolu; Ogun Waterside; 
Sagamu; Imeko-Afon; Ipokia; Ijebu; Ewekoro; and Remo North. The state occupies a 
landmass of 16,409.26 squares kilometers. The state has a population of 3,728,098 
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persons by the 2006 census. The study dwells extensively on the dynamics, nature, 
pattern and implications of legislature-executive relations in these two states within the 
period under review.   
 
1.8. Operational Definition of Concepts 
The idea of conceptual clarification stems from the necessity to understand some terms as 
used in this study. Osumah and Ikelegbe (2009) assert that the essence of conceptualization is 
to give operational definitions to some important terms used in the discourse. Conceptual 
clarification helps specify what we mean when we use particular terms for purposes of 
facilitating their contextual operationalization and comprehension (Rubbin & Babbie, 1989).  
This is because this study involves a social investigation, and it is therefore necessary to 
clarify basic concepts to avoid ambiguity in the use of terms. As rightly observed by Chafe 
(1994), the primary requirement for debating anything is to understand first and foremost the 
actual thing being discussed. Thus, clarifying some concepts used in this study helps remove 
ambiguity and cultural contextualisation. In this regard, the following terms are defined: 
 
Assembly: The assembly, as used in this study, means the legislative body of a particular 
state or a country. 
Oversight: Oversight here refers to the legislative function of supervising the activities 
of government. 
Executive: The term executive in the context of this study, is the branch of government 
that has sole authority and responsibility for the daily administration of the state 
bureaucracy. 
Legislature: The term legislature, as used in this study, means a branch of government, a 
deliberative assembly of persons, usually elective, with the power to pass, amend, and 
repeal laws for a state.  
Parliament: The term parliament in this context means a national legislative body. 
Relations: This refers to an existing mode or kind of connection or interactions, a 
significant association between the executive and the legislature. 
Party Discipline: This refers to the control that party leaders have over its legislature in 
getting its members to support the policies of the party.  
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Majority Government: A situation in which the government party controls absolute 
majority in the legislative body. 
Minority Government: A situation in which the government party does not have 
absolute majority in the legislative body. 
 
1.9. Organization of Work 
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter One introduces the study and gives a 
description of the background to the study. It highlights the research problem, the aim 
and objectives of the study, the geographical and time scope of the study and the 
delimitation of the scope to a particular section.  
 
Chapter Two dwells on a review of the literature and the theoretical framework of the 
study. It centres essentially on previous and existing work on the executive and the 
legislature, the executive system, types, powers and functions, and the executive – 
legislative relations in Nigeria and some presidential political system. It identifies the 
inherent gap in the literature and the likely contribution of the present study. 
 
Chapter Three of the study dwells on legislature-executive relations in the presidential 
system of government. It examines the basic institutional characteristics of a presidential 
system of government and their consequences on legislature-executive relations. In 
addition, the chapter deals with case study analysis of executive-legislative relations in 
some presidential political systems with a view to determining the extent to which the 
presidential institutional arrangements have determined the nature of the legislature-
executive relations in those countries.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on Nigerian presidential system of government and examines in 
historical perspective, the legislature-executive relations in Nigeria‟s presidential system. 
It looks at the provisions for the office and power of the executive and the legislature in 
Nigeria under the 1979 and 1999 presidential constitutions of the country.  
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Chapter Five deals with the methodology of the research, the presentation, interpretation 
and analysis of data obtained through primary sources on the dynamics, pattern and 
implications of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States. This chapter 
also includes the detailed discussions of empirical findings of the study.  
 
Chapter Six includes the summary, conclusion and recommendation of the study. The 
area uncovered in this research is identified; suggestions and recommendations were also 
given for further studies.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Series of studies in the area of legislature-executive relations have been undertaken by 
different researchers. This chapter extensively reviews previous related studies, 
observations, opinions, comments, ideas and knowledge that shed light on the key 
concepts under discussion. The essence is to situate this study in proper context and to 
create a bond between related previous studies and this research work and as well to 
identify the gap in knowledge with respect to the study of the subject matter and to 
appropriately intervene by providing the missing link and by updating and contributing to 
the existing body of knowledge in the field. Thematic method is adopted in reviewing 
literature on political institutions, forms, model and operations of government and other 
issues that are germane to the relationship between the executive and the legislature in a 
presidential political system. Attempt is also made to conceptualize this study within a 
theoretical framework relevant to the field of study.  
 
2.2. Political Institutions 
The fundamental expectation of the modern state is effective and efficient governance. 
This role is performed by the government which not only provides security to the people 
but also looks after their basic needs and ensures their political and socio-economic 
development (Gill, 2002). These objectives are achieved by the government through the 
enactment of binding rules, the giving of direction to societal activities and the 
enforcement of the rules to ensure compliance (Bang & Esmark, 2009). From the most 
ancient times to the present, governments have performed these important functions by 
mapping out policies, implementing and enforcing the laws and adjudicating or 
administering justice (Nwabuzor & Mueller, 1985; Akintola, 1999). It is imperative 
therefore, that social acceptance of the power of the government to control the people 
must be voluntary and recognized by the people.  
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Government fulfils its role of effective governance by dividing its powers and functions 
between its institutions with each performing some specific functions (Edosa & Azelama, 
1995). Perhaps it is because of the division of the powers and functions among these 
institutions of governance that government is defined as a set of institutions through 
which the will of the state is realized (Adler, 1996). Thus institutionalist scholars averred 
that powers and functions of government are vested in the legislature, the executive and 
the judicial organs of government which are coordinate or independent (Jones, 2002). 
Constitutional government all over the world recognizes these three basic departments of 
government (Ball, 1977; Nwabuzor & Mueller, 1985; Edosa & Azelama, 1995; Akintola, 
1999; Magill, 2001). Laski (1992) reiterates this position when he averred that since the 
time of Aristotle, it has been generally agreed that political power is divisible into three 
broad categories. These authorities, according to him, include the legislature which 
makes the general rules for the society, the executive which seeks to apply those rules 
laid down by the legislature to particular situations and the judiciary which settles 
disputes between government and its citizens and those between citizens. Kousoulas 
(1975) also lent his credence to the tripartite political administrative division of 
governmental functions. He viewed that all contemporary states, in practice, have three 
branches of government responsible for carrying out the basic functions of government.  
According to him, one set of officials has the primary function of enacting laws, another 
set of officials implement state policies and decisions while the third settles disputes and 
punishes those who contravene the law of the land. The next section reviews extant 
literature on these institutions. 
 
2.3. The Legislature 
The term „legislature‟ has been given different names across nations of the world. It is 
referred to as „Parliament‟ in Britain, „National Assembly‟ (the central legislature) in 
Nigeria, „Congress‟ in United States etc. (Abonyi, 2006; Heywood, 2007; Lafenwa, 
2009). As noted by Lafenwa (2009), however, there is no serious contention about its 
definition. The legislature is seen as occupying a key position in the machinery of 
government (Heywood, 2007) and as the people‟s branch with the singular purpose of 
articulating and expressing the collective will of the people (Bernick & Bernick, 2008; 
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Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). As an organ of government, it is the forum for the representation 
of the electorate (Taiwo & Fajingbesi, 2004). Awotokun (1998) conceptualizes the term 
legislature from a functional perspective. He defines the legislature as the branch of 
government made up of elected representatives or a constitutionally constituted assembly 
(body) of people whose duties among other things are to make laws, control executive 
activities and safeguard the interest of the people. Following this functional definition, 
Anyaegbunam (2000) conceptualizes the legislature as having the role of making, 
revising, amending and repealing laws for the advancement and well being of the 
citizenry that it represents. Similarly, Lafenwa (2009) defines the legislature as an official 
body, usually chosen by election, with the power to make, change, and repeal laws; as 
well as powers to represent the constituent units and control government. Okoosi-
Simbine (2010) also conceptualizes the legislature as the law-making, deliberative and 
policy influencing body working for the furtherance of democratic political system. He 
describes the legislature as the First Estate of the Realm, the realm of representation and 
the site of sovereignty, the only expression of the will of the people. It follows from this 
analysis that the authority of the legislature is derived from the people and should be 
exercise according to the will of the people who they represent. This seems to be the 
position of Bogdanor (1991) when he affirms that the authority of the legislature as a 
political institution is derived from a claim that its members are representative of the 
political community, and decisions are collectively made according to complex 
procedures.  
 
Perhaps, it is in the light of this, that Smith (1980) sees the legislature as the symbol of 
power and legitimacy because its decision is based on the collective wisdom of men and 
women who enjoy the confidence of the electorate. Jewell (1997), on the other hand, 
identifies two features that distinguish the legislature from other branches of government. 
The first feature, according to him, is that the legislature possesses formal authority to 
make laws, and secondly, members are normally elected to represent various elements in 
the population. Thus, Davies (2004) avers that representative liberal democracy cannot 
exist without a healthy, lively and credible legislature. He noted that the establishment of 
the legislature rests on the assumption that in the final analysis, political power still 
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resides in the people and that the people can, if they choose, delegate the exercise of their 
sovereignty to elected representatives.  Loewenberg (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010) 
seem to concede to this important view of the legislature as the people‟s representative by 
viewing the legislature as assemblies of elected representatives from geographically 
defined constituencies, with lawmaking functions in the governmental process of a 
country. The fact that the legislature is an assembly of people elected to represent the 
citizens is perhaps, the reason why Awotokun (1998) notes that the legislature is an 
assembly of ambassadors who serve their constituencies in various ways as 
intermediaries between the citizens and government officials. 
 
The strength and the state of the legislature have been identified as among the strongest 
predictors of a country‟s democratic development and survival (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010; 
Poteete, 2010). As Lafenwa (1991) argues, the legislature is the central element of 
democracy. Democracy cannot exist in any country without a healthy and lively 
legislature (Blondel, 1973; Taiwo & Fajingbesi, 2004). As noted by Edosa and Azelama 
(1995) the nature of the legislature that is adopted determines whether a given political 
system is democratic or not. The centrality of the legislature to democracy is perhaps 
succinctly captured by Awotokun (1998) when he avers that the legislature is the pivot of 
modern democratic systems. 
 
According to Lafenwa (1991), Edosa & Azelama (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010), 
legislatures vary both in their design, structure, pattern of organisation and operational 
procedures, selection process as well as sizes, tenure of office and frequency and nature 
of meetings. The variation, Nwabueze (1982) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010) posit, is 
contingent upon past traditions, theory of government, character of the regime and most 
importantly the nature of the society in question. They observe that modern legislative 
procedures derive from British procedures and thus serves as a model for the 
development of legislature and legislative procedure for many countries around the 
world.  
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Ball (1977) and Edosa & Azelama (1995) traced the emergence of the legislature to the 
need for advisory bodies by the executive. In this perspective, the origins and the 
essential features of the modern legislature are found in the advisory councils which from 
ancient times were established to give advice to a ruler – king, Chief emperor, Oba, Ovie, 
Obi or sultan (Nwabuzor & Mueller, 1985, Edosa & Azelama, 1995). According to this 
theory of the origin of the legislature, for the purpose of effective governance, rulers have 
had to surround themselves with advisers. Edosa and Azelama (1995) bring to the fore, 
the implication of this. According to them, firstly, it means that state power or 
governance was never monopolized but shared to some extent. Secondly, that rulers 
surrounded themselves with team of experts as advisers means that rulers from time past 
were inclined to effective governance which they believed would be beneficial to all. The 
team of advisers could be in the form of a council of elders whose members where 
usually respected individuals of certain military or economic groups or persons with 
expert knowledge of the times, custom and tradition of the community. 
 
The method of constituting these advisory councils and their level of usage, however, 
depended on the character of the ruler, the historical period and the type of society 
involved (Nwabuzor & Mueller, 1985). According to Edosa and Azelama (1995), the 
ruler was usually left with the discretion of determining the mode of selecting members 
of the advisory councils, the content and use of their deliberation. They pointed out that 
the nature of the ruler, the circumstances of the period and the peculiarity of the society 
were the determinants of the relationship between the sovereign and his advisory council. 
They noted further that advisory councils were either permanent bodies or ad hoc bodies 
with members invited by the ruler when needed. In the situation when they are permanent 
however, they became known by the community as co-rulers and policy-makers with the 
king. It later became more possible to clearly define the relationship between the advisory 
council and the ruler, the conditions and qualifications for council membership, the 
tenure, and the working procedure. Edosa and Azelama (1995), in an interjectory manner, 
argued that the evolutionary development of African‟s indigenous legislature was 
distorted by the imposition of colonial rule of African kingdoms. Edosa and Azelama 
seem to hold relevance going by the fact that government in the traditional African 
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societies had their various defined and structured process of enacting rules which were 
seen as representative of the wishes of the people in the particular society. 
 
Two main designs for the legislature are identified in the works of Nwabueze (1982), 
Lafenwa (1991), Edosa and Azelama (1995), Heywood (2007), Anifowose (2008) and 
Okoosi-Simbine (2010). Some legislatures have two chambers popularly referred to as 
bicameral legislatures while some others have single chamber commonly known as 
unicameral legislature. Yugoslavia has, however, experimented with a five-chamber 
legislative assembly and South Africa, a three-chamber legislative assembly between 
1984 and 1994 (Heywood, 2007). 
 
In a bicameral type of arrangement two legislative chambers exist in a country; one 
chamber seems to dominate the other. This situation is noted by Nwabueze and Mueller 
(1985) when they viewed that in a bicameral legislature, there exists some forms of 
dominance of one chamber on the other in respect of some legislation, tenure of office of 
members, size and importance of the constituencies represented. They, however, added 
that intricate rules are usually adopted to harmonize the legislation function of the two 
chambers. Furthermore, Nwabuzor and Mueller (1985) noted that federal political 
structures, such as those found in Nigeria, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, 
Australia and Switzerland, often adopt bicameralism in order to protect the interests of 
the minorities. Some systems, such as Great Britain, the Third Republic in France and the 
former Nigerian House of Chiefs in the 1960s, adopt bicameralism to enable the upper 
house check against hasty legislations. In a similar argument, Edosa and Azelama (1995) 
averred that the bicameral type of legislative structure is more common with federal 
states stemming from the imperative of one house to protect the special interests of 
minority or regional groups in such states. They noted that some federal states such as 
Nigeria, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Germany and Australia have opted for 
bicameralism on this basis. According to them, however, some countries such as Britain, 
second chamber is adopted to play a somewhat conservative role or to serve as a check on 
radical legislation of the lower house. The British House of Lords, according to them, has 
usually been disposed to delaying, moderating or out-rightly preventing fierce 
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legislations of the lower house – the House of Commons. A similar situation is found in 
the defunct post-independence Nigerian House of Chiefs at the regions. France second 
chamber is made up of members who are elderly and are, therefore, expected to be 
conservative and also moderate the activities of the lower chamber (Nwabueze, 1982; 
Lafenwa, 1991; Edosa & Azelama, 1995; Oyediran, 2003; Egwu, 2005).  
 
This double-chamber legislature is found in countries such as Nigeria, France and United 
States. The Congress of the United States comprises the Senate (Upper House) and House 
of Representatives (Lower House). Similarly, the National Assembly of Nigeria is made 
up of the Senate (Upper House) and House of Representatives (Lower House). France 
legislative body also comprises of the Deputies and the Senate.  In the case of Nigeria, 
the country had a unicameral arrangement at the federal level up to the 1954 Lyttleton 
Constitution. It, however, adopted a bicameral structure at independence. This 
arrangement was maintained in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions. Ghana and New Zealand 
also adopted a bicameral legislature after attainment of independence. In France, 
however, bicameral legislature was not adopted until the third republic. France‟s second 
republic constitution provided for a unicameral legislative structure till 1952 when the 
republic was abolished. The Supreme Soviet of the former USSR comprised of the Soviet 
of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The power of this legislative body was 
unrestricted including amending the constitution. China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and 
other communist countries, however, have a different bicameral legislative arrangement 
in that legislature in these countries are closely linked with the state party. The two 
chambers though are supposed to act as checks on the other, such checks are minimal 
because major debates on policy demands is done with the party rather than the 
legislature (Edosa & Azelama, 1995). In countries where bicameralism operates, 
however, the constitutions ensure that one chamber provides the opportunity for equal 
representation of the federating units while the diverse interests are represented in the 
other chamber. In addition, bicameral legislature makes it difficult for the legislature to 
be controlled by a despot or demagogue (Abonyi, 2006). It also provides opportunity for 
wider representation of various interests groups in the country. Furthermore, the 
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arrangement serves as check against hasty passage of law and gives opportunity for 
division of labour between the two houses (Heywood, 2007; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). 
 
The other type of legislative structure is the single chamber legislature popularly referred 
to as unicameral. Edosa & Azelama (1995) and Abonyi (2006) noted that this type of 
legislative structure exists when there is only one legislative body in a country. This 
practice, according to then is less common than the bicameral legislative structure. China 
operates unicameralism. Israel established a single-chamber legislature (the Knesset) in 
1948, the second republic constitution of France had unicameral legislative arrangement 
which lasted between 1848 and 1952. Similarly, Nigeria had a unicameral legislature at 
the federal level up to the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution and changed to unicameralism at 
independence (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2011). New Zealand and Ghana also had 
unicameral legislature before independence. A two-chamber legislature was abolished in 
Denmark in 1954 and Sweden in 1970 (Edosa & Azelama, 199; Heywood, 2007). For 
these countries the choice of a single-chamber legislature was predicated on the fact that 
unicameralism is more streamlined and more effective especially in terms of responding 
to the needs of small and relatively cohesive and homogenous political societies (Abonyi, 
2006). In addition, its structure is simple and less expensive to run and avoids delay in 
law making (Heywood, 2007; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). 
 
Edosa and Azelama (1995) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010), in another dimension, see the 
legislatures as differing considerably in size, composition, operation, role, tenure of 
office and internal rules from one democracy to the other. Nwabuzor and Muller (1985) 
averred that such factors as the role of the presiding officer, the establishment of the order 
of business, legislation process, number and power of legislative committee, degree of 
intra-party discipline expected and manner of terminating debate on questions under 
consideration account for the differences among countries. They noted that while the size 
of the legislature in Iceland, New Zealand and some African countries are relatively 
small, the legislative body of the defunct Soviet Republic – Supreme Soviet, comprised 
of about 1,500 members. With respect to the term of office, the lower house of the 
legislature in Britain, Canada, France, India, Italy, Ireland and South Africa operates a 5-
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year tenure of office while in the United States of America, members of the legislature 
are elected every two years. In Britain, on the contrary, members of the upper house hold 
office for life and may even be succeeded by their heirs. Nwabuzor and Muller (1985), 
however, noted that countries which operate short-term tenure for their legislature do so 
because of the need for the representatives concerned to reflect better the ever-changing 
currents of public preference regarding government policy. They argue that the longer 
term tenure is, however, to ensure the stability of national interests which do not have to 
be bent to constantly changing public opinion.  
 
2.3.1. Functions of the Legislature 
Ball (1977) observed wide variations in status, powers and functions of the legislature 
among states. According to him, in some political systems (e.g. the United States 
Congress), the legislative body assumes wide powers and exercises real power with 
respect to various decision-making processes. In some other political systems (e.g. the 
former Soviet Union), the legislature exists as a mere rubber stamp for decisions made 
elsewhere. Ornstein (1992) in the same vein, classifies the legislature of the defunct 
Soviet Union as a rubber stamp assembly whose main role was to legitimize the policy of 
government. A similar observation is made on Africa‟s legislature by Nijzink, Mozaffar 
& Azevedo (2006). According to them, such variables as colonial legacies, the 
appointment and dismissal powers of governing parties, executive control of state 
resources and role perceptions of legislators has contributed to the institutional and 
policy-making weakness of the legislature. The institutional weakness thus limiting their 
capacity to represent citizens, make laws and perform their oversight role (Nijzink & 
et‟al, 2006).  In line with this argument, Thomas & Sissokho (2005), Burnell (2002), 
Burnell, (2003), Mezey (1983) and Packenham (1983) averred that Africa‟s legislature 
are mere institution for legitimizing government policies, recruiting and socializing new 
elites, and mobilizing public support for political regimes.  
 
While most scholars of Africa‟s legislatures argue in favour of the policy making and 
institutional weakness of Africa‟s legislature, Barkan, Ademolekun, and Zhou (2004), 
however, noted a cross-national variation of this scenario over the continent of Africa. 
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According to their comparative study of four Africa‟s legislatures, they conclude that 
although African legislatures are often labeled as weak, the authority of the legislature in 
Africa ranges from being very weak in Senegal, to moderately strong in Kenya with 
Benin and Ghana falling somewhere in between. Explaining the factors responsible for 
this variation, Barkan, Ademolekun and Zhou (2004) mentioned contextual factor which 
has to do with the structure of the society, constitutional provisions and formal rules and 
the internal structure of the legislature and the resources available to members. In another 
dimension, Okoosi-Simbine (2010) observed that the design of a legislature in a given 
political system is contingent upon past traditions, theory of government, character of the 
regime and, above all, the nature of the society itself. In this context, therefore, 
legislatures vary by manner of election, bases of election, size, frequency and nature of 
meetings and mode of power sharing by the two houses in the case of bicameral 
legislatures.  
 
It is noted at this juncture that the issue of the legislature being a mere rubber stamp 
assembly is not limited to African continent. Political scientists often make the 
generalization that ineffective assemblies - serving as a mere rubber stamp assembly for 
legitimizing the decisions made elsewhere or caves of the winds given more to venting 
than governing - are the most common type of legislature (Ball, 1977; Bernick & 
Wiggins, 1981; Johnson & Nakamura, 1999; Ray, 2004).  
 
Okoosi-Simbine (2010), however, noted a significant and growing group of legislatures 
which function as important governing partners because they represent, shape laws, and 
exercise a degree of oversight or control over the executive. In line with this argument, 
Saliu and Mohammad (2010) averred that functioning legislatures in democratic nations 
have a greater and more predictable role representing publics, in making laws, and 
exercising oversight than those of less democratic societies. Performing these functions 
contributes to good government by increasing its capacity to monitor and respond to 
public sentiments/dissatisfactions, by playing a part in passing legislation capable of 
withstanding critical scrutiny, and serving as a vehicle for improving the degree of 
probity, efficiency, and responsiveness in the administration of laws.  
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There is a considerable variation of functions performed by the legislature identified in 
the literature. These include serving as an electoral-college to put governments into 
power in parliamentary systems (U.K.), or making decisions when election results are 
inconclusive or in dispute in presidential systems (U.S.). Legislatures also use 
apportionment formulae recognizing ethnic, religious, language, gender, economic and 
geographic differences for legislative representation as instruments for national 
integration (India, Ethiopia). Other discrete functions include; educating the electorate 
through public displays of competition; playing roles in executive removal 
(impeachment, votes of no confidence, censure); serving as a recruiting pools for other 
government positions (Brazil‟s congress and more commonly in many parliamentary 
systems); and providing a place where policy ideas might be "incubated" (U.S.) (Johnson 
& Nakamura, 1999).   
 
While the functions performed by the legislature may vary from country to country, as 
posited by Abonyi (2006) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010), some fundamental similarities 
exist among parliament. The following are the major functions of the legislature found in 
literature:  
 
Legislation: Legislation functions are said to be the basic, primary and the most 
important role of the legislature (Edosa & Azelama, 1995; Abonyi, 2006). According to 
Laski (1992), the legislature has the responsibility for passing laws. He averred that the 
legislature is the body which lays down the general rules of a society. The legislature has 
the responsibility of making laws for the good governance of a state. These laws may 
originate as private member‟s bills, or they may originate from the executive branch 
(Abonyi, 2006; Benjamin, 2010). According to Awotokun (1998), laws made by the 
legislature must be in the interest of the general populace with the expectation of 
modifying peoples‟ behaviour and response towards a given situation, be of good quality 
and self-sustaining. This is perhaps the reason why Abonyi (2006) averred that bills are 
expected to be thoroughly examined and passed through various stages, and in the 
process, could be altered through addition or deletion.  Kousoulas (1975), however, 
posited that while legislation is a function of the legislature, the inputs and sometimes, 
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the overbearing attitude of the executive and some other factors such as concessions to 
the opposition and other concerned groups against some aspects of proposed laws had 
greatly reduced the legislative powers of the legislature to a mere deliberative assembly. 
Heywood (2007) also alluded when he stated that the twentieth century witnesses a 
progressive weakening of legislation power in the form of a decline of legislatures. 
Heywood (2007) and Okoosi-Simbine (2010) noted that this situation he noted had 
reduced many legislative assemblies to mere “talking shops” that do little more than 
rubber-stamp decisions that have effectively been made elsewhere. 
 
Oversight: The oversight function is another fundamental function of the legislature and 
as reiterated by Fashagba (2009), it is a major component of the activities of modern 
legislature irrespective of the form of government in practice. According to NDI (2000) 
oversight is perhaps the most important function of any legislature. The importance stems 
from the continuous wielding of enormous powers by executive leaders. Saliu and 
Muhammad (2010) define legislative oversight as a process by which the legislative body 
takes active role in understanding and monitoring the performance of the executive arm 
and its agencies. The legislature has the responsibility of overseeing the work of the 
government and holds it responsible for its actions and omissions (Fashagba, 2009; 
Okoosi-Simbine (2010). Edosa and Azelama (1995) described this function as 
maintaining surveillance over the activities of the executive. Adebayo (1986) sees 
legislative oversight as a check on the executive by scrutinizing and examining the 
activities of the Chief Executive, government department and agencies. According to the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2002), the principle behind the legislative 
oversight of the executive activity is to ensure that public policy is administered in 
accordance with the legislative intent. In view of this principle, the legislative function 
does not end at the passage of bills. Oversight is, therefore, the obvious follow-on activity 
linked to lawmaking (NDI, 2000). After participating in lawmaking, it is the 
responsibility of the legislature to ensure that such laws are being implemented 
effectively. Referring to the oversight functions of the legislature, Woodrow Wilson 
averred that: 
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It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every 
affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be 
the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its 
constituents. Unless Congress has and uses every means of acquainting 
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the 
government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being 
served…The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its 
legislative function (cited in Simmons, 2002).  
 
The Constitution of India (Eighty-eighth Amendment) Act, 2003, states that the 
Executive branch of the State (Council of Ministers) shall be collectively responsible to 
the Legislature (House of the People). This implies that Parliament should oversee the 
work of the government and hold it responsible for its actions and omissions.  The 
oversight function enables the legislature to monitor the policy implementation process in 
order to uncover any defects and act to correct misinterpretation or maladministration. 
The legislative process is, therefore, an instrument for checks and balances (Roberts, 
2002). Thus, the concept of oversight function of the legislature exists as an essential 
corollary to the law-making process. Examples of areas of oversight function of the 
legislature over the executive are in financial behaviour and appointments of key officials 
such as ambassadors, ministers/commissioners and so on. According to Lafenwa and 
Gberevbie (2007), effective legislative oversight enhances the accountability, efficiency 
and fidelity of the government. 
 
Representation: According to Awotokun (1998), representation is the central role of the 
legislature. This, according to him, owes to the fact that the complexity of modern 
administration has made it practically impossible for the people to directly run the affairs 
of the state as was the case of the early Greek City-States. He averred that the legislative 
institution serves a mechanism through which the population, its special interests and 
diverse territory are represented and guaranteed a say in the scheme of things. Edosa and 
Azelama (1995) thus, argued that the representation function of the legislature provides 
citizens the opportunity to have a say in governance. Different groups in a society are 
represented in the legislature which gives those groups the opportunity of articulat ing and 
advancing their interests and concerns. Simmons (2002) thus sees the legislature as 
representing the interests of their constituencies.  
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Edigheji (2006) noted that the idea of representative assembly dates back to the latter 
centuries of Rome, when the Prince was regarded as the representative of the Roman 
people. Legislators, as noted by Roberts (2002), play dual representational roles. First, 
they represent their people to government, and second, they represent government in their 
constituency. As an organ of government, the legislature is the forum for the 
representation of the electorate (Davies, 2004). Political representation, according to 
Saliu and Muhammad (2010), is a central component of democratic governance. It is a 
key institution, machinery and process of a democratic government.  This is because the 
fulcrum of legislative activity is expected to be the articulation and aggregation of diverse 
interests of the represented constituencies into the policy process. The representation 
function of the legislature thus enhances the legitimacy of public policy, reduces 
alienation, reduces estrangement between the government and the governed as well as 
enhances the stability of the system (Edosa & Azelama, 1995). 
 
Financial Function: Another responsibility of the legislature is its financial function. 
The legislature has the responsibility of authorizing the expenditure of the government. 
Sanyal (2009) avers that all government expenditure (except a few items specified in the 
Constitution) need to be sanctioned by the legislature. This is usually done as part of the 
annual budget process. Additional expenditure may also be sanctioned through 
supplementary demand for grants. Lafenwa and Gberevbie (2007) see this function as a  
catalyst for sustainable democratic governance. According to them, the responsibilities of 
the legislature involves among others, the control of public expenditure and taxation. 
They argue that the legislature must be able to manage funds in order to provide the good 
life for the entire citizenry.  
 
Committee function: Committee function is another responsibility of the legislature. 
Fashagba (2010) conceptualizes committees as task oriented bodies, with a clearly 
defined purpose and direction. Heywood (2007) sees committee functions as the hub of 
the legislative process and as the power houses of the legislature. He noted that 
committees examine legislative measures in detail. They examine bills and financial 
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demands of the government. They also examine important issues related to ministries and 
oversee the financial functioning of the government based on audits by the Controller and 
Auditor-General (Edigheji, 2006). They may invite the public for feedbacks (Sanyal, 
2009). Abonyi (2006) also sees the legislative committees‟ functions as carrying out the 
investigative power of the legislature. There are standing committees under which the 
members of the legislature are divided. A committee may however, be utilized for 
exigency purpose, in which case, it is appointed in response to a particular development 
at any given point in time under and ad hoc situation (Fashagba, 2010). 
 
While the fundamental place the legislature occupies in democratic governance may not 
be disputable, its real role of citizens‟ representation through legislation and oversight 
functions in contemporary times has become debatable and controversial. Theoretical 
postulations in inter-branch relations have averred that though the legislature is the 
people‟s branch with the singular purpose of expressing the will of the people, the chief 
executive‟s continuous involvement in the legislative process undermines the legislative 
role of citizens‟ representation (Bernick and Wiggins, 1991; Rosenthal et.al., 2003; 
Edosa & Azelama, 1995; Bernick & Bernick, 2008). They argue that such instruments 
and opportunities as the singular nature of the office of the chief executive, his 
responsibility of managing the machinery of government, inter-state diplomacy, budget 
development, the calling of special sessions, and the veto power has given him (chief 
executive) a competitive advantage over the legislature and hence continues to exert the 
executive dominance (Beyle and Muchmore, 1983; Bernick and Wiggins, 1991; 
Rosenthal et.al., 2003). 
Furthermore, while some scholars see the legislature in some political system as having 
wide powers and exercises real power in respect to various decision-making processes, 
some others see the institution as a mere rubber stamp assembly for legitimizing the 
decisions made elsewhere (Ball, 1977; Adebo, 1988; Burnell, 2003; Heywood, 2007). 
Some, however, noted the abdication of responsibility by Parliament to fulfill some other 
interests (Saliu & Mohammad, 2010; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). According to Burnell 
(2003), legislatures, the world over, appear to be undergoing secular decline, unable to 
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arrest the accumulation of executive power driven by national and global financial, 
economic and political forces. In line with this controversy, Ray (2004) avers that a 
general study of the position and working of the legislature in the present century would 
reveal that, barring few important and striking exceptions, legislatures have declined in 
certain important aspects and particularly in respect of powers in relation to the executive 
power of governments.  Lending his credence to this, Adebo (1988) revealed that the 
legislators in Nigeria‟s Second Republic spent substantial part of their tenure on issues of 
accommodation, comfort and salaries for members and threatened to boycott sittings 
indefinitely if their demand for luxury and grandeur were not met by the government. 
This situation has been the unsightly feature of the legislators in the Fourth Republic 
(Fashaga, 2010). In fact, state government reformers, more sympathetic to the legislature, 
have lamented the presumed decline in legislative branch prowess, attributing present 
legislature-executive imbalances to a combination of legislative abdication and enhanced 
gubernatorial power (Bernick & Wiggins, 1981). 
2.4. The Executive 
The executive, according to Heywood (2007), is the irreducible core of government. 
Similarly, Laski (1992) sees the executive as occupying a very crucial position in the 
administration of a state. According to him, the executive in all democratic systems exists 
to, first and foremost, decide on the final choice of policy to be submitted to the 
legislative assembly for approval; secondly, it is its business to see to it that the public 
services fully adhere to that policy as intended by the legislature; and thirdly, it ensures 
that it delimits and also coordinates the activities of the different departments of state. It 
is on this score that Puke (2007) sees the executive as responsible for providing good and 
responsible governance for the state. Edosa and Azelama (1995) also defined the 
executive as the implementation organ of government. They, noted that from ages, 
making and enforcing binding rules and allocations through the executive have been the 
primary functions of government. They however, argued that while political structures 
have existed for centuries without separate agencies for making laws, state structures 
without executive organ will be hard to come by. This position is also supported by 
Heywood (2007) when he averred that political systems can operate without 
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constitutions, assemblies, judiciaries, and even political parties, but cannot survive 
without an executive arm to formulate government policy and ensure that they are 
implemented. Similarly, Ranney (1975), in looking at the executive, noted that it is the 
arm of government that is basically concerned with the application of the authoritative 
rules and policies of any society. It is the executive which formulates and then 
implements various policies.  
 
Anifowose (2008), however, sees the executive as the arm of government responsible for 
applying the authoritative rules and policies of a society. The executive, he noted, by 
implementing the constitution, statutes, decrees, treaties, i.e., of the land gives effect to 
the will of the state. Furthermore, he noted the executive performs two principal roles 
which include ceremonial role and control of governmental administration. These two 
roles are performed by the executive as the Chief of the State and as Head of Government 
respectively. He concluded that these two roles are performed by two distinct officials in 
a parliamentary system of government and by the same official in a presidential system of 
government. Ikoronye (2005) defines the executive as the organ of government which 
bears the responsibility of putting into effect the laws enacted by the legislature subject, 
however, to the judgment and orders of the judiciary. Abonyi (2006) sees the Executive 
as that arm of government which is the teeth of action to the will of the state by carrying 
out or executing the law of the land as contained in the constitution, statutes, decrees, 
treaties, charters etc.  
 
Garner (1928), however, observed both the broad and collective perspective of the 
executive as he sees the executive organ as embracing the aggregate or totality of all the 
functionaries and agencies which are concerned with the execution of the will of the state 
as that will has been formulated and expressed in terms of law. By this definition, 
therefore, the executive comprehends the entire governmental organization. Thus tax 
collectors, inspectors, commissioners, policemen and perhaps the officers of the army and 
navy are a part of the executive organization. Similarly Appadorai (1975) lends his 
credence to the broad perspective of the executive. He defined the executive as the 
aggregate or totality of all functionaries and agencies, which are concerned with the 
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execution of the will of the state. Similarly, Heywood (2007) analysed the executive in 
this broad perspective. He defines the executive as the branch of government that is 
responsible for the execution or implementation of laws and policies made by the 
legislature. He sees the executive to extend from the head of government to the members 
of the enforcement agencies and includes both the ministers and the civil servants. He 
categorises the executive into political executive and bureaucratic executive. This, 
according to him, highlights the difference between politicians and the civil servants, and 
more broadly, politics and administration. In his final analysis, he posits that more 
commonly, the term executive is now used in a narrower sense to describe the smaller 
body of decision-makers who take overall responsibility for the direction and 
coordination of government policy. Puke (2007) also sees the executive from the broad 
perspective as he defines the executive as the arm of government responsible for 
implementing laws made by the legislature. While Puke (2007) defines the executive 
from the broad perspectives, he however equates the functions of the executive with that 
of the chief executive – the President. This makes the functions of the executive rather 
ambiguous considering the fact that the term “President” may not have the same 
responsibility in all political system. The President of India, for example, may not 
perform the same responsibility as the President of United States of America.  
 
Though the term executive is understood both in broad and narrow senses, in the realm of 
the study of politics, its narrow meaning is applied. It is the executive head and his 
principal colleagues who run the machinery of government formulate national policy and 
see that it is properly implemented (Grant, 1967; Abonyi, 2006). The foregoing analysis 
reveals that the executive initiates policies and programmes, executes them after they are 
passed into law by the assembly, and equally coordinates government policies to ensure 
that policy execution is done within the framework of the original plan and the 
legislature‟s approved policy. It is because of these enormous responsibilities that 
Fasagba (2010) sees the executive as strategically important to the attainment of 
democratic goods. 
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Since the executive implements the laws made by the legislature, it is necessary that it 
should comprise competent and efficient people. As observed by Fabbrini (1995), the 
executive must convey a sense of public purpose, forged through interaction with public 
opinion that counteracts the inertia of well organized minorities and other powerful 
interest groups.  
 
The status, powers and functions of the executive are not everywhere or at all times 
identical. As noted by Appadorai (1975), they vary according to the type of executive and 
according to the prevailing conceptions regarding the sphere of the state. According to 
him, the functions of the executive are greater in those countries having a non-
parliamentary executive than in those having a parliamentary executive.  
 
2.4.1. Functions of the Executive 
According to Edosa and Azelama (1995), the executive organ performs quite extensive 
functions resulting from the growing complexity of the modern political system. These 
functions, they averred, are so broad to the extent that even the legislative and judicial 
functions cannot be completely separated from the formulation and implementation of 
policies which the executive carries out. Abonyi (2006) also lends his credence to this 
view as he posits that there are many parts to executive powers. He noted that these 
powers appear to have increased in most political systems. According to him, The British 
Prime Minister is referred to as “Primus Interpares” which means first among equals. In 
recent years, however, the Prime Minister of Great Britain has grown beyond the status of 
simply functioning as first among equals. Heywood (2007), in the same vein, affirms the 
enhanced and widening role of the executive as a result of the increasing responsibilities 
of the state in both the domestic and international realm. Abonyi (2006) further accounts 
for the factors responsible for the increasing powers of the executive. These include the 
growth of a disciplined party system especially in a parliamentary system, the 
considerable influence of the Chief Executive over the legislature, the executive‟s control 
of his cabinet and his power to determine policy lines of the nation, national emergency 
and terrorism and the single nature of the executive position. Anifowose (2008), 
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however, encapsulates the powers and functions of the executive into three; legislative, 
administrative and judicial functions. 
1. Legislative Functions: The executive performs legislative functions by 
recommending and initiating bills for the consideration of the legislature. In addition, 
through delegated power by the legislature, the executive can issue statutory orders 
and rules necessary to meet changing circumstances. Furthermore, in a parliamentary 
system, the executive performs the political function of summoning, proroguing and 
dissolving the legislatures (Anifowose, 2008). The power of veto is also a legislative 
function of the executive most especially in the presidential system of government 
(Abonyi, 2006). 
2. Administrative Functions: Under this function, the executive coordinates controls 
and administers the affairs of the state as well as directs, supervises and coordinates 
the implementation of law (Abonyi, 2006). In addition, the executive appoints, 
controls, disciplines and removes the higher administrative officers. Such 
appointments, however, have to be confirmed by the legislative body.  Another 
administrative function according to Anifowose (2008) is the control of military 
forces. By this function, the Chief executive is the supreme command of the army and 
has the power to declare war against external aggression and internal insurrection. He 
has the responsibility of declaring a state of emergency in the country. Another 
administrative function is the conduct of foreign affairs. Further to the administrative 
functions of the executive is the determination of foreign policies by the Chief 
Executive. The Chief Executive as well, represents the country in international 
assemblies and conferences and negotiates binding treaties with foreign countries. 
The treaties, however, may need the ratification of the legislature for their validity 
(Abonyi, 2006). 
3. Judicial Functions: The judicial functions of the executive include issuing 
prerogative of mercy on offenders of the state. Such prerogative may include 
reducing a judicial sentence already passed on a person who had committed an 
offence, reprieving a person from the legal consequences of crimes committed or 
delaying execution. The chief executive can also issue a proclamation of amnesty on 
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specific class of persons thus freeing them from the legal consequences of their 
actions (Abonyi, 2006; Anifowose, 2008). 
 
2.4.2. Types of Executive 
Literature revealed different ways in which the executive are classified. For instance, 
Crossman (1972) and Almond & Powel (1975) classified the executive into political 
executive and the permanent executive, parliamentary and presidential. Abonyi (2006) 
and Anifowose (2008) classified the executive as either titular or executives, single or 
collegial executives, parliamentary or non-parliamentary. According to him, a titular 
executive is the type who serves as a symbol of unity and performs ceremonial functions, 
thus relieving the real executive - head of government, of numerous engagements thereby 
enabling him concentrate more on real issues of governance. He, however, has the right 
of information and consultation by the head of government about public issues. This type 
of executive is found in Britain, Australia and India. According to Abonyi (2006), the 
President or Governor-General in many parliamentary systems generally performs 
symbolic and ceremonial functions. In his analysis he noted that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
between 1961 and January 1966 played this role in Nigeria. The real executive, on the 
other hand, is the head of government who is responsible for daily governmental 
administration.  The cabinet headed by the Prime Minister is the real executive in a 
parliamentary system while in a presidential system, is the President who also serves as 
the head of state, thus combining the two functions (Abonyi, 2006; Anifowose, 2008).  
 
In another dimension, the executive has been classified as monocephalous having single 
executive or bicephalous having a dual type of executive. The third type of the executive 
under this classification is referred to as collegial where no single person serves as the 
Chief Executive (Appadorai, 1975; Ball, 1977; Nwabueze, 2004 and Anifowose, 2008). 
In monocephalous type of executive, a single executive - the President, who is both the 
Head of State and the Head of Government, possesses both ceremonial and real executive 
power. All other executives – cabinet ministers are responsible and subordinate to him. 
This is characteristic of a presidential system of government. According to Anifowose 
(2008), the advantage of the single executive is that it secures the unity, singleness of 
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purpose, energy and promptness of decision necessary for the executive. This, he noted, 
is apparent during cases of emergency when there is a high need for unity of control. The 
President of United States of America has been seen as an outstanding example of the 
monocephalous type of executive (Anifowose, 2008).  
 
The executive can also be bicephalous or a dual type of executive in which the Head of 
State is different from the Head of Government, a common feature of a parliamentary 
system of government where the Head of State holds ceremonial headship while real 
executive power is in the Head of Government called the Prime Minister. Alternatively, 
the executive may be collegial. The collegial executive according to Appadorai (1975), 
Ball (1977) and Nwabueze (2004), exists where no single person serves as the Chief 
Executive of the state. Anifowose (2008) also shared a similar view. He described a 
collegial executive as the one in which executive powers are performed by a council or a 
cabinet. The number constituting the cabinet varies from seven to fifteen. He however 
viewed the collegial executive system as safer than the single executive in that it renders 
more difficult, the encroachment on citizens‟ liberty despite that there is a possibility of 
the system impairing unity of control by dividing responsibility of government. Example 
is Switzerland where the number in the cabinet is seven. 
 
Crossman (1972) and Almond & Powel (1975) in a similar dimension viewed the 
executive as generally consisting of two types of officials: (a) the political executive: i.e. 
President, Prime Minister, Cabinet or Council of Ministers; and (b) the permanent 
executive or the bureaucracy which remains in office for a fixed period of tenure 
regardless of which government  comes to power. The political executive is elected 
directly by the people as in the United States of America where the Presidential type of 
government prevails (Crossman, 1972). The President may be elected indirectly by the 
legislature, as in the case of India. In China, the President is elected by the National 
People‟s Congress and is the head of state and the highest ceremonial functionary of the 
state. 
 
42 
 
Crossman (1972) and Almond & Powel (1975) further classified the political executive 
into three categories. First, it is democratic when its members are chosen by the people 
and remain accountable to their constituencies. For instance, the British cabinet may be 
removed from office by an adverse vote in the House of Commons. The American 
President can also be removed from office, not through a vote of no-confidence but by 
the process of impeachment. The second classification involves the totalitarian state 
where the real executive cannot be removed by the people or their chosen representatives. 
In Crossman‟s view (1972), people in such state have no freedom to criticize or censure 
the conduct of the government. The third category involves the colonial executive in 
which the executive acts under the authority of the colonial government.  
 
Another classification of the executive is the monarch and the republican. According to 
Anifowose (2008), the monarchical type of executive is the one whose position as the 
head of state is hereditary and wields legislative, executive and judicial powers. He 
concluded this analysis by noting that, most states have, however, replaced the absolute 
monarch with a constitutional monarch who performs symbolic and ceremonial functions 
with government formally conducted in the monarch‟s name while real executive is 
vested in the Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister.  
 
In another dimension, however, Crossman (1972), Abonyi (2006) and Anifowose (2008) 
classified the democratic model of governance into two categories – parliamentary and 
presidential. According to Crossman (1972), in the parliamentary form of government, 
the government is run by a cabinet under the leadership of the Prime Minister. The 
cabinet is collectively responsible to the legislature, as in India and the United Kingdom. 
The Head of States is a nominal executive in whose name governance is done by the 
cabinet. Accordingly, Anifowose (2008) noted that in parliamentary system, the 
executive is chosen from among members of the Parliament and holding office as long as 
it commands the majority in that parliament. For example, the President of India and the 
Queen of the United Kingdom are nominal heads of state.  
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It is in the light of this that Rasch (2011) sees a parliamentary system as a system of 
government in which the members of a legislative body determine the formation of the 
cabinet (the executive) and in which any majority of the legislature at almost any time 
may vote the cabinet out of office. Thus, Strom (1990) noted that in any parliamentary 
system, legislative majorities have instruments at their disposal (such as no-confidence 
votes and investiture votes) they may use to control the composition of the government 
and government policy. He argues that in the parliamentary system, majority 
governments are not always formed. This view is supported by Rasch (2004) when he 
stated that nearly one-third of all governments in Western Europe since World War II 
have lacked majority support in their respective national assembly. In a parliamentary 
democracy, the cabinet is supported, or at least tolerated, by the legislature. 
 
Similarly, Katigbak (2006) averred that parliamentary system is distinguished by the 
executive branch of government being dependent on the direct or indirect support of the 
parliament often expressed through a vote of confidence. The authority is vested in a 
parliament and there is no clear cut in separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches, leading to a lack of the checks and balances found in a presidential 
republic. In a parliamentary system, people vote the members of the parliament and from 
the members of the parliament they will vote for their prime minister and the vote of no 
confidence can be done by the members of the parliament if they thought that the prime 
minister is not capable enough to lead.  
 
Scholars have found the parliamentary system advantageous. In the view of Katigbak 
(2006), the fact that the executive branch is dependent upon the direct or indirect support 
of the legislative branch and often includes members of the legislative makes it easier and 
quicker to pass legislation within a parliamentary system. Besides this advantage of a 
parliamentary system, Katigbak (2006) averred that parliamentary systems are associated 
with lower corruptions and that Political parties in parliamentary system have had much 
tighter ideology than in presidential system. He, however, noted that the major criticism 
of many parliamentary systems is that the head of the government cannot be directly 
voted by the people. 
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The second variety of democratic model, namely the presidential form of government, 
exists in the U. S. In fact, as noted by Riggs (1997) the presidential form of government 
evolved first in the United States of America. In the United States, the basis of executive-
legislature relationship is separation of powers. The President is the real executive. He is 
neither a member of the legislature nor removable by it except by impeachment on the 
ground of “bribery, treason, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” (Smith, 2010). 
Osaghae (2002) enunciated the major characteristics of presidential system to include:  
a. An elected president (and vice president) who headed the executive, and had wide – 
ranging powers  and has fixed tenure in office; and 
b. A separation of powers between executive, legislature and judiciary, and a delicate 
system of checks and balances. 
 
Samuels and Eaton (2002), however, enunciated three important features that characterize 
a presidential system of government. First is the separate origin and survival of executive 
and legislative branches. Shugart and Carey (1992) averred that separation of origin is 
defined by the process of executive selection in which selection of the chief executive 
follows from a process of counting votes separately from the allocation of legislative 
seats while separation of survival is defined by the principle that ends governments. Thus 
in a presidential system of government, the terms of both the legislature and the executive 
are fixed and are not contingent on mutual confidence (Lijphart, 1999). The second 
feature of a presidential system, according to Samuels and Eaton (2002), is a 
constitutionally guaranteed executive authority to execute the laws which implies that 
one branch (legislature) makes the laws, the other (executive) implements them. This 
follows the Montesquieu‟s principle of separation of power. The third feature is the Chief 
executive‟s control over the cabinet. This feature stems from the power of the President 
to select his ministers without restriction. The ministers are responsible to him and not to 
the legislature, thus he has power over the cabinet (Idahosa & Ekpekurede, 1995).  
 
In line with this argument, Shugart (2006) distinguishes between presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. According to him, the independence of the legislative and executive 
powers is the specific quality of the presidential government, just as the fusion and 
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combination is the precise principle of Cabinet Government. Shugart (2006) thus defines 
parliamentary democracy by two features. According to him, the first defining feature is 
that the executive authority, consisting of a prime minister and cabinet, arises out of the 
legislative assembly. Secondly, the executive is at all times subject to potential dismissal 
via a vote of “no confidence” by a majority of the legislative assembly. These two criteria 
express the hierarchical relationship of executive to legislative authority. Shugart (2006), 
in the same vein, defines a Presidential democracy by three features. These are, firstly, 
the executive is headed by a popularly elected president who serves as the “chief 
executive”. Secondly, the terms of the chief executive and the legislative assembly are 
fixed, and not subject to mutual confidence; and thirdly, the president names and directs 
the cabinet and has some constitutionally granted law-making authority. 
 
In between these two models of executive, scholars have argued for the possibility of 
having a system in which a popularly elected president as well as a prime minister is 
responsible to the parliament. This type of executive is referred to as "semi-presidential 
government" (Duverger, 1980) or “quasi-presidentialism” or “quasi-parliamentarism 
(Crossman, 1972).  Crossman (1972), in his analysis of the French model of executive 
which he referred to as quasi-parliamentary or quasi-presidential, noted that the President 
is the real executive and the Prime Minister and the cabinet are under his control. At the 
same time however, they are accountable to the Parliament. So, the French model 
imbibes some features of both parliamentary and presidential forms of governments. The 
basic characteristical features of this form of executive are succinctly outlined by 
Duverger (1980).  According to him, a semi-presidential system is characterized by three 
elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister 
and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only 
if the parliament does not show its opposition to them. Duverger (1980) examines France 
after 1958, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, and the Weimar Republic from 
1919 to 1933 and concluded that the constitutional arrangements of their political systems 
are characteristic of this type of executive. 
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In his evaluation of what constitutes good governance, Fabbrini (1995) concluded that 
none of the presidentialism, the quasi/semi-presidentialism or the parliamentarianism 
offer satisfactory institutional approximations that authenticate good government. 
Scholars, however, view the chief executive as having numerous opportunities of being 
involved in the legislative process and hence a competitive advantage over the 
legislature. Such instruments and opportunities include the singular nature of the office of 
the chief executive and his responsibility of managing the machinery of government, 
budget development, the calling of special sessions, and the veto power (Beyle and 
Muchmore, 1983; Bernick and Wiggins, 1991; Rosenthal et.al., 2003).  
 
In their examination of the powers of the president in relations to that of the Congress of 
the United State, Moe & Howell (1999) and Howell (2005) sketched a theory of 
presidential unilateralism that explores the conditions in which a president is likely to use 
unilateral power. Samuels and Eaton (2002) defined unilateral power of executive as the 
relative imbalance between the executive and the legislature in terms of the allocation of 
unilateral veto, budget, decree, agenda and other formal powers. According to them the 
executive unilateral power has greater impact in the presidential system of government 
than in the parliamentary system because of independent origin and survival of the 
executive from the legislature. This theory according to Kelley and Marshall (2009), 
suggests that the design of the executive branch produces inherent advantages and 
opportunities in the exercise and cementing of power relative to the other branches. 
According to them, some of this advantages and opportunities include the unified 
structure of executive power which provides the president with greater ability to exploit 
constitutional ambiguity relative to other branches of government. Moreover, the 
incentives for the accumulation of executive power are ultimately stronger than partisan 
incentives for cooperation, and so presidents are encouraged to exercise unilateral direct 
actions to achieve their goals. As long as the president does not step on the collective toes 
of Congress, the opportunities for the accumulation of power are substantial (Kelley & 
Marshall, 2009). This executive activity in the legislature, many political scientists 
believe, has culminated in the executive branch being too strong (Rosenthal et.al., 2003). 
The emergence of executive dominance, therefore, constitutes a concern to scholars of 
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political philosophy (Bernick and Wiggins, 1991; Rosenthal et.al., 2003; Bernick & 
Bernick, 2008). 
Theorists of absolutism had in the earlier medieval period emphasized the performance of 
the legislative and executive powers by a single authoritative body. They have averred 
that a single, omnipotent source of law and power was necessary together with a fixed 
unchanging pattern of divinely inspired custom which man could apply but could not 
change (Ikoronye, 2005). Thus Laski (1992) argued for the possibility of conceiving all 
the three functions as being performed by a single body or even in the name of a single 
person. Political philosophers, particularly defenders of liberty, have however argued for 
a separation of these governmental powers and functions since vesting all governmental 
powers in a single body almost always leads to tyranny (Ejere, 2004; Campbell, 2004).  
 
According to Robinson (1903) and Bryce & Bryce (1921), an analysis of government into 
three main divisions was first made by Aristotle in his study of Athens and other Greek 
city states.  Aristotle postulated three main governmental agencies: the general assembly, 
deliberating upon public affairs; the public officials, and the judiciary. In Aristotle's 
analysis the functions of these agencies were not sharply distinguished, but varied and 
overlapped. The assembly deliberated about laws, exercised control over the 
administration, and gave judgments in important cases. That body was at once a 
parliament and a government, an executive, legislature and judiciary in one; executive 
power was comminuted and distributed among a large number of boards, each consisting 
of many persons and restricted to a few special functions. There was no proper judicial 
establishment. The archons in Athens had both administrative and judicial powers 
(Robinson, 1903; Bryce & Bryce, 1921; Fairlie, 1923). 
 
In medieval European constitution making, the idea of division of powers came to be a 
counter force against the divine sovereign powers claimed by monarchs (Sabine and 
Thorson, 1973).  Thus, early in modern European history, Bodin, a French scholar, 
argued that the separation of powers was necessary to avoid arbitrary rule. Montesquieu, 
who famously articulated the theory of separation of powers, argued that when legislative 
power and executive power are united in a single person or body of magistrate, there is 
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no liberty, because it is likely that the same government that makes tyrannical laws will 
execute them tyrannically (Ejere, 2004). In 1748, Montesquieu published The Spirit of 
the Laws (Esprit de Lois) in which he reformulated this ancient idea in political theory. In 
book XI of Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu ascribed the liberty enjoyed in England to the 
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, and to the balancing of these 
powers against each other (Sabine and Thorson, 1973). Noting the dangers of absolute 
power, Dalberg-Acton (1949) in a letter he wrote to scholar and ecclesiastic Mandell 
Creighton, asserts that all power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. 
Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not 
authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or certainty of corruption by full 
authority. 
  
Madison (1992), lending his credence to the idea of the separation of powers of the 
organs of government, posited that vesting all the powers of the legislature, executive and 
judiciary in the same persons or body breeds tyranny. According to him, the 
accumulation of all powers in the same hands may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny. Laski (1992) also argued in favour of the Madison‟s idea of 
separation of powers when he stated that some distinction between the three powers is 
essential to the maintenance of freedom. He argued further that power that is not in some 
fashion divided is bound to be absolute and power by its very nature is dangerous to those 
who exercise it and therefore needs to be limited before it can be exercised safely.  In the 
same vein, Persson, Roland, & Tabellini and (1997) Persson & Tabellini (2000) argue in 
support of the theory of separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. 
They affirm that such practice leads to policies that promote general welfare rather than 
private benefits to individuals or groups in country. 
 
The theory of separation of powers, as propounded by Baron Montesquieu, has been 
identified as one of the basic concepts and the cornerstone principle of modern 
democracy in the last three centuries (Sabine and Thorson, 1973; Madison, 1992; 
Fabbrini, 1995). The genius of Montesquieu lay in reformulating an idea connoting a 
political balancing of economic and social interests into a system of legal checks and 
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balances between parts of a constitution. Montesquieu conceptualizes a system of 
government in which each traditional arm of government (i.e.  executive, legislative and 
judiciary) maintains clear and distinguished functions of its own as allotted to it by the 
constitution, with checks and balances from the other two arms. In this way, the doctrine 
of separation of powers is understood as a way of controlling the exercise of state power 
by fragmenting it among three different institutions and guaranteeing that fragmentation 
(Magill, 2001). According to Montesquieu, when the legislative and executive powers are 
united in the same persons or body, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may 
arise lest the monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to enforce them in a 
tyrannical manner (Colher, Miller & Stone, 1989). 
 
American federalist later adopted the proposition of Montesquieu as the organizing 
framework of the American constitution (Ibeanu 2002). Madison (1992), defending the 
newly proposed constitution in 1788,   noted an underlying principle of competition and 
rivalry among the branches, as means of limiting and controlling government. He also 
reflected on the checks and balances system and the need for auxiliary precautions to 
sustain it. The constant aim is to divide and arrange the branches of government in such a 
way that each may be a check on the tyranny and conflict between the arms of 
government and this has been a major principle of liberal democratic constitution making 
for many years.  In her study, Magill (2001) affirmed that the conventional separation of 
powers analysis relies on two mechanisms to achieve and maintain the dispersal of state 
power. The first is to separate legislative, executive, and judicial power in three different 
branches while the second mechanism is to preserve a balance among those branches. It 
can be inferred therefore that the concern of these mechanisms is about the proper 
allocation of functions and balance among the branches. 
 
The imperative of checks and balances was noted in the introduction to the 1979 Draft 
Constitution of Nigeria prepared by the “49 wise men.” It asserts that: 
The legislative process would be incomplete if all that legislature have to 
do were to examine bills placed before them without going any further, we 
think that is too narrow a view of legislative functions. Legislators must 
inform themselves of how existing laws are administered and what defects 
show up in the administration of the laws (cited in Oyediran, 2007). 
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Modern political science has, however, generally discarded the theory of separation of 
powers. Scholars have viewed that such a complete separation of power as enunciated by 
Montesquieu is difficult in the present day government of nations (Ejere, 2004). They 
have denied the desirability of the separation of powers, as they conceive it, and dispute 
the value and even the reality of the theoretical division of governmental functions upon 
which it rests. Some however see it as incapable of accurate statement, and seems 
impossible to apply with beneficial results in the formation of any concrete political 
organization (Goodnow, 2003). Laski (1919) for instance, conceived the separation of 
governmental powers as delusive and a mere paper merit for the simple reason that in 
practice, it is largely unworkable because the business of government does not admit any 
exact division into categories. Laski (1992) further argued that in the modern democratic 
state the distinction between the three organs of government cannot be consistently 
maintained. He argued that the legislatures often perform executive acts and judicial 
duties. In the same manner, the executive in the modern time performs acts that are 
difficult to distinguish from legislation on one hand and judicial functions on the other. 
Drawing instances from the United States experience, Laski (1992) noted that the Senate 
of the United States confirms the nominations of the President. He therefore concluded 
that little is gained by the formal attempt at distinguishing between the different types of 
functions of government.  
 
Goodnow (2003) also commenting on the Constitution of the United State of America, 
averred that the theory of three separated powers has proven to be an unworkable legal 
principle and an inapplicable rule of law because there is a common borderland between 
them, and that it is really existent in an attenuated form. As Neustadt (1960) famously 
asserted, rather than creating a government of “separated powers,” the United State 
Constitution established “a government of separated institutions sharing powers.” 
Bowman, Woods and Stark (2010) stressed this position more vividly when he noted that 
though the United State Constitution erects fairly distinct boundaries to differentiate 
among the governmental branches, each of them connects with the others at various 
points, creating a constitutional Venn diagram. Indeed, the system of checks and balances 
established by the Constitution produces interdependent entities. From the beginning, 
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these separated but inextricably connected authoritative institutions have sought to assert 
their dominance and expand their portion of those shared powers. They have developed 
distinctive identities and routinized behaviors; they are seemingly permanent and 
predictable. In other words, they have engaged in a process of institutionalization. 
 
In a similar vein, Green (1920) perceived the distinction of governmental functions as 
largely a matter of convention and convenience, and that the same kind of power may be 
exercised by a legislature and called legislative, by an administrator and called executive, 
or by a court and called judicial. 
 
Many recent writers have, however, remarked a growing tendency, if not a compelling 
need, to vest in administrators a large discretion and authority to make rules. This 
amounts, in a sense, to a delegation of real, though limited, legislative power. For 
instance, Nwabuzor and Mueller (1985) while examining the legislative political 
institution noted that the total process of governing requires that some of the other 
institutions, including both the executive and the bureaucracy, share in the legislative 
functions. For the purpose of symbolic coherence and implementation, and hence 
effective governance, Fabbrini (1995) affirmed the importance of the executive‟s 
majority support in the legislature and the ability of the executive to counter the 
conservative tendencies and interest base of the legislature when innovation and the 
addressing of new social demands are required. This assertion insinuates a tendency of 
mutual interdependence, interrelationship and interaction between the executive organ 
and the legislature for the purpose of effective governance. The next section therefore 
examines the relationship between the executive and the legislature. 
 
2.5. Legislature-Executive Relations 
Aiyede and Isumonah (2002) explicated the imperative of interaction between the 
executive and the legislature when they posited that democratic consolidation can only 
occur in a context in which political institutions, especially the executive and legislature, 
are functional and interact in a way that reinforces confidence in the government and the 
process through which the offices of these government institutions are filled. In a similar 
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dimension, Kopecky (2004) sees the relationship between the legislature and the 
executive as one of the key defining characteristics of the functioning of any political 
system. He noted the vital place that structural and legal factors hold in shaping the 
relationships between these two political institutions. This position is emphasized by 
Lijphart (2004) when he argued that the constitutional prerogatives vested in legislatures 
and the executive are most important because they define the broad framework for 
interactions between the two powers. Similarly, Posner and Young (2007) averred that 
institutionalized rules are increasingly becoming relevant in regulating the behaviours of 
political actors, especially in Africa. This new development, to Fashagba (2010), is 
heartwarming because it aligns with the postulation that democracy entails an 
institutionalized arrangement for arriving at political decisions.  
 
While the institutional view of executive-legislature may hold strong as a factor that 
shapes the relationship between the executive and the legislature, numerous informal 
rules and conventions, such as the customs concerning nomination of members to the 
cabinet following an election, are very important as well. Perhaps this is exemplified by 
Bernick and Bernick (2008) when they affirmed that such relationships are largely shaped 
by the attitudes and beliefs of the participants. They contend that these relationships are 
complex, depending on a range of formal and informal practices. Of course while formal 
texts of constitutional charters and law are very instrumental to the relationships that exist 
between the executive and the legislature, however, such relationship hinges on the 
informal conditions and practices that permit these norms to be implemented in practice.  
 
Constructive relationships between the executive and the legislative arms of government 
are essential to the effective maintenance of the constitution and the rule of law (Holme, 
2007). In recent years, however, the character of these relationships has changed 
significantly, both because of changes in governance and because of wider societal 
changes. Scholars have been expressing a wide variety of viewpoints on legislature-
executive relations, about conflict and cooperation, whether one or the other dominates, 
and whether benefits or liabilities result from either. While some see conflict between the 
executive and legislature as a necessary and beneficial precondition to limiting and 
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controlling government (Aiyede, 2005), others view it as contributing to gridlock over 
major public policy decisions, thus making government ineffective (Mbah, 2007; Dulani 
& Donge, 2006). 
 
2.5.1. Modes of Legislature-Executive Relations 
Scholars are very keen to examine the modes of relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. This relationship, according to Lijphart (1999), is 
inherently a power relationship and, more accurately, a power struggle. In this regards, 
Bernick and Bernick (2008), while considering the model of a balance of power between 
the executive and the legislature, summarized the relationship between the two branches 
into three configurations: the governor is dominant, the legislature is dominant and the 
two are competitively structured. Bernick and Bernick (2008), however, noted that the 
more frequent circumstance is the last, in which the governors and legislatures have a 
delicate balance and changes in either branch can shift the relationship into one of the 
other two categories. The analysis of Penning (2003) is similar in this dimension. He 
views that the modes of interactions between the legislature and the executive depend on 
the power divisions within and between the legislative assembly and the executive. In this 
regard, Penning (2003) identified three mode of legislature-executive relations: the 
government dominates parliament, the parliament dominates government, and the 
parliament and government are balanced. Furthermore, he identified three basic variables 
that constitute these relationships: 
i. The role of the vote of investiture. He argues that the constitutional requirement of 
this imposes a barrier on the executive when there is no majority in the legislative 
assembly.  
ii. The vote of confidence. This procedure can be used by both parliaments and 
governments in order to achieve their goals. 
iii. The role of the Head of State. This in particular relates to the formal powers in 
relation to the legislature and the executive.  
 
54 
 
King‟s (1976) typology of the mode of legislature-executive relations, however, finds 
prominence among scholars of the inter-branch relationship. With regard to legislature-
executive relations, King‟s model has been seen as the most authoritative typology 
(Andeweg, 1992; Muller, 1993; Saalfeld, 1990; Andeweg & Thomassen, 2003; Boyko & 
Herron, 2009). King (1976) identified five quite separate and distinct patterns of political 
relationship that are generally subsumed under the phenomena of executive-legislative 
relations. These are: the non-party, intra-party, inter-party, opposition, and cross-party 
modes. The nonparty or private member mode according to King (1976) is an interactive 
mode in which the executive and the legislature interact with each other as members of 
two distinct institutions. The intra-party mode addresses how government ministers 
compete and collaborate with backbenchers from their own parties, while the inter-party 
mode explains the relationship between government and different parties, i.e., this mode 
addresses how parties form and manage coalitions. The opposition mode, on the other, 
hand indicates the relations between the government and the opposition. As noted by 
Boyko and Herron (2009), this mode of relationship addresses how conflicts between 
governing and non-governing parties are managed. The cross-party relationship, on the 
other hand, addresses how the government, backbenchers from governing parties, and the 
political opposition can unify on specific policy matters.  
 
Using the King (1976) typology of modes of executive-legislative relations to examine 
the relationship between the Dutch parliament and government, Andeweg (1992) 
modified this classification into four patterns, namely, the non-party mode, intra-party 
mode, inter-party mode and cross-party mode. Andeweg (op cit) thus subsumed the 
opposition mode postulated by King as a variety of the inter-party mode. Andeweg 
(1992) further classified the inter-branch relationship into monism and dualism. The 
monistic interaction, according to him, describes osmosis – a diffusion of powers and 
functions between the executive and the legislature; on the other hand, the dualistic 
relationship refers to a separation of power between the two institutions. 
 
In considering the modes of legislature-executive relations, Anyaegbunam (2010) 
observed that legislature in most democracies, particularly Nigeria is often perceived by 
55 
 
the executive as overstepping her constitutional boundaries in the performance of her 
over oversight duties. This, the executive often sees as hindering the government from 
speedily meeting the needs of the public. Anyaegbunam (2010) noted further the 
legislature on the other hand, being the constitutionally ordained watchdog of the people, 
views the frustration of her investigative role, as a direct affront to the people‟s mandate. 
Thus, the legislature sees the executive‟s uncooperative attitude as a denial of the 
citizenry‟s right to be acquainted with the executives‟ activities. This cycle of mutual 
suspicion usually degenerates into a frosty relationship between both arms of 
government. According to Anyaegbunam (2010), this experience in most countries has 
established three patterns of relationship. The first pattern of legislature-executive 
relations according to him is the polarized relationship which is a kind of worrisome 
antagonistic relationship between the executive and the legislature. The second nature of 
legislature-executive relations is the cordial relationship. In this type, According to 
Anyaegbunam (2010), executive-legislature disagreements over policies are resolved 
through healthy and mutual understanding. Thus mostly occur when legislative 
assemblies lost their constitutional oversight role to the overwhelming influence of the 
executive, thereby hampering the necessary checks and balances which should aid the 
social, economic and political well-being of the masses. The third pattern of executive-
legislature relations is the mild hostility. This is a kind of mild and inconsistent hostility 
short of outright antagonism between the executive and the legislature. 
 
For Oyediran (1980) however, there are three types of legislature-executive relations. The 
first according to him is the rubber stamp assembly. The second type is that of hostile 
relationship between the executive and the legislature. Mbah (2007) noted however, that 
the hostile kind of legislature-executive relations is not peculiar to states where one party 
controls the executive office and another party controls the legislature. The third type of 
legislature-executive relationship, according to Oyediran (1980), is the cooperative 
relationship. He however noted that cooperative relationship can either be based on 
genuine respect, or due to ignorance.  
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In another development, however, many scholars of legislature-executive relations view 
the legislature as the first branch of government that, nevertheless, suffers a disadvantage 
in power to the more visible executive (Cheibub & Limongi, 2010). This they view owe 
to the fact that the executive, apart from having the responsibility of managing the state‟s 
administrative machinery, has an integral role to play in the legislative process. In 
addition, the chief executive, by the singular nature of his office, has a competitive edge 
in shaping the public perception of the other branches and, more importantly, public 
policy (Rosenthal et.al., 2003; Bernick & Bernick, 2008). The increased executive power, 
Bernick and Bernick (2008) argue, does not necessarily constitute or translate into an 
imbalance of power between the two institutions. In order to determine the interaction 
between the governor and the legislature, Bernick & Bernick (2008) suggest an 
evaluation of the success of the executive‟s legislative agenda, the frequency of vetoes 
(and overrides), budget approval, or gubernatorial appointments. 
 
Scholars of comparative institutions often debate which system of government is better in 
terms of legislature-executive relations and democratic stability under different 
circumstances (Cheibub, 2002).  They argue that the relationship among a country‟s 
governing institutions, especially the executive and the legislature differ depending on the 
type of political system such a country operates, whether a presidential, parliamentary or 
hybrid (Lipset, 1992; Riggs, 1997; Liijphart, 1999; Cheibub & Limongi, 2010). In 
studying the legislature-executive relations in Italy, Bardi (2007) attempted a 
generalization of the legislative power in presidential systems. According to him, the 
legislature, in a presidential system, tends to have more power and less executive control, 
while those in parliamentary systems generally exhibit less legislative power but more 
executive control. This assertion is also upheld by Lipset (1992), who also contended that 
the parliamentary system has long been identified to result in weaker parliaments and 
stronger executives than their presidential counterparts. Schlesinger (2004) argued that 
this seeming anomaly results from a number of factors among which is the fact that since 
executive power is drawn from legislatures in parliamentary systems, strong party 
discipline is necessary to ensure the survival of governments.  Furthermore, according to 
Hankla (2002), whereas party defection in a presidential system might prevent a piece of 
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legislation from becoming law, the repercussions of defections in parliamentary systems 
are potentially much more serious. He argued that if executives in parliamentary systems 
are unable to retain their majorities, they may collapse.  As a result, individual legislators 
are under significant pressure to vote with their party leaders, who are usually the very 
individuals selected to constitute the executive. As noted by Liijphart (1999), while 
parliamentary system gives the legislature the final right to dismiss the government, this 
power is a blunt instrument that cannot be employed as a threat to influence individual 
pieces of legislation. Kreppel (2009), while supporting this position, argued that whereas 
this generalization holds true, there could be exceptional cases. According to him, Italy is 
a typical example of such a deviating country.   
 
It is however observed that, while there are variations of the mode of legislature-
executive relations among countries within each of these political typologies, some 
conclusions have been drawn about the characteristics of each of these systems and their 
relationship to political conflict and executive and legislative power. These 
generalisations are however, useful for helping to determine the characteristics of 
political systems and the nature of their legislature-executive relations. In the light of this, 
Cheibub and Limongi (2010) contend that the study of legislature-executive relations can 
be situated within the various forms of government. Similarly, National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), (2000) avers that the type of governmental system under which a country 
operates fundamentally influences the structure and tenor of legislature-executive 
relations. Odubajo (2011) also lends his credence to this position when he asserts that the 
nature of relationship between the various arms of government is typically determined by 
the system of government in operation. 
 
Following this argument, Riggs (1997) argues that the basic design of any constitutional 
system of governance, whether such constitution is based on the separation of powers, 
i.e., presidentialism or it is based on the fusion of powers, i.e., parliamentarialism 
profoundly affects the operations of other institutional variables. It is on this note that 
Cheibub and Limongi (2010) observe that literature on legislature-executive relations had 
evolved into two separate and independent bodies of work with each branch focusing on 
58 
 
parliamentary and other on presidential systems. They therefore contend that the study of 
legislature-executive relations can be situated within the various forms of government. 
These two forms of government according to them represent two completely independent 
and alternative ways of organizing the political world. It is however noted that Cheibub 
and Limongi (2010) argument of bipolar division of system of government into 
presidential and parliamentary may not be very accurate. Sometimes, a hybrid, emanating 
from a combination of both forms of government is often adopted by some countries. 
Perhaps this gap in literature is rectified by Hankler (2002) who avers that the two most 
important ways of organizing legislature-executive relations in modern democracies are 
presidential and parliamentary systems.  He however noted that a number of hybrid 
systems exist, such as in France and Switzerland, though most democratic states can be 
put into one or the other of these two categories.  
 
The argument of these scholars however, is that the type of governmental system under 
which a country operates fundamentally influences the structure, the nature and the tone 
of legislature-executive relations. This is because each form of political structure is 
characterized by vastly different principles that give incentive to and, consequently 
behaviour of political actors that determine the nature of the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative powers. Furthermore, it is their contention that each system 
assigns certain fundamental privileges and responsibilities to the legislature and 
executive, respectively, while additional factors encourage cooperation or reward 
confrontation between the branches. In the same vain, each system contains ambiguities 
that enable an assertive legislature or ambiguitious executive leaders to expand their 
influence (NDI, 2000). As averred by Shugart and Carey (1992), the differences in the 
formal (legal-constitutional) characteristics of presidentialism and parliamentary regimes 
are fundamental to the political consequences of country and should be considered 
theoretically prior to the introduction of other variables. Scholars in comparative 
institutions therefore aver that institutional characteristics that distinguish these two 
systems and the consequences those characteristics portend for legislature-executive 
relations (Verney, 1992; Linz, 1994; Cheibub, 2002; Schlesinger, 1992; Lipset, 1992; 
Lijphart, 1999).  
59 
 
Lijphart (1999) examines the basic distinguishing institutional characteristics of the 
parliamentary systems. First, in parliamentarianism, the executive is dependent upon the 
legislature for its existence, and may be dismissed by a legislative vote of no confidence.  
In the presidential systems however, the legislature is unable to dismiss the executive, 
and power is separated among the branches of government.  The second basic 
distinguishing feature is that in parliamentary systems, the majority party or a majority 
coalition in the legislature chooses the members of the executive.  In other words, 
executive power is drawn from the legislature, and generally remains in power for as long 
as the governing parliamentary group holds.  In contrast, under presidential systems, the 
executive is directly elected by the citizens and serves for a fixed term. Hankler (2002) 
however, observes an irony of parliamentary systems. According to him, 
parliamentarianism tends to result in weaker parliament and stronger executives than 
their presidential counterparts.  
The factors responsible for this seeming anomaly are examined by Schlesinger (1992) 
and Lipset (1992).  According to them, because executive power is drawn from 
legislatures in parliamentary systems, strong party discipline is necessary to ensure the 
survival of governments.  Whereas party defection in a presidential system might prevent 
a piece of legislation from becoming law, the repercussions of defection in parliamentary 
systems are potentially much more serious (Hankler, 2002).  If executives in 
parliamentary systems are unable to retain their majorities, they may collapse.  As a 
result, individual legislators are under significant pressure to vote with their party leaders, 
who are usually the very individuals selected to constitute the executive (Cheibub, 2002). 
Thus, while parliamentary systems give the legislature the final right to dismiss the 
government, this power is a blunt instrument that cannot usually be threatened to 
influence individual pieces of legislation. Legislatures under presidential systems, in 
contrast, can more credibly threaten to withhold their votes from particular bill to 
pressure the executive. This is why Linz (1994) asserts that presidentialism is more prone 
to legislature-executive squabble and wrangle than parliamentarianism. Furthermore, 
According to Hankler (2002), the fact that agenda setting power usually rests with party 
leaders in the government under parliamentary systems further strengthens the power of 
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the executive over the legislature. He observes further that bills and policy ideas 
generally originate in the legislature n presidential systems, whereas the executive makes 
most proposals in parliamentary systems.  The result of this agenda setting power is that 
the influence of the legislature is greatly strengthens in presidential systems.  
In his final analysis, Hankler (2002) views that because of the separation of powers of the 
legislature and the executive, the legislature in presidential systems generally has well-
developed, independent agencies to provide them with information about policy ideas, 
bills, and the actions of the government.  On the contrary however, the legislatures in 
parliamentary systems usually rely on the executive to provide them with information 
which tends to weaken their ability to criticize the actions of the government.  In his 
observation, Linz (1994) sees the advantage of the executive dominance over the 
legislature in parliamentary systems especially apparent in the Westminster model, which 
combines plurality voting and a two-party system with parliamentary democracy. 
According to him, most presidential systems possess majoritarian, or at least semi-
majoritarian, institutional arrangements, and are thus rarely distinguished from one 
another on the basis of electoral system.  This is not the case parliamentarianism as 
different parliamentary regimes possess different electoral systems which have 
significant influence on executive- legislative relations (Linz 1994; Lipset 1992). Lipset 
(1992) examines the proportional representation electoral system in a parliamentary 
democracy and avers that the frequent need of governments to depend on legislative 
coalitions requires the executive to consider more carefully the preferences of the 
legislature in policy formulations. But the while legislators may not have agenda setting 
power, they do often possess coercive power over the executive.  On the contrary, 
because the governing party in Westminster parliamentary system possesses an absolute 
majority of votes without necessarily forming a coalition, it usually produces weak 
legislatures (Hankler, 2002). Thus party discipline in parliamentary political systems 
allows the executive tremendous freedom to follow any policy agenda. This enhances the 
durability of governments that practice parliamentary systems more than those ones that 
practice presidential systems across the world (Linz 1992; Lipset 1992; Lijphart 1999).  
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On a final note Hankler (2002) concludes that the debate of the impact of institutional 
characteristics determine the mode of relationship between the executive and the 
legislature and whether the relationship is more cordial in one system than the other is 
useful for highlighting the contrasting elements of presidential versus parliamentary 
democracy. He however asserts that for every flaw that can be identified in one of the 
systems, an advantage can also be found.  According to him, the disproportionately 
powerful executive of the parliamentary system, for instance, is rendered more 
democratic by the collegial nature of cabinet government. He pointed out two relevant 
points that hold true in most circumstances.  One is that, other things being equal, 
legislatures under presidential systems hold more influence over policy than legislatures 
in parliamentary systems. The second point is that the relative power of legislatures over 
executives varies among different types of parliamentary systems, with proportional 
representation systems tending toward greater legislative power. 
The dichotomy between presidential and parliamentary systems has however been 
criticized. Scholars have argued for the possibility of having a system in which a 
popularly elected president as well as a prime minister is responsible to the parliament. 
Duverger (1980) had referred to such a system as “semi-presidential government.”  
According to him, a semi-presidential system is characterized by three elements: (1) the 
president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite 
considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers 
who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the 
parliament does not show its opposition to them. This type of constitutional arrangement 
is found in Zambia, Switzerland, France after 1958, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, 
Portugal, and the Weimar Republic from 1919 to 1933. Duverger (1980) noted that the 
practice in some of these countries particularly, Austria, Ireland, and Iceland are more 
parliamentary than presidential in the sense that the president had relatively little power, 
on the contrary, the modern France represented a strong presidential system.  
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2.5.3. Factors Determining the Nature of Legislature-Executive Relations 
Lijphart (1999), in an attempt at analyzing the sources of presidential powers in a 
presidential system, identified three sources of presidential power which determine his 
relationships with the legislature. One is the power of the president as defined by the 
constitution. This constitutional power consists of reactive powers, especially presidential 
veto power and proactive powers, especially the ability to legislate by decree in certain 
areas.  The second source of power of the president is the strength and cohesion of his 
party in the legislature. The analysis of Lijphart (1999) here suggests that party discipline 
is a determinant of legislature-executive relations. In this regards, the strength and 
cohesion of presidents‟ parties in the legislature will affects his power relative to the 
legislature. The third source of the power of the president is his direct popular election.  
 
From the three sources of the power of the president enumerated by Lijphart (1999) 
above, the first (constitutional power) and the third (direct popular mandate) source 
bother on the constitutional arrangement. Thus Lijphart (1999) tends to suggest 
institutional designs as the major determinant of legislature-executive relations 
particularly in a presidential system of government. Jones (2002) also lends his credence 
to fact that the constitutional design of a country greatly determines the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in the country. According to him, the relationship between 
the executive and legislature in a presidential system is determined by the constitutional 
legislative power of the president e.g. formal constitutional powers, agenda setting 
prerogatives and budgetary authority. This argument has been the position of the group of 
scholars known as institutionalist approach (Linz 1994; Lipset 1992; Lijphart, 1999).  
 
The neo-institutionalists scholars have, however, found the paraconstitutional practices 
and partisan powers of the executive as equally important predictors of legislature-
executive relations (Hammond & Butler, 2003). According to them, informal factors such 
as personalistic, clientelistic, the support enjoyed by the executive‟s party in the 
legislature (majority, veto-sustaining or not veto-sustaining) and the responsiveness of 
the legislators to the executive are important determinant of legislature-executive 
relations (Sargentich, 1993; Samuels, 2002; Chiebub (2007). What is less clear is the 
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extent to which these paraconstitutional variables uniquely determine the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature. 
 
Sargentich (1993) and Abonyi (2006), in another dimension aver that the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature depends upon many factors other than the 
constitutional structure. According to there arguments, such factors as a nation's political 
culture, its party system, and its electoral arrangement have great implications on the 
relationship between the two branches of government. This is because, politics is much 
more complex and multi-dimensional than a single-minded focus on constitutional 
formalities acknowledges. Accordingly, the relative power of the executive or legislative 
branches cannot be determined simply on the basis of a nation's formal type of 
governmental system. A number of political factors in addition to the constitutional 
arrangement that has been chosen have great implications for legislature-executive 
relations and government‟s stability. 
 
2.6. Gap in the Literature 
This chapter focused on the review of extant literature on the legis lature and the 
executive and the relationship between the two institutions of governance. The models of 
government which provides the institutional framework for the operations of the 
executive and the legislature are also reviewed. It also situates the study within a 
theoretical framework which provides a lens through which the subject of legislature-
executive relationship is studied and understood. Evident from previous studies on 
legislature-executive relations is however, a consistent exemplification of the formal 
structure of legislature-executive relations while the informal structure has largely been 
neglected by researchers. Most analyses dwell on the institutional approach with 
emphasis on the structural design as it relates to legislature-executive relations. What is 
less clear however, is the extent to which institutions determine legislature-executive 
relations in the face of informal practices. A more in-depth study of legislature-executive 
relations with a view to determining the degree to which both institutional and informal 
factors uniquely and correlate to influence legislature-executive relations is thus greatly 
desired at this juncture.  
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This position is further aggravated by the fact that models and constructs of these studies 
on legislature-executive relations are situated within the framework and political-cum-
economic experience of the Western world. While the political systems of most African 
countries, particularly Nigeria, are largely adopted from the Western world, 
environmental influence seriously impacts the operations of these systems thereby 
resulting to different experiences despite similar structural designs. These factors 
therefore create a gap in knowledge on the intrigues and dynamics of legislature-
executive relationships that could emanate from the political and socio-cultural 
environment of other continents, particularly Africa.  
 
This study fills these gaps in literature by examining legislature-executive relations from 
a holistic perspective and situating the study within the framework of the formal designs 
as well as the role of the informal practices insinuated largely by Nigeria‟s environment. 
 
2.7: Theoretical Framework 
Theory is an essential ingredient in any research work, as it provides a foundational 
structure upon which a research work anchors. As posited by Bunch, (2005), a theory 
gives a framework for evaluating various strategies in both the long and short run, and for 
seeing the types of changes that they are likely to produce. Theory is a system of 
concepts and principles designed to enhance the understanding of a collection of events, 
facts, and phenomena (Sheila, 2001). A theory can help us to understand by providing a 
system of explanations, a framework, a way of looking at things so that we may know not 
only that something is a certain way but also why it is that way, either in the sense of 
giving reasons for it or in the sense of revealing it causes, that is, what gives rise to it 
(Omotola, 2007).  Situating a study within a theoretical framework thus bridges the range 
of facts that are to be investigated, and as noted by Goode and Hatt (1952), social science 
is theory-based and its operations are guided by relevant principles of human behavior. 
 
One of the most important distinguishing features of the behavioural revolution was the 
explicit concern with theory development. The idea is that political science had to 
develop some general framework of theories that could explain phenomena in a variety of 
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settings (Peter, 2005:12). Some of such theories are the Montesquieu theory of separation 
of power, King‟s Theory or Typology of Modes of political Interaction, and the 
Structural-Functional approach among others.  
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature is a classical topic in political 
science. This relationship has, more often than not, been studied according to the 
Montesquieu formula of the separation of powers (Dalberg-Acton, 1949; Sabine and 
Thorson, 1973; Madison, 1992; Fabbrini 1995; Aiyede & Isumonah, 2002; Ikoronye, 
2005; Aiyede, 2005; Fasagba, 2010) and King‟s Theory of Modes of Interaction 
(Saalfeld, 1990; Andeweg, 1992; Muller, 1993; Andeweg & Thomassen, 2003 & Boyko 
& Herron, 2009). The principle of the Separation of powers as a theoretical framework 
provides a useful guide to the distribution of legislative and executive powers. 
Nevertheless, when interpreted too rigidly and applied universally, it leads to 
misconception rather than enlightenment (Ball, 1977). Furthermore, as noted by King 
(1976), the Montesquieu theory of the separation of powers, though used widely in the 
study of interactions between the executive and the legislature, does not reflect the rise of 
political parties and the transformation of polities toward party democracies.  King 
(1976) therefore postulated its typology of mode of political interaction.  
 
While admitting the clarity and comprehensiveness of King‟s theory in explaining 
legislature-executive  relations, the fact that this theory was based on King‟s study of the 
British parliamentary system makes the theory faulty and of limited applicability. While 
the theory has been used as a theoretical framework for the study of inter-branch 
relationships in parliamentary democratic states in Europe, the political-cum-economic 
experience in other continents, such as in Africa, makes the theory inadequate to explain 
the intrigues and dynamisms of legislature-executive  relationships. A more adequate 
theoretical approach to the study of legislature-executive relations is therefore needed. 
Such a theory would be one that takes into account the party composition of the executive 
and legislature and the intra-party differences between the government or the front bench 
opposition, on the one hand, and the respective backbenchers on the other. Such a theory 
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will recognize more than the two political actors constituted by the executive and the 
legislative powers in the Montesquieu or King formula. 
 
The institutionalist approach has been a fundamental theoretical framework to the study 
of legislature-executive relations (O‟Donnell, 1994; Linz, 1994; Fish, 2001; Hammond & 
Butler, 2003; Valenzuela, 2004; Lijphart, 2004). This approach assumes that conflict and 
cooperation between the executive and the legislature are conditioned by fundamental 
questions of institutional design (Linz 1994). According to this theory, features of a 
country‟s institutional framework account for observed political, economic and social 
outcomes in the country (Hammond & Butler, 2003). Institutions do not merely shape the 
strategies of actors, they also affect the probability distribution of certain political 
outcomes, and thus, a countries political structure therefore, has great implications on 
policy outcomes (Lijphart, 2004; Cheibub 2007). While admitting the importance of 
institutional design as a predictor of legislature-executive relations, it is imperative to 
note that other informal or paraconstitutional behavioural factors equally shape the nature 
of legislature-executive relations observable in a political system. As argue by Weaver & 
Rockman (1993), Steinmo & Tolbert (1998) and Hammond & Butler (2003) although 
institutional designs affect government capabilities, several other non-institutional factors 
sometimes mediate the impact of institutions. A more encompassing theory that will treat 
a larger number of relations and produce a more complex analysis is therefore desired.  
 
Almond (1969) structural-functionalist approach is relevant in this context and provides a 
more comprehensive theoretical framework for the analysis of legislature-executive 
relations. It is a theory which aims at providing a consistent and integrated theory from 
which can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects of a political system 
(Lane, 1994). The structural-functional model is most associated with Parsons (1951) 
whose work was greatly influenced by Durkheim (Chilcote, 1998). Almond (1969) has 
however, restated the scheme so drastically that he has an influence independent of 
Parsons (Charlesworth, 1968). 
According to Almond‟s structural-functional analysis, all political systems must perform 
certain requisite functions and, by comparison, one must identify which structure 
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performs the tasks (Peter 2005). Almond‟s structural-functional theory describes societal 
reality largely in terms of structures, processes, mechanisms and functions. In this model 
the parts and pieces of an organism contribute to the functioning of the organism as an 
entity. The functionalist tradition postulates that social systems meet certain needs and 
suggests that there are functional imperatives that must be met in order for a group to 
survive (Malinowski, 1944; Radcliffe-Brown, 1950; Parsons, 1951). In fact, Malinowski 
(1944) defined function as the satisfaction of a need. Radcliffe-Brown (1951) claimed 
that the rules of conduct within a society lead to a social structure consisting of defined 
roles that are coordinated by these rules. As these roles are enacted, they contribute to 
maintaining the social structure. This alignment of social relations is critical for the 
survival of the society.  
 
Society can, therefore, be viewed as a system of mutually interdependent parts 
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1950). A change in one segment of the culture of a society results in 
corresponding changes in other segments of the culture of that society (Malinowski 1944; 
Merton, 1949). This simple model of a socio-cultural system established on the 
mechanical structure of the human body can indicate the place of a particular element of 
culture or social institution with respect to other elements in the system (Spencer 1965). 
Thus no custom or institution exists within a vacuum. Charlesworth (1968) identified 
certain characteristic features embodied in the structural-functionalism approach. These 
include: 
 An emphasis on the whole system as the unit of analysis. 
 The postulation of particular functions as requisite to the maintenance of the 
whole system. 
 Functional interdependence of diverse structures within the whole system. 
The idea of structural-functionalist approach in political science represented a vast 
improvement over the then prevailing mechanistic theories of David Easton and others 
(Varma, 1975).   
 
Almond outlined an approach to understanding political systems that took into account 
not only their structural components (institutions) but also their functions within the 
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system as a whole. Thus instead of focusing on such concepts as institution, organization, 
or group, Almond turned to “role and structure”. Role is defined as the interacting units 
of a political system while structure is a pattern of interrelated roles or pattern of 
interactions (Chilcote, 1998). 
According to Varma (1975), three things emerge from Almond‟s definition of political 
system. 
1. A political system is a concrete whole influencing and, in turn being influenced 
by the environment, the presence of a legitimate force holding it together. 
2. Interactions take place not between individuals but between roles adopted by 
them. 
3. The political system is an open system engaged in a continuous communication 
with entities and systems beyond its own boundaries. 
A system, according to Almond (1969), is characterized by (1) comprehensives, (2) 
interdependence, and (3) the existence of boundaries. A system is comprehensive in the 
sense that it includes all the interactions – inputs as well as outputs - which affect the use 
of physical coercion in all the structures, including undifferentiated structures like kinship 
and lineage, and anomic phenomena like riots and street demonstrations, and not merely 
the interactions which take place within the structures associated with the state, like 
parliament, executives and bureaucracies, and formally organized units, like parties, 
interest groups and media of communication. 
 
Some critics are of the opinion that structuralism is unlikely to achieve its objectives of 
providing a scientific theory of the political system because of the difficulties in applying 
it to the analysis of the political system – such as defining terms operationally and 
specifying which activities perform functions. They believe that Almond‟s structural- 
functionalist model presents a static model of society and, as a consequence, cannot 
account for change; it overemphasizes integration and, as a consequence, fails to deal 
with dysfunction (Charlesworth, 1968; Chilcote, 1998). 
 
The criticisms against the theory of structural-functionalism have however, led to the 
subsequent work of Almond and Powell (1970) where the dynamism of political 
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development was inculcated into the theory of structural-functionalism (Alexander 
(1970).  Almond and Powell (1975) averred that the theory of structural-functionalism 
can fit many phenomena, which at first sight appear quite disparate and unconnected into 
one framework. It gives context for and limits at some degree of reciprocal influence 
among all sorts of things – people, institutions and events. It also gives a number of 
common denominators for comparisons among outwardly very different polities: It 
assumes that whatever their institutional trappings and cultural, ideological, economic, 
and even chronological and spatial differences, all societies share in the performance of a 
number of crucial political functions. With the theory of structural-functionalism, 
Almond and Powell (1975) noted that we are encouraged to see how the same political 
tasks are performed in somewhat different ways in different societies and invited, as it 
were, to fill in the terms in an equation, having presumably mastered the rudiments of 
political diagnosis by learning what the equation is. 
 
Despite the criticisms against structural-functionalism, the approach provides a 
framework for the analysis of legislature-executive relations in this study. By this 
framework, the government is conceived as a social system and the executive and the 
legislature are political institutions viewed as structural parts or units of the political 
system or government. Each of these political institutions (also seen as structures) 
performs explicitly specified requisite functions that contribute to the stability, continuity 
and survival of the political system (Ray, 2004).  While the legislature is sadled with the 
role of law making, the executive implements the law. The various functions of these 
structures are however, contained in the constitution of the land. 
 
According to Almond (1969), a system is characterized by interdependent units. The 
various structures or parts or units of a system are interdependent through their structural 
and functional relationships. This brings to clarity the necessary mutually 
interdependence of the executive and the legislature through their functional interactions 
in the policy process (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950). While the executive and the legislature 
may be constitutionally or structurally delineated by their personnels and functions, they 
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however, necessarily collaborate through their shared functions as institutions of 
governance for the maintenance of the state. 
 
Since the executive and the legislature are open systems, these relationships are 
influenced by internal and external environments and by the presence of a legitimate 
force holding them together. According to Almond‟s structural-functional analysis, all 
political systems must perform certain requisite functions (Peter 2005). These functions 
in this regards, include policy making, policy implementation and rule adjudication 
which are carried out by the various arms of government. Thus structural-functionalism, 
as a framework for this study, provides an effective measure for assessing the different 
functions performed by the separate but interdependent organs of government in a 
presidential democracy. As emphasized by the structural-functional proponents, a study 
of the functions of these structural institutions is necessary for the understanding of the 
workings of the political system (Person, 1999).  
 
With Almond‟s structural-functional theory therefore, legislature-executive relations can 
be described largely in terms of structure, personality, processes, mechanisms and 
functions. Radcliffe-Brown (1951) claimed that the rules of conduct within a society lead 
to a social structure consisting of defined roles that are coordinated by these rules. As 
these roles are enacted, they contribute to maintaining and stabilising the social structure. 
In this regards, the alignment of the executive and the legislature to the rules of these 
social relations, their mutual interactions and collaboration in the policy process is critical 
for the stability and survival of the society.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
LEGISLATURE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS IN THE 
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The global wave of democratization that swept over different parts of the world in the 
past three decades has led to the adoption of either a presidential or parliamentary system 
of government by both old and new democratic states. Research on the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature in recent times has therefore been bifurcated 
along these forms of political structure – presidentialism and parliamentarism with a view 
to determining the extent to which these political arrangements matter in legislature-
executive relations (Cheibub & Limongi, 2000; Hammond & Butler, 2003). This is going 
by the fact that the major institutional characteristic which distinguishes the two systems 
of government is the degree of separateness of origin and survival between the executive 
and the legislature (Riggs, 1997; Hammond, et‟al, 2003; Cheibub, 2007). This chapter 
therefore examines the institutional designs of presidentialism and the implications that 
such framework portends for legislature-executive relations. It also takes an empirical 
journey into some selected presidential political systems with a view to interrogate and 
document the nature of legislature-executive relations in those countries and the formal 
and informal institutional resources and practices which govern such relationship.   
  
3.2 Presidential System and Legislature-Executive Relations 
There are some basic principles of the presidential form of government which have 
implications for legislature-executive relations. Firstly, the President who is the Chief 
Executive is elected in a popular election either directly or via a popularly elected 
presidential electoral college. In the latter, the President has his or her own electoral base 
(Shugart & Carey, 1992). Concurrently, an elected legislative assembly is created to 
parallel the President on the basis of the principle of separation of powers, thus there is a 
separate origin and survival of the executive and legislative branches. The separation of 
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origin is defined by the process of executive selection in which the chief executive is 
selected through a process of counting votes separately from the allocation of legislative 
seats (Shugart & Carey, 1992). The President and the legislature have their own electoral 
mandates, being separately elected (Beermann, 2011).  
 
Secondly, the President holds office for a constitutionally fixed term and until that 
prescribed term ends, he can not be discharged by legislative votes of no-confidence even 
if he or she favours policies opposed by the legislative authority (Cheibub, 2007), though 
it may be possible to remove a president for criminal wrongdoing by the process of 
impeachment (Lijphart, 1999). It has been established however, that the impeachment of 
a president does not necessarily occur simply as a result of political disagreement 
between the branches of government (Riggs, 1997; Penings, 2003). Thus there is a 
separate survival of the executive and the legislature defined by the principle that ends 
governments (Shugart & Carey, 1992). In a presidential system of government therefore, 
the terms of both the legislature and the executive are fixed and are not contingent on 
mutual confidence. 
 
Thirdly, there exists a constitutionally guaranteed executive authority to execute the laws 
which implies that one branch (legislature) makes the laws, the other (executive) 
implements them (Samuels & Eaton, 2002), thus, the President has extensive 
governmental authority vested in him to manage the government bureaucracy (Nijzink, 
Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006). The fourth principle is that the Chief executive has control 
over the cabinet as a result of his power to select his ministers without restriction and are 
(the ministers) responsible to him and not to the legislature (Idahosa & Ekpekurede, 
1995). In fact, the ministers are mere advisers and subordinate to the President (Cheibub, 
2007). Most important decisions can be made by him with or without, and even against, 
the advice of the cabinet, hence he (the President) has power over the cabinet (Lijphart, 
1999). These basic characteristics are the salient premises on which presidential system 
rests and have been followed in all presidentialist regimes (Riggs, 1997; Akinsanya, 
2005).   
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Some consequential legislature-executive relations arise from these institutional 
arrangements. The control over the state bureaucracy is divided between rival centres of 
authority – the executive and the legislature. The separate origin and survival of the 
executive and the legislature means that the executive does not depend on the continued 
support of the legislature to stay in power (Nijzink, Mozaffar & Azevedo, 2006). There is 
consequently a system of mutual independence of the executive and the legislature 
(Cheibub & Limongi, 2000). In the presidential system therefore, autonomy takes a 
different form than in systems in which the executive is selected by the legislature and 
stays in power only as long as it has the continued confidence of the legislature 
(Beermann, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the idea of separate origin and survival of the executive and the legislature 
and constitutional authority of the executive to implement the laws in a presidential 
system inform the executive‟s unilateral power and separation of purpose between the 
executive and the legislature (Samuels & Eaton, 2002). Hammond and Butler (2003) 
define executive‟s unilateral power as the relative imbalance between the executive and 
the legislature in terms of the allocation of unilateral veto, budget, decree, agenda and 
other formal powers. For instance, a President who has decree powers has relatively more 
liberty than a Prime Minister because he doesn‟t depend on the legislature to survive. 
Besides, he can use his formal powers to pull policy towards his preferred point without 
fear of loosing his job. Separation of purpose on the other hand, is the relative degree to 
which the executive and the majority in the legislature have similar political preferences 
and respond to and are accountable to the same pressure and demands (Hammond & 
Butler, 2003). 
 
In addition, the institutional arrangement in which both the President and the legislature 
are popularly elected and are mandated to pursue policies can create a dual popular 
legitimacy. This dual democratic legitimacy results in frequent legislature-executive 
stalemates and impairs the ability of the presidential political system to control its 
appointed officials and therefore limit its capacity to manage a bureaucracy powerful 
enough to deal effectively with complex modern problems (Linz, 1994; Pennings, 2003).  
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In another dimension, the election of the President for a fixed term of office informs the 
rigidity of presidential terms of office. This means that presidents are elected for fixed 
periods and often cannot be extended because of term limits, and cannot easily be 
shortened even if the president proves to be incompetent, becomes seriously ill, or is 
beset by scandals of various kinds (Linz, 1994). This can lead to gridlock between the 
executive and the legislative branches impairing the accountability of the chief executive 
to the elected legislative assembly (Weaver & Rockman, 1993).  
 
Furtherstill, the dual popular legitimation of presidential system based on the fact that 
both the executive and the legislature are mandated to pursue policies, creates power 
parity over sovereignty or supremacy over each other (Abonyi, 2006). Consequently 
separation of powers and separate elections in a presidential system makes legislature-
executive relations cumbersome and perhaps conflictual by design (Smith, Stuckey & 
Winkle (1998). The presidential system hence, creates less stable conditions for 
democratic consolidation due to looser connection between the chief executive and 
legislative leadership (Juan, 1994, Clark & Simenas, 2004). Since there is no 
constitutional principle that can be invoked to resolve conflict between executives and 
legislatures, such as the vote of no confidence of parliamentary systems, deadlocks would 
provide incentives for actors to search for extra constitutional means of resolving their 
differences, thus making the system prone to instability (Cheibub, 2002). 
 
In addition, the president and the legislature have a fixed term in office and government 
duration, therefore, becomes a moot question. The President does not need to generate 
majority support in the legislature in order to remain in office. This in turn makes 
coalition governments unnecessary in presidentialism (Cheibub, 2010). The importance 
of coalition is understood very properly when considering the very nature of 
parliamentarism. The system is such that parties operate under the imperative of 
majoritarianism, meaning that it is required that governments must be composed by 
parties that together command the majority (more than 50%) of legislat ive seats 
(Anifowose, 2008). In this view, governments are formed as parties exchange cabinet 
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positions for legislative support and a party is considered to be in government if it 
controls one or more cabinets and when in government, a party‟s members of parliament 
are expected to vote in support of government measures. If a party alone commands the 
majority of the seats in the legislature, it forms a single-party government and keeps to 
itself all the benefits of being in the government as it does not need the support of other 
parties to remain in power. If on the other hand, no party controls majority of the 
legislative seats, then parties must form a coalition government by sharing cabinet 
positions (Lijphart, 1999). Coalition is therefore a crucial matter especially given the fact 
that in the majority of parliamentary democracies no party commands more than 50% of 
the seats (Cheibub, 2010). On the contrary, however, in presidentialism, the fact that the 
head of government‟s mandate originates in popular elections and exists for fixed term in 
office leads to a situation where coalitions and government duration are irrelevant 
(Hammond & Butler, 2003). 
 
Besides these basic principles of presidential system analysed above, weakly 
institutionalized political parties characterize a presidential system (Linz, 1994; Pennings, 
2003). Political parties in presidential systems are sometimes less structured, and 
legislators may be free to identify with their individual constituency interests, or other 
regional, ethnic, economic interests rather than their parties when considering policy 
issues (Hammond & Butler, 2003). This is particularly so due to the fact that the failure 
of the legislators to vote with their parties do not threaten to bring down the government 
(Samuels, 2002). The president and the majority of the legislature may belong to different 
parties or may have divergent preferences even if they belong to the same party, hence 
members are less amenable to voting along party line (Linz, 1994; Marsteintredet, 2008). 
In addition, diffused character of leadership within the legislature brought about by 
separation of powers affects party discipline within the legislature (Abonyi, 2006; 
Beermann, 2011). In the same vein, there is more possible case of minority than majority 
government in Presidentialism. Minority governments are those in which the governing 
coalition does not control a majority of seats in the legislature or, in a bicameral system, 
those in which it does not control a majority of seats in at least one of the chambers 
(Cheibub, 2002). In minority governments, a presidential system would cause deadlocks 
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because of inability to form majority coalitions. If however, coalition were to occur, lack 
of party discipline that is inherent in presidentialism will make it unstable (Linz, 1994; 
Marsteintredet, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, presidentialism introduces a strong element of zero-sum game into 
democratic politics with rules that tend toward a winner-take-all outcome and presidential 
election campaigns encourage the politics of personality and overshadow the politics of 
competing parties and party programmes (Linz, 1994). Consequently, the weakly 
institutionalized political parties and permissive electoral systems tend to produce 
presidents whose party does not control a majority of seats in the legislature. In another 
dimension, weak party system could in turn strengthen the dominant position of the 
president (Linz, 1994). 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature in a presidential system is 
certainly one of the most intriguing empirical questions in the study of political 
institutions. The concomitant effects of the institutional arrangements of the presidential 
system often pose the crucial problem of relationship between the executive and the 
legislature which is being pejoratively referred to as „deadlock‟, „gridlock‟ or „stalemate‟ 
(Lijphart, 1999; Hammond, & Butler, 2003).  
 
Scholars of comparative constitutions have long averred that presidential system is prone 
to legislature-executive conflicts and hence government instability commonly accounted 
for by its institutional design (Weaver & Rockman, 1993; Alvarez, 1997; Figueiredo & 
Fernando, 2000; Linz, 2000; Cheibub, 2002; Abonyi, 2006). This position has 
particularly found support of the institutional school of thought who argue that a 
countries political structure have great implications on policy outcomes (Hammond & 
Butler, 2003). According to this view, features of a country‟s institutional framework 
account for observed political, economic and social outcomes in the country (Lijphart, 
1999). Following this argument therefore, the features of presidentialism explains the 
high level of instability in the system (Linz, 2000). This school of thought sees the 
presidential institutions as the cause of the recent crisis in the presidencies in Latin 
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America (O‟Donnell, 1994; Valenzuela, 2004), the cause of the weak political parties 
found in Africa (Van de Walle, 2003) and the main cause of the degradation of Russian 
politics (Fish, 2001). In fact, the breakdown of democratic regimes and the alleged crisis 
of governability of new democracies have been attributed to presidentialism (Cheibub, 
2002). Thus presidential systems are inherently ungovernable, structurally problematic, 
likely to generate crises, chronically incapable of dealing with crises once they erupt, and 
hence undesirable for consolidation of democracy (Lijphart, 1999).   
 
The institutionalists‟ view of presidentialism has however been greatly criticized by a 
group that can be referred to as neo-institutionalists. Pivotal to the neo-institutional 
school of thought are scholars like Jose Antonio Cheibub, Thomas H. Hammond, 
Christopher K. Butler, Fernando Limongi, Leiv marsteintredet. In Cheibub (2007)‟s 
argument for instance, the problem of presidential democracies is not that they are 
institutionally flawed, rather the problem is that they tend to exist in societies where 
democracies of any type are likely to be unstable. Presidential system emphasizes 
democratic values, providing checks and balances necessary for various opinions 
expressed, various interests represented and for expertise rather than for party loyalty to 
be brought into play in the legislative process (Abonyi, 2006). Sources of instability in 
the presidential system therefore have nothing to do with its institutional structure 
(Cheibub, 2007). Accordingly, the relative power of the executive or legislative branches 
cannot be determined simply on the basis of a nation's formal type of governmental 
system ((Hammond & Butler, 2003). A number of political factors in addition to the 
constitutional arrangement that has been chosen have great implications for legislature-
executive relations and government‟s stability (Sargentich, 1993). 
 
In this view, the relationship between the executive and legislature in a presidential 
system can be categories into two parts. The first is the constitutional legislative power of 
the president e.g. formal constitutional powers, agenda setting prerogatives and budgetary 
authority (Jones, 2002; Chiebub, 2007).  This category of relationship is relatively 
straightforward since it may be explicitly defined by the formal texts of constitutional 
charters and law. The second part of the relationship is the paraconstitutional practices 
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and partisan powers of the president which concerns factors such as personalistic, 
clientelistic, the support enjoyed by the president‟s party in the legislature (majority, 
veto-sustaining or not veto-sustaining) and the responsiveness of these legislators to their 
president (Sargentich, 1993; Samuels, 2002).  
 
It is at the backdrop of the above, that the next section documents the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in some selected presidential political systems and the 
formal and informal institutional practices which govern such relationship.    
 
3.3. Case Study Analyses of Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential 
Model of Government 
 
3.3.1 Legislature-Executive Relations in the American Presidential System  
 
The 1789 Constitution of the United States of America (as amended in 1992) provides for 
an elected President who is both the Head of State and the Head of Government. Potential 
candidates for the office of the President pass through a complex party nomination 
process which encourages the participation of party members (Lindsay, 2003). An 
indirect election process is prescribed in the Constitution for the voters to choose the 
electors, who in turn choose the President (Appadorai, 1975). The President, as the Head 
of State, possesses the powers to mobilize the army, to represent the US in foreign 
relations and to grant reprieves and pardons; as the Head of Government, he possesses 
the powers to oversee the executive departments, appoint officials and judges, and 
recommend legislation. The President can also form the Executive Office of the President 
and the Cabinet to assist him. Cabinet members can only be removed from office by the 
President (Bradley and Flaherty, 2004). 
 
 Under the United States‟ Constitution, the president's term of office is for four years and 
he cannot be removed during the term of office under normal circumstances, except by a 
specially prescribed, politically exceptional process of impeachment. Impeachment can 
occur only when the House of Representatives votes to impeach a president for “high 
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crimes and misdemeanors” and the Senate votes to convict the president of such 
dereliction (Sargentich, 2010; Beermann, 2011). It has however, been established that the 
impeachment of a president cannot occur simply as a result of political disagreement 
between the branches of government (Erturk, 2011). Three impeachment decisions have 
been applied in the USA so far. These are Johnson in 1868, Nixon (Watergate) in 1975 
and Clinton in 1998. Nixon resigned for fear that he would be found guilty, the other two 
impeachments decisions remained ineffective (Gozler 2000; Erturk, 2011). 
 
The Congress, the bicameral legislature of the USA on the other hand, is composed of the 
Senate and House of Representatives. Members of the two chambers are elected by direct 
universal suffrage in two elections (Edwards & Davies, 2004). The Congress possesses 
legislative powers: the powers to approve the budget, to scrutinize the executive and to 
propose constitutional amendments. The Senate stands on an equal footing with the 
House of Representatives in the law making process (Winetrobe, 2000). 
 
The Constitution of the United States of America applies the interpretation of the 18th 
Century doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the three branches of 
government (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary) are separated from one 
another with a divided mandate of power (Fisher, 2007). Under the constitution, Articles 
I, II and III created the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary respectively. Article 
1, Section 1, baldly states: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of Senate and House of 
Representatives”. Article I, Section 6, prevents members of Congress from serving as 
officers of the government in the executive branch. In fact, Section 6, Clause 2 of Article 
1 specifically declares:  
No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, 
be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which 
shall have been created, or the emolument whereof shall have been increased 
during such time; and no person holding any office of the United States, shall 
be a member of either House during his continuance in office. 
In addition to the broad separation of powers into three branches, the Constitution keeps 
the executive and legislative branches separate with various specific provisions. Article I, 
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Section 5, says each chamber of Congress, namely the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, is the sole judge of who wins congressional elections and who is qualified to 
serve there. The same part of the Constitution gives the House and Senate sole authority 
to make their rules of operation. 
It is therefore, apparent that the executive and legislative functions of the United States 
government reside more clearly in their own separate institutions. The two branches have 
their own democratic legitimacy and authority, as they derive from distinct electoral 
bases. The executive cannot directly control and use the constitutional power of the 
legislature; it operates with, rather than through, the legislature. The President has no 
power to dissolve the Congress, neither do the President nor the Cabinet holds collective 
responsibility to the legislature (Winetrobe, 2000).  
 
The foundational principle of separation of powers is the basis of legislature-executive 
relations in the United States (Smith, 2010), and remains vital in the contemporary 
American government. The division of the three arms of government is however, not 
absolute as the constitution recognizes a system of checks and balances (Oshio (2004). 
The activities of the organs overlap in some cases and each of them connects with the 
others at various points.  For instance, while the President who is the Chief-Executive can 
be removed from office by impeachment, under a system of checks and balances, the 
President may influence the law making process by legislation recommendations and by 
use of the veto power. On the other hand, the Vice President (executive) is the President 
of the Senate (legislature).The legislature can monitor the executive by congressional 
hearings and investigations and create congressional offices to scrutinize the budget 
proposals of the President (Kwong, 2000). The legislature must debate and pass various 
bills. The President has the power to veto a bill passed by Congress, thus preventing its 
adoption. This is an exercise of legislative power (Bowman, Woods & Stark, 2010). The 
legislature may, however, override the President's veto if they can muster enough votes. 
Justices of the Supreme Court (the Judiciary) are nominated for appointment by the 
President and are screened for confirmation by the Senate before taking their oath of 
office. The legislators are free to vote according to their conscience with little 
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repercussions from their party. Hence they are less subject to party discipline. They can 
make use of a filibuster, that is, delay legislative action with long speeches (Abonyi, 
2006). The consequence of these arrangements is therefore, interdependent of entities; 
and rather than creating a government of separated powers, what exists is a government 
of separated institutions sharing powers (Bowman, Woods & Stark, 2010).   
 
From the beginning, these separated but inextricably connected authoritative institutions 
have sought to assert their dominance and expand their portion of those shared powers 
(Bowman, et „al, 2010).  The American presidential system is therefore, characterized by 
uneasy relationship between the executive and the legislature despite the constitutional 
separation of the powers of these political institutions (Appadorai, 1975; Lenchner, 
1976). For instance, when a party different from the party of the President controls the 
Congress there can be extended periods of time when no legislation is passed (Taffet, 
2004). This can be costly to government operations and a waste of time. Moreover, 
beginning from Jefferson‟s administration, the United States of America entered into new 
century in which national expansion and international recognition and hegemony became 
central to the country‟s being (Cho, 2003). Following this, the pendulum of power 
continued to shift back and forth between the United States Congress and the President. 
Jefferson, however, enjoyed legislature-executive harmony consequential upon the 
growth of party organisation and the remarkable party discipline in the Congress 
(Edwards & Davies, 2004).  
Clinton administration however, experienced legislature-executive rivalry especially on 
matters relating to foreign policies. The period witnessed a significant power shift from 
the executive branch to Congress with respect to the national legislative agenda and even 
foreign policy where executives‟ prerogative powers may be at their greatest (Prins & 
Shull, 2006). For instance, President Clinton had to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia 
in 1994 (Crabb, Antizzo & Sarieddine, 2000). Not only was President Clinton the first 
president in 25 years to fail to secure “fast-track” trade authority, but the Government 
Opposition Party in the Congress also forced his administration to accept a State 
Department reorganization plan and defeated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Prins 
& Shull, 2006). The Congress slashed his foreign aid requests and refused to grant him 
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fast-track trade negotiating authority; it forced him to accept a national missile defence 
system and a regime change in Iraq as goals of U.S. foreign policy and blocked his efforts 
to pay U.S. back dues to the United Nations. Even when the Congress backed Clinton on 
foreign policy, as with the dispatch of U.S. peacekeepers to Bosnia and the Senate‟s 
approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention and NATO enlargement, the victories 
seemed to require inordinate efforts on the part of the administration (Lindsay, 2003).  
 
Bush administration, conversely, had a different experience as he had Congress‟s support 
on the government‟s foreign policy. The Congress overwhelmingly authorized him to 
wage two wars and as well granted assent to his decisions to leave the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty and move to develop an expansive new national missile defence 
system (Lindsay (2003). The Congress gave him almost everything he requested for 
defence and foreign affairs spending; it embraced his request to begin the largest 
reorganization of the federal government in more than a century; it gave him the trade-
promotion (formerly fast-track) authority it had denied Clinton. Bush also enjoyed 
harmonious legislature-executive relations on the government national security policies 
(Lindsay, 2003). 
 
This is not to say however, that Bush had all-time smooth sails through the congress as 
there were occasions of gridlocks between the President and congressmen (Sonnett, 
2006). This in many cases resulted in the President using unilateral tools particularly the 
presidential signing statement to nudge legislation closer to his liking (Bradley & Posner, 
2006). The use of this executive institutional power (the signing statement) was however, 
not without great deals of controversy (Cooper, 2005; Kellman, 2006; Remes, Waldron, 
& Lang, 2006; Savage, 2006). The event that ignited the controversy was the McCain 
amendment which sought to limit the manner in which the United States military 
interrogated the prisoners of war in the cause of the United State‟s “Global War on 
Terrorism” (GWOT). The attempt by the Vice President - Dick Cheney to lobby the 
Congress to provide for exceptions to the way in which the detainees were treated when 
they were questioned did not gain support in the Senate as he was greatly opposed by the 
Republican Senator and former Vietnam War POW - John McCain (R-AZ) (Kelley & 
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Marshall, 2009). In mid-December 2005, President Bush had to finally concede the loss 
on this particular issue (Bush, 2005). 
 
Another legislature-executive struggle during Bush administration was over the FY 2006 
Department of Defense (DoD) Appropriations Bill (Kelley & Marshall, 2009). The bill 
generated a number of issues and disagreements that provoked a constant back-and-forth 
between the administration and Congress and even incited presidential veto threats. These 
issues included among others, the cuts to the president‟s budgetary request for Defense, 
weakening of the Base Realignment and Closure process, limitations on the Buy 
American Act, or any interference with the effective conduct of the War on Terror. The 
legislature-executive disagreement on this bill resulted to the president‟s threat of 
applying his veto power. While the president was able muster congressional‟s support on 
some issues during the veto bargaining process, he could not secure the legislature‟s 
support on the exceptions to the treatment of enemy detainees (Calabresi, 2008). On the 
McCain amendment where the president could not get Congress to budge, he used the 
signing statement to turn a policy loss into a win (Kelley & Marshall, 2009). 
 
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 altered 
the American political landscape and particularly the United States‟ legislature-executive 
relations. This dastardly event made members of Congress who previously took pride in 
opposing the executive to suddenly see the need to rally around the President over good 
policy and good politics instead of partisan politics (Lindsay, 2003). Thus, increased 
perceptions of foreign threat seemed to enhance executive power at home, and the 
constitutional arguments for greater executive power in America (Bradley & Flaherty, 
2004). The the broad assertions of presidential power therefore became commonplace 
after the events of September 11 and the ensuing war on international terrorism, and the 
rise of the United States to hegemonic leadership coincided with a shift from a Congress-
centred to an executive centred structure (Cho, 2003; Edwards & Davies, 2004).  
 
Besides the issue of foreign policy that have given rise to the increasing executive power 
viz-a-viz the congressional power in the United States, some other inherent factors 
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seemed to have enhanced the executive branch in the exercise and cementing of its power 
relative to the other branches. Some of these factors include the unified structure of 
executive power which provides the president with greater ability to exploit constitutional 
ambiguity relative to other branches of government. Moreover, the incentives for the 
accumulation of executive power are ultimately stronger than partisan incentives for 
cooperation, and so presidents are encouraged to exercise unilateral direct actions to 
achieve their goals as long as the president does not step on the collective toes of 
Congress (Kelley & Marshall, 2009). Moe & Howell (1999) and Howell (2005) termed 
this as the theory of presidential unilateralism.  
 
The relationships between the president and the congress particularly in the post–World 
War II era have however, largely been determined by personality rather than formal 
mechanisms (Bradley & Posner, 2006; Kellman, 2006; Remes, Waldron, & Lang, 2006; 
Savage, 2006; Sonnett, 2006). The personal presidency has become the dominant 
paradigm on presidential power. Rather than formal mechanisms, legislature-executive 
relations since this period hve been rooted in the president‟s ability to bargain and/or 
persuade. Even the president‟s most formidable constitutional power (the veto) in the 
legislative realm now depended on his ability to persuade more than one third of a 
chamber in Congress to sustain such an action (Kelley & Marshall, 2009). 
 
3.3.2. Legislature-Executive Relations in the Brazil’s Presidential System 
Brazil, like the United States, operates a presidential system with a separation of 
governmtal powers into three independent branches - executive, legislative and judicial 
(Magstadt, 2005). The presidential system was established in 1889, upon the 
proclamation of the republic in a military coup d'état against the Emperor Pedro II 
(Pereira & Mueller, 2004).  
 
The executive power is exercised by the President who is both the head of state and 
government elected for a fixed term of 4 years with a possible reelection. He is the 
commander-in-chief of the Brazilian Armed Forces. Legislative power on the other hand, 
is vested upon the National Congress made up of two chambers - The Senate (Senado 
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Federal) with 81 seats and the Chamber of Deputies (Camara dos Deputados) made up of 
513 seats. The competences and power structure of the National Congress are explicitly 
spelt out in articles 44 - 75 of the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil. Members of the 
Senate represent each of the Brazilian States with each state being represented by three 
elected senators regardless of population, area, wealthness or any other factor. Senators 
are elected for an eight-year term. The Chamber of Deputies on the other hands 
represents the people with the number of Deputies proportional to the population of each 
state while minimum and maximum limits are determined by a law. Deputies are elected 
for a four-year term. While Deputies are elected by proportional representation of each 
Party, they are not prohibited from changing Parties after being elected (Pereira & 
Mueller, 2004; Pereira, 2011).  
 
Unlike the United States however, the Brazilian political system is being characterized by 
weak political institutions: weak and fragmented party system, low party discipline, a 
proportional electoral system, presidential control over political options and a limited 
degree of political organization and mobilization (Santos & Hochman, 2000; Rego, 2004; 
Renno, 2010; Lemos, & Power, 2011). The Brazilian Congress is made up of legislators 
who rather than being representatives for the good of the country, vote for geographic 
redistribution, i.e., particularistic benefits they can deliver to constituents (Alston & 
Mueller, 2005; Hagopian, et‟al, 2009). All these factors have often been presented by 
scholars as potential obstacles to government‟s ability to function (Ames, 2001; Rego, 
2004; Amorim Neto, 2006; Pereira, 2011). 
 
Conversely, however, the Brazilian presidential experience since her first republic 
presents a very interesting analytical interrogation, being always mentioned as a country 
of great stability as far as legislature-executive relations is concerned (Santos & 
Hochman, 2000; Pereira & Mueller, 2004; Lucio, 2010). The fundamental empirical 
question that this scenario raises is how then is the relationship between presidents and 
legislators organized or, what are the institutional mechanisms by which the Brazillian 
governments achieve majority support of the National Congress for their administrations. 
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The Brazillian political system is known with an old tradition of legislature-executive 
relations mechanism known as democratic centralization – a political action in which 
political decisions are concentrated on the top of the political pyramid i.e., the presidency 
(Rego, 2004). The existence of strong executive power thus enables the president to mold 
a stable coalition in Congress (Alston & Mueller, 2005). A key component of the 
democratic centralism is strong party cohesion and discipline in the National Congress 
(Amorim Neto, 2006) and an exchange mechanism known as “pork” in which the 
president uses policy trade-off and strategic allocation of resources as negotiation 
mechanisms for congressional support (Alston & Mueller, 2005). 
 
A number of institutional rules and structural factors accounted for the executive 
dominance in the Brazillian Presidential system. In the Brazilian electoral system, vital 
activities of the electoral process occur at the state level: nomination, coalition formation, 
campaigning, counting of votes, and winning seats (Samuels, 2000; Pereira, 2011). The 
decentralizing effect of this electoral system makes governors and mayors in control of 
congressional elections and hence great influence on the legislative behaviour. Another 
factor is the distribution of power within Congress which tends to centralize the 
legislative process. In addition, the institutional legislative powers held by the executive 
(president‟s decree and veto powers, right to introduce new legislation, permission to 
request urgency time-limit to certain bills, discretionary power on the budget 
appropriation, etc) enhance executive dominance. Furthermore, the President‟s capacity 
to distribute political and financial resources selectively works as key determinant for 
legislators to behave in accordance with the indication of party leaders and as well act as 
means of centralizing political power. In fact, the electoral system provides incentives for 
politicians to behave individually while the internal rules of the Congress, the president‟s 
power to legislate, and the centralisation of benefits by the president, render legislators‟ 
behaviour extremely dependent on loyalty to the party and presidential preferences 
(Nicolau, 1991; Pereira, 2011). 
 
The nature of legislature-executive relations at the dawn of the first republic of Brazil 
(1889–1930), usually termed the Old Republic, was one of conflict and congressional 
98 
 
autonomy (Santos & Hochman, 2000). This nature however, changed following the 
President Campos Sales pact between the federal government and the state governments. 
In the deal, the federal government would distribute ministerial spoils to State 
governments in exchange for control over the states electoral results for the National 
Congress (Santos & Hochman, 2000) and for the tight control exerted by the governors 
upon their state delegations in Congress (Lessa, 1988). This was based on President 
Sales‟ perception that congressional opposition to president‟s policies was a consequence 
of dislocation from power of those state oligarchies who formerly had controlled the 
elections for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Santos & Hochman, 2000). Thus 
President Sales‟s pact was a trade-off between policy outcomes and patronage, where the 
outcomes depend both on preferences and on the value of patronage to both the State 
government controlled members of Congress and the president (Alston & Mueller, 2005).  
This implies that the nature of legislature-executive relations during this period depended 
on how presidential behaviour interacted with state governments‟ interests.  It was a case 
of executive dominance instigated by the nature of intergovernmental relations in Brazil.  
 
The electoral system in Brazil was such that Congress members specifically the deputies 
were elected in plurinominal districts by a plurality of votes with the process marked by a 
high level of uncertainty, fraud and manipulation. Counting of votes and the 
announcement of winning candidates in to the Chamber of Deputies were conducted by 
the local councils (Nicolau, 1991). State and local leaders (governors and mayors) were 
therefore almost completely in control of the electoral process. They were the final 
decision-makers about who would be the elected candidates for the Chamber of Deputies 
and invariably the one who would select, by manipulation, as many loyal candidates as 
possible (Lessa 1988). The performance of Brazilian Chamber of Deputies during the Old 
Republic was therefore, one of apathy, with relevant political issues not really being 
decided by deputies and senators as members of a representative institution but an 
expression of the political rule of state bosses. The president would negotiate directly 
with the states and the legislative behaviour would be a function of the several bargains 
entailed between federal government and sate governors (Nicolau, 1991). This 
institutional arrangement means that lawmaking was entirely submissive to presidential 
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preferences except if there was a conflict between the president and the governors of the 
main states (Alston & Mueller, 2005). Under this circumstance, certainly Brazilian 
representatives in the Chamber would be accountable not to their constituencies but to the 
state and local leaders. 
 
The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 that ended the Old Republic altered the political 
landscape of Brazil.  The revolution ushered in military government which abrogated the 
country's 1891 Constitution and dissolved the National Congress. The country was under 
military rule except in 1934 when a new constitution was promulgated and Vargas 
elected the President by the Constituent Assembly (Ready, 1985). 
 
The redemocratization of the country with the adoption of a new Constitution in 1946 
marked the beginning of another Republic in Brazil (Garfield, 1997). The democratic 
period (1946 - 1964) was characterized by extreme institutional instability, deadlock and 
stalemate between the Brazilian legislative assembly - Congress and the Executive 
(Pereira, 2011). It was the conflictual relationship between the two organs of government 
that provided the underlying rationale for promulgating the 1988 Constitution (Alston & 
Mueller (2005). The experience of the 22 years of dictatorship in Brazil must have made 
Brazil to believe that an institutionally-weak president could not last without some sort of 
governing capacity to enforce his/her agenda. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 in this 
view, gave relatively strong powers to the president with the capacity to coordinate 
political parties in a coalition. In order to ensure governability and stability of the 
democratic game, the constitution transferred institutional resources to the executive but 
also equips the legislature with a set of oversight tools that could be used to monitor or 
scrutinize the powerful executive under a system of checks and balances (Pereira, 2011; 
Lemos & Power (2011). In addition, the majority of legislators learned from that period 
and therefore, decided not to change the Proportional Representation electoral system in 
the new constitution because it would create too much uncertainty with respect to 
legislators‟ electoral survival (Hagopian, Gervasoni & Moraes, 2009). One must 
understand at this juncture, that the new institutional arrangement of conceding much 
power to the President under the 1988 Constitution was a consequence of the legislature‟s 
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choice arising from a historical learning process rather than illegitimate usurpation of 
powers by the executive (Pereira, 2011).  
 
The important consequence of this new institutional arrangement was that all elected 
presidents of Brazil, with the exception of President Fernando Collor De Mello (1990 – 
1992), have been able to build stable majority coalitions within Congress and have 
experienced relatively strong party discipline within the presidential governing coalition 
and hence high level of political stability (Pereira, 2011). The elected presidents are able 
to achieve congressional support, though none of them belong to a party with absolute 
majority of congressional seats. Nevertheless they have been able to achieve legislature-
executive harmony by using their extensive legislative and non-legislative powers as well 
as gains from exchange mechanisms under the executive (Pereira & Mueller, 2004; 
Pereira, 2011). 
 
The legislature-executive relations that ensued in President Collor‟s minority coalition 
government took exception to this experience (Amorim Neto, 2002). Collor‟s coalition 
was relatively homogenous made up of three political parties and controlled 49 % of the 
seats in the National Congress (Pereira, 2011). Conversely, his cabinets were extremely 
disproportional having 60% of them as nonpartisan ministers and thus, did not share 
power with parties that could support him in times of need (Ames, 2001). When he faced 
massive popular protests around the country in 1992, he had no credible and sustainable 
coalition in Congress and was unable to resort to the Brazilian custom of buying support 
of the Congress. Consequently he was impeached and removed from office (Amorim 
Neto, 2006; Pereira, 2011). With the exception of Collor, presidents in Brazil have been 
able to build majority support through coalitions that enable the executive exert 
dominance on the legislature (Pereira & Mueller, 2004). 
 
The experience with Collo was a lesson for President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-
2002. Being aware that governing without a sustainable coalition in Congress would be 
too risky, Cardoso formed a majority coalition government of almost 75% support of the 
National Congress (Pereira, 2011). This he did realizing that he would need a broader 
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majority to gain approval of his many proposed constitutional reforms, which would 
require supportive supermajorities in both houses. The Presidents party – the Workers‟ 
Party therefore, used party discipline - a key component of the idea of democratic 
centralism, as a mechanism for relating with its parliamentary base. Following this, the 
party resolved that its representatives would not vote against the government policies and 
dissidents were expelled (Rego, 2004). The coalition management choices made by 
Cardoso were decisive elements in helping him to sustain his majority coalition and 
hence legislature-executive harmony for almost eight years at a comparatively low cost 
(Amorim Neto, 2006).  
 
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva became the President of Brazil on the 1st of January 
2003. Lula, apparently have learnt the long tradition of the democratic centralism, 
enjoyed a comfortable majority support of the National Congress (Pereira, 2011). He 
achieved this by forming a coalition government made up of 9 political parties, the 
strength of the political coordination function within the executive branch and by 
negotiating with political parties as a whole instead of trying to capture individual votes 
in the National Congress (Rego, 2004; Pereira, 2011). Unfortunately, Lula‟s comfortable 
majority support of the deputies was soon dashed.  The country had plunged into 
successive political crises which resulted from economic stagnation, increasing 
unemployment rate, lack of tangible results of the government programmes and a public 
opinion of general administration paralysis (Pereira, Power & Raile, 2008; Pereira, 2011). 
Lula had to resort to the long tradition of democratic centralism in order to overcome the 
obstacles to his achieving political power. He allocated more cabinets to other coalition 
members and maintained strict party discipline as those who acted against the party‟s 
majority decisions faced the consequence of expulsion (Rego, 2004).  
 
Dilma Rousseff of the Workers‟ Party became the President of Brazil following the 2010 
election. With nearly 65% majority of the seats in both chambers obtained through 
coalition government, it is widely speculated that Rouseff would face fewer difficulties in 
terms of legislature-executive relations than her predecessor, President Lula (Pereira, 
2011). Some other choices that would be fundamental to the legislature-executive 
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relations in her multiparty presidential regime are the number of parties in the coalition, 
the ideological heterogeneity of those parties and the degree of power sharing among 
coalition partners. As Pereira and Power (2011) argued, each of these managerial choices 
engenders trade-offs and different costs for the Executive. 
 
The analysis of legislature-executive relations in the Brazilian presidentialism, in this 
section, shows a coalitional form of presidential governance as a response to the 
institutional dilemmas posed by the coexistence of a presidential executive with a 
fragmented multiparty legislature. Presidents, in order to win support for their legislative 
agenda, must sustain interparty coalitions in the Congress. The goal is to build a 
heterogeneous alliance that would build legislative majority support for the executive 
policy. Thus the power of the Brazilian Executive, its ability to impose its preferences on 
the legislation being decided in Congress situates legislature-executive relations in the 
Brazilian presidential system within the purview of the theory of executive dominance. 
 
3.3.3. Legislature-Executive Relations in the Philippine’s Presidential System  
The Republic of the Philippines is a sovereign country in Southeast Asia. It obtained full 
independence in July 4, 1946 with a presidential democratic government largely 
patterned after that of the United States Constitution (Tarling, 1999; Wilhelm, 2006).  
The Constitutions of the Philippines, starting with the 1935 Constitution to the 1973 
Constitution, and the current Constitution of 1987, established the principles of 
separation of powers of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of 
government with each branch being supreme in its own sphere but with constitutional 
limits and a firm tripod of checks and balances (Yu-Jose, 1999). The doctrine of 
separation of powers is designed to prevent tyranny by preventing the concentration of 
the sovereign powers of state in one body (Mendoza, 1999). Following this, Article VI, 
VII and VIII of   the 1987 Constitution enunciate the division of governmental functions 
into legislative, executive and judicial department respectively. The executive branch is 
headed by the president, the legislative branch is composed of Congress - a bicameral 
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legislature and while the judiciary has the Supreme Court occupying the highest tier of 
the organ (1987 Constitution of Philippine).  
According to Article 7, Section 1 and 11 of the 1987 Constitution of Philippine, the 
President functions simultaneously as head of state and head of government and he is the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He is elected by a popular vote for a single six-
year term by direct universal suffrage, during which he or she appoints and presides over 
the cabinet while the Vice-President, is separately elected and may be elected to a 
maximum of two consecutive six-year terms. It is pertinent to note here that since the 
president and vice president are not elected as a team, they may be ideologically opposed 
or even personal rivals. The executive functions of the government are carried out 
through the Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the president with the consent of the 
Commission of Appointments made up of twelve senators and twelve representatives. 
The bicameral Congress of the Philippines on the other hand, consists of the Senate 
(upper chamber) and House of Representatives (lower chamber). Members of the 24-seat 
Senate are elected at large to six-year terms and are limited to not more than two 
consecutive terms (Article 6, Section 1- 7). Members of the House of Representatives 
with a constitutional limitation of a maximum of 250 seats are elected from both 
legislative districts and through sectoral representation to a three-year term (1987 
Constitution of Philippine). House members are limited to not more than three 
consecutive terms. The Philippines Congress enjoys substantial powers. The Senate has 
the exclusive power to approve treaties, while the House has considerable fiscal powers. 
Both chambers maintain extensive committee systems, which enhance their influence in 
the legislative and executive process (Solheim, 2006). 
 
While separation of powers exists between the branches of government, a constitutional 
checks and balances also exist to impose limits on the powers of the organs. The 
Congress is empowered to conduct inquiries into the executive activities, the president 
cannot abolish the Congress, and the Congress can override a presidential veto with a 
two-thirds majority vote. The Senate ratifies treaties by a two-thirds vote and all 
appropriations bills must originate in the House, but the president is given a line-item 
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veto over them. The Philippines Congress has power of impeachment and the prerogative 
of questioning the actions of the President, specifically, his appointment powers, his veto 
power, and his power of declaring martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, the president needs congressional support in order to 
implement policies and programmes. In this format, the executive and the legislature are 
co-equal with power to check the other to prevent official abuses and promote the rights 
of the people (Ogul and Rockman, 1990).  
 
The legislature-executive relations in the Philippines have been viewed in two contrasting 
perspective of strong Congress and yet, executive dominance. This is because, while the 
Philippines Congress wields substantial constitutional power as has been early 
enumerated, the President of Philippine is also an executive president. The President, like 
that of the United States, undoubtedly, enjoys first-among-unequals status and is the most 
influential figure in the political landscape of Philippine (Kawanaka, 2008; 2010). The 
constitution provides for equality between the three branches of government, however, 
the Philippine President enjoys a vast array of powers that enables him to influence the 
policymaking process. As the head of the executive department, he possesses law-making 
powers, both of the pro-active and reactive kind. Pro-active powers allow the President to 
establish a new legislative order. He plays a pre-eminent role in setting the policy agenda 
and formulating policy proposals. Reactive powers on the other hand, allow the President 
to defend the status quo against legislative attempts to change it. The most familiar 
reactive power is the president‟s veto power (de Dios, 2002).  
 
The constitutional powers of the President however, is certainly not enough for him to get 
his legislative preferences passed by a congress that is characterised by weak party 
discipline and parochial social interests of dominant social class (Abuva, 2002) Policy 
outcomes in Philippine are not just the result of unilateral influence of the President 
(Kawanaka, 2010). This raise the question of how does the President get the 
congressional support for his legislative preferences. 
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Despite the institutional powers of the Congress, Philippine has been described as having 
a strong president operating with a weak legislature amid limited or ineffective 
constitutional checks (Ogul and Rockman, 1990) Vicerra, 2006; Carlos et.al., 2010). The 
executive over the years continued to display somewhat a dominant role in governance 
that interferes with the proceedings of the Congress. The emerging phenomenon of an 
imperial presidency with overwhelming influence on the Congress in Philippine has been 
attributed to the president‟s formal (e.g. presidential veto power) and more importantly 
informal superior power of patronage (Kawanaka, 2010). The Philippine president‟s veto 
power is enhanced by a relatively strict override provision by the constitution of two 
thirds of all members of each house of Congress. Thus, no presidential veto had been 
reversed by congressional action. The president often refers to the constitutional 
separation of powers to justify assertions of power and as a shield against oversight by 
other branches or bodies. The presidential power of unilateral actions has further been 
enhanced by the civil strife in the Philippines in spite of opposition from some aspects of 
society (Randolph, 2010). Over the years, tensions have arisen between the Constitution‟s 
attempts to control the presidency and the de facto exercise of that power (Rose-
Ackerman, Desierto and Volosin, 2010). 
 
The more relevant power that the President has that affects lawmaking is his power over 
the sources of legislators‟ patronage, which is especially important given the candidate-
centeredness of Philippine electoral politics and weak party system (Teehankee, 2002; 
Randolph, 2010). Unlike the United States, the Philippine political system is 
characterized by weak political institutions - weak and fragmented party system, low 
party discipline, weak judicial structure, proportional electoral system, limited degree of 
political organization and mobilization, and control over political options (Teehankee, 
2002; Kasuya, 2008; Randolph, 2010; Kawanaka, 2010). This institutional weakness 
enables the President engage in the politics of exchange of pork for policy reforms. The 
president controls the release of legislators‟ pork barrel funds and could therefore, „buy‟ 
legislative support for preferred legislation or punish recalcitrant or unsupportive 
legislators (Kasuya, 2008).  In addition to pork barrel funds, other sources of patronage 
such as the president‟s power of appointments and influence over policy implementation 
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and law enforcement are engaged to influence legislative behaviour (Kawanaka, 2010). 
The president‟s control over patronage resources is especially important to a legislator 
seeking re-election. The Philippines legislators tend to gratify the base wishes of their 
constituents rather than work for the good of the nation (Caoili, 1993; Carlos, 2010). For 
this reason, policy deliberations during periods close to elections enhance presidential 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the legislature. However, legislators seeking re-election will 
also be the target for „bribery‟ by special interests to shape policy in their favour in 
exchange for campaign finances and other considerations (Teehankee, 2002; Rose-
Ackerman, Desierto and Volosin, 2010). This factor contributes to the fractionalization of 
the Congress and hence increasing transaction costs of legislation in terms of pork barrel 
distributions (Folscher, 2006; Kawanaka, 2008). In addition, the internal operation of the 
Congress has been slowed by inefficiency and a lack of party discipline. Legislation has 
often been detained in the forty-three House and thirty-six Senate committees staffed 
with friends and relatives of members of Congress (UNDP, 2005; Colonel et.al., 2007). 
The formation of Congress Watch Indicative in 1991 by the National Movement for Free 
Elections (NAMFREL) and the Makati Business Club to monitor the activities of sitting 
congress members and promote accountability and honesty is indicative of the public 
frustration with the Congress‟ inefficiency and corrupt practices (Manuel, 1999; Posner, 
and Park, 2007). 
 
Philippine political parties are characterized by diverse ideologies fractionalization, 
incoherency and instability, weak party discipline and lack of organizational identities 
without clear constituencies (Randolph, 2010). In the 2010 election, there were 187 party 
list groups which were registered with the COMELEC (Carlos, Lalata, Despi and Carlos, 
2010).  Weak political parties failed to act as a sieve against the surfacing of mediocre 
personalities contending for political positions. Their choice of candidates for the 
presidency is based on their appraisal of who can best deliver patronage benefits to them. 
The weak parties also produce weak congressional members who tend to gratify the base 
wishes of their constituents rather than work for the good of the nation (Carey, 2009). 
The Philippines multi-party system is such that no one party often has a chance of 
gaining power alone, and parties must work with each other to form coalition 
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governments. The cumulative effects of the weakness contribute to the dominance of the 
President in the supposed co-equal branches of government in the entire political 
spectrum of the country (Ostrogorski, 2010). 
In the First Republic of Philippine, the history of legislature-executive relations started to 
take a new dimension at the Malolos Congress. President Aguinaldo, having recognized 
the powers of the congress to form a constitution, ratified a more powerful legislature 
despite an advice for more executive powers. The consequence of this development was 
the legislature‟s ability to immobilize executive initiatives through either outright 
rejection or watered-down legislation (Yu-Jose, 1999).  
The preeminence of patronage and local interests however, created a new relationship 
between the executive and the legislative branches. The more the executive tried to 
accomplish, the more deals were needed in terms of compromising exchange in order to 
secure congressional support for presidential legislation preference (Kawanaka, 2008). 
The first five postwar Philippine presidents - Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon 
Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal had to resort to this practice of 
patronage being often faced with corruption charges, pressures and the challenge of a 
domestic Communist rebellion, (Abinales, and Amoroso, 2005).  
While a relatively stable pattern of legislature-executive relations, sustained by the 
generally clientilist and neo-patrimonial character of the regime, have evolved in 
Philippines, a reforming president sometimes, also faces the formidable obstacle of 
constructing legislative majorities. For example, in September 1987, the Congress 
summoned the presidential executive secretary to testify about the conduct of his office. 
The following year, Congress also rejected Aquino's proposed administrative code, which 
would have conferred greater power on the secretary of national defense (Posner, Paul 
and Park, 2007).  
The need to strengthen legislative support for the President through eliminating 
legislative and executive gridlock on policy and programme decisions that impact 
national development planning was the basis for creating the Legislative-Executive 
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Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) in 1992 during the term of President Ramos. 
The Council composed of 20 members (including the Vice President, Senate President, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, seven Cabinet members, three Senators, three 
Representatives, the president of the League of Provinces, and a representative from each 
of the private business and youth sectors) with the President as chair. After its initial 
formation, the Council expanded its membership by inviting all cabinet members and 
selected legislators from both congressional chambers to attend its weekly meetings. The 
intervention of LEDAC during Ramos presidency and the establishment of a coalition 
between the President‟s party and the party which controlled the Senate resulted in the 
passage of key economic reform measures (Vicerra, 2006). The LEDAC meetings also 
facilitated the management of crisis situations such as when the Supreme Court declared 
the first version of the Oil Deregulation Law (Republic Act No. 8180) as 
unconstitutional. The Council was immediately convened and the key technical staff of 
both legislative chambers was able to immediately draft a new version in response to the 
Court‟s observations. In record time, a new version was approved and passed into law 
(Kawanaka, 2010). 
 
In the subsequent administrations however, this formal mechanism was used sparingly. 
During President Estrada administration, LEDAC rarely met. President Estrada was 
impeached by the House of Representatives in November 2000 and was succeeded by 
Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (IPU 2001; Keesing's 2001). President 
Arroyo‟s initial term in office was marked by fractious coalition politics. She however, 
preferred the services of House Speaker Jose de Venecia and her political adviser, 
Gabriel Claudio, whose office supervised the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office 
(PLLO), to facilitate her government‟s relations with the Congress. Following the 
political crisis in July 2005 amidst strong allegations of fraud over the 2004 presidential 
elections, her relations with the Senate soured. Key allies such as Senate President 
Franklin Drilon deserted her camp and called for her immediate resignation (Marsh, 
2006). As a result, the Senate came under the control of opposition senators and for two 
years, thwarted the passage of budget bills. Attempts to impeach President Arroyo in 
2005 over the allegation of electoral fraud however, failed. But her attempted 
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controversial plan to overhaul the constitution towards transforming the country‟s 
presidential-bicameral republic to a federal parliamentary-unicameral form of 
government was unsuccessful. Following the expiration of her tenure of office in June, 
2010, she was succeeded by President Benigno S. Aquino 111 (Carlos, 2010; Kawanaka, 
2010). 
 
Independent stature of the Philippines national legislature has however, been unattainable 
due to the enduring patronage relationships that determine legislature-executive relations 
whereby executives kept the legislature at bay with generous perks and pork such that the 
system of check-and-balance mechanism failed to kick in (Valdehuesa, 2005). The 
legislature would trade off its independence in exchange for a bargaining muscle that 
generates frequent side payments. In most cases, the executive get his projects or policies 
implemented even without proper consultations, by winning legislative approval through 
bribing the legislature with pork, funds and perks (Carey, 2009). Given the Philippine 
political culture, the bargaining nature in legislature-executive relations typically centers 
on politicization and cooperation for amassing government resources in which little 
headway has been made on long-term institutional development such as an independent 
and highly capable legislative bodies (Colonel, et‟ al, 2007; Kawankana, 2010). From 
1987, whoever assumed power as President exerted great influence on the alignment of 
political forces in Congress, as well as on the process and outcome of choosing the 
leadership of both chambers and legislators tended to affiliate themselves with the 
political party of the incumbent President. The President‟s virtual control of the 
leadership of both houses and the majority of their members, placed him or her in a 
position of extreme influence to dictate the legislative agenda and control both houses 
(Carey, 2009). While this situation may have been viewed as facilitating the smooth 
interface of executive and legislative coordination that eliminates gridlock in the passage 
of legislation, the pattern of influence of the president over the legislature continue to 
raise questions on the independence of Congress as a separate branch of the Government 
of Philippine (Rose-Ackerman, Desierto and Volosin, 2010). 
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3.3.4. Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System of Malawi 
The republic of Malawi is a unitary state headed by a republican President and operates 
in a framework of multi-party representative democratic system. It got its independence 
from Britain on July 6, 1964 and adopted a republican constitution two years later. The 
government is a hybrid system combining both the features of a presidential and a 
parliamentary system of government (Lembani, 2007).  
 
The Constitution of Malawi at independence provided for three organs of the state, 
namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary (Nenani and Kayanula-Banda, 
2010). The parliament in Malawi was modeled after the British parliament while the 
Head of State remained the Queen of England but the executive organ was headed by the 
Prime Minister. This constitution also ensured a form of limited exercise of governmental 
authority on the part of the executive organ (Hara, 2006).  
 
With Malawi becoming a republic in 1966, a new Republican Constitution came into 
force which retained the three organs of the state – the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. The constitution vested the supreme executive powers in the office of the 
President, while the legislature - National Assembly consisted of 50 elected members, 5 
nominated members, one appointed Speaker and 3 appointed Ministers who were not 
Members of Parliament (Chigawa, 2006). Following the amendment of the constitution in 
1970, the country officially became a one-party state with the Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP) as the national party and Banda its life president. Members of the National 
Assembly therefore, had to be members of the MCP. The MCP‟s procedures and the 
executive presidential system of government were structured in such a way that they 
sought to exert supreme control over government and the people. Thus the main theme 
that ran throughout this constitution was that of a strong executive authority vested in the 
President and the recognition of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as the only party. In 
fact, the constitution specifically mentioned Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda as a life President of 
Malawi (Chinsinga, 2010).  
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Emerging from this supreme executive authority of the President and the one-party 
scenario, the Malawi Parliament was largely a rubber stamp assembly for decisions made 
by the executive (Patel, 2008). Opposition to the government was illegalised, practically 
concealed and perceivably treasonous. This was reinforced by Section 2 of the 1966 
Republican Constitution which established Malawi upon the four cornerstones of Unity, 
Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline. The Republican Constitution and the MCP gave Dr. 
Banda absolute power to decide who could occupy political office and who could be 
elected for a given parliamentary constituency. For example, in 1981, thirty-eight (38) 
out of the one-hundred and twenty five (125) MPs were nominated by Dr. Banda and had 
no legitimate constituency to represent (Khembo, 2004). Thus, the executive presidency 
fully controlled the legislature, while all other public institutions and officers strictly 
observed the „four cornerstones‟. For more than 30 years, representative democracy was 
illusive and the single party system reinforced party patronage in Malawi (Chigawa, 
2006). All attempts at unseating the Banda government proved abortive until 1992 when 
the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and others pushed successfully for a referendum 
on adopting a multi-party system (Nenani and Kayanula-Banda, 2010). On May 17, 1994, 
Malawi conducted its first multiparty elections with Dr. Bakili Muluzi, the head of the 
United Democratic Front (UDF), emerging as the new Head of State (Chinsinga, 2008).  
In the parliamentary elections, UDF won eighty-five (85) seats, MCP fifty-six (56) and 
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), thirty six (36) seats. This shows that, no party won 
the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution to conduct legislative business, or the 
fifty percent (50%) required to pass bills (Nenani and Kayanula-Banda, 2010).  
 
The 1994 Constitution however, clearly establishes three separate branches of 
government with clear separate functions. Chapters VI, VIII and IX deal with the 
composition and powers of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government, ensuring the separation of powers between them (Government of Malawi, 
2002). Under the new constitution, the president, who is both chief of state and head of 
the government, is elected by popular vote through the universal direct suffrage (Section 
80 (2)) for a five years term (Section 83). Malawi has a vice president who is elected with 
the president. The president has the option of appointing a second vice president, who 
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must be from a different party (Lembani, 2007). The three arms of Government operate 
independently. The Cabinet of Malawi is the executive branch of the government made 
up of the President, Vice-President and Ministers who are appointed at the sole discretion 
of the President. Ministers can be appointed from members of the National Assembly or 
non-members (Section 51 (3) of the Constitution).  
 
The Legislature on the other hand, is made up of the National Assembly, a unicameral 
system comprised of one-hundred and ninety-three (193) members of parliament elected 
by universal suffrage, each of whom serves for a five-year term in single-seat 
constituencies. The constitution also provides for a second house, a Senate of eighty (80) 
seats, but no action was taken to create it (Patel, Tambulasi, Molande and Mpesi, 2007). 
The Senate is intended to provide representation for traditional leaders and the different 
geographical districts, as well as various special interest groups, such as women, youth, 
and the disabled. The President does not have statutory powers to nominate any Member 
of Parliament. The Judiciary branch of the government of Malawi is headed by the Chief 
Justice an independent branch which is free from the control of both the legislature and 
the executive branch (Chinsinga, 2010).  
 
Recognising the inevitability of interactions of the branches in the discharge of their 
respective duties however, the constitution provides a number of checks and balances as a 
framework against absolute separation of the branches of the State. The President must 
assent to all Bills passed by the legislature for them to become law. The dates for 
Parliamentary sessions are determined after consultation between the Speaker and the 
President. Though Parliament can initiate legislation through private members‟ Bills, 
legislation is in general initiated and presented to Parliament by members of the Cabinet. 
The Attorney-General, a member of the executive, is also a principal legal adviser to 
government (Patel et.al., 2007). On its part, the National Assembly exercises power of 
scrutiny over policies and decisions made by the executive. The National Assembly can 
also, in the process of enacting legislation, change bills as drafted by the executive. 
Political appointments are within the powers of the President, but the National Assembly 
must ratify such appointments. The National Assembly can also impeach judges and the 
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President. The impeachment of judges has to be approved by the President. The judiciary 
may declare any act of parliament invalid if it is inconsistent with the Constitution; the 
judiciary has unlimited jurisdiction to review the legality or constitutionality of the 
Executive‟s and Parliament‟s decisions and actions (Hara, 2006; Mwale, 2006).  
 
This successful transition, and the balance of power in the legislature, brought high hopes 
that the National Assembly of Malawi would be independent of the executive and 
therefore would be able to perform its core constitutional roles of legislation, oversight 
and citizens‟ representation. On the contrary, Malawi since the installation of multi-party 
system in May 1994, continues to face the challenge of lack of good working relations 
with parliament and has severely undermined the ability of the legislature to perform its 
functions (Patel et.al., 2007). The democratic consolidation has been limited by the 
declining performance of legislature‟s constitutional role and its inability to fully exercise 
its authority vis-à-vis the executive. Since the introduction of multiparty competition, the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) continues to dominate Malawi‟s political arena 
(Chinsinga, 2010). 
 
Despite the challenges the Malawi parliament faces, it distinguished itself in 2002 when it 
helped to maintain constitutionality by denying the president‟s bid to change the 
constitution to allow him stay beyond the constitutional limit of two terms (Patel, et „al, 
2007). The attempt to amend the constitution so as to allow for an open/third presidential 
term is an indication of the elements of presidential autocracy with its attendant vices 
such as coercion, bribery, intimidation and violence by means of the Young Democrats in 
the face of widespread popular resistance. Despite such harsh methods the amendment 
bill was eventually defeated (van de Walle 2002). Its defeat can be seen as an example of 
the assertion of parliament‟s accountability role vis-à-vis the executive. Since then 
however, the parliament has been less effective in performing its main functions in the 
face of the continuous domination of the President (Nenani and Kayanula-Banda, 2010). 
 
One of the major factors responsible for this has been structural (legal and political 
system) problems that exist both within and outside the National Assembly that have 
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shaped its development (Patel et.al.,, 2007). According to the 1994 Constitution of 
Malawi cabinet ministers are recruited from the ranks of the legislators, although it is not 
an absolute requirement as non-elected technocrats can serve as ministers (Kamanga, 
2006). The status quo owes its legitimacy to section 51 (3) of the 1994 Constitution. 
Allowing Members of Parliament to double up as ministers however has been argued to 
create a tendency of reducing instances of deadlock that many otherwise operate to the 
detriment of governance (Forsyth, 2006). On the contrary however, this provision has 
been seen as negating the principle of separation of powers and as a result, during the 
very first post-1994 session of parliament, MPs from the Alliance for Democracy 
(AFORD) and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) objected to the full-time participation 
in the assembly debates by those cabinet ministers who were not elected members of the 
assembly referring to them as „strangers in the House‟ (Patel and Tolstensen, 2006; 
Nenani and Kayanula-Banda, 2010). Another effect of the status quo as regards the 
relationship between the legislature and the executive is that the balance of power is tilted 
towards the executive. Members of Parliament who are Ministers would almost always 
support Government in the House (Forsyth, 2006). The implication of this is that 
executive and the National Assembly easily conspires to take selfishly advantageous 
actions without consideration of the interests of the people of Malawi (Hara, 2006; 
Forsyth, 2006).  
 
 In addition, the doubling by ministers as MPs was seen as an inappropriate practice. The 
practice was seen as capable of breeding conflict of interest as it was tasking for such 
MPs to be serving the executive and the legislature at the same time (Mwale, 2006). It 
became starkly perturbed when nearly one-quarter and more of the MPs were also cabinet 
members. Since 1994 the practice has been that most members of the cabinet were from 
the National Assembly (Patel et.al., 2007). In 1996 for instance, out of thirty-three (33) 
members of the National Assembly, twenty-three (23) members doubled as Ministers and 
MPs, in 2001, thirty (30) out of thirty-seven (37) members doubled as Ministers and MP 
while in 2004, only five (5) members were Ministers not elected MPs (Patel and 
Tolstensen, 2006). The demanding nature of ministerial duties had the tendency of 
resulting to ministers neglecting their constituencies.  Another significance implication of 
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this provision is that it gives the President who has many Ministers from the National 
Assembly, and commands a majority in the National Assembly, power to control the 
National Assembly (Mwale, 2006).  
 
This history of Malawi‟s democracy has been that parliament never had a single party 
with a clear majority (Patel et.al., 2007). While this is good in the sense of having 
pluralism and space for opposition parties, it has also provided a theatre for power 
struggles between the executive and the legislature where the executive has found it 
difficult to develop a harmonious relationship with the legislature. The experience has 
therefore, been that Presidents without an overwhelming majority, enter into a coalition 
with another party with the purpose of gaining numbers (Partel et.al., 2007). Eventually, 
the party acquired more and more numbers until no meaningful oppositions exist. This 
has resulted in past government becoming less and less accountable as the President 
almost always succeeded in passing bills in the National Assembly (Forsyth, 2006). 
During President Muluzi‟s administration for instance, allegations of corruption became 
so widespread that before the expiration of his second term of office international donors 
had to withdraw aids to the country. Besides, this constitutional arrangement allows a 
situation where the Executive and the National Assembly easily conspire to take actions 
that may not serve the interests of the Malawians (Hara, 2006; Forsyth, 2006).  
 
Another factors that contribute to the excessive dominance of the executive over  the 
parliament of Malawi include the culture of excessive respect for those in authority, the 
politics of patronage, „poaching‟ MPs and floor-crossing (Khaila and Chibwana, 2005; 
Mthinda and Khaila, 2006; Nenani and Kayanula-Banda, 2010). Opposition parties in 
Malawi have normally emerged strong immediately after elections. The strength of the 
opposition parties was demonstrated on a number of issues, such as there being well 
represented in the various parliamentary committees (Patel and Tostensen, 2006; 
Lembani, 2007). The opposition was too strong and proved a threat to the minority UDF 
government. Consequently the government could not conduct its business and get bills 
passed. Despite their immediate post-election strength, however, opposition parties in 
Malawi have tended to lose power and vigour as time passed by (Khembo, 2004). This is 
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partly due to defections or crossing of the floor by MPs, and partly due to coalition 
formation (Patel and Tostensen, 2006; Lembani, 2007).  Pos-elections in Malawi 
multiparty system often result to coalitions in order to form a majority seats in the 
parliament. Conversely, where formalized post-election coalitions have been sabotaged 
or collapse, the governments often resort to luring individual legislators to lend their 
support to the executive. This support, which is secured and sustained in covert and overt 
form, has been deemed to constitute floor crossing (Lembani, 2007). 
 
Like other countries of the region, Malawi is largely a victim of neopatrimonialism, 
where though a framework of formal law and administration exist, the state is informally 
captured by patronage networks which produces strongly presidentialist political systems 
irrespective of the constitution (Van de Walle, 2003; Khaila and Chibwana, 2005; 
Cammack and Kelsall, 2010). The distribution of the spoils of office in Malawi takes 
precedence over the formal functions of the state. This tends to severely limit the ability 
of public officials to make policies in the general interest of the people. This has been the 
striking case of Malawi, despite the transition from personal dictatorship to multi-party 
politics in 1994 (Cammack, 2011). Both periods have witnessed a systematic failure to 
distinguish between private sector resources, state resources and the resources of the 
ruling party. The politics of patronage, use of „money power‟ (accumulation and 
distribution of spoils), corruption and political exploitation have been the characteristic 
ways of building and sustaining political loyalties in both periods (Mthinda and Khaila, 
2006; Cammack and Kelsall, 2010). These syndromes continued to drive policy to a large 
extent and the ascendancy of presidential supremacy in the face of formal provision for 
balanced of power in Malawi. The patronage powers of the President are so great that 
they effectively neutralise the independent effectiveness of other political and state 
institutions, including political parties, parliament, the judiciary and the security services. 
Checks on the accountability of the executive thus become weak as a result (Chigawa, 
2006).  
 
The examination of legislature-executive relations in Malawi has shown a continuous 
weakening of the legislative powers in the face of continuous supremacy of the President. 
117 
 
Two broad factors have been largely resulted into this. First is the institutional provision 
that seems to allocate much power to the President while implicitly relegating the 
legislature to secondary role. More importantly is however, the failure of the practitioners 
of the constitution to follow the rule of the game as provided in the constitution. 
Malawi‟s political system continues to witness glaring divergences between the 
constitutional stipulations and the governance practice. As Hara (2006) noted, tensions 
between the branches of government in Malawi do not necessarily arise from inherent 
weaknesses of the Constitution; the tensions arise from the pursuit of personal and 
partisan interests by those in the political organs of the State: the legislature and the 
executive. As he rightly observed, there shouldn‟t be tension if all the organs of the State 
exercised their constitutional authority solely in the interests of the people of Malawi, 
there should be little, if any, tension. The concomitant effect of these broad factors is the 
subordination of the legislature to the executive in Malawi. 
 
 3.4. Legislature-Executive Relations in Comparative Perspective  
The presidential model of governance is unlike the parliamentary democracy in which a 
cordial relationship is expected between the two political institutions (executive and 
legislature) since members of the cabinet (executive) are drawn from among the party 
that controls the majority in the parliament. In the case of parliamentary democracy, the 
cabinet is part of, and derives its political power from being part of the parliament 
(Nwabueze, 1985; Momoh, 2000). The executive is dependent upon the legislature for its 
existence, and may be dismissed by a legislative vote of no confidence (Lijphart, 2004). 
The majority party or a majority coalition in the legislature chooses the members of the 
executive (Hankla, 2002). In other words, under the parliamentary system, executive 
power is drawn from the legislature and the executive generally remains in power for as 
long as the governing parliamentary group holds. Parliamentary democracies therefore, 
tend be more stable and hence last longer than presidential systems (Linz, 1994; Lijphart, 
2004; Cheibub, 2007).  
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature in a parliamentary system 
depends on the management of relationships among the parties, as well as on the 
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government‟s ability to muster and hold together a reliable majority of supportive votes 
(Mbah, 2000). Scholars have, however, identified an irony of parliamentary systems that 
tend to result in weaker parliaments and stronger executives than their presidential 
counterparts (Lipset 1992; Hankla, 2002; Schlesinger, 2004). This seeming anomaly 
results from a number of factors.  Because executive power is drawn from legislatures in 
parliamentary systems, strong party discipline is necessary to ensure the survival of 
governments.  Whereas party defection in a presidential system might prevent a piece of 
legislation from becoming law, the repercussions of defection in parliamentary systems 
are potentially much more serious. If executives in parliamentary systems are unable to 
retain their majorities, they may collapse (Hankla, 2002). As a result, individual 
legislators are under significant pressure to vote with their party leaders, who are usually 
the very individuals selected to constitute the executive.   
 
Another factor that further strengthens the power of the executive over the legislature 
under parliamentary systems is the fact that the agenda setting power usually rests with 
party leaders in the government (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). While, parliamentary 
systems give the legislature the final right to dismiss the government, this power is, 
however, a blunt instrument that cannot usually be employed as a threat to  influence 
individual pieces of legislation (Lijphart, 1999). Perhaps this finding can be understood 
more clearly by examine a country with parliamentary system of government. Israel‟s 
parliamentary system thus suits our analysis. 
 
Under Israeli Law, the Cabinet Ministers including the Prime Minister are collectively 
accountable to the Knesset, Israel‟s parliament for their actions. As the legislative branch 
of the state, the Knesset is meant to play a significant role in supervising the work of the 
government (El-Gendy, 2010). Any Knesset faction (a minimum of 2 members of 
Knesset) may submit a motion of no confidence in the government. If a motion of no 
confidence is submitted, the Knesset must vote on it at its first meeting during the week 
following the submission. If the no-confidence motion receives a majority of 61 votes, 
general elections are called within 60 days. The defeated government continues to 
function as a caretaker until a new government is established (El-Gendy, 2010). 
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However, like many other parliamentary democracies, the Knesset‟s exercise of 
supremacy over the government is only in theory. In spite of this formal control of the 
legislature over the executive, in practice, the focus of political power is in the executive 
while the legislature has been reduced to a staging ground (Arian, Nachmias and Amir, 
2002). 
 
Even as the party system in Israel's parliamentary government becomes more 
fractionalized and coalitions became increasingly difficult to manage, the executive 
continued to retain its firm control of power and dominance of the Knesset (Arian, Atmor 
and Hadar, 2007). As of 2009, there were 12 political parties represented in the Knesset, 
spanning both the political and religious spectra. This resulted in a fragmented legislature 
in which small parties were being represented in the Knesset and no party ever had the 
required majority (more than 60 seats) to form a government on its own (El-Gendy, 
2010). This system also allowed fringe parties which hold views outside the mainstream 
political and public consensus to have representation in the Knesset. Examples of these 
are the Haredi religious parties, parties that represent the national religious or limited 
agenda parties such as Gil, which represented pensioners in the 2006 elections (Garaysi, 
2006; Arian, Atmor and Hadar, 2007). 
 
The Mapai, Israel‟s governing Labour Party, until the late 1960s, enjoyed almost a free 
hand in policy formulation, since its relatively safe position of dominance effectively 
prevented any initiative by the opposition to introduce any significant check on executive 
power. The party, though never able to achieve an absolute majority in the Knesset - 
something that would have made Israelis parliamentary system close to a Westminster 
model – enjoyed a relatively high degree of smooth decision-making in economic and 
social matters. Even after it was resoundingly defeated in 1977 by the right-of-centre 
Likud Party, the arrangements developed over three decades left a strong executive in 
place (Libai, Lynn, Rubinstein, and Tsiddon, 1990). The persistence of conflict in the 
Middle East and the resulting prominence of security concerns in Israel‟s policy-making 
allowed the executive to retain a firm control of power (Susser, 1989; Ottolenghi, 2004). 
Hence, despite the multi-party format of the system and the polarized nature of society, 
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Israel coalition governments continue to enjoy unprecedented executive dominance over 
the Knesset (Ottolenghi, 2004). The increasing dominance of the executive in Israel has 
been described as a clear manifestation of 'presidentialization‟ of Israeli‟s parliamentary 
democracy (Korn, 2010). 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on executive legislative relations in presidential political systems. It 
examine the institutional designs the presidential system and the implication that such 
designs portends for legislature-executive relationship. Both executive and the legislative 
branches are elected separately by a popular vote for a fixed term and therefore, 
presidential system is characterized by dual democratic legitimacy.  The fact that the two 
branches have separate origin and separate survival insinuates a mutual interdependence 
between the two branches of government. The system of checks and balance at the face 
of separation of powers escalated by party fragmentation, a concomitant of multipartism, 
that characterize a presidential system of government often create deadlock and gridlock 
between the two. The President would therefore, have to seek for paraconstitutional 
means of getting legislation in the parliament passed in favour of his preference. This 
makes the presidential system to behave like parliamentary system. The power of the 
President to do this is enhanced by his power to distribute pork, a scenario that is 
common among the various countries examined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATURE-EXECUTIVE 
RELATIONS IN NIGERIA’S PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM  
  
4.1. Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the origin and development of the executive and the 
legislative institutions and presidential system in Nigeria. In addition, this chapter 
examines the nature of legislature-executive relations in the Nigeria‟s presidential system 
beginning from the Second Republic when the constitution of the country was first 
drafted in favour of presidentialism. A critical analysis of these issues is germane to the 
understanding of the contemporary realities of legislature-executive relations in the 
presidential system in Nigeria. 
 
4.2. Historical Development of the Executive and the Legislature in Nigeria 
There is no political community without a set of rules and governing body that determine 
and regulate the interactions among members of the community (Fashagba, 2009). Thus 
from the most ancient times to the present, in the process of ruling society, governmental 
institutions had existed to give directions to societal activities by mapping out policies, 
implementing and enforcing these policies and settling disputes arising from the rules 
enacted (Edosa and Azelama, 1995). Consequently therefore, traditional institutions of 
governance had existed in the kingdoms and communities in Nigeria through which laws 
were made and administered (Okoh, 1995; Bello-Imam, 2005).  These basic political 
institutions were not separated as such but fused into one structure. The King was at one 
and the same time the executive, the legislator and the judge. This was so because   both 
the structure and functions of government had not assumed a complex nature as found 
today (Abonyi, 2006). Modern political institutions in Nigeria however, are traceable to 
the British colonial government which produced various constitutions for Nigeria in 
1922, 1933, 1946, 1951, 1954 and 1960 (Ayodele, 2002). In all these constitutions, 
legislative and executive organs were created at various times in different regions of the 
131 
 
country (Aghalino, 2006; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). The nature and development of these 
institutions of governance in Nigeria under the colonial administration are examined in 
detail in the next section. 
 
4.2.1 Legislative and Executive Institutions under the Colonial Administration in 
Nigeria 
The British Colonial powers established the Legislative and Executive Council in 1862 
for the Colony of Lagos. The Legislative Council composed of the Colonial Governor, 
six officials, two Europeans, and two Nigerians, who were unofficial members. The 
Legislative Council was however, a mere advisory body to the Governor and was 
supervised by the Executive (Kaiser, 2005). The Executive Council on the other hand, 
was established for the whole of Nigeria and headed by the Governor who was also the 
president of the Legislative Council (Ehindero, 1991). Following the amalgamation of the 
Colony of Lagos with the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914, a Nigerian 
Council which existed side by side with the Legislative Council was established. The 
Nigerian Council comprised of 36 members, out of which 23 were Europeans officials, 7 
European businessmen, and 6 Nigerians mainly traditional rulers. These legislative 
bodies were however, not law-making institutions as the British intended them only to be 
deliberative houses and hence performed no legislative functions (Nwabueze, 1982). 
 
In 1922, the Clifford constitution merged the Legislative Council of 1862 meant for the 
Colony of Lagos with the Nigerian Council of 1914 to become a new one under the new 
ordinance - the Nigerian Legislative Council which for the first time, was established for 
the whole of Nigeria (Mbah, 2001).  The council was however, a mere deliberative body 
consisting of Nigerians and a majority of officials or nominees of the colonial 
government. The resolutions of the council have no force of law, and in spite of the 
embracive coloration of the council however, its jurisdiction was confined to the 
Southern provinces, including the colony of Lagos, the council did not legislate for the 
Northern provinces. The Northern Nigeria continued to be governed by order from the 
colonial office in London and the Governor in Lagos (Oyediran, 2007). It is perhaps 
imperative to note here that the Nigerian Legislative Council created by the Colonial 
132 
 
master was not for any altruistic motive, rather it was meant to enable the British officials 
obtain, in the central exercise of their power, as much local advice and opinions as could 
be evoked (Olusanye, 1980). 
 
The composition of the Executive Council on the other hand was predominantly 
Europeans as Africans were not represented in the Council despite enormous powers it 
wielded. It was composed of the Governor, Chief Secretary, Governor of Southern and 
Northern Provinces, the Administrator of the Colony and the various heads of 
departments. The governor was conferred with wide power that created a forum for 
unrestrained use of absolute power (Olusanye, 1980). The implication of the exclusion of 
Nigerians from the Executive Council was that Nigerians had no opportunities of being 
part of the formulation and implementation of policies that had far reaching effects on 
their lives.  Furthermore, the subordination of the Nigeria Legislative Council to the 
Executive Council subjected the latter to the whims and caprices of the Governor. The 
Governor was empowered to veto or give consent to any law passed by the Legislative 
Council subject to the instruction given to him by the British Government. No law took 
effect until he or the British Government had assented to it. He also had power to suspend 
any member of the Legislative Council with the approval of the British Government. In 
fact, the Executive Council was also headed by the Governor thus, making him a tyranny.  
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the 1922 Constitution was the introduction of 
Elective Principle which, for the first time, provided opportunity for Africans to elect 
their representatives and participate in the legislative process. This political development 
provided an impetus for the early rise of nationalist movements in Nigeria and also the 
evolution of political parties in the Country (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008). It was 
during the period that the first Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) led by 
Herbert Macaulay was formed. Also, the Nigerian Youth Movement and the National 
Council of Nigerian Citizens were formed. The political parties joined forces with the 
nationalist movements to give the British Government a stiff opposition.  The elective 
principle however, came under heavy criticisms by the African elites on the basis that it 
limited the franchise of Africans. According to the Constitution, only the British subjects 
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or protected persons who met the condition of possession of properties and annual gross 
income of 100 Pound Sterling were qualified to vote, or be voted for (Okafor, 1981). 
These conditions made it difficult for many Nigerians in Lagos and Calabar to be 
qualified. The outrageous income was fixed at a time when an average worker earned 
about 25 pence a day (Oyediran, 2007). 
 
The two political entities of Nigeria Southern and Northern Protectorates however, 
continued to be governed by separate legislative bodies, until 1946 when the newly 
promulgated Richard‟s Constitution, made provisions for one legislature for the whole of 
Nigeria and regional legislative councils, known as House of Assembly, with the 
principal function of presenting nominees for the central legislative body (Mbah, 2005). 
The increasing agitations by Nigerians for more representation and participation in their 
affairs had led Sir Arthur Richards, who then had become the Governor of Nigeria, to 
introduce further changes in the development of these organs of government in the 
country (Odumu, 2010). Thus Richard Constitution established a Central Nigeria 
Legislative Council with overwhelming African majority and created three regional 
assemblies for the three provinces, viz – North, West and East which it had delineated 
(Ehindero, 1991). These provincial divisions roughly corresponded to the major ethnic 
groups in the country – Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West and Igbo in the 
East (Kaiser, 2005).  
 
The Central Legislative Council, for the first time however, had an overwhelming 
African majority and had jurisdiction to make laws for the whole country (Akinboye and 
Anifowose, 2008).  The council consisted of 45 members, the Governor who continued to 
be the president, 16 official members, 13 Ex-officio members and 3 nominated members 
and 28 Un-official members, 4 directly elected members and 24 nominated or indirectly 
elected members (Ojo, 1997). Each of the Western and Eastern Regions had a unicameral 
legislature – House of Assembly, while the Northern Region had a bicameral legislature 
comprising a House of Assembly and House of Chiefs. The House of Chiefs was made 
up of first class chiefs only and was presided over by the Chief Commissioner – a new 
title for the Lt. Governor, while the House of Assembly was composed of nominees of 
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the Native Authorities from among their own members as well as official and unofficial 
members. The monetary requirement noticeable in Clifford‟s Constitution was reduced in 
order not to disenfranchise eligible voters and contestants for political offices (Oyediran, 
2008).  The Executive Council was however not affected by the new constitution. 
Membership was still mostly officials and some nominated members. The Governor was 
still all powerful and overawed the Legislative Council as he dictated the pace and no 
ordinance could be passed without his consent. The Legislative Council was therefore, 
not different in functions and capacity from that of the 19922 even though it had wider 
representation and the unofficial members were in the majority (Ojo, 1997). The 
emphasis of the Richards Constitution on regionalism was however, criticized as having 
attendant negative consequences on the unity of Nigeria. The constitution was thus 
regarded as a divisible document (Kaiser, 2005; Aghalino, 2006).  
Richard Constitution could not run its full course of nine years due to the vociferous 
opposition to its configurations. A new constitution was therefore, promulgated five years 
later. When Sir Macpherson became the Governor of Nigeria in 1948, he decided to 
fashion out a new constitution and after much deliberations and debates of the draft 
constitution, Macpherson Constitution (1951) sought to impose a colonial hybrid 
arrangement, which had the characteristics of both Federal and unitary legal frameworks 
(Aghalino, 2006). The constitution represented a major advance from the pre-existing 
constitutional provisions. It introduced majorities in the central legislature - the House of 
Representatives (replacing the Legislative Council) and the regional legislature (Houses 
of Assembly). Thus the number of the elected Nigerians into the legislative councils both 
at the central and regional levels was increased. Both the North and the West had a bi-
camera Legislature each while the East had a single-chamber legislature (Ojo, 1997). The 
House of Representatives was composed of 136 indirectly elected members (68 from the 
North and 34 from each of the West and the East, 6 ex-officio members and 6 special 
members appointed by the Governor. In the Northern Regional Assemblies, the House of 
Assembly was composed of the President appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor, 4 
Official members, 10 Special members and 90 elected members. The House of Chiefs 
composed of the Governor as President, all first class Emirs and 37 other Chiefs, 3 
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Official members and 1 Adviser on Moslem Law. The Western Regional House of 
Assembly was composed of the Governor as the President, 4 Official members, 3 Special 
members and 80 elected members while the House of Chiefs was made up of Lieutenant-
Governor as President, 50 first and second class Obas, 3 Official members and 3 Special 
members. The Eastern Regional House of Assembly was however, composed of 
Lieutenant-Governor as President, 5 Official members, 3 Special members and 80 elected 
members. Elections into the regional assembly were through Electoral College system 
(Mbah, 2001). While the House of Representatives could legislate on any matter 
whatsoever, the regional legislatures were no longer consultative or advisory bodies 
(Okhaide, 1995). The Governor however still had the reserved powers to refuse assent to 
any bill passed by the central legislature or to enact into law, bills rejected by the 
parliament. He had power to stop or propose amendment to any regional bill considered 
to be in conflict with the national interest. 
The Constitution also established a Central Executive Council and Regional Executive 
Councils (Okhaide, 1995; Mbah, 2001). It is important to point out that members of the 
executive council were no longer solely officials, but included elected and few nominated 
members. The “Nigerianization” of the executive council on this platform was indeed, a 
landmark step towards the attainment of self-government in Nigeria‟s political 
development. The Central Executive Council consisted of the Governor himself, 6 ex-
officio members and 12 Ministers appointed by the Governor from the Central 
Legislature after consultation with the Lieutenant Governor of the Region from which 
they had been elected in the first instance. The Ministers could be removed by the 
Governor or at the instance of an address moved by two-third members of the House of 
Representatives (Oyediran, 2007). Each of the Regional Executive Council however, 
consisted of the Lt. Governor, not more than 5 officials and 6 to 9 Ministers appointed by 
the Lt. Governor from the regional legislatures with the support and approval of the 
legislature. While the Lt. Governors, in the exercise of their executive powers, took their 
directives from the Governor, they could remove a Minister at their discretion or upon an 
address passed by a simple majority of the regional legislature (Ojo, 1997).  
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It is imperative to note at this juncture, that the unequivocal division of constitutional 
powers between the central and the regional legislatures by the constitution was an 
introduction of a quasi-federal structure into the political and constitutional development 
in Nigeria. In order to avoid conflict of powers therefore, the constitution stipulated that 
in the event of a clash under the concurrent legislative matters, the regional laws was void 
to the extent of its inconsistency with that of the central legislature (Aghalino, 2006). 
Furthermore, a profound consequence of the constitutional provision for the 
establishment of a regional legislature along the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria was 
the emergence of ethnic-based parties with its attendant acrimonious politics and ethnic 
cleavage, a phenomenon that exists in Nigeria political experience even till date. Ethic-
based political parties such as the National Council of Nigerians and the Cameroons, 
(NCNC) Action Group, (AG) and the Northern People‟s congress, (NPC) emerged. In 
addition, the constitution was described as a wretched compromise between federalism 
and unitarism because it contained some provisions that were patently contradictory to 
the principles and norms of federalism (Mbah, 2001). As observed by Awolowo (1966), 
the Federation which existed under the Macpherson‟s Constitution was a very tight one 
and proved unbearably restrictive and obstructive in operation. Moreover, the 
constitutional provision for regional legislature and executive insinuated legislature-
executive frictions in almost all the regions. In the East for instance, the Governor had to 
result to the use of his reserved powers to allocate money for government business due to 
the refusal of the Regional House of Assembly to pass all bills sent to it (Mbah, 2001).  
These and some other factors such as intra-party crisis, mutual suspicion by major ethnic 
groups, the Kano riots of May 1953 and the issue of self-government in 1956 precipitated 
the total breakdown of the Constitution in 1953. 
Despite the constitutional advancement made by Macpherson Constitution, it was 
unsatisfactory to Nigerian nationalists who vigorously campaigned for its replacement. A 
constitutional conference was therefore, called both in London in 1953 and in Lagos in 
1954 which lead to the setting aside of the Macpherson Constitution and was replaced by 
the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008). The 1954 Lyttleton 
Constitution laid the foundations for a classical Federation for Nigeria as it provided for 
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the first time, the residual, exclusive and the concurrent lists, and defined the spheres of 
powers between the central and regional legislative houses. Nigeria therefore, emerged as 
a federation with three regions independent of the centre. Each region had a Premier, a 
cabinet and a legislature, while the Governor-General and the regional governors were no 
longer members of the legislature (Eso, 1976; Aghalino, 2006). Suffice to state also, is 
the creation of the post of a Prime Minister by the constitution and the consequent 
emergence of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) as 
the occupant (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008). 
With respect to the legislative institutions, the constitution retained for the federation, the 
House of Representatives presided over by the Speaker and no longer the Governor. The 
House of Representatives composed of a Speaker, 3 ex-officio members, and 184 
Representatives elected from the various constituencies in Nigeria with the North having 
92 members, East and West, 42 each, Southern Cameroons 6 and Lagos 2 members. The 
House of Representatives was vested with power to make laws for the country and 
discuss financial matters. Regional legislatures were to become independent of the 
Central Legislature and thus the centre‟s power to approve regional laws was removed. 
While bicameral legislature (House of Chiefs and House of Assembly) was maintained in 
the North and West, the East had only a House of Assembly (Ojo, 1997). In the West, the 
Governor or his nominee was no longer President in any of the houses, The President of 
the House of Chiefs and the Speaker of the House of Assembly were appointed by free 
votes in the respective Houses. In the East however, the Governor still appointed the 
Speaker of the House of Assembly while in the North, the Governor still presided over 
the House of Chiefs and his nominee presided over the House of Assembly. Following 
the federal structure, three legislative lists were created – an exclusive legislative list 
which specified the items on which the House of Representatives had powers to legislate 
upon, a concurrent list which the House of Representatives and the Regional Houses of 
Assembly had coexisting legislative powers; and a residual list made up of items on 
which the regional legislatures alone had powers upon (Ojo, 1997).  
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The Executive-Council at the federal level however, was made up of the Governor-
General who presided over the council, ministers appointed from the federal legislature 
from among the party with overall majority. They were now ministers with portfolio 
having direct control over departments (Oyediran, 2007). It is observed here that the 
selection of ministers from the party with overall majority in the legislature was 
obviously a gradual introduction of the Westminster parliamentary system into the 
political development of Nigeria. This agenda was however concretized in the 
independence Constitution of 1960.  
 
The salient issue that needs to be raised at this juncture is the way and manner the 
executive and especially, the legislature evolved and developed under the colonial 
administration. These political institutions hardly had any real functional power as an 
institution of governance. They were mere advisory tools in the hands of the Governor 
who was not in any means constitutionally committed to govern with the decisions of 
these institutions. They were not in any way designed to build a Nigerian State, but 
essentially administrative strategies designed for better administration of the colonial 
state (Akinboye and Anifowosem, 2008).  At no time during the colonial period did the 
type or the extent of executive and legislative power seemed to be an important issue. 
The principal legislative and executive powers of the colony were vested in the 
Governor-General of Nigeria and in the Governors of the Regions, all of whom 
theoretically, exercised their powers as the representatives of the British monarch.  Even  
on  the  eve  of independence when  the independence constitution was  under discussion, 
there seemed to  be little or no attention paid to the type  of  executive  which  should  be  
established.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the Federation of Nigeria found itself with an 
almost exact copy of the British parliamentary system (Juergensmeyer, 1964).  
 
It is perhaps more pertinent to note that the Nigerian Legislature developed as an 
appendage and necessary extension of the colonial state which brought it to existence not 
to perform legislative functions as the most important institution of liberal democratic 
state but to perform ratificatory functions for the executive directives issued by the 
Colonial Governor. Thus the Nigerian legislature, from its creation and embryonic stage, 
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was subordinated to the needs and logic of the legislature of the metropolis and as a result 
was prevented from developing as an autonomous institution with the attributes of 
legislature in modern democratic state (Adebo, 1988). The colonial legislature were not 
designed to perform such enviable role as were characteristic of their precursors in 
Europe in limiting royal absolutism but were merely designed to compliment the work of 
the colonial governments by serving as agencies for articulation of views and ventilation 
of popular feelings that were not expected to radically change the patterns and policies of 
the respective colonial governments (Alabi, 2009). This orientation was to have a long 
lasting effect on the performance of the legislature, not only during but even years after 
effective renunciation of colonial rule. Thus at independence, Nigeria inherited weak 
political institutions and inexperienced leadership. These institutions (executive and 
legislative) at independence, are examined in detail in the next section.  
 
4.2.2 Legislative and Executive Institutions in the First Republic of Nigeria 
 
The necessity for an independent Nigeria prompted the Constitutional Conference of 
London in 1957 and Lagos in 1958 (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008). Agreements were 
reached in those conferences, among which was that Nigeria should be granted 
independence on October 1, 1960. The independence constitution of Nigeria came into 
force on October 1, 1960 and established a Parliament system modeled after the British 
parliamentary democracy (Mbah, 2001). Chapter V of the Independent Constitution 
provided for a bicameral legislature made up of a House of Representatives of 312 
elected members and a Senate of 44 nominated members. The Senate was presided upon 
by a President who must be a Senator or a person who was qualified for selection as a 
Senator. The House of Representatives was however, headed by a Speaker elected from 
among members of the House. Two legislative lists were established – the Exclusive 
Legislative List of 44 items for the Parliament and the Concurrent Legislative List  
consisting of 28 items on which both the Parliament and the Regional Houses of 
Assembly were empowered to make laws  (Ojo, 1997). Both the Federal and the regional 
legislatures were competent to legislate with respect to matters contained in the 
concurrent list (Elias, 1967). 
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The life of the Parliament was five years except that the Governor-General might at any 
time dissolve it, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. The 
resolution of the House of Representatives on the ground of a vote of no confidence on 
the government of the federation may also result to the dissolution of the Parliament. The 
Governor-General could also dissolve the Parliament if the Office of the Prime Minister 
was vacant and there was no prospect of appointing someone who could command the 
support of the majority of members of the House (Dudley, 1982).  
 
The executive organ at the centre was made up of the Governor-General (representing the 
queen) who was the ceremonial head of State and the Prime Minister who was the 
executive head. The fact that the country operated the Westminster Parliamentary system 
meant that executive power derived from legislative majority (of the NPC and NCNC at 
the centre) (Osaghae, 2002). The Republican Constitution of 1963 was not a complete 
departure from the 1960 Constitution as all the changes it effected were that the Queen of 
England ceased to be Nigeria‟s Head of State as well as sit in the legislative houses 
(Mommoh, 2000).  Under the 1963 Constitution, the President who now replaced the 
Governor-General was a ceremonial Head of State and the Commander of the armed 
forces. The Prime Minister who was to be a member that commanded majority support in 
the House of Representatives was to be appointed by the President. There were therefore, 
two executives positions, namely, that of the president and the Prime Minister. Real 
executive power was in the hand of the Prime Minister who came from the largest party 
in the parliament. There was to be a Council of Ministers appointed by the President on 
the advice of the Prime Minister who was to be his advisers. The ministers were 
collectively responsible in ministerial responsibilities and functions to the legislature 
(Elias, 1967). The term of office of the President was for 5 years in the first instance. The 
number of times he could be re-elected depended on the continued majority support in the 
Parliament (Ojo, 1985). His removal was to be based on a motion of his misconduct or 
inability to perform his duty supported by at least one-fourth of all members of the Senate 
or the House of Representatives. An obvious lapse in the constitution was the fact that 
what constituted misconduct and in what condition could it be said that the President was 
unable to perform his functions was not explicitly clarified.   
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The political institutions operating at the centre were replicated at the regional level. The 
post of a Regional Governor and a Premier were provided for each of the regions. The 
power to appoint the Premier was exercised by the Regional Governor who continued to 
oversee the smooth running of government programmes in their respective regions 
(Mommoh, 2000). The Executive Council (consisting of the Premier and some other 
Ministers appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier) was collectively 
responsible to the regional legislature (Odunmosu, 1963). Members of the executive 
organ of each region were drawn from the legislatures in the regions. In general, the 
regional constitutions followed the federal model, both structurally and functionally. The 
most striking departure was in the Northern Region, where special provisions brought the 
regional constitution into consonance with Islamic law and custom (Ezera, 1960). 
Following the parliamentary tradition however, the same structure of party government 
existed in each region, but under an entirely different shape as de-facto one-party rule 
was the major feature of regional governments during the republic. Each of the regions 
was controlled by political party founded by the major ethnic groups within the regions 
(Osaghae, 1998).  
 
A significant feature of the parliamentary democracy of the First Republic was the fusion 
of the powers and personnel of the legislative and the executive branches of government 
(Isiola, 2002). The executive was part of, and derived its power from, being included in 
the legislature (Nwabueze, 1985; Momoh, 2000). Within this fused relationship, the 
responsibility for ensuring accountability was the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. 
Members of the Cabinet who constituted the executive were responsible to the parliament 
for the activities of the government. More importantly, is the power of the Parliament to 
pass a vote of no confidence on the government as a means of ensuring accountability. 
The usage of this power however, has the implication of resulting to the dissolution of the 
Parliament (Baker and Balogun, 1975). Thus, a cordial relationship is expected between 
the Parliament and the Executive. The party with the majority of seats in the House of 
Representative was constitutionally required to form government and by implication 
produced the Prime Minister who sat atop the executive or cabinet (Nwabueze, 1985).   
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It is perhaps pertinent to note at this juncture, that the executive in the First Republic did 
not emerge through a popular election. In the parliamentary system bequeathed to Nigeria 
during this period, whoever had the majority support in the parliament had to form the 
cabinet (Ojo, 1998). With the adoption of this model therefore, the executive power 
derived from the legislative majority (Osaghae, 2002). However, as a result of the 
coalition that Southern parties – the Action Group (AG) and the National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), entered into with the Northern minor parties – Northern 
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) 
respectively, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) was unable to win the majority seats 
required to form government alone (Osaghae, 1998). The necessity to produce the simple 
majority required to form government and successfully pass its measure consequently 
forced the NPC, the leading party in the house, into fragile alliance with the NCNC 
(Akinsanya, 2005). There was therefore, a tension and conflict laden dual headship of the 
executive, which had a titular head of government (called Governor-General at 
independence and President after 1963) and a Prime Minister who was the effective head 
of government (Osaghae, 2002). 
 
The legislature at the centre was bicameral, comprising of the Senate and House of 
Representative. The Senate however, had very limited legislative powers; it had delaying 
powers only and lacked jurisdiction over financial matters. In addition, the house 
appeared to have been transformed by politicians into a dumping ground for those who 
failed to win seats at popular elections but who had ambition to be ministers (Osaghae, 
2002). Moreover, the legislature in the First Republic consisted of the Queen, represented 
by the Governor-General at the centre and the Governor at the regions. A legislative 
measure therefore, could never become an Act without any one of these institutions (Ojo, 
1997). Thus, despite the country‟s independence, the legislature of the Nigeria‟s First 
Republic did not change in relations to the legislative power of the British Crown in 
Nigeria (Omoweh, 2006). 
 
The First Republic parliamentary system was however, terminated following the military 
intervention of January 1966. The collapse has been attributed to the inappropriateness of 
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the political institutions and process bequeathed to Nigeria by the Constitutions and their 
not being adequately entrenched under colonial rule as well as the failure of the elite to 
follow the rule of the game. The Westminster parliamentary system of government which 
was bequeathed to Nigeria by the 1960 and 1963 constitutions has been viewed as prone 
to fractionalization, confrontation and instability and therefore the root cause of the crises 
that led to the eventual collapse of the First Republic (Momoh, 2000; Dudley, 1982; 
Eteng, 1997; Akinwumi, 2004; Nwabueze, 1973 and Aniagolu, 1993, Akinsanya, 2005). 
Nigeria in the First Republic inherited the norms of British parliamentary democracy with 
provision for government and opposition. It is argued that the third world countries may 
not be ripe for “opposition” as practiced in countries like Britain where opposition was 
mostly constructive and saw itself as an alternative (and better) government and was 
prepared to exercise patience until the next elections to sell its programme to the 
electorate, and, if successful, unseat the incumbent government in place (Akinwumi, 
2004). The idea of a loyal opposition in parliament with its own shadow cabinet and 
specified parliamentary functions did not take root and within three years the key 
members of the opposition were found guilty of treasonable felony and sentenced to 
various terms of imprisonment (Adamolekun, 2003).   
 
In a Third World Country like Nigeria where the economy is under the control of the 
government, the concept of politicians particularly the government‟s opposition being 
abandoned on the fringes or in the wilderness of power without the chance of sharing in 
the federal amenities and patronage was hardly a comforting prospect (Akinsanya, 2005; 
Ekweme, 2005). In addition, parliamentary system is characterized with the ethos of 
winner-take-all and with the potential for tension between the formal power of the 
President and the actual power of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister shared power 
with the President, so also did the Premier and the Regional Governor. The President, 
who was constitutionally, the chief executive usually, exercised his powers on the advice 
of the Prime Minister and his cabinet members. So the practice of having a figure-head 
Head of State acting on the advice of a power-loaded Head of Government in the 
Westminster model did not conform to African political reality. Traditional rulers have 
always combined real and formal authority. The separation of real and formal authority 
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was therefore, meaningless in the context of Africa‟s historical experience. Separation 
leads to clash of personalities and interests, a conflict of authority and an unnecessary 
complexity and uncertainty in government (Akinsanya, 2005). In African society, the 
leader wants to assert his authorities without restraint, expectedly, there were clashes 
between the President and the Prime Minister (Aghalino, 2006). Furthermore, there was 
no complete separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature; 
consequently, the system was prone to instability (Dudley, 1982). The conflicts, fractions 
and confrontations between political actors that led to the failure of the state in the first 
republic have been described as inevitable factors in Westminster-style parliamentary 
democracy that the First Republican Constitutions bequeathed to Nigeria (Ezera, 1960, 
Dudley, 1982). These inadequacies of the parliamentary system of government thus 
exposed the system to instability.  The second factor was the elite who, lacking a political 
culture to sustain democracy, failed to play the political game according to established 
rules. It is argued that because members of the elite that took over from the colonialists 
lacked a material base for their aspirations, they resorted to control of state offices and 
resources. The elites saw the opportunity to perpetuate their selfish and parochial 
interests through the deadly manipulation of forces of identity, particularly ethnicity and 
religion (Momoh, 2000). The failure of the elite, however, has been argued to be a 
symptom rather than the cause of the problem. The uneven rates of development among 
the various groups and regions invested the struggle for state power with a group 
character. These factors gave importance to group, ethnic, and regional conflicts that 
eventually contributed to the collapse of the republic (Osaghae, 2002; Akinsanya, 2005). 
 
The military intervention in 1966 dethroned the Nigeria‟s democratic governance and 
marked the end of the First Republic. The legislative bodies were abolished. Legislative 
and executive powers were then exercised by the Military. Military incursion in to the 
political arena of Nigeria‟s political development further worsened the precarious 
situation of the legislative body in the country (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). The first military 
rule (1966 to 1979) created an authoritarian order and arrogated to itself the supreme 
power of the Nigerian state. It abolished the constitution and governed the country by 
decrees and proscribed elections until when the country returned to a presidential 
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democracy in 1979 (Omoruyi, 2002; Egwu, 2005). By 1976 the then Military government 
heeded the call of Nigerians for return to civilian constitutional and democratic 
governance and thereby commenced the processes of disengaging and returning the 
country to civilian rule referred to as the Second Republic. The next section examines the 
nature of the executive and the legislature in the Nigeria‟s Second Republic.  
 
4.2.3. Legislative and Executive Institutions in the Nigeria’s Second Republic 
The restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria on 1st October, I979 after thirteen years of 
military government was of landmark significance for Nigeria. In the programme of 
transition, the primary concern of the military leaders was to avoid the recurrence of the 
mistakes, disaster and disappointment of the First Republic (Read, 1979; Suberu, 1988). 
Their belief was that if the structures and processes of government and politics that had 
proved inappropriate in the First Republic could be changed, a stable and effective 
civilian government would emerge (Dudley, 1982; Oluleye, 1985). The collapse of the 
First Republic therefore informed the measures taken to engender democratic stability 
in the 1975 to 1979 transition programme (Osaghae, 2002). The transition was 
therefore, designed to address those fundamental issues, which were historically 
divisive and to establish new political institutions, processes, and orientations (Asia, 
2001). Accordingly, a 50-man Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) was appointed 
to review not only the 1963 Constitution but to also look at what other constitutional 
practices and lessons in other parts of the world could be used as input in crafting a 
constitutional system suited to the Nigerian environment (Aghalino, 2006). At the 
inaugural meeting of the committee on 18th of October, 1975, the Head of State of 
Nigeria expressed the views of the Supreme Military Council regarding the new 
constitution. According to him, it was to eliminate cut-throat political competition 
based on a system of winner takes-all, to discourage institutionalized opposition to the 
Government in power, to establish the principle of public accountability, to decentralize 
power, to ensure free and fair election and to devise an effective non-political system of 
census (Awotokun, 1998). In order to achieve these aims, the Supreme Military Council 
averred that it has carefully discussed and agreed on an executive presidential system of 
government in which the president and vice- president are elected, with clearly defined 
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powers and are accountable to the people while the choice of the Cabinet should reflect 
the Federal Character of the country and a genuine and truly national political parties 
(Oyediran, 1981). 
Unlike the constitutions of the First Republic, the Second Republic Constitution was a 
product of the groundwork prepared by a Constitution Drafting Committee and a 
Constituent Assembly made up of elected citizens acting as representatives of the people. 
The Constituent Assembly was composed of 230 members, of whom 20 were appointed 
by the government and 7 were the chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee and 
the chairpersons of its sub-committees. The remaining 203 members were elected by the 
local councils acting as electoral colleges (Nwabueze, 1985). The Constitutional Drafting 
Committee on the other hand, was made up of 49 independent people chosen for their 
specialist knowledge or background (Nwabueze, 1985). These two bodies functioned 
between 1978 and 1979 and produced the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1979 (Udoma 1994). An initial draft was presented to the assembly by the Constitution 
Drafting Committee. In fashioning the draft constitution, the committee considered 
memoranda from the general public. It was this bill which later became the constitution 
(Read, 1979). 
 
By Decree No. 25 of 1978, the 1979 Constitution was enacted. The Constitution differed 
from those of the First Republic in that it introduced a United States-type presidential 
system in place of the parliamentary system. The report of the 1977/78 Constituent 
Assembly clearly stated the reason for the adoption of presidential democracy. The model 
was based on the need for unity, energy, and dispatch inherent in the single executive 
system – the President (Dudley, 1982; Aghalino, 2006). According to the committee, the 
choice of the presidential system was based on the need for effective leadership that 
expresses on aspiration for national unity without, at the same time, building a leviathan 
whose powers may be difficult to curb (CDC, 1978). It would therefore, appear that the 
discovery of the apparent fractionalization, contradictions and confrontations in the 
parliamentary system of government made the drafters of the 1979 Constitution to 
jettison the dual system of leadership for the executive presidential system. In principle, 
reliance on an executive with a fixed term of office is supposed to enhance government 
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stability, allowing presidents to see their programmes through to the end of their terms 
without the threat of early removal. Furthermore, reliance on a single chief executive is 
assumed to clarify lines of accountability: voters can identify incumbents and hold them 
accountable for their performance (Kim and Bahry, 2008).  
 
Nigeria therefore, following the restoration of civilian rule in on 1st October, I979 after 
thirteen years of military government, opted for a new constitutional structure modeled 
after the United States‟ presidential and gubernatorial government with its central 
principle of a single chief executive and a clear separation of powers among the three 
arms of government (Read, 1979; Suberu, 1988).  
 
The Executive power was vested in the President assisted by a Vice President and they 
were to be elected on the same ticket. According to Section 122 (1 and 2) of the 1979 
Republican Constitution, the President was simultaneously the Head of State and Head of 
Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation. The 
implication of being the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation, is 
that he could determine the operational use of the armed forces and to appoint the Chief 
of Defence Staff, the Head of the Army, Navy and Air Force and such other branches of 
the armed forces of the federation as may be established by an Act of the National 
Assembly (Dudley, 1982). The plural executive (the bane that created confrontations in 
the First Republic) was hence, jettisoned in favour of a single executive (Ojo, 1985).  
 
The wide-ranging power of the President is however worthy of note at this juncture. As 
the Head of State and the Chief Executive of the Federation, executive powers of the state 
are vested in him (Ojo, 1985). This implies that the President is empowered to, either 
directly or indirectly, give effect to all acts of the federal legislature - National Assembly. 
Besides the power of the President to assent to bills, he alone is empowered to present 
before the National Assembly, the annual Appropriation Bill - a statement of the 
estimated revenue and expenditure of the federation which he can do any time in each 
financial year (Dudley, 1982). The President could authorize the expenditure of monies 
necessary to carry out the services of the government for a period of not exceeding six 
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months, from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation if the National Assembly 
failed to pass the Annual Appropriation Act before the beginning of the financial year. 
Besides his power of appointments which however, was subject to the legislative 
approval, the President can also enter into a treaty with other states on behalf of the 
federation subject to the ratification of the National Assembly (Osaghae, 2002). Another 
wide-ranging power of the President is his power to declare a state of emergency by the 
simple process of causing to be published in the Official Gazette of the Government, a 
proclamation that a state of emergency exists and then supported by a two-third majority 
of the National Assembly. In addition to the enormous power of the President is the 
prerogative of mercy which enables him grant a pardon to any person convicted of any 
offence created by law (Ojo, 1985).  
 
It is instructive to note that the same provisions in terms of the executive institution of the 
federation also apply to the executive organ at the state level of government. Section 162 
of the 1979 Constitution for instance, provided that each state shall have a Governor who 
shall be the Chief Executive of the state. The tenure of office of the state Governor 
according to Section 166 (1b) is for four years and could be re-elected once. The same 
procedure for the removal of the President under Section 132 is also laid down for the 
removal of the Governor under Section 170 of the Constitution. 
 
Under the Constitution, the president and vice president, as well as state governors and 
their deputies, were directly elected in separate elections by the people. This makes the 
federation and the state, respectively, as constituencies and establishes a direct link of 
mandate between them (chief executives) and the electorate (Suberu, 1988). Because an 
executive presidency or governor derived his mandate directly from the people rather 
than indirectly through the legislature as in the parliamentary model, it was a source of 
strength. It meant the President or Governor could govern even without a parliamentary 
majority and therefore with dispatch, even though he needed the legislature to govern 
more effectively. The president (and the Governor at the state level) is eligible for two 
four-year terms. No one can hold office for a period exceeding two terms (Section 128 
(1b), however, when there is a war in which the territory of Nigeria is physically involved 
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and the President considers that it is not practicable to hold elections, the National 
Assembly may, by resolution, extend the period of four years from time to time, provided 
that no such extension exceeds a period of six months at one time (Dudley, 1982). 
Universal suffrage at age 18 applies to all elections. Winning candidates are determined 
according to the British first-past-the-post system, whereby a plurality of the votes 
ensures victory (Oyediran, 2007).  
 
The president‟s Federal Executive Council, or cabinet, includes representatives from all 
36 states (Mohammadu and Mohammadu, 1989). The President, unlike the Prime 
Minister, was not bound to restrict his nominations to elected Parliamentarians. He 
equally, was not bound by the principle of cabinet responsibility since the cabinet was 
merely a consultative body (Osaghae, 2002). The President however, was considered 
tremendously powerful with the powers conferred on him and with his command of the 
armed forces and since he is no longer subjected to the vagaries of a vote of no 
confidence which could prematurely force him out of office (Ojo, 1985).  This portends 
danger of dictatorship, but these powers were not absolute as he could be effectively 
checked by the legislature. As Awotokun (1998:21) averred;  
…in order to guard against possible emergence of a dictator that… a 
presidential constitution may breed, there was the conception of a 
powerful legislature embedded in the constitution to serve as a 
countervailing power against the influence and authority of the executive. 
 
Legislative power on the other hand, was vested in the National Assembly (bi-cameral) at 
the Federal level. There was a Senate, with a membership strength of 95, (each of the 
then 19 states in the country produced five Senators), and a House of Representatives 
with a membership strength of 450 (Metz, 1991). Seats in the House of Representatives 
are allocated according to population. Therefore, the number of House members from 
each state differs. Members of the National Assembly are elected to a maximum of two 
four-year terms (Asia, 2001).  While the Senate was largely a ceremonial body in the 
First Republic, the 1979 Constitution gave the Senate equal powers with the House of 
Representatives (Suberu, 1988). The fact that the Senate had the power to ratify 
appointments, that its President was constitutionally the “number three” state official and 
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the historical and universal conception of the Senate as the upper house however, gave it 
an edge over the House of Representative (Osaghae, 2002).  
 
A unicameral legislative house of assembly was established in the states of the federation. 
There were two legislative lists which defined the powers of the National Assembly 
exclusively on Exclusive Legislative List matters and concurrent powers with Houses of 
Assembly in the States on Concurrent Legislative items (Adebo, 1988). 
 
One of the salient premises on which the Presidential system of the 1979 Constitution rest 
is the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances among 
the three branches of government (Akinsanya, 2005). Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Chapter V of 
the 1979 Constitution established and provided for the distinct and specific functions and 
composition of the National Assembly (the Senate and the House of Representatives).  
Chapter VI provides for the executive arm of government and Chapter VII contained the 
aspect relating to the judicature.  The essence of the separation of powers is that each 
branch of government, as a general rule, is prohibited from exercising the powers of the 
other branches of government and enables each branch to keep the power of the others in 
proper balance with its own power (Nwabueze, 1982). Under the Constitution, the 
executive is to execute the law made by the legislature and should not venture into law 
making, while the legislature is to make laws and the judiciary, to adjudicate and interpret 
the laws made by the legislature.  None of these arms of government is expected to 
dabble into the arena outside its purview of functions. Thus, tyranny and arbitrariness 
would be avoided because no branch would be able to act free from all and any restraints 
(Awotokun, 1998; Akinsanya, 2005).  
 
Some provisions were however made in the constitution to ensure checks and balances of 
powers among the organs. The executive is granted a wide range of power by the 
constitution but he cannot go beyond these powers else, he would be checked by the 
legislative arm by way of impeachment (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008). In addition, 
the executive is constitutionally empowered to veto bills passed by the legislature. He 
may withhold his assent to such bills. The legislature however, could override the 
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executive‟s veto through a two-third vote of members of the House. The President has the 
power of appointments such as Federal Minister, Special Advisors, Chief Justice of the 
Federation, Ambassadors, High Commissioners or other principal representatives of the 
country abroad. Such appointments must however, be ratified by the Legislature 
(Awotokun, 1998). Again, the constitution empowers the legislature to investigate all 
activities of the executive in order to prevent it from going beyond its legislative mandate 
and maintaining balance between their powers (Awotokun, 1998). Furthermore, while the 
President is elected for a fixed term of office, his stay in office could be terminated by 
impeachment moved by the two-third members of the legislature. Section 132 and 140 of 
the constitution provide for the removal of the President and the Vice President.  
 
The judiciary can on the other hand, render unconstitutional, activities of the executive 
and the legislature deemed contrary to the provision of the constitution (Oyediran, 2007). 
While the President is recognized by the Constitution as a Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces, he could not drag the country to unnecessary war at his whims and 
caprices. Only the National Assembly could determine when the country can go to war, 
make laws for the regulation of appointments, promotion, and disciplinary control of the 
Armed Forces of the Federation (Nwabueze, 1982). 
 
The 1979 Constitution for the first time in Nigeria recognized and committed itself to the 
composition and administration of political parties. Such issues as party constitutions, 
rules and regulations, control and regulation of party funds, mode of election of party 
leaders and restrictions on the form in which party funds are to be held were all provided 
for in the constitution. The effect of this was the abrogation of the possibility of carpet-
crossing which was a common phenomenon during the first republic (Metz, 1991; 
Nwabueze, 1982 and Dudley, 1982). In a bit to eradicate ethnic politicking, the 
constitution called for the formation of political parties with national outlook (Asia, 
2001). It explicitly specified that such parties must not have any religious or ethnic 
connotations in their names, signs, emblems, or mottoes, and must not only be open to all 
Nigerians of all ethnic and religious spectra, it must also have their headquarters located 
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in the federal capital. Each party executive board also had to reflect the national character 
(1979 Constitution).  
 
Despite the constitution stipulation for broad based political parties with national outlook 
however, the 1979 elections indicated that the ethnic allegiances and bases of the First 
Republic parties merely laid in waiting to be resuscitated (Adamu and Ogunsanwo, 
1982). The nature of political competition and voting pattern merely followed the same 
old pattern by and large, exploring and exploiting ethnics‟ differences along the way 
(Kurfi, 1983). The political parties that controlled the states in the Second Republic were 
members of the defunct political parties that controlled the regions under which the new 
states fell. The NPN which controlled majority of the states in the Northern part of 
Nigeria in 1979 was made up of majority of the members of the defunct NPC. The same 
was applicable to the UPN that controlled all the states in the South-western part of 
Nigeria which was the area of influence of the defunct Action Group in the First 
Republic. The case of the NPP which was the offshoot of the NCNC over the control of 
the South-eastern States was not different (Ojiako, 1981).  
 
In that 1979 general election, Shehu Shagari, a Muslim Hausa-Fulani from the North was 
elected the President. The three political parties representing Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and 
Ibo interests received the most votes demonstrating the continued salience of ethnic 
politics in the country despite efforts of the Supreme Military Council to achieve the 
opposite (Kaiser, 2005).  Thus, compounded the problems of national integration and 
development and confirmed the Nigeria‟s problem of tensions between the larger ethnic 
groups and the hostility derived not from ethnic differences, but from competition 
between peoples of wealth and power (Oyediran, 1981). The elections, particularly the 
presidential election, generated animosity among the parties. Only the NPP responded to 
the NPN‟s call for a broad based government, and entered into accord, which the NPN 
needed to strengthen its base in the National Assembly. The accord provided a working 
majority of 52 senators and 244 representatives (Ikelegbe, 1995). The accord was 
however, broken in 1981 over conflicts on the distribution of political largesse. The NPP 
governors joined the progressive governors in 1981 and the NPP joined the other parties 
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in criticizing and opposing the NPN and the federal government. The informal alliance of 
progressive parties became a formidable opposition to the NPN and created bi-
polarization (Ojo, 1985).  This was instigated by several factors and generated several 
crises. One of these was the occasional high handedness, arrogance and boastfulness of 
the NPN. The party was seen as tending towards fascism through undermining other 
parties and seeking more total control. The Shugaba factor considerably coalesce the 
other parties into opposition ostensibly to collaborate in ensuring their survival. In 
addition, the Shagari government was seen as inactive, slow, ineffective, and corrupt. The 
opposition that resulted from these perceptions and activities generated crises of inter-
governmental and intra-governmental relations, and crises within the PRP and GNPP 
(Ikelegbe, 1995).   
 
Shagari was however, re-elected in 1983 amidst political violence and accusations of 
fraud. Eroded political legitimacy coincided with economic crises and proved too much 
for the Second Republic to withstand (Kaiser, 2005). Thus similar to the attempt in the 
First Republic to establish democratic order, the Second Republic became a mere 
interlude between a sucession of military leaders with limited interest in promoting 
democracy in the country. 
 
 The Second Republic was abruptly terminated by a Military coup on December 31, 1983 
and the 1979 Constitution was suspended. The National Assembly was abrogated and the 
military exercised legislative powers by way of promulgating Military Decrees 
(Mackintosh, 1966). The precarious situation of the legislative body in Nigeria was 
worsened by military incursion in to the political arena of Nigeria‟s political development 
(Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). The Military regime created an authoritarian order and 
arrogated to itself the supreme power of the Nigerian state.  
 
Through a carefully controlled and manipulated plan for the return to civilian rule by the 
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) under Babangida administration, a new 
Constitution was promulgated in 1989 for the Third Republic through Decree Number 12 
of 1989 (Aghalino, 2006). It is pertinent to note that the Constitution did not 
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fundamentally depart from the 1979 Constitution except for certain provisions such as the 
establishment of Two-Party System, creation of traditional councils and conferring on 
state government, the power to create local government areas among others (Akinboye 
and Anifowose, 2008). The imposed transition programme resulted in the election of 91 
Senators to the National Assembly in December 1992, with each of the then 30 states 
producing three Senators, and the Federal Capital Territory producing a seat. The Federal 
House of Representatives, however, had membership strength of 593; the seats were 
filled on the basis of one Representative per each of the 593 Local governments existing 
then in the country. Elections for the National Assembly were held in 1992 (Kaiser, 
2005).  Unfortunately however, the constitution was merely promulgated but did not 
wholly come into operation due to lack of full democratic governance in the country. It 
was only at the state level that it was practiced for two years (Mbah, 2001). The national 
and Sate legislatures only existed but were powerless as the military held on to power 
(Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008). The Presidential election that held in June 12, 1993, 
which would have ushered in properly constituted democratic governance in the country, 
was annulled by the military junta.  
 
The mounted pressure from both within and without, impelled Babangida to resign after 
handling over to an Interim National Government (ING) under the leadership of Chief 
Ernest Shonekan on August 26, 1993. Amidst public outcry against the illegitimacy of 
the ING, the military moved swiftly and toppled the government. It abolished the 
constitution and governed the country by decrees having disbanded the legislative bodies 
and proscribed elections until when the country returned to a presidential democracy in 
1999 (Omoruyi, 2002; Egwu, 2005). The executive and the legislative institutions under 
this new dispensation known as the Fourth Republic are examined in the next section. 
 
4.2.4. Legislative and Executive Institutions in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria established the legal framework 
for the democratic government of the Fourth Republic. The document is based on the 
1979 presidential constitution with some amendments and came into force with effect 
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from 29 May, 1999, the date of the military handover to a democratically elected civilian 
regime. The constitution subdivided the federation into 36 states and a Federal Capital 
Territory (Abuja) and a total of 774 local government areas (Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999). The document was based on the 1979 Constitution 
with some amendments. The great trust that Nigerian political leaders place on 
Presidential form of governance as the best for the country underpinned its retention in 
the 1999 Constitution, despite the acrimonious politics of the second republic (Aiyede, 
2005). Thus the 1999 Constitution established a presidential system in wich the President 
has strong powers to function as both head of state and government independent of the 
legislature (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008).  
 
The constitution preserves the tripartite system at all the levels of government: The 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary (Awotokun, 2005). Chapter 1, Part 11 (4, 5 
and 6) of the constitution provides for the powers of the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary at all levels of government.  
 
According to Section 5 of the constitution, the executive powers of the Federation  is 
vested in the President  and  may  subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of  any law 
made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him directly or through the Vice-
President and Ministers of the Federal Government  or officers in the public service of 
the federation; and shall extend to execution  and  maintenance  of the constitution, all 
laws  made by the National  Assembly and  to all matters with  respect to which the 
National Assembly has power to  make  laws. Subsection 2 also in the same manner 
conferred executive power in any State of the federation on the Governor of the state who 
may exercise such power directly or through the Deputy Governor and Commissioners of 
the State Government or officers in the public service of the State.  
 
Under the constitution, candidates for election as the President of the federation or 
governor of a state, must belong to and be sponsored by a political party. The office-
holder is directly elected for a term of four years and may serve no more than two terms 
in office (section 137(1)). The appointment of Ministers is made by the President 
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following confirmation by the Senate. The composition of the Federal Government must 
reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national loyalty thereby 
ensuring “that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few 
ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies” (section 
14(3)). To give effect to this provision, the President must appoint at least one Minister 
from each State (who shall be an indigene of such State) (section 147(3)). The State 
Executive is headed by a directly elected Governor and similar provisions to those for the 
Federal President apply as regards the term of office of a Governor.  
 
The legislative powers of the federation on the other hand are vested by the constitution 
in the National Assembly – the Senate and the House of Representatives (Section 4 (1)). 
The Senate is made up of three senators from each of the 36 states and one from the 
Federal Capital Territory. The House of Representatives on the other hand, consists of 
360 constituency members. Subsection 2 empowers the National Assembly to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government for the Federation.  Likewise, Section 6 and 7 
vest the legislative powers of each State in the House of Assembly of the State which is 
empowered to make laws for the peace, order and good government for the State. 
 
The analysis in this section shows that the 1999 Constitution unequivocally states that the 
functions or powers of law making are vested in the National Assembly and Houses of 
Assembly of the states for the Federation and states respectively. In order to avoid 
conflict of jurisdictional power, Section 3, 4 and 6 (a and b) of the constitution clearly 
demarcate between the areas which can be legislated upon by the National Assembly and 
the states Houses of Assembly. These are contained in the exclusive and concurrent 
legislative lists. The National Assembly has exclusive jurisdictional power to legislate on 
matters included in the exclusive legislative list, to the exclusion of the Houses of 
Assembly of the states, while both the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly 
have legislative powers on those matters contained in the concurrent legislative list.  It is 
apparent from the items on the exclusive legislative list that the federal government 
enjoys overwhelming power to legislate virtually on every subject. This is clearly an 
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indication of the federal government dominance at the expense of the states and of 
course, inimical to the tenet of federalism which the constitution enunciated.    
 
 There are some significant restrictions on the operation of the political system. In 
particular, members of the House of Assembly must belong to and be sponsored by a 
political party whilst there are rigorous conditions as to the formation, funding and 
operation of political parties themselves (section 221-226). Sagay (2010) observed that 
these may well hinder the development of new political players in the country. In 
addition, the President may address either or both Houses of the National Assembly 
whilst a Government Minister “shall attend either House of the National Assembly if 
invited to explain to the House the conduct of his Ministry” (section 67). 
  
The judicial power of government is vested in the courts established for the country 
(Section 6). The Federal Courts consist of The Supreme Court of Nigeria, a Court of 
Appeal, High Courts, the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital territory and the 
Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory. The Chief Justice of 
Nigeria, Justices of the Supreme Court and the President of the Court of Appeal are all 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council and 
subject to confirmation by the Senate (Ogowewo, 2000).  
 
An important feature of the Constitution is the establishment of a number of federal 
bodies responsible for overseeing key aspects of public life. These include the National 
Judicial Council, National Economic Council and the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (section 153). In an attempt to promote transparency in public life and 
combat corruption, the Code of Conduct Bureau is tasked with overseeing the operations 
and conducts of public officials (Fifth Schedule, Part I). This is reinforced by the Code of 
Conduct Tribunal which has power, amongst other things, to order any person found in 
breach of the Code of Conduct to vacate their office or parliamentary seat. How effective 
this effort to bring erring officials to book however, remains a subject of controversy 
(Ihonvbere, 2000).  
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The 1999 constitution, like the 1979 and 1989 constitutions of Nigeria, embodies the 
doctrine of separation of powers rather than fusion of power. Section 4 (2), (3) and (4) of 
the constitution succinctly spell out the legislative powers while Section 5 on the other 
hand, concerns with the executive powers of government. The power of the judiciary is 
contained in section 6. These provisions are similar to sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 1979 
Constitution.  At the state government level, legislative power is enshrined in section 4 
(6) and (7) while executive power of the State is contained in section 5 (2). Based on 
these provisions therefore, members of the law making body (parliamentarians) at both 
Federal and State levels and even at the Local government being the third tier of 
government are not allowed to be members of executive or judiciary and vice versa  
(Olojede, 2008). 
 
Though separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional principle of the 1999 
Constitution, it is imperative to note that the three branches are not completely sealed off 
from one other. A system of checks and balances exist among them. Sections 58 (1) and 
100 (1) reveal that the president or the governor shares the law making power of the 
legislature by virtue of the constitutional provision for presidential or governor‟s assent to 
bills before they become laws. According to sections 58 (5) and 100 (5) however, at the 
event of presidential or gubernatorial refusal to assent to bills, the respective legislature 
can override such refusal by 2/3 majority.  
While the term of office of the President and the Governors are fixed, Section 143 and 
188 of the constitution grant the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly the 
power of their impeachment. The impeachment powers aims at curtailing the President 
and a Governor from misuse of the enormous powers at their disposal or misapplication 
of the huge resources of the state. More importantly, the impeachment process is 
expected to be an antidote to the immunity protection granted the president, governors 
and their deputies under the Constitution. In fact, Section 308 (1) protects the president, 
governors and their deputies from facing civil or criminal proceedings. It also protects 
them from being arrested or imprisoned or be compelled to appear before any court 
proceeding during their periods of office. By the provision of the immunity clause, it is 
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almost impossible to do anything to an incumbent president, governor or their deputies 
even if he openly commits an offence. The impeachment power of legislature thus 
constitutes a check on the executive (Taiwo, 2009).  
Again, while the President or the Governor has the power of appointment of member of 
the executive council, such appointment is subject to the ratification of the legislature 
(Sections 147 (2) and 192 (2) of 1999 constitution). Furthermore, the prerogative of 
mercy or grant of pardon of the President and the Governor as contained in section 175 
and 211 of the Constitution respectively, is a conferment of judicial power on the 
executive. This power clearly derogates from the power of the judiciary to impose 
sentence after a due process of adjudication (Dalhatu, 2008).  
The legislative power vested in the legislature under the 1999 Constitution is subject to 
judicial review as to its constitutionality. Section 4 (8) states that the exercise of 
legislative powers by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly shall be subject 
to the jurisdiction of courts of law and of judicial tribunals established by law, and 
accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall not enact any law, that 
ousts or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or of a judicial tribunal 
established by law. The judicial review thus equally constitutes a check on the excesses 
of the legislature (Taiwo, 2009). This system of checks and balances is necessary for 
maintenance of, and at the same time, needed for co-operation and interdependence 
among these fundamental institutions. The essence is to promote liberty and as well, 
harmony that are essential in governance and for efficiency. 
Perhaps, of great significance is the party system in the Fourth Republic. The abortive 
experiment with non-sectional parties during General Babangida‟s military 
administration had a lasting impact on political coalitions in Nigeria by breaking up 
regional and ethnic party structures and channeling political groupings into multi-ethnic 
entities (Lewis, 2003). While the People‟s Democratic Party (PDP) continues to 
dominate, holding majority of seats in the National Assembly in the Fourth Republic, 
others parties including the All Nigeria People‟s Party (ANPP) the Alliance for 
Democracy (AD), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive 
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Change (CPC), the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), the Labour Party (LP) and 
the ACCORD Party also constitute large parties. Following the 2011 elections, ten parties 
were represented in the National Assembly. Within the National Assembly, majority 
control of the ruling party - PDP grew to more than three-fourths of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives by 2007 (Omotola, 2009). It however, dropped to about two-
thirds after more competitive elections in 2011 (Lewis, 2011). In presidential elections 
however, the governing party achieved a 62% majority in Olusegun Obasanjo‟s 2003 re-
election, and reached an unprecedented 70% in the election of the late Umaru Yar‟Adua 
in 2007. Goodluck Jonathan however secured 59% of the popular vote in the 2011 
general elections (Eme and Anyadike, 2011). 
 
4.3. Historical Analysis of Legislature-Executive Relations in the Nigeria’s 
Presidential System 
The presidential form of democratic governance that Nigeria adopted, beginning from the 
1979 Constitution, is modeled after that of the United State of America. Under this 
system of government, the President has strong powers to function both as head of state 
and as head of government independent of the legislature. A single executive system was 
chosen in place of the plural executive that was considered as the bane of the First 
Republic. One of the salient premises on which the system rests is the doctrine of 
separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances among the three branches 
of government. It aims at ensuing fair play and avoids tyranny and arbitrary rule because 
no branch will be able to act free from all and any restraints (Awotokun, 1998; 
Akinsanya, 2005; Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008).  
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria since Nigeria opted 
for presidential form of political governance in 1979 has been characterized by mutual 
suspicion and distrust, acrimony, intimidation, political rivalry, unnecessary bickering, 
and sometimes blackmail (Awotokun; 1988; Aiyede, 2005; Ikoronye, 2005; Mbah, 2007). 
This is however, not unexpected stemming from a degree of competition and opposition 
from the two organs (the executive and the legislature) such that each would be anxious 
to guide and assert its autonomy (Awotokun, 1998).  
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In the 1979 general elections, NPN secured 37% (168 out of the 449) seats in the House 
of Representatives and 38% (36 out 98) seats in the Senate. At the state level, NPN 
secured 36% of the seats in the state assemblies across the federation, and won seven of 
the 19 state governorships. In the presidential elections, Shehu Shagari of the NPN 
obtained the 25% mandatory vote in 12 rather than 13 of the 19 states but following a 
legal debate on this, the Supreme Court upheld his election (Adamu and Ogunsanwo, 
1982). These result clearly indicated that NPN the government‟s party had no majority in 
the National Assembly, an indication of possible uneasy relations between the executive 
and the legislature in the Second Republic.  
The first major conflict occurred in Kaduna State where the PRP governor had a 
perennial conflict with the NPN dominated House of Assembly over programmes and 
orientation. The relations became increasingly uncompromising, as the House perennially 
rejected Governor Balarebe Musa‟s political nominees. This culminated in his 
impeachment and removal from office by the NPN House in June 1981. The 
impeachment led to further polarization between the NPN and other parties, and further 
solidified the progressive opposition to the NPN (Ikelegbe, 1995). 
The period between 1979 and 1983, during Nigeria‟s second republic was marked with 
unhealthy rivalry and competition for supremacy between the National Assembly and 
President Shehu Sagari who was often exasperated with the legislature. There were 
various accusations by both arms of government of the other of going beyond 
constitutional responsibilities (Dunmoye, 2005).  
 
During this dispensation, the legislative arm of government though tried to exert its 
omnipotence, was not independent of the executive arm (Nwabueze, 1985). This was 
sequel to the dominance of the party in power, particularly the President and Governors, 
who by their position and influence, were in a position to use the power of patronage to 
subdue members of the legislature. This took the form of award of contracts, appointment 
to boards and straight forward bribery by cash, land allocation, distributorship of scarce 
commodities, provision of social amenities, like roads, schools, hospitals, pipe borne 
water in the members constituencies and so on (Awotokun, 1988). 
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The legislature is not supposed to be under the whims and caprices of the executive but 
should be able to stand on its own. It is equally not supposed to be hostile to the 
executive because the two branches have to work in mutual interdependence and 
harmony to ensure a stable polity. The interplay between the President and the National 
Assembly in Nigeria‟s presidential system under the Second Republic however, revealed 
continued gridlocks between the branches. The first test of legislature-executive relations 
at the federal level was the need for the National Assembly to approve the President‟s 
ministerial nominees (Awotokun, 1988). The appointment of ministers is the prerogative 
of the executive. This is however, subject to Senate‟s confirmation as stipulated by the 
1979 Constitution. Due to the uneasy rivalry between the executive and the legislature, 
the confirmation process by the National Assembly experienced unwarranted delay 
(Odumu, 2010). Hardly had the issue been resolved than the two branches plunged into 
another collision as the National Assembly, this time, refused to approve any pay for the 
Presidential Liason Officers (PLOS) arguing that those offices were not included in the 
Constitution (Awotokun, 1998).  
 
Another bone of contention between the legislature and the executive was the issue of the 
legislators‟ welfare. Elections to the Senate and House of Representatives were 
conducted on July 8 and 15, 1979 respectively. The two houses resumed offices on the 9th 
of October, 1979. For almost one year of their resumption however, the legislature was at 
loggerhead with the executive concerning accommodation, comfort and salaries for its 
members (legislature) (Adebo, 1988). The law making organ of the country rejected the 
Badagry luxury and grandeur high-rise apartment and threatened to boycott sittings 
indefinitely if they were not allocated to the civil-servant high-rise apartment in Victoria 
Island. In addition, they demanded for better remunerations despite the whopping sum of 
about N44 million salaries and allowances received by this few men and women of the 
assembly (Awotokun, 1988).  
 
Another major area of confrontation between the Executive and the Legislature in the 
Second Republic was the fixing of remuneration for certain public functionaries. Section 
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78 (1) and Section 139 (2) of the 1979 Constitution provides that the remuneration and 
allowances of the President, Vice-President, Special Advisers, Auditor-General, Federal 
judges and members of the Constitutional Commissions are to be prescribed by the 
National Assembly. The proposed package by the National Assembly on the subject 
matter was considered to be on the high side by the President. But the National Assembly 
refused to change its decision on the ground that the President had no power under the 
Constitution to block its pay proposals (Ojiako, 1981).  
 
Another area of conflict between the Executive and the Legislature during the Second 
Republic was the attempt by the National Assembly to remove the Vice-President and the 
State Governors from membership of the National Economic Council (NEC) by a 
constitutional amendment. The National Assembly argued that this was necessary in 
order to ensure that only persons with relevant knowledge in economic and financial 
matters should be members of the NEC. It must be noted that, in spite of the assembly‟s 
attempt at rationalize the proposed amendment on the basis of principle, the real motive 
was not unconnected to the assembly‟s vindictive plot against the Vice President and 
state governors for attempting to deprive them (assembly members) of their entitlements,  
for attempting to destroy their credibility and integrity by exciting against it the anger of 
the nation and for attempting to subvert and erode its (assembly) power and reduce it to a 
rubber stamp assembly (Nwabueze, 1985).  
 
The President‟s refusal to assent to a bill for the establishment of a National Assembly 
Service Commission to be responsible for the appointment, discipline and removal of 
staff of the National Assembly resulted to another face-off between the executive and the 
legislature in the presidential system of Nigeria‟s Second Republic. The President vetoed 
the bill on the ground that the power to constitute the commission and discharge its 
functions fell within the purview of the presidential appointive and executive power by 
Section 5 (1) of the 1979 Constitution. The President on this note, viewed the request by 
the National assembly as amounting to usurpation of executive power. The National 
Assembly on the contrary, saw the veto as executive dictation and breach of the 
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independence of the National Assembly which is required for its effective functioning 
(Odumu, 2010). 
 
The Supplementary Appropriation 1979-1980 also generated hostility between the 
Executive and the Legislature during the Nigeria‟s Second Republic. The investigation 
made by the Appropriation Committee of the House had discovered that the President 
had in fact committed some of the money before seeking legislative backing. This 
practice was apparently a flagrant disregard of the Constitution by the executive and of 
course, did not go down well with the National Assembly (Awotokun, 1988).  The next 
issue that generated legislature-executive controversy during this period was the Electoral 
Bill of October 1981 introduced by the executive which proposed to introduce electronic 
voting system in the country. While some members of the assembly supported the 
motion, some others objected to it on the ground that such device was a blatant way of 
rigging elections in the country (Awotokun, 1988). 
 
The enormous power conceded to the legislature by the 1979 Constitution was expected 
to be a check on the power of the executive in a presidential system (Awotokun, 1998). 
The experience with the Second Republic legislature however, revealed a reversal of the 
expectation. Party patronage was given precedence over expertise and this led to the 
buying of many bills in Committees (Anyanwu, 1999). The all important function of 
making laws for the peace, order and good governance of the nation was compromised by 
the legislature. It could neither perform its oversight roles on the government nor 
effectively perform its role of citizens‟ representation. In fact, the ineffectiveness of the 
legislature was one of the fundamental contributing factors to the collapse of the 
Nigeria‟s Second Republic (Omoweh, 2006). 
 
4.4. Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System of Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic 
The management of legislature-executive relations has been a major disturbing issue in 
the presidential system of Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic (Aiyede, 2005). The country has 
witnessed conflicts between the legislators and the executive at all levels of government 
165 
 
(Ikoronye, 2005). Despite some determined provisions of the constitution aimed at 
rectifying some of the problems identified with legislature-executive relations in the 
preceding republics, the Fourth Republic also follow the confrontational and conflictual 
power relations and the absence of comity and cooperation between the executive and the 
legislature (Mba, 2007). Thus managing executive-legislature relations has been the 
single most problematic issue since this new dispensation termed the Fourth republic. 
The first democratic dispensation of the fourth republic (1999 – 2007) was characterized 
by gridlocks over major public policy decisions and struggles in a climate of partisanship 
because of face-off between the executive and the legislature both at the federal and state 
level of government in the country (Aiyede, 2005).  
 
One of the early issues of discord between these two arms of government was the 
scrapping by President Obasanjo, of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) established under 
Decree No. 25 of 1994. This act was viewed by the National Assembly as usurpation of 
its constitutional responsibility of making and repealing laws. It took the intervention of 
the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice to lay the matter to rest. The Minister 
argued that the President‟s action was not unconstitutional going by the provision of 
Section 315 (4) (a) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution which provided that the President 
could modify any existing law. He argued that the modification could be addition, 
alteration, omission or repeal (Ehwarieme, 2001).   
 
The controversy that surrounded the passing of the Electoral Act of 2001 and the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) Act 2000 by the legislature was also 
one of the early manifestations of friction between the executive and the legislature in the 
Fourth Republic. The controversy arose from the insertion of a clause to section 80 of the 
Electoral Act 2001 which would make it impossible for new political parties to field in 
candidates in 2003 except for council polls. By that insertion, section 80 (1) of the bill 
was amended to mean that a newly registered political party would be eligible to 
participate in federal and state elections provided that the political party shall first 
participate in the local government election and win at least 10 percent of the 
councillorship and chairmanship positions throughout the federation, spread among two-
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thirds of the states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory. In the original bill 
however, clause 80 (1) had submitted that at the close of nominations for the general 
elections, any political party which fails to sponsor at least 15 percent of the candidates 
for councillorship, council chairmanship, and state houses of assembly respectively 
throughout the federation, spread among two-thirds of the states of the federation, and the 
Federal Capital Territory, shall not participate in the general elections (Ogunmupe, and 
Phillips, 2002). The incidence resulted to a landmark controversy between the presidency 
and the National Assembly over the authenticity of the version of the Electoral Act of 
2001 (Sanyaolu, 2002 and Dunmoye, 2002).  
 
The role of the legislature and the executive in public finance is one of the major issues 
of gridlock between the two institutions of government in the Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic. 
There have been several areas of conflicts between the legislators and the executive in 
respect of the budget approval, implementation and evaluation processes (Lewis, 2011). 
Section 80 of the 1999 Constitution establishes the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the 
Federation and requires that no money shall be withdrawn from the fund except to meet 
expenditure charged on it or where the issuance of those moneys has been authorised by 
the legislature in pursuance of Section 81 of the Constitution. It further states that no 
moneys shall be withdrawn from any other fund of the Federation except authorised by 
an act of the legislature and such Act shall also state the manner of such withdrawal. 
Significantly, Section 81 (1) reserves the power of budget preparation for the executive. 
This has led to frictions between the executive and legislative arms of government since 
the advent of civil rule in 1999. The unilateral amendment of the outcomes of the draft 
budgets by the parliament often caused disagreement between the executive and the 
legislature which have always resulted to late approval of the budget.  The 2002 budget 
proposal for instance, was attended to by gridlock before it was passed into law five 
months after its presentation to the National Assembly (Aiyede and Isumonah, 2002). 
During the 2002 budget exercise, the executive had sent to the National Assembly a 
Budget of N1.06 trillion, with a provision of N297 billion capital expenditure and N587, 
096, 146, 413 recurrent expenditure. The National Assembly however increased the 
capital allocation from N297 billion to N458, 705, 107, 107 and slashed the recurrent 
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allocation by 20%. Exasperated by the jumbo-size of the 2002 budget, the President 
revised the budget estimate which the National Assembly viewed as unilateral decision of 
the executive. The decision of the President to proceed with the implementation of the 
revised budget without adherence to the version passed by the National Assembly 
instigated the National Assembly to commence impeachment process against the 
President. It however, took the intervention of the ruling party (PDP) to thwart the 
impeachment bid (Eminue, 2008).   
 
In a similar dimension, the 2003 federal budget was presented in mid-November, 2002 
with an expectation that it will be approved by 1st January, 2003. Unfortunately, the draft 
budget was approved in May, 2003 while it was signed into a law in July, 2003 eight 
months after it was first presented to the National Assembly. The reason adduced by the 
legislators was that they needed enough time to study the budget as a result of the 
importance they attached to the budget. The 2004 budget also followed the same 
controversial review by the National assembly. While the executive presented to the 
House, N1.089 trillion, the legislature raised the amount to N1.3trilion (Olojede, 2008). 
The most difficult problem in public sector budgeting has been the allocation of scarce 
resources among competing needs. The National Assembly made several attempts to cut 
down on recurrent expenditure particularly, salaries of civil servants, overhead costs and 
domestic debt service for the benefit of the capital budget. However, the actual outcomes 
of expenditure over the years have indicated that there were serious shortfalls for salaries 
and domestic debt service payments. The perception of the legislators was that higher 
capital budget directly affects growth and will enhance rapid poverty reduction.   
 
The performance of oversight function by the National Assembly is also an issue that 
generated conflicts in many occasions to the extent that President Obasanjo had to remark 
that that the executive will not succumb to threats and intimidation by the National 
Assembly through the abuse of the oversight function (Eminue, 2008). Even after the 
conclusion of the second round of general elections in which President Olusegun 
Obasanjo secured a second mandate to rule from 2003 to 2007, the legislature and 
executive branch often appeared locked in a permanent political standoff (Aiyede, 2008). 
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The National Assembly for instance overturned a presidential veto on the Independent 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Bill it earlier 
submitted to the President for assent on May 8, 2003 (Aiyede, 2008).  
 
The change of administration in 2007 opened the way to new legislature-executive 
relations in Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic. President Yar‟ Adua‟s different leadership style 
contrasted with Obasanjo‟s assertive personal control of many aspects of government 
(Lewis, 2011). The crisis that emanated from the deliberate refusal of President Yar 
„Adua to transmit a written declaration to the National Assembly to inform it that it was 
proceeding on health vacation however, revealed the continued acrimonious relationship 
between the executive and the legislature in the Fourth Republic of the Nigeria‟s 
presidential model of democratic governance (Fasagba, 2010). The power vacuum caused 
by the health saga was a case of executive and the legislative gridlocks caused by 
ambiguous provision of the 1999 Constitution. Section 145 of the Constitution provides 
that whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, a written declaration that he is proceeding on vacation or 
unable to discharge the functions of his office, until he transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such functions shall be discharged by the Vice President as 
Acting President (CFRN, 1999). Though the Constitution mandates the President to 
transmit to the National Assembly his inability to perform the functions of his office and 
his consequential proceed on vacation, it did not provide for the mode/format by which 
the President should transmit the written declaration (Sagay, 2010). Worst still, the 
Constitution did not fix any time limit within which the letter should be transmited 
(Oboh, 2010).  
 
For more than 100 days the National Assembly and Judiciary were incapacitated to take 
action as partisan politician kept exploring the inadequacies of the constitution to 
perpetrate their selfish ends at the expense of the whole country. There was the danger of 
an impending military takeover and the overthrow of democracy if something was not 
urgently done. As aptly argued by Sagay (2010), the vacuum in the constitution led to the 
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adoption of the “doctrine of necessity” in that what was otherwise not lawful was made 
lawful by necessity. 
 
Hardly had President Jonathan settled down in Aso-Rock than his administration began to 
get in conflict with the legislature. One of these conflicts was the legal battle on the 
validity of the amendment of the 1999 Constitution by the National Assembly without the 
signature of the President (Nwannekanma and Ogbodo, 2010). The legislature-executive 
disagreement was on whether or not constitutional amendment required presidential 
assent in order to become operational (Okorie, 2010). The position of the National 
Assembly was that the amendment, having passed through public hearings and passed by 
more than even the two thirds of the state houses of assembly made up of representatives 
of the people, the assent of President Goodluck Jonathan was not needed (Vanguard, 
2010). It is pertinent to note that according to the provisions of Section 9 of the 1999 
Constitution, amendment of the Constitution is within the purview of the National 
Assembly which must be supported by two-thirds majority of its members and approved 
by not less than two-thirds majority of members of the States House of Assembly in the 
Federation. Conversely however, Section 58 of the Constitution provides that a bill of the 
National Assembly shall not become law until it is assented to by the President. By 
Section 58 (5), it is only when the President exercises his veto power by refuses assent 
that he shall after 30 days send the bill back to the National Assembly who may use its 
overriding power and pass the bill to law by the support of two-third majority of the 
whole members, the President‟s assent not longer required (CFRN, 1999).  
 
Another manifestation of legislature-executive rivalry was on the removal of fuel subsidy 
by President Jonathan, on January 1, 2012 leading to increase in the pump price of PMS 
(petrol) from N65.00 to N141.00 per litre (Akpan, 2012). Following the nationwide strike 
and mass protests that greeted the decision, the House of Representatives in an 
extraordinary session on Sunday, January 8, 2012 passed a motion in the House, 
demanding that the Federal Government rescinds its decision. Though the Senate did not 
adopt a formal resolution on the issue, Senators were alleged to have during a closed door 
session on January 10, 2012 mandated the President of the Senate, Senator David Mark to 
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convey the position of members that the hike should be rescinded (Agande, Umoru and 
Shaibu, 2012). The legislators argued that the nation could not bear the full deregulation 
of the downstream sector of the oil industry at that moment. The President in a swift 
reaction however, described the House resolution as mere advisory which had no 
substantial effect. The executive argued that not even in the budget do the powers of the 
legislature go as far as dictating what should be the content and claimed that the 
resolution of the House was tantamount to inciting the people of Nigeria against the 
government (Ajaero, 2012). It is pertinent to note that a resolution is the decision of the 
legislature expressing its condemnation of certain unpleasant actions of a body on 
particular issues of State, national or international concern (Omoleye, 2011). Such 
resolutions however, are persuasive and do not require the agreement of the president and 
therefore does not have the force of law but only an expression of the sentiments of the 
legislature (Esebagbon, 2005). In this regard therefore, the decision of the legislature to 
pass a resolution on an issue that threw the nation into a weeklong chaos need not to have 
warranted such resentful reaction from the executive since the former was merely 
performing its role of expressing the will of the Nigerian people over the fuel price hike.   
 
The threats of impeachment of President Goodluck Jonathan by the National Assembly 
over poor implementation of the 2012 budget and non-implementation of some 
resolutions of the assembly particularly the recommendations on the Bureau for Public 
Enterprises (BPE) and the recall of the suspended Director-General of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Ms Aruma Oteh, contrary to the decision of the Lower House 
constitute another instance of legislature-executive face-off under the present 
administration (Okocha, 2012). The nation‟s legislative assembly argued that the 
President was negligent in his primary duty in that the budget particularly, the capital 
expenditure, as reported by the MDAs, was abysmally implemented. The legislature 
asserted that a proper implementation of the budget would have addressed the nation‟s 
poor infrastructure. The legislature hinged its impeachment warning on section 143 of the 
1999 constitution threatened to impeach him if the 2012 budget was not fully 
implemented by September 8, 2012 (Ameh, 2012). The executive however, contended 
that the serial impeachment threat against it by the legislature was not in the interest of 
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democracy in Nigeria (Okocha and Ogbodo, 2012). While the National Assembly hinged 
their impeachment threat on non-implementation of the 2012 budget however, the real 
bone of contention between it and the executive was failure of the President to execute all 
the constituency projects of lawmakers built into the 2012 Appropriation Act (Ameh, 
2012).  Their grouse followed a breakdown of the projects in the budget, which allegedly 
indicated that some ministers had more projects than members of the National Assembly 
in their constituencies. Funding for projects was also discovered to have been skewed in 
favour of the projects initiated by the appointees of government, as against those put in 
the budget by the elected representatives of the people (Okocha, 2012). The impeachment 
threat therefore was a reminder to the President of the legislature‟s constitutional power, 
should the President continued to ignore their entreaties (Ameh, 2012.   
 
The persistent cat and mouse relationship between the House and the Presidency during 
this dispensation is however worrisome. The National Assembly and, indeed, the House 
of Representative is dominated by the PDP, the government party. One would have 
expected that this majority government, in which the President‟s party has overwhelming 
majority in the National Assembly, should have been a source of strength and not 
constant legislature-executive bickering. Conversely however, as averred by Bassey 
(2006), the cancer of prebendal politics and culture of settlement, mediocrity and 
opportunism continue to dictate political behaviour of these public officers. 
 
4.5. Legislature-Executive Relations at the State Level of Nigeria’s Presidential 
System 
The fact that Nigeria operates a federal constitution means the replication of the separate 
arms of government at the federal level of government in the state level. Following the 
federal model therefore, each state‟s executive and legislature derive their powers from 
the constitution. The head of the executive branch at the federal level is the President of 
Nigeria and at the state level is the Governor. The legislative body at the federal level is 
the National Assembly while at the state level, State House of Assembly. The executive 
branch at the state level is separate both in function and personnel from the State House 
of Assembly. However, for the purpose of government, these two institutions of 
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government are expected to operate in an atmosphere of cordial relationship. In essence, 
flexibility, understanding and cooperation between the Governor who is the chief 
executive and the State House of Assemble in the process of governance are mostly 
desired for effective governance at the state level.  
 
The acrimonious legislature-executive relations in the Nigeria‟s presidential system is 
however, not only restricted to the federal level but also a common phenomenon at the 
state government level (Olojede, 2008). In the Second Republic, Kaduna State was the 
first to blaze the trail when the state House of Assembly brought the full force of the 
provisions of the Constitution as regards the impeachment of elected public office holders 
to bear on former Governor Balarabe Musa on June 23, 1981. The acrimonious 
legislature-executive relationship in the state was instigated by the fact that the 
governor‟s party did not command majority seat in the State legislative assembly  
(Oyediran, 1980).  While the Governor was elected on the platform of Peoples 
Redemption Party (PRP), the State‟s legislative assembly was dominated by a rivalry 
party - the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). This is a case of minority government in 
which the government‟s party does not have control of majority of the seats in the 
legislature. It was expected therefore, that legislature-executive confrontations would be 
more rigorous given this scenario. At the peak of the confrontations, Governor Balarebe 
Musa who was legitimately elected by the electorate was impeached by the Kaduna State 
House of Assembly (Awotokun, 1998).  
 
The experience of Kaduna State however, contrasted the acrimony that greeted legislature-
executive relations in the then Bendel State, where the government party - Unity Party of 
Nigeria also controlled a comfortable majority in the State House of Assembly (Mbah, 2007). 
The impeachment of the State Governor by the Bendel State House of Assembly is 
suggestive of the dynamic and complex nature of legislature-executive relations in the 
Nigeria‟s presidential system expecially at the state level (Oyediran, 1980).  In a similar 
dimension, the Deputy Governor of Kano State was impeached by the State‟s legislative 
assembly on the ground of his refusal to perform the duties assigned to him by the Governor. 
In the then Gongola State however, the impeachment proceeding initiated by the State House 
of Assembly against the Governor of the State on the account of gross misconduct was 
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frustrated. In fact, the state assembly had secured the signatory of 43 out of the 61 members 
of the house to impeach the Governor but the impeachment proceeding was closed following 
the denial of the allegations by the Governor. A Similar incidence also happened in Rivers 
State where a motion of impeachment was moved against the state Governor for alleged 
financial impropriety, nepotism and indiscipline. The motion however, could not secure the 
support of the majority of its members and was therefore, rebuffed (Akinsanya and Davies, 
2002). The Governor of Ondo State was also victim of legislature-executive hostility that 
resulted in impeachment threat.  
 
When the legislature was permitted to exist under schemes of diarchy during the aborted 
third republic, confrontations characterized legislature-executive relations in the country 
(Awotokun, 1998). At the State level, in Osun State, the Governor- Mr. Isiaka Adeleke 
appointed two commissioners whose candidatures Osun State House of Assembly had 
earlier rejected on the ground of tax default. When the state assembly questioned the 
Governor over such unconstitutional act, the Governor simply objected based on Decree 
50 of 1991 which shielded the executive from legislative scrutiny (Davies, 1996). In 
Lagos State also, the State House of Assembly threatened the state Governor – Otedola 
with impeachment for his contempt on the House by revoking the land allocated to its 
members.  The Governor of Cross River State also faced impeachment threat from the 
State assembly for daring to ask the basis for fixing N25, 000.00 per annum to each 
legislator as salary and allowance of a personal assistant (Awotokun, 1998). 
 
The legislature-executive face-offs during the Second Republic were however, slight 
compared with what happended in the Fourth Republic (Lawan, 2010). The impeachment 
of Governor - Diepreye Alamesieagha by the Bayelsa State House of Assembly was one 
of such legislature-executive face-offs at the State level of Nigeria‟s presidential system 
in the Fourth Republic. Governor Diepreye Alamesieagha was impeached by the State‟s 
legislators on the ground of gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his 
office which included corruption, abuse of office and extra-budgetary and fraudulent 
expenditures (Owei, 2002). His impeachment however, showed abuse of the powers of 
impeachment by the state legislature. The Governor was impeached by fifteen (15) out of 
the twenty-four (24) members of the state assembly (Lawan, 2010). This number 
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obviously, did not constitute the two-third (2/3rd) majority of the House required by 
section 188 of the 1999 Constitution to initiate impeachment proceeding.  
 
 Another case of legislature-executive face-off at the state government level was the 
acrimony that led to the impeachment of Senator Rasheed Ladoja the Governor of Oyo 
State on January 12, 2006 (Lawan, 2010). The removal process was also clearly 
unconstitutional. Less than two-third (2/3rd) of the members of the State House of 
Assembly (18 out of 32 members) were present at the hotel in the capital city, Ibadan 
when the House made the resolution adopting the report of the panel of investigation on 
allegation brought against him (Ogunmade, 2006).  
 
The controversial impeachment of the Anambra state governor - Peter Obi by the State 
House of Assembly on November 2, 2006 was another instance of legislature-executive 
conflict at the state level of the federation. The Mike Belonwu-led faction of the 
Anambra State House of Assembly got the governor impeached. The impeachment 
proceeding was done outside the assembly complex at the early hour of 5.00am under the 
cover of darkness (Onah, 2007). At the time of the impeachment, the panel constituted by 
the state judge – Justice Chuka Okoli to investigate allegations of corruption against the 
governor was yet to submit its report which was constitutionally required to be adopted 
by two-third (2/3rd) members of the house before commencing the impeachment 
proceeding (Lawan, 2010). Mike Belonwu however, got the twenty-one (21) votes of the 
30-member to impeach the governor despite that no fewer than thirteen (13) legislators 
were purportedly to be Obi‟s loyalist, while one (1) of the legislators was hospitalized in 
London during the impeachment verdict and two (2) other members of the House denied 
ever being part of the plot. It was however, alleged that the legislators actions were 
orchestrated by PDP leadership and Chief Andy Ubah who wanted to be the next 
governor of the state (Airahuobhor, 2007). 
 
The case of Ekiti State also comes to the fore in the analysis of legislative and executive 
relations at the state level in Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic. Governor Peter Ayodele Fayose 
and his deputy, Mrs. Biodun Olujimi of Ekiti State were impeached on 16th October, 
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2006 by twenty-four (24) out of the twenty (26) members of the State House of 
Assembly. It was only in this case that the constitutional requirement of atleast two-third 
(2/3rd) members of the house to conduct the impeachment proceeding was satisfied 
(Lawan, 2010). The deliberation by the House on the report of the seven-man panel led 
by Ebenezer Omotoso submitted to it, found the governor and his deputy guilty of all the 
financial allegations levelled against them (Ogunmade, 2006). They were accused of 
embezzling state funds, particularly the Ekiti State Poultry Project handled by Governor 
Fayose childhood friend and contractor, Gbenga James. Consequently, the speaker, Mr. 
Friday Aderemi was sworn as acting governor of Ekiti State (Ailemen, 2007). 
 
Another governor who fell victim of legislature-executive squabble was Joshua Dariye 
the Governor of Plateau State who was impeached in controversial circumstances on 
November 13, 2006 by 8 out of the 24 members of the State House of Assembly 
(Olojede, 2008). He was impeached by the State lawmakers after a legislative panel set 
up to try him for corruption, submitted its findings to the House (Onah, 2007). The 
lawmakers alleged that he stole the resources of the people of Plateau State and converted 
same to his own, laundered the money (eight million pounds, i.e, two billion naira) and 
siphoned it into various accounts in England contrary to Section 15(5) of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ngamsa, 2007). The Supreme Court however, 
ordered his reinstatement on 27 April, 2007 on the ground that  one-third (8 out of 24) of 
the members of the Plateau State House of Assembly did not form a quorum for  the 
purpose of commencing and concluding impeachment process under section 188 of the 
199 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Dariye's term of office as Governor 
of Plateau State however, concluded on 29 May 2007 and so, he could not return to office 
(Ailemen, 2007). It is pertinent to note that the House of Assembly group that plotted the 
impeachment action firmly enjoyed the support of the Federal Government (Olojede, 
2008). 
 
The impeachment move against Governor Borni Haruna of Adamawa State was however, 
unsuccessful. While Governor Boni Haruna was out of the country for medical treatment, 
17 of the 25 members of the Adamawa State House of Assembly commenced 
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impeachment process against him for alleged gross misconduct, misappropriation of 
several billions of naira and involvement in money laundering and inability to perform 
the functions of his office as demanded by the 1999 Constitution (Airahuobhor, 2007). 
The House accused the governor of diverting over N50 billion meant for the payment of 
the state's foreign debts incurred by the defunct Gongola State. This legislative action 
was also alleged to have been instigated by President Obasanjo. It must be noted that 
Boni Haruna became the Governor of Adamawa state in April 1999 when Vice-President 
Atiku Abubakar, the elected governor was elevated to the position of the Vice-President. 
He was reelected in April 2003 (Airahuobhor, 2007). Boni Haruna tenaciously remained 
loyal to his political godfather, the vice president – Atiku Abubakar. This constituted an 
obstacle to President Obasanjo in his war to obliterate the political influence of Vice 
President Atiku in Adamawa State (Onah, 2007). In March 2006, Boni Haruna spoke 
against a third term for President Olusegun Obasanjo and repeated his opposition during 
an April 2006 meeting of 20 state governors. Haruna‟s action in this manner obviously 
would have pitched him against the President hence the plot to have him (Haruna) 
impeached. 
 
It is perhaps pertinent to point out that most of these cases of legislature-executive tussle 
were orchestrated largely by local godfathers in alliance with the presidency (Olojede, 
2008). The PDP-led federal government was complicit in most of these acrimonies. The 
federal government stage-managed the impeachment of Governor Alamesieagha through 
the EFCC. The Oyo State lawmakers acted the script of a federal government backed 
Lamidi Adedibu who felt betrayed by the governor for not making financial returns to 
him (Lawan, 2010). In fact, the impeachment move was after the lawmakers returned 
from a series of meetings with the President and leadership of the Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) in Abuja (Ngamsa, 2007). 
 
The experience of the inter-branch relations in Nigeria presidential democratic 
governance both at the Federal and State level over the years seems to be contrary to the 
position of Madison (1992) who, while defending the newly proposed American 
constitution in 1788,   noted an underlying principle of competition and rivalry among the 
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branches, as means of limiting and controlling government. As Nigeria works out 
representational democracy, conflicts continue to persist between the executive and 
legislative branches, the major issues of gridlocks being on appropriations and other 
proposed legislation (Ojo, 2008, Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). Thus more often than not, the 
executive and the legislature in the Nigeria‟s presidential democratic governance have 
been relating with each other as adversaries, not as responsible partners in governing! 
 
4.6. Legislative and Executive Power Relations in Nigeria’s Politics  
The power relation between the executive and the legislature remains germane to the 
analysis of legislature-executive relations in the government and politics of Nigeria. The 
executive in the presidential system tends to monopolize power and discretionary 
authority not in Nigeria alone but in presidential regimes across nations of the world 
(Aiyede, 2006). The singular nature of the office, its power to initiate and enacts laws, 
rules and regulations, and ensure their compliance, its control of administration of the 
country, and its role as the main provider of public goods and services, including security 
and defense, and maintenance of law and order; it power to formulate and implement 
national policies; and control major material and financial resources, mobilize people and 
provide employment clearly places tremendous powers and discretionary authority at the 
disposal of the executive (Awotokun, 1998; Baker, 2005). Legislative politics in Nigeria 
on the other hand, right from the period of colonialism, has been severely 
underdeveloped. This is due to absence of democracy and the consequential effects of 
prevailing political authoritarianism that either proscribed out-rightly or completely 
subordinated the legislature to the executive arm of government (Lafenwa, 2009).  
 
The Nigerian Legislature developed as an appendage and necessary extension of the 
colonial state which brought it to existence not to perform legislative functions as the 
most important institution of liberal democratic state, but to perform ratificatory functions 
for the executive directives issued by the Colonial Governor (Awotokun, 1998). Thus 
legislative institution in Nigerian, from its creation and embryonic stage, was 
subordinated to the needs and logic of the legislature of the metropolis and as a result was 
prevented from developing as an autonomous institution with the attributes of legislature 
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in modern democratic state (Adebo, 1988). The colonial legislature were not designed to 
perform such enviable role as were characteristic of their precursors in Europe in limiting 
royal absolutism, but were merely designed to compliment the work of the colonial 
governments by serving as agencies for articulation of views and ventilation of popular 
feelings that were not expected to radically change the patterns and policies of the 
respective colonial governments (Alabi, 2009). This orientation was to have a long 
lasting effect on the performance of the legislature, not only during but even years after 
effective renunciation of colonial rule. In 1963 a national daily newspaper was quoted to 
have referred to the Federal Legislature as an expensive and irrelevant talking shop 
(Awotokun, 1998). The Report of the Political Bureau of March 1987 revealed that up 
until 1979, when the Nigerian state returned to a civilian administration thirteen years 
after military rule, legislatures were the weakest link in the making of public policies in 
Nigeria (MAMSER, 1987). The authoritarian legacy of colonialism destroyed the power 
balance of the organs of government (Schraeder, 2000). 
 
The second and aborted third Republics‟ legislatures did not improve significantly in 
terms of their performance. This basic institution of democratic governance remained 
weak and vulnerable to executive manipulation under conditions of enormous 
concentration of power and resources in the executive presidency (Akinsanya and Davies, 
2002; Ibeanu and Egwu, 2007).  
 
The Nigerian legislative institution, though started as a deliberative organ of the colonial 
government, has however, developed to become a full fledged legislative institution of 
law making, representation and oversight. Paradoxically, the emerging legislature 
remained junior partners of the executive in the politics and government of Nigeria after 
independence. Despite the powers, functions and privileges provided for the legislature in 
most Nigerian constitutions after independence, this organ of government has not been 
able to live up to expectation. Public policy making continued to be dominated by the 
executive, post independent Nigeria.  
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The challenges of governance faced by Nigeria, decades after independence further 
reinforced the weaknesses of Nigeria‟s legislative institutions. These systems either put 
the legislature in abeyance or subjected it to manipulations and control of the patrimonial 
executive rulers (Saliu and Muhammad, 2010). With the advent of independence of 
Nigeria from the colonial master in 1960, the country began to set up new dreams and 
expectations as instrument of power was being handed to the indigenous people.  These 
dreams were however, soon shattered as government after government began to fall 
victims to the coup d‟etat of the military junta. The hope of a democratic rule began to 
give way to military dictatorship and ushered in what would mark another era in the 
political history of Nigeria. The new military rulers accused the civilian government of 
everything from corruption and incompetence to mismanagement of the national 
economy.  Rather than solve the Nigerian contemporary political and socio-economic 
problems, military coups d‟etat seemed to drive the country into further turmoil (Eso, 
1996). The precarious situation of the legislative body in Nigeria was further worsened 
by military incursion into Nigeria‟s politics (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). For almost three 
decades under different military regimes, the National Assembly suffered various forms 
of subjugation and proscription under the government (Mentan, 2009).  
 
Among the first actions of military regime in Nigeria was the dissolution of pre-existing 
democratic structures, the legislature being the greatest victim of such dissolution (Alabi, 
2002). The executive arm of government however, existed and indeed waxed stronger. 
Each time the legislative institution came under military assault, the legislature is 
abrogated, and its powers merged with that of the executive military rulers who, through 
a supreme military governing organ, wielded both the legislative and executive (and a 
times, judicial) powers (Fasagba and Olujinmi, 2010), and exercised legislative powers 
by way of promulgating Military Decrees (Mackintosh, 1966). In such a situation, the 
legislatures could not but be seriously weakened as institution of governance while on the 
other hand, the executive continued to wax stronger. 
 
When the legislature was permitted to exist under schemes of diarchy during the aborted 
third republic, the organ of government remained within the stranglehold of the military 
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rulers who used the legislature to create some sense of legitimacy for their 
administrations (Awotokun, 1998). Legislative institution in Nigeria during the decades 
of military administration was therefore denied the advantage of experience which is the 
cornerstone of the enviable tradition of legislative supremacy and significance in the 
governance of the advanced democracies (Kaiser, 2005). Because the Nigeria‟s 
legislatures were hardly permitted to make mistakes and learn from lessons of the past by 
the military rulers who seized every opportunity of major disagreements in parliaments to 
truncate democratic rule, the legislatures got weakened and remained inexperienced 
compared to other arms of government as soon as a return to democratic rules were 
permitted. The legislative arm is thus, the least institutionalized compared to the 
executive arm, following this long history of authoritarianism in Nigeria (Saliu and 
Muhammad, 2010). 
 
More germane to the discussion here is perhaps, the tremendous influence which the 
departed military rulers have wielded in molding the succeeding legislatures to remain 
subservient to executive powers even under democratic rule (Awotokun, 1988). The 
military transition programmes in Nigeria, including the making of the constitutions, 
were designed and supervised by the military rulers. Majority of those conscripted to 
draft such constitutions or give legitimacy to such exercise, through Constituent 
Assemblies were stage-managed to serve the interest of the ruling class and hence such 
instruments were molded along the preferred interests of the military rulers. The general 
pattern has been to designate the legislature as the first arm of the civil government, while 
legal provisions are used to make it subservient to executive powers (Omoweh, 2006; 
Lafenwa, 2009). Thus, the constitutions of the Nigeria‟s post-military era created strong 
presidency and a weak legislature. Moreover, some quasi-legislative powers are given to 
the executive which are often used by the latter to subvert the legislative process. The 
implication of this is that while the legislatures exist as veritable instruments of 
representative democracy, they are unable to perform their avowed role of serving as 
effective checks on the executive. Thus even in the new democratic dispensation ushered 
in on May 29, 1999, the legislature as a basic institution of democratic governance 
remained weak and vulnerable to executive manipulation under conditions of enormous 
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concentration of power and resources in the executive presidency (Ibeanu and Egwu, 
2007; Olujinmi and Fashagba, 2010). 
 
Several other factors have reinforced to weaken the Nigerian legislature as an 
institutional check on the executive in Nigeria. One of these factors includes the 
absence of well established political parties and political process (Benjamin, 2010). In 
most democracies of the world, the performance of the legislature is to a great extent, 
determined by the party system in place (Mukherjee, 2003). Paradoxically however, 
party system in Nigeria is characterized by party instability and fragmentation, lack of  
clear ideology, cross carpeting, ethnic politics, poor structuring of the relationship 
between elected legislators and party bosses and godfatherism (Anifowose and 
Akinbobola, 2005; Omotola, 2009; Omodia, 2010). As a result, political parties in the 
country have failed to metamorphose into enduring and sustainable democratic 
institutions (Muhammad, 2008). This instance of course, has rubbed on the workings of 
the legislators in Nigeria since independence. In many cases, members‟ loyalties to 
political parties or leaders far outweigh concerns for the legislature as an institution 
(Dudley, 1982, Benjamin, 2010).  
 
Another major factor which has weakened the Nigerian legislature is corruption. The 
Nigerian legislature at all level of government – federal, state and local have been 
unable to adequately discharge the onerous duty of protecting public funds and other 
resources due to its corrupt practices in connivance with members of the executive arm. 
The legislature is seen as the accredited representatives of the people and has the duty 
of protecting and controlling public treasury (Stapenhurst, Ulrich and Strohal, 2006). 
While the organ is expected to facilitate accountability through scrutiny of 
administration, the concern of the Nigerian legislature have been on material and 
financial benefits it could amass using its office and power (Alabi and Fasagba, 2009). 
 
Closely related to the factor mentiond above is the personal ambition and parochial 
interest and agenda of legislators. The self serving and pathological conception of politics 
in Nigeria is such that control of political power is seen as a means of perpetuating selfish 
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interests (Muhammad, 2008). The legislature and other activity sectors in the country is 
as a result, saddled with persons who have more consciousness and drive for self service 
rather than the concern for public service, their constituents and the common good. 
Consequently, most legislators see there positions as means of promoting selfish and 
parochial interest rather than national interest (Lafenwa, 2009). 
 
The dysfunctional constituents in Nigeria is another factor that has affected negatively, 
the effectiveness of Nigeria‟s legislature. Many individuals and groups in civil society do 
not understand the workings of the legislature, and are often unskilled in articulating their 
needs to the organ. Conversely, many legislators do not operate constituency offices and 
rarely interact with their constituents, thus resulting to serious disengagement between 
them (legislators) and the people they represent (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010).  
 
The presence of amateur or underdeveloped legislators has also hampered the 
effectiveness of the legislative institution in Nigeria (Omoweh, 2006). The Nigeria 
legislature has no space previously to experience the value of law making derived from a 
representative social order because there was no legislature distinct from the executive in 
politics and governance during the prolonged dictatorial and authoritarian rule by the 
military (Oyovbaire, 2007).  Indeed, many Nigerians who were elected into the 
legislative arm in 1999 knew little or nothing about legislation and the legislative process 
outside of the idea and provisions of the constitution (Olujimi, 2009). Furthermore, the 
job of a legislator is complex, yet few Nigeria‟s legislatures provide adequate training 
opportunities for either new or returning members. Most of them therefore, are often 
unaware of their authority, how to best organize their time and conduct their business 
(Alabi, 2010). 
 
The above factors together with the easy vulnerability of electoral systems to various 
kinds of manipulation, the under-funding of parliament and poor harnessing of the funds 
available for deepening the foundations of democratic politics account for the poor 
performance of the National Assembly and state legislatures in the discharge of its 
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functions in Nigeria (Awotokun, 1998; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002; Akinboye and 
Anifowose, 2008; Olujinmi and Fasagba, 2010). 
 
Despite these challenges, however, legislative politics in the country has undergone 
significant institutional development. A gradual decline in executive dominance in 
Nigeria seemed discernable. This is triggered by the spontaneous awakening of the civil 
society organisations and the media‟s protests against authoritarianism, the abuse of 
power and corruption and demands for individual freedom, human rights and the right to 
participate effectively in the development and democratisation processes of the country.  
 
The resultant threats of impeachment of President Obasanjo by the National Assembly, 
for constitutional violations can be seen as a move by the legislature to assert its 
independence and oversight on the executive (Lafenwa, 2009). The investigations 
conducted by the Senate of the National Assembly into the Presidency‟s handling of the 
Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF) thereby exposing several corrupt dealings of 
the Presidency all continue to give a glimmer of hope for the independence of the 
legislature in Nigeria (Alabi, 2009).  The independence of the National Assembly was 
most evident in its exercise of legislative power to thwart the tenure extension attempt of 
President Obasanjo (Oyewo, 2007). The threat of impeachment against President 
Goodluck Jonathan for non-implementation of the 2012 budget, The appalling exposures 
by the National Assembly of corrupt practices in the energy, oil and financial sector is an 
indication that the Nigerian legislature has wielded considerable influence in oversight 
roles and citizens‟ representation, though not without some scandalous corrupt practices 
by some members of the body itself. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
The historical development of the executive and legislative political institutions in 
Nigeria has been examined in this chapter. It is obvious that the roles of these institutions 
of governance have always been established to complement each other under the 
presidential constitutions of Nigeria. The presidential practice in the country since 1979 
when the country adopted the system of government, have nonetheless, witnessed 
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legislature-executive gridlocks, deadlocks and stalemates over important policy issues. 
The legislative institution of Nigeria is adjudged to have been unable to adequately 
perform its constitutional roles in the face of executive dominance in the Nigeria‟s 
presidential model. Recent performance of the legislature of the Fourth Republic in 
Nigeria however, gives a glimmer of hope for sustainable democracy in the country as a 
gradual decline in executive dominance in Nigeria is discernable. Moreveer, the 2011 
general elections in Nigeria indicated that Nigeria is beginning to accept and use 
elections as the only legitimate process for assuming power and the foundations of 
accountability.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
METHODS OF THE STUDY  
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the research and the analysis of the 
data gathered in the course of the research. It dwells on the mix of methodology deemed 
appropriate for the research study including the research design, the sources of data, 
sample and sampling technique, instrument for data collection, procedure for data 
gathering and method of data analysis. The chapter also dwells on the presentation and 
analysis of the data gathered in the course of the study. This also includes discussion of 
research findings and juxtaposition of the research findings with the research 
propositions. 
 
5.2. Research Design 
The quality of research findings are usually measured against the quality of the 
methodology adopted (Kerlinger, 1973; Ojo, 2003; Aworh et.al., 2006). The research 
typology adopted for this study is the survey design using well structured in-depth 
interviews and questionnaires. Survey research design can be used to collect large and 
standardized data from the field- specified population (Ojo, 2003, Fawole et. al., 2006). 
Quantitative and qualitative data were generated through field survey research design. 
Qualitative method is predicated on the fact that the principle of power dispersion 
between the executive and the legislature and the characterizing relationship require a 
conscious approach that is best captured by the descriptive and analytical methods. As 
noted by Osuala (1982), qualitative method enables proper appraisal of process that 
enables critical evaluations of information gathered from secondary sources. Quantitative 
research, on the other hand, involved the systematic empirical investigation of the 
quantitative properties and phenomena and their relationships using survey design in data 
collection and statistical techniques in data analysis (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Creswell, 2003; Andrade, 2009). The combination of qualitative 
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and quantitative research methods in this study is substantiated by Fawole et.al, (2006) 
who aver that qualitative and quantitative researches are often complementary, and both 
may feature in a research design.   
 
The study is descriptive in nature. As observed by Benjamin (2010) with descriptive 
methodology, one is able to examine a given situation and presents its result as it is; it 
exposes the major elements and characteristics of any phenomenon or attributes. With 
descriptive research, therefore, people‟s attitudes, actions, behaviour or opinions towards 
situations are assessed (Ojo, 2003). Calmorin (1995) averred that this approach is 
appropriate wherever the objects of any class vary among themselves and one is 
interested in knowing the extent to which different conditions obtain among these 
objects. Descriptive research therefore, enables the study to look at the problem by 
exploring the views of different sets of respondents, as well as by exploring different 
literatures related to the study.  
 
5.3. Sources of Data 
The study engaged both primary and secondary sources of data. The required primary 
data were collected directly from the sample under study through the use of a well 
structured questionnaire and in-depth, non-scheduled structured interviews. The 
secondary data, on the other hand, were gathered from government gazettes, Legislative 
Hansards, bulletin, magazines, journals, newspapers, articles, relevant textbooks, 
materials from internet, term papers and archival documents on the subject area.  
 
5.4. Population of Study 
The executive and the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States of Nigeria constitute the 
study population. The executive at the state level is headed by the Governor and is seen 
as the Chief Executive. The commissioners are appointed by him and are mere advisers 
to him and so the Governor can rule with or without the advice of his commissioners. The 
legislature at the state level, on the other hand, is the State House of Assembly. In this 
regard, the study examines the relationship between the Governor and the State House of 
Assembly in Lagos and Ogun States.  
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  5.5. Sampling Technique 
The method used in selecting respondents for this study is a combination of simple 
random and purposive sampling techniques. Simple random sampling technique was used 
to select respondents for the administration of the questionnaire. This sampling technique 
was complemented with purposive sampling technique to select participants for interview 
(Bernard, 1995; Marshall, 1996). The choice of the purposive sampling technique in this 
research is predicated upon the fact that the primary data required for this study can only 
be provided by political actors that are well informed and possess adequate knowledge of 
the subject matter of this study. This necessitates a conscious identification of the 
individuals with such unique characteristics.  
   
5.6. Research Instrument for Data Collection 
The survey data on the pattern, causes and consequences of legislature-executive 
relations in Lagos and Ogun States were gathered using a well structured questionnaire 
and in-depth interview. The questionnaire contained both closed and open-ended 
questions and was divided into five sections. Each of the sections addressed a specific 
segment of the study. The first section of the questionnaire solicited information on the 
personal background, such as age, sex educational attainment, marital status and political 
party affiliation of the respondents. The second segment, however, dwelled on the extent 
to which the legislatures in Lagos and Ogun States were able to maintain viable 
independent positions in carrying out their constitutional functions in the face of 
executive‟s influence in the two States. The third section focused on the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States.  The fourth section, however, 
solicited data on the factors responsible for such pattern, while section five dwelled on 
the implications of such pattern on governance in the two states. The in-depth interview, 
in like manner, covered the themes of this study as contained in the research objectives.  
 
5.7. Data Collection Procedure 
A total number of 300 respondents were selected from Lagos and Ogun States on a ration 
1:1 basis for administration of the questionnaire. Respondents were selected from 
members of the state executive and the State House of Assembly. Respondents were also 
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selected from the civil service, leaders of political parties, political actors, civil society 
and media organisations and academia. In addition, some political actors directly or 
indirectly involved in the political process during the period of study were identified and 
selected for personal interviews. The interviews were conducted with the aid of a tape 
recorder. A combination of the questionnaire and interview methods provided a platform 
for in-depth probing into salient issues that are relevant to the study. Moreover, this 
method has been used in similar studies (Simbine-Okoosi 2010; and Fasagba 2009). Also, 
historical analysis from literature also formed part of the background information of this 
study. The historical account of the research involved investigating, recording and 
analyzing past events as they relate to inter-branch relations in Nigeria. The weakness of 
historical research, however, lies in the fact that it is difficult to delimit the problem so 
that a satisfactory analysis is possible, and faulty past records mean faulty results or 
findings. Nevertheless, because of its usefulness in research it cannot be ignored 
(Osunde, 1993). 
 
5.8. Validity and Reliability of Survey Instrument 
The need to ensure that a measurement instrument measures accurately what it intended 
and the procedure  produces consistent results overtime is very germane and of course, 
the concern of every researcher. This is because the accuracy and dependability of 
research findings hinge on these two fundamental characteristics of a measurement 
instrument and procedure (Allen, 1979). In order to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the instrument employed in this research, the choice of methods and variables employed 
was guided by previous legislative studies (Maestas, Neeley and Richardson, 2003; 
Fasagba, 2009; Odumu, 2010; Simbine-Okoosi, 2010; Benjamin, 2010; Freedom House, 
2010). The variables chosen were also subjected to experts and political scientists with 
respect to the adequacy of the variables to cover the basic legislative activities and 
executive-legislature relations. In addition, experts in the field of social sciences were 
consulted on appropriateness of the instruments and procedure for the study. The 
instrument was then submitted to both supervisors for review and final approval.  
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The Cronbach's Alpha was used to measure the internal consistency of the instrument. 
Cronbach's Alpha is commonly used to determine the reliability of the scale when a 
Likert questionnaire is used for a survey. The range of coefficient varies from zero to 
one. A research instrument with high reliability would tend towards one, while an 
instrument with low or no reliability will have a score tending towards zero. The 
Crombach Alpha for this instrument is .899. This reliability statistics is shown in the table 
below.  
 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.899 47 
 
 
5.9. Method of Data Analysis 
The primary and secondary data obtained were analyzed and computed based on the 
research objectives of this study. The primary data were analysed using measures of 
central tendency and simple percentage statistical techniques with the aid of the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences software (SPSS version 17.0). Measures of central 
tendency and simple percentage are considered appropriate as quantitative tools for 
analysis in this study. The combination of these two statistical techniques is predicated on 
their ability to demonstrate with statistical accuracy, the extent to which the legislature 
vis-à-vis the executive are involved in policy decisions and governance (Creswell, 2003; 
Fasagba, 2009; Simbine-Okosi, 2010). The qualitative data obtained from the interview 
were analysed using content analysis.  
 
5.10. Presentation and Analysis of Data 
This section dwells on presentation and analysis of the data obtained in the course of this 
study. Statistical analyses include frequency distribution, simple percentages and 
measures of central tendency. A total of 300 copies of the questionnaire were self-
administered on 300 respondents (150 respondents in each of Lagos and Ogun States) out 
of which 246 copies of the questionnaire (125 in Lagos State and 121 in Ogun State) 
were duly recovered for analysis. In the ensuing data presentation and analysis, the word 
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“undecided” stands for respondents that were indifferent to some of the questions. Short 
descriptive analyses of the tables are also presented for clarity purpose. The return rate is 
indicated in the table below 
 
State Copies of Questionnaire 
administered 
Copies of Questionnaire 
Retrieved  
% 
Lagos 150 125 83.3 
Ogun 150 121 80.7 
Total 300 276 92 
Source: Field Report, 2012  
 
5.10.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
 
This section presents the frequency distribution by socio-demographic characteristics of 
the respondents. 
 
Table 5. 1 Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Gender  
 
 
 
GENDER 
Lagos State Ogun State Total  Total 
 
f % F % F % 
Male 69 55 75 62 144 59 
Female 56 45 46 38 102 41 
Total  125 100 121 100 246 100 
 
Source: Field Report, 2012 
 
Table 5.1 above is the frequency distribution of respondents according to their gender. 
The table shows that 144 (59%) out of the 246 respondents in both Lagos and Ogun 
States are male and 102 (41%) are female. Thus the male constitute the majority of the 
total respondents in the two states. In Lagos State, 69 (55%) of the 125 respondents are 
male and 56 (45%), female. In Ogun State however, 75 (62%) of the 121 respondents are 
male while 46 (38%) are female. This shows more male respondents than female. The 
disparity in gender is however, higher in Ogun State indicating that there are more male 
respondents than female in the state.  
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Table 5.2: Distribution of Respondents by Age 
 
AGE 
Lagos State Ogun State Total 
 
f % f % f % 
18 – 30 8 6 8 7 16 7 
31 – 40 48 38 41 34 89 36 
41 -  50 53 42 58 48 111 45 
51-Above  16 13 14 12 30 12 
Total 125 100 121 100 246 100 
Source: Field Report, 2012 
Table 5.2 presented above shows the age distribution of respondents. The table reveals 
that 16 (i.e., 7%) out of the 246 respondents fall between the age 18 and 30. A total of 89 
(48 for Lagos State and 41 for Ogun State) out of the 246 respondents fall between the 
age 31 and 40. This represents 36% of the respondents. However, the number of 
respondents between the age of 41 and 50 stands at 58 or 45% (53 in Lagos State and 58 
in Ogun State), while 30 i.e.  12% of the respondents (16 in Lagos State and 14 in Ogun 
State) are 51 years and above. It is clear from the table that more of the respondents were 
above 31 years of age. This is helpful for this study because it affords the researcher to 
gather very useful information since individuals in these age groups are experienced and 
all things being equal, are expected to have a substantial knowledge about the field of 
study in both states. 
 
Table 5. 3. Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status 
 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
Lagos State Ogun State 
 
Total Total 
f % F % F % 
Single 14 11 20 17 31 13 
Married 96 77 95 79 191 78 
Divorced 11 9 3 3 14 6 
Widow 4 3.2 3 2.5 7 3 
Total 125 100.0 121 100.0 246 100 
Source: Field Report 2012 
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Table 5.3 above reveals the percentage distribution of marital status of respondents. 31% 
(31) of the respondents in both states (14 in Lagos State and 20 in Ogun State) were 
single while 78% (191) of respondents in both states (96 in Lagos state and 95 in Ogun 
state) were married. The percentage of respondents who were divorcees in both states 
was 6% (14 out of which Lagos state is 11 and Ogun state, 3). 
 
Table 5. 4. Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Academic Qualifications 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Lagos State Ogun State 
 
Total 
 
F % f % f % 
Primary  - - - -  - 
Secondary 5 4 6 5 11 4 
Tertiary 120 96.0 115 95 235 94 
Total 125 100.0 121 100 246 100 
Source: Field Reports, 2012 
Table 5.4 is the frequency distribution of the age of respondents. The table shows a high 
level of literacy among the respondents in both states. 235 representing 94 % of the 
respondents have education up to tertiary level. The numbers of respondents with 
maximum secondary school education in the two states are 11 (i.e., 4%). This high level 
of literacy among the respondents enabled them answer the questions responsibly. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Place of Work 
 
PLACE OF WORK 
Lagos State 
 
Ogun State 
 
Total 
 
F % F % F % 
State House of Assembly 19 15 15 12 34 14 
State Executive 8 6 9 7 17 7 
Civil Service 21 17 25 21 46 19 
Academic 30 24 28 23 58 24 
Party Sec 12 10 10 8 22 9 
Media 18 14 16 13 34 14 
Civil Society Org. 17 14 18 15 35 14 
Total 125 100 121 100 246 100 
Source: Field Reports, 2012 
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The distribution of respondents according their places of work is presented in table 5.5. 
According to the table, the total percentage of respondents who are members of the 
legislature are 14 (Lagos State House of Assembly is 15% while that of Ogun State is 
12%).  7% of the respondents are from the executive (6% in Lagos State Executive and 
7% in Ogun State Executive). The total percentage of respondents from the civil service 
is 19% (17% in Lagos State and 21% in Ogun State) while the percentage of respondents 
from academic institutions is 24% (24% in Lagos State and 23% in Ogun State).  9% of 
the respondents are from party secretariats (Lagos State is10% and Ogun State, 8%).  
14% (14% in Lagos State and 13%, Ogun State) of the respondents are from the media 
institutions. The percentage of respondents from the civil society organisation is also 
14% (15% in Lagos State and 14% in Ogun State). It is instructive to note that the 
distribution of respondents across various institutions in the study area as presented in 
this analysis enabled the researcher gather comprehensive and balanced information on 
the subject matter. 
 
Table 5. 6. Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Religious Affiliation 
 
Religion 
Lagos State Ogun State Total 
F % F % f % 
Christianity 65 52 68 56 133 54 
Islam 54 43 51 42 105 43 
Others 6 5 2 2 8 3 
Total 125 100 121 100 246 100 
Source: Field Report, 2012 
The religion affiliations of the respondents are presented in the table 5.6 above. The table 
shows that 54% of the respondents in Lagos State belong to the Christianity faith while 
43% is from the Islamic faith. 3% of the respondents either indicated they belong to other 
religions which were not specified or indicated they are not affiliated to any religion.  
 
 
 
 
199 
 
Table 5. 7. Frequency Distribution of Respondents by Party Affiliation 
Party 
Affiliation 
Lagos State Ogun State Total 
f % F % f % 
PDP 20 16 19 16 39 16 
ACN 36 29 25 24 61 25 
PPN 0 0 5 4 5 2 
CPC 6 9 2 2 8 3 
APGA 2 2 0 0 2 1 
Others 14 11 14 12 28 11 
None 47 38 56 46 103 42 
Total 125 100 121 100 246 100 
Source: Field Report, 2012 
Table 5.7 presents the frequency distribution of respondents‟ party affiliations. It shows 
that 16% of the respondents in each of Lagos and Ogun States are affiliated to People‟s 
Democratic Party (PDP). 29% of the respondents in Lagos State indicated affiliation with 
the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) while 24% of the respondents are affiliated to the 
same party in Ogun State. 4% of the respondents in Ogun State are members of the 
People‟s Party of Nigeria (PPN). There is however no respondent in who indicated 
affiliation to the party (PPN) in Lagos State. The table shows that 9% of the respondents 
in Lagos indicated membership of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and 2% 
indicated affiliations with the same party in Ogun State.  
 
Table 5. 8. Frequency Distribution of Respondents by State   
STATE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Lagos 125 51 
Ogun 121 49 
Total 246 100 
Source: Field Report, 2012 
 
In table 5.8, the number of respondents from Lagos and Ogun States are presented. From 
the frequency table, 125 of the respondents (i.e., 51%) are from Lagos State while the 
remaining 121 respondents (i.e., 49%) are from Ogun State. 
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5.10.2. Independence of the Legislature from Executive’s Interference in Lagos and 
Ogun States. 
This section presents and analyses data on the extent of legislature‟s independence of 
executive‟s interference and control in Lagos State and Ogun States between 1999 and 
2011.  
 
The functions of the legislature are done through the legislative process (Okoosi-Simbine, 
2010; Anyaegbunan, 2010; Omoleye, 2011). The examination of the extent to which the 
legislature is independent of executive‟s interference in its legislative process is therefore, 
an investigation of the extent to which the legislature is able to perform its constitutional 
functions without undue interference of the executive. It is at the backdrop of this that 
this section analyzes the extent to which the legislative processes of the Lagos and Ogun 
States Houses of Assembly were independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 
and 2011. Esebagbon (2005) and Anyaegbunam (2010) indetifiy these legislative 
processes to include internal procedures and business of the House, debates and passage 
of bills, parliamentary finance, investigation process, scrutiny and approval of nominees 
for political positions, consideration and amendment and approval process of 
appropriation bills. Table 5.9 below presents the frequency distribution of respondents‟ 
positions on the extent to which the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States were 
independent of executive‟s influence in their various constitutional legislative processes 
between 1999 and 2011. 
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Table 5.9. Frequency Distribution of Respondents on Executive’s interference in the 
Legislative Process of Lagos and Ogun States House of Assembly. 
 
Legislative Processes 
 
Lagos State 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree  
Undecided 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Adoption of rules of Procedure 15 12 14 11 16 13 70 56 10 8 
Parliamentary finance 14 11 10 8 60 48 21 17 14 11 
Motions and Resolutions of the 
House 
17 14 16 13 11 9 28 23 54 45 
Elections and removal of 
Principal Officers of the House 
16 12 13 11 16 13 70 56 10 8 
Debate and passage of bills 4 3 9 7 12 10 81 65 19 15 
Investigation process 4 3 14 11 5 4 85 68 17 14 
Scrutiny and approval of 
nominees for political positions in 
the State 
11 9 15 12 13 11 70 56 16 13 
Approval of appropriation bills 15 12 14 11 16 13 70 56 10 8 
 
Ogun State 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Undecided 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Adoption of rules of Procedure 17 14 16 13 6 5 28 23 54 45 
Parliamentary finance 9 7 23 19 11 9 68 56 10 8 
Motions and Resolutions of the 
House 
9 7 21 17 12 10 67 55 12 10 
Elections and removal of 
Principal Officers of the House 
9 7 23 19 11 9 68 56 10 8 
Debate and passage of bills 7 6 21 17 3 3 30 25 60 50 
Investigation process 2 2 13 11 8 7 40 33 58 50 
Scrutiny and approval of 
nominees for political positions in 
the State 
12 10 18 15 8 7 78 65 5 4 
Approval of appropriation bills 22 18 23 19 8 7 19 16 49 40 
Source: Field Reports, 2012 
The table above presents the percentage response of the respondents on whether or not 
the legislative processes of adopting rules of procedure by the Lagos and Ogun States 
House of Assembly were independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 and 
2011. The table shows that a total 23% (12% strongly agree and 11% agree) of the 
respondents in Lagos State agreed that the legislative processes of the State House of 
Assembly were independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011. 13% of 
the respondents was indifferent while 64 % (56% disagree and 8% strongly disagree) did 
not agree that this process was independent of executive‟ interference in the State. 
Similarly, in Ogun State, 33% (14% strongly agree and 13% agree) of the respondents 
agreed that the legislative processes of adopting rules of procedure by Ogun Satate House 
of Assembly between 1999 and 2011 were independent of executive‟s interference. 5% 
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of the respondents were undecided while a total of 68% of the respondents disagreed. 
This analysis shows that majority of the respondents in both Lagos and Ogun States did 
not agree that the legislative processes of adopting rules of procedure by the House of 
Assembly in the two states were independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 
and 2011.  
 
In respect of the parliamentary finance, the table indicates that 11% strongly agreed that 
funding of Lagos State House of Assembly was independent of executive‟s manipulation 
between 1999 and 2011 while 8% merely agreed. 48% were however, indifferent. 17% of 
the respondent disagreed and 11% strongly disagreed. Similarly, in Ogun State, 7% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that the parliamentary finance of Ogun State House of was 
independent of executive‟s interference, while 19% merely agreed. 9% was undecided 
while 56% disagreed and 8% strongly disagreed. This analysis shows majority of our 
respondents in Lagos and Ogun States did not agree that funding of the legislative 
assemblies in the two states were independent of executive‟s manipulation between 1999 
and 2011.   
 
With respect to the motions and resolutions of the House Assembly in Lagos and Ogun 
States, 27%, of the respondents in Lagos believed that the processes were independent of 
executive‟s interference. 10% were undecided while 68% believed that the processes 
were not free from executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011. Similarly, in Ogun 
State, 24% of the respondents believed that motions and resolutions of the State House of 
Assembly were free from executive‟s interference, 9% were undecided while 65% 
disagreed that the State House of Assembly was independent of executive‟s influence in 
its motions and resolutions.  The analysis thus indicates that majority of the respondents 
in the two states affirmed that the executive did influence the motions and resolutions of 
the House of Assembly in the two states. 
 
The table also shows the percentage response of the respondents on executive‟s 
interference in the legislative processes of electing and removing Principal Officers of the 
Lagos and Ogun States House of Assembly.  The table shows that 12% of the 
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respondents strongly agreed that these legislative processes in the Lagos State House of 
Assembly were independent of executive‟s interference, 11% simply agreed while 13% 
undecided. 56% of the respondents however disagreed while 8% strongly disagreed. In 
Ogun State on the other hand, 7% of the respondents strongly agreed that the legislative 
processes of electing and removing Principal Officers of Ogun House of Assembly were 
independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011.  19% of the respondent 
simply agreed while 9% were undecided. 56% however, disagreed and 8% strongly 
disagreed. It is observed from this analysis that majority of the respondents in both Lagos 
and Ogun States disagreed that the processes of electing and removing Principal Officers 
of the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States were not independent of 
executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011.  
 
In respect of debate and passage of bills by the State House of Assembly in Lagos and 
Ogun States, Table 5.9 reveals that a large percentage of respondents (80% in Lagos State 
and 75% in Ogun State) believed that this fundamental function of the legislature was 
subject to executive‟s influence in Lagos State as well as in Ogun State. While 13% and 
23% of the respondents in Lagos and Ogun States respectively, disagreed with this view, 
10% of the respondents in each of the two states where undecided.  
 
The percentage response of the respondents on the extent to which the investigative 
processes of the State House of Assembly in Lagos and Ogun States were independent of 
the executive‟s interference is also presented in Table 5.9. In the table, 3% of the 
respondents in Lagos State strongly agreed that these legislative processes were 
independent of executive‟s meddlesomeness in Lagos State while 11% merely agreed 
with the notion. 4% of the respondents were however undecided. Whereas 68% of the 
respondents merely disagreed, 14% of the respondents expressed their strong 
disagreement on the notion. The percentage response of the respondents in Ogun State on 
the other hand, shows that 2% of the respondents strongly agreed and 11% simply agreed 
that Ogun State House of Assembly was independent of executive‟s interference in the 
performance of its investigative functions between 1999 and 2011. 7% of the respondents 
were undecided.  33% however expressed their disagreement and 50% strongly 
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disagreed. From this analysis, it can be seen that majority of the respondents in Lagos and 
Ogun States were of the view that the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States 
were not independent of executive‟s influence while performing their investigative 
functions between 1999 and 2011. 
 
The table also presents the percentage response of the respondents on the independence 
of the Lagos and Ogun States Houses of Assembly from executive‟s interference in their 
process of scrutinizing and approving the Governor‟s nominees for political positions. 
From the table, 9% of the respondents in Lagos State strongly agreed, 12% simply 
agreed, 11% was indifferent, 56% strongly disagreed and 13% merely disagreed that 
Lagos States House of Assembly was independent of executive‟s interference in its 
processes of scrutinizing and approving Governor‟s nominees for political positions in 
the state. Conversely, in Ogun State, 10% of the respondents strongly agreed that the 
processes of scrutinizing and approving Governor‟s nominees for political positions 
between 1999 and 2011 were independent of executive‟s interference, while 15% merely 
agreed. 7% of the respondents was indifferent. 65% disagreed and 4% expressed strong 
disagreement. This analysis shows that majority of the respondents both in Lagos and 
Ogun States were of the view that the legislative processes of scrutinising and approving 
Governors‟ nominees for political positions in the State were not independent of 
executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011.  
 
The percentage response of the respondents on the independence of Lagos and Ogun 
States Houses of Assembly in their legislative processes of approving appropriation bills 
of the states between 1999 and 2011 are also presented in Table 5.9. The table shows that 
12% of the respondents strongly agreed, 11% simply agreed, 13% indifference while 
56% agreed and 8% strongly disagreed that Lagos State House of Assembly was 
independent of executive‟s interference in the processes of approving appropriation bills 
between 1999 and 2011. In the same vein, for Ogun State, the table indicates that 18% of 
the respondents strongly agreed, 19% merely agreed, 7% were undecided while 16% 
disagreed and 40% strongly disagreed that the processes of approving appropriation bills 
by the Ogun State House of Assembly between 1999 and 2011 were independent of 
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executive‟s interference. By this analysis, it is clear that majority of the respondents in 
both Lagos and Ogun States viewed that the approval processes of appropriation bills by 
the states House of Assembly were not independent of executive‟s interference between 
1999 and 2011.  Table I. below is the descriptive statistical analysis of the respondents on 
the extent of executive‟s interference in the legislative process of Lagos and Ogun States 
House of Assembly.  
 
Table 5.10: Descriptive Statistics of Executive’s Interference in the Legislative 
Process of Lagos and Ogun States House of Assembly. 
 
Lagos State  
 
N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Adoption of rules of Procedure 125 376.00 3.0080 
Parliamentary finance 125 465.00 3.7200 
Motions and Resolutions of the House 125 468.00 3.7440 
Election and removal of Principal Officers of the House 125 481.00 3.8480 
Debate and passage of bills 125 472.00 3.7760 
Investigation process 125 375.00 3.0000 
Scrutiny and approval of nominees for political positions 
in the State 
125 465.00 3.7200 
Approval of appropriation bills 125 376.00 3.0080 
 
Ogun State  
 
N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Adoption of rules of Procedure 121 449.00 3.7107 
Parliamentary finance 121 410.00 3.3884 
Motions and Resolutions of the House 121 411.00 3.3966 
Elections and removal of Principal Officers of the House 121 432.00 3.5702 
Debate and passage of bills 121 448.00 3.7024 
Investigation process 121 317.00 2.6198 
Scrutiny and approval of nominees for political positions 
in the State 
121 409.00 3.3802 
Approval of appropriation bills 121 331.00 2.7355 
Source: Field Data, 2012 
 
The result of the statistical test indicated in Table 5.10 above shows the extent to which 
the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States were independent of executive‟s 
interference in their legislative processes between 1999 and 2011. In respect of the 
process of adopting rules of procedure, the test shows a mean of 3.0080 for Lagos State 
House of Assembly. This reveals that this legislative process in the Lagos State House of 
Assembly was not independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011. 
Similarly in Ogun State, the extent of executive‟s interference in the adoption of rules of 
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procedure by the State House of Assembly is indicated by a mean of 3.7107. With this 
statistical result, it is affirmed that the adoption of rules of procedure by the Ogun State 
House of Assembly between 1999 and 2011 was not independent of executive‟s 
interference.  
 
The table also reveals the test result of the extent of executive‟s interference in the 
parliamentary finances of the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States. For Lagos 
State, the test indicates a mean of 3.7200 while that of Ogun State reveals 3.3884. These 
results indicate high executive‟s interference in the parliamentary finances of the Houses 
of Assembly in both States. It is instructive to note that the high mean value obtained in 
both states is as a result of the high percentage of respondents who disagreed that the 
parliamentary finances of the legislative assemblies were independent of executive 
meddlesomeness between the periods of study. On the motions and resolutions of the 
state, the test result shows a mean value of 3.7440 for Lagos State while that of Ogun 
State is 3.3884. With these high mean values for each of the two states, it is affirmed that 
motions and resolutions of the legislative houses in Lagos and Ogun States were not 
independent of executive‟s influences between 1999 and 2011.  
 
The test result also affirmed that the process of electing and removing principal officers 
of the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States were not independent of 
executive‟s manipulations.  This is indicated by a mean of 3.7440 for Lagos State and 
3.8480 for Ogun State as shown in Table 5.10 above. It is worthy of note that the high 
mean for the two states is a consequence of the very high percentage of respondents who 
disagreed that the processes of electing and removing principal officers of the legislative 
assemblies in the two states were independent of executive‟s interference between 1999 
and 2011.  
 
The crucial process of debating and passage of bills by the legislature was found not 
independent of executive‟s manipulations in Lagos State House of Assembly and in Ogun 
State House of Assembly. This is indicated by the statistical mean of 3.7760 for Lagos 
State and 3.7024 for Ogun State. The high mean value for both states is indicative of high 
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disapproval by our respondents that debates and passage of bills in the legislative houses 
of Lagos and Ogun were independent of executive‟s interference.  
 
The extent to which the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States were able to perform their 
oversight function independent of executive manipulation was also tested. The result 
indicated that this important function of the legislature was not independent of 
executive‟s interference in Lagos State between 1999 and 2011. Table 5.10 reveals the 
statistical test result of a mean of 3.0000 for this legislative process. In a similar 
dimension, the statistical test result for Ogun State shows a mean of 2.6198. It is 
instructive to note that this mean value for Ogun State, though shows respondents‟ 
disagreement with the independence of the State House of Assembly in the performance 
of its oversight function, the disagreement is however, very weak. Comparatively, 
therefore, while executive‟s interference in the investigation process of the legislature in 
Lagos State was high, such interference was very low in Ogun State.   
 
On the important function of scrutiny and approval of nominees for political positions by 
the Lagos State House of Assembly, the mean of 3.7200 indicated that the process was 
not independent of executive‟s interference. Similarly, Ogun State reveals a mean of 
2.9102 indicating respondents‟ disagreement that the process was independent of 
executive‟s interference between 1999 and 2011. The other test was on the approval of 
appropriation bills by the legislature. While Lagos State revealed a mean of 3.0080, that 
of Ogun State was 2.7355. We therefore, conclude that this legislative process was not 
independent of executive‟s interference in the two states. It is instructive to note that the 
level of interference in Lagos State was higher than that of Ogun State.  
 
These findings on legislative independence of the State House of Assembly for each of 
Lagos and Ogun States are discussed in details below. 
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5.10.3. Discussion of Findings on the Independence of the Legislature from 
Executive’s Interference in Lagos and Ogun States. 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for the separation of 
the personnel, powers and functions of the executive and the legislature. The separation 
of powers is understood to be a way of controlling the exercise of state power by 
fragmenting it among the three different institutions – the executive, the legislature and 
the judiciary. This separation of powers is the basic principle of the presidential system of 
government adopted in Nigeria since 1979 and enshrined in sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 
1999 Constitution. By the general principle of checks and balances, however, the powers 
are distinct but not wholly separate. Each of the powers designated a specific sphere of 
action and there are situations when one power has a partial agency in the operation of 
another. The whole essence is to provide for balance of power among the organs of 
government. Accordingly, no one arm of government is superior to the other, neither is 
any subordinate to the other. Each organ is independent within its own sphere of 
influence.  
 
As noted by Campbell (2004), however, the principle of separation of powers is 
abrogated when a power is exercised by a branch of the government which possesses a 
different power. By the principle of separations of powers, the legislature is independent 
of the executive in performing its constitutionally specified functions and in conducting 
its internal affairs. A good legislature accordingly, has to be relatively independent of the 
executive and participate in policy initiation rather than being a rubber stamp of 
executive proposals. Furthermore, one of the basic principles of a democratic system is 
the inherent right of the legislature to regulate its own affairs by determining the pattern 
and form of procedure to be followed in the conduct of legislative business (Okoosi-
Simbine, 2010). Independence of the legislature from executive control is therefore, 
critical to the performance of the legislature‟s constitutional functions of citizens‟ 
representation through legislations and checking executive excesses, arbitrariness and 
abuse of governmental power. It is central to democratic governance. It is in the view of 
this that Section 60 and 101 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provide that the nation‟s 
legislative assemblies (National Assembly and State House of Assembly) shall have 
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powers to regulate its own procedure, including the procedure for summoning and recess 
of the House. It is therefore, not only a duty but also a right of the legislature to exercise 
its power independently without executive meddlesomeness. The extent to which this 
occurred in Lagos and Ogun State is discussed below. 
 
5.10.3.1. Internal Procedure and Business of the House  
The hallmark of legislative independence is its ability to adopt its rule of procedure and 
regulate its own business. This is the spirit behind the provision of Section 60 and 101 of 
the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. The internal procedure and business of the legislative 
assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States were however, not independent of executive‟s 
interference between 1999 and 2011.   
 
One of the fundamental internal procedures of the legislature is the nomination, election 
and removal of Principal Officers of the House. In the State legislature, the Speaker 
together with the Deputy Speaker and all other elected functionaries are referred to as the 
Principal Officers (Omoleye, 2011). The Speaker, who is the presiding officer of the 
House is nominated and elected from among fellow honourable members. According to 
Section 92 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, there shall be a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker of 
a House of Assembly who shall be elected by the members of the House from among 
themselves. The removal process of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker is also stated in 
Section 92 (2) of the 1999 Constitution. It states that these key principal officers of the 
House of Assembly shall vacate their offices if they cease to be members of the House of 
Assembly, otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of the House, when the House first 
sits after dissolution of the House; or if he is removed from office by a resolution of the 
House of Assembly by votes of not less than two-third majority of the members of the 
House. It is obvious therefore, that the election and removal of the Speaker of the House 
of Assembly is intended, by the constitution, to be purely the affairs of the legislative 
house void of executive meddlesomeness.   
 
In Lagos State, the processes of electing and removing principal officers of the Lagos 
State House of Assembly between 1999 and 2011 were not independent of executive‟s 
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interference. This important legislative process, during this period, was remotely 
manipulated by the executive. One of such executive‟s interferences was the election of 
the Speaker of the House at the inception of the Fourth Republic in June, 1999. In fact, 
investigation revealed that the Governor at the inauguration of the Lagos State House of 
Assembly on the 2nd of June, 1999 had to monitor the election process of the Speaker in 
order to ensure that his preferred candidate won the speakership position of the House. 
Consequently, Dr. Adeleke Olorunnimbe Mamora from Kosofe 1 Constituency emerged 
as the Speaker of the Assembly and remained in that position for that period until 2003 
when he was elected into the Senate on the platform of the Action Congress (AC) and 
again re-elected into the Senate in 2007 (Akogun, 2010).  
 
Another instance of executive‟s interference in the legislative processes of electing and 
removing principal officers of the Lagos State House of Assembly was the impeachment 
of Mr Jokotola Pelumi as the Speaker of the House on 30th December, 2005.  Mr Jokotola 
Pelumi was elected as Speaker of the Fifth Lagos State Legislative Assembly in 2003. It 
was alleged however, that trouble started brewing for him following agitations by 
members of the House for a sharing formula relating to the N20 million (155,642 US 
dollar) withheld council fund paid to the State. It was alleged that the House leadership 
under Pelumi was on the verge of blackmailing Governor Bola Tinubu with the view to 
compell him to accede to the demands of the House which also included allocation of 
plots of land and constituency projects, before the intrigue of his impeachment. In order 
to forestall the House from doing this, it was alleged that Governor Bola Tinubu had to 
instigate the state legislators for a change of leadership in the Assembly. Indeed, 
Governor Bola Tinubu who was a Guest of Honour at Professor Segun Gbadegesin's 
book launch at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), during the period of 
impeachment, monitored the proceedings on the floor of the House with his mobile phone 
while the event lasted (Ajanaku and Farotimi, 2005, BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 2005). Through executive‟s manipulation of the House members, most of whose 
elections into the House were sponsored by the Governor, Pelumi‟s impeachment was 
endorsed by 33 out of the 40 members of the House.  
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In a similar dimension, the legislative processes of electing and removing principal 
officers of the Ogun State House of Assembly were not independent of executive‟s 
interference between 1999 and 2011. The emergence of Mrs. Titi Oseni as the Speaker of 
the Ogun State House of Assembly in 1999 is one of such instances of executive‟s 
interference in the election process of principal officers of the State‟s legislative 
assembly. Finding revealed that Oseni‟s victory against Mr. Fasiu Bakenne of Abeokuta 
South Constituency 1 with 19 to 7 votes was a result of her closeness to the Executive 
Governor of the state - Otunba Gbenga Daniel (Ogunsakin, 2003). The Governor‟s 
support for Oseni‟s victory hinged on the latter‟s role as a strong factor in the defunct 
Daniel Campaign Organisation as well as strong supporter of the Gateway Foundation, a 
brainchild of the governor. Oseni‟s husband is from the Ijebu ethnic group. Moreover, 
Bakenne‟s alleged closeness to one of the aspirants that lost the gubernatorial seat to 
Daniel at PDP primaries would have made him (Daniel) support any candidate against 
Bakenne (Ogunsakin, 2003).  Findings revealed that prior to Oseni‟s election, the PDP 
leaders from Ogun Central Senatorial Zone, comprising Abeokuta and its environs, had 
unanimously agreed to support the candidature of Bakenne since the party had zoned the 
speakership to the area. Moreover the party stalwarts opposed Oseni candidature because 
her husband is an Ijebu which could tilt her loyalty towards the ethnic group especially 
going by the fact that the governor also has Ijebu origin. Just out of the blues however, 
Oseni joined the race and won. It would appear therefore, that the Governor had used his 
clout against Bakenne in favour of Oseni. 
 
Another case of executive‟s interference in the legislative processes of electing and 
removing principal officers of the Ogun State Assembly was the impeachment of 
Honourable Tunji Egbedokun as the Speaker of the House under a questionable 
circumstance by a group of 11 lawmakers popularly known as G-11. It is instructive to 
note that Egbedokun has been the leader of the G-15, the anti-Daniel group in the State 
Assembly who was resolute on impeaching the governor (Olukoya, 2009). Since his 
emergence as the Speaker of the State Assembly, the relationship between the House and 
the Governor has been hostile. The Governor would as a result, had to resort to using 
every possible means to get rid of him. In his antics he (Governor) was able to propel a 
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machinery of the minority of the legislators (11 out of 26 members) to unconstitutionally 
removed Egbedokun as the Speaker of the State Assembly while Mr. Soyemi Coker 
became the new Speaker. 
 
The impeachment of Alhaji Isa Kawu, the Speaker of Niger State House of Assembly is 
similar to the analysis above. Kawu's election to replace the impeached Speaker 
Mohammed Tsowa Gamunu seemed to receive warmth acceptance by his colleagues in 
the House because of his record of personal reputation and integrity. It was alleged that 
he (Kawu) had at one time rejected perks, including a car that the executive arm of the 
state government gave to all the members of the State House of Assembly. The rejection 
of such largesse would have been seen by the Governor as indicating Kawu‟s antipathy to 
his administration. Thus, the emergence of Kawu as the Speaker was not comfortable to 
the Governor. Consequently, through executive‟s political intriques, Kalu was impeached 
exactly a week after his election, by a vote of no confidence passed by twenty-one votes 
of the legislature (DailyTrust, 2012). 
 
It is pertinent to note the strategic position that the Speaker of a State House of Assembly 
occupies to the extent that the control of his election and removal by the executive could 
invariably place the operations, activities and performance of the Assembly at the whims 
and caprices of the executive. In such situation, the legislature becomes no better than a 
stooge in the hands of the executive who through leadership of the House manipulates the 
former to legitimize his policy directions and exerts his dominance in the polity thereby 
undermining the principle of separation of powers in presidential democratic governance. 
 
Another factor that is critical to the internal processes and effective functioning of the 
legislature is parliamentary financial autonomy. According to the legislators interviewed, 
parliamentary finance is imperative for the legislature to carry out the onerous 
responsibilities placed upon it by virtue of being the people‟s representative through law 
making and oversight on the operations of government. These fundamental roles in a 
democratic polity inform the need for the legislature to be financially self-directed and 
not to be tied to the apron strings of the executive. The funding of the three arms of 
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government, though separately derives directly from the annual appropriation act of the 
State, the decision to release money to any department of government is ultimately the 
prerogative of the executive. While the 1999 Constitution grants financial autonomy for 
the National Assembly, state legislative assemblies in the country do not have such right 
in the Constitution. Conversely, financial autonomy of the legislature is indispensable for 
its independence in order for it to effectively carryout its tedious responsibilities. It was 
on the bases of this that the self-accounting law, which aimed at quaranteeing the 
financial autonomy of the State House of Assembly, was passed in 2000 (Lagos State 
House of Assembly (LSHA), 2000, vol.2) and authenticated on the 8th of January 2001. 
 
Parliamentary finance is nonetheless, one of the areas in which the Lagos State House of 
Assembly was not independent of executive meddlesomeness between 1999 and 2011. 
This period witnessed executive hegemony which deliberately trickle funds to the 
legislature as a means of controlling the operations of the House in the state. While the 
self-accounting law was passed in 2000, it was not implemented by the executive (Ajayi, 
2010; Akoni and Sessou, 2012).  Our interview with Mr. Quadri Wasiu Adesanya, Head, 
Parliamentary Education Unit, revealed that not until 2009, the Lagos State House of 
Assembly did not enjoy regular funding from the executive. Some of the legislators 
interviewed argued that the legislature‟s financial subjugation under the whims and 
caprices of the executive greatly handicapped the assembly in carrying out in-depth 
investigations necessary for its role of legislation and oversight.  
 
In a similar dimension, parliamentary finance is one of the areas in which the Ogun State 
House of Assembly was not free from executive meddlesomeness. The period between 
2003 and 2010 for instance, witnessed executive meddling with the money appropriated 
for the internal operations of the State House of Assembly. The House passed the House 
of Assembly Self-Accounting Bill No. 5, into law in 2003 (Ogun State House of 
Assembly (OGHA), 2003 vol. 1). By this Bill, Ogun State House of Assembly Account is 
to be established and maintained and the Clerk of the House becomes the accounting 
officer. Despite that these bills have been assented to by the Governor, he did not 
implement it thereby starving the Assembly of funds (Ali, 2009). 
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Our interview with Mr. Femi Ademosun, the Director, Bills, Ogun State House of 
Assembly, revealed that since the removal of Titi Oseni as the Speaker of the State House 
of Assembly, the Governor had continued to deliberately starve the state assembly of the 
required fund for running the institution. The Assembly had no control over its budget 
and finances which was under the whims and caprices of the Governor who likewise used 
the instrument to manipulate the assembly.  In fact, at a point, the House had to adjourn 
its plenary sessions indefinitely on the grounds that it could no longer muster enough 
funds to run the affairs of the House such as purchase of diesel and photocopying papers 
(Coffie-Gyanfi, 2010). The allegation of starvation funds was however, refuted by the 
then State Commissioner for Information and Orientation, Mr. Sina Kawonise who 
argued that it was the state‟s debt burden that crippled allocations to all the state 
government institutions and agencies since November, 2009. Our interview with some 
key political actors in the State however, revealed that the Governor deliberately withheld 
the State Assembly‟s allocation in retaliation to the House refusal to grant him the legal 
backing for obtaining a proposed N40million loan from the capital market.  
 
Fiscal autonomy for the legislature enables it exercise control over its internal operations. 
The non-release of funds appropriated for the legislature on the other hand, has great 
consequence for the activities and operations of the assembly. It constitutes great 
hindrance to its oversight performance. For instance, committees‟ sites tour, researches, 
organizing public hearing among others, require fund. Failure to properly fund the 
legislature would then mean limited investigative ability of the assembly. 
 
It is the crucial position that parliamentary finance holds to legislative independence and 
effectiveness that informed the sixth National Assembly‟s attempt at passing the bill for 
the financial autonomy of states house of assemblies in the country. The bill however, got 
the support of only 23 States Assemblies against 24 needed for the bill to be passed to 
law (Bamgboye, 2012). The issue of financial autonomy for the state legislative 
assemblies constituted one of the major discussions at the Conference of Speakers of 
State Houses of Assembly held in May/June, 2012 in Lagos State (Okoeki, 2012, Jaiyeola 
and Durojaiye, 2012). The states lawmakers however, seemed to have recognized the 
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fundamental place of financial autonomy in legislative independence. This perhaps was 
the reason for the mass support of the resolution at the Conference. According to the 
Chairman of the Speakers' Conference, Mohammed Inuwa, it was now a unanimous 
decision among the state lawmakers that state legislatures must be seen as actually 
independent of the executive (Jaiyeola and Durojaiye, 2012).  As at May, 2012, the bill 
for an act to alter the provisions of the 1999 Constitution to give financial autonomy to 
State Assemblies has passed through the second reading in the House of Representatives 
(Okoeki, 2012; Oluwaseun and Anofi, 2012).  
 
5.10.3.2. Debate and Passage of Bills 
Law making is the fundamental responsibility of the legislature in a democratic state 
(Esebagbon, 2005). According to Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution, the primary 
function of the legislature is to make law for the peace, order and good governance of the 
federation. Legislation, therefore, occupies a prime place in modern governance as it 
provides the necessary legal authority for governmental actions for the peace, order and 
good governance.  The law making responsibility in a state is conferred on the House of 
Assembly by Section 4 (6) and (7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria which state that the legislative power of a State of the Federation shall be vested 
in the House of Assembly of a State which shall have power to make law for the peace, 
order and good government of the State.  
 
Legislatures adopt policies and make laws through the process of deliberation and 
passage of bills. Section 100 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria states that the power of the House of Assembly to make laws shall be exercised 
by bills passed by the House of Assembly. A bill may be introduced or initiated by a 
member of the assembly or a group of members of the House (Private member‟s bill) or 
emanates from the executive (executive bill).  
 
The Lagos State House of Assembly, particularly the Fourth and the Fifth Assembly have 
been weak in fashioning out transparent development strategy for the state through public 
legislation. For instance, the Fourth Lagos State House of Assembly (1999 to 2003) 
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passed 30 bills (motions and resolutions inclusive) out of which only four (4) were 
private member bills.  While most of the bills were introduced by the Chief Executive, 
the State Assembly merely provided the legitimacy required for the Governor to 
implement them.  
 
Among the four (4) bills initiated by members of the Assembly during this period is the 
Lagos State (Constituency) Project Development Law, 1999. It is pertinent to note that 
while Constituency Project could be seen as efforts to decentralize development spending 
and decision making with the potential of addressing the peculiar development needs of 
the constituencies, it however, compromises the principle of separation of powers 
enshrined in the constitution of the country. The constitutional role of the legislature is to 
make law and not to implement laws or projects. By involving in the execution of 
projects, legislators would automatically lose their powers of watchdogs in holding the 
government accountable, a crucial oversight role in making sure that the Government 
undertakes its obligations as required. As Alabi (2008) observed, by the Constituency 
Project Law, legislators are turned into instruments for carryingout executive 
responsibilities through their involvement in projects execution. Moreover, in a country 
where political actors are ladened with corruption and economic exigency, such law 
appears not to be at the interest of the public but for parochial and selfish gain of the 
legislators. The second private members bill passed into law by the State Assembly 
within this period was the Self Accounting Law on the 8th January, 2001(LSHA, 2001, 
Vol. 1). By this law, the State Assembly would have independent control over its yearly 
allocations as opposed to the practice of intermittent release of allocations to them by the 
executive. This law would have strengthened the independence of the legislature in the 
State. Conversely, the law though assented by the Governor, was not implemented. The 
other two laws include the Safety of Workers in Construction and Allied Industries in 
Lagos State Law, 2003 and Lagos State Emergency Relief Agency Functions of the 
Agency Law, 2003 (LSHA, 2003, Vol. 2).  
 
While it is noted that in most democratic legislatures, the executive branch introduces 
most of the legislations (NDI, 2000), the impact of the legislature is however, brought to 
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bear on the legislations through objective debates and amemdments and by so doing, the 
interests of the people who they respresent are reflected in those legislations. In Lagos 
State House of Assembly, particularly the Fourth and the Fifth Assembly (1999-2003 and 
2003-2007 respectively) however, while bills introduced by private members were 
greeted with serious and hot debates leading to amemdments either modifications, 
changing part of such bills or adding new provisions, debates on executive bills were in 
most cases often, shallow with no substantial legislative influence. For instance, towards 
the end of 2000, the Assembly approved for the bill for a law to raise N10 billion loan 
from the capital market and on August 02, 2001, bearly six months after, the Governor 
forwarded another bill for the assembly‟s approval to raise another N25billion loan from 
the capital market which was also approved hookline and sinker (Sanni, 2001). 
 
In the same dimension, the Sixth Lagos State House of Assembly (2007 – 2011), was 
more of a clearing house for the executive. For instance, the State legislature passed six 
bills at one of its sittings, all of which were executive bills. The bills included 
Administration of Criminal Justice (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill, 2011, Criminal Law 
of Lagos State Bill, 2011 and Lagos State Audit Bill, 2011, Lagos State Safety 
Commission Bill, 2011, Lagos State Emergency Management Agency (Amendment) Bill, 
2011 and Customary Courts Bill, 2011 (LSHA, 2011, Vol. 2). Thus, the Sixth Lagos 
State Assembly was more or less a deliberative assembly and a rubber stamp for the 
executive. Parochial interests and political ambitions often preoccupied members‟ actions 
and subjected them to the whims and caprices of their godfather at the expense of the 
electorates. The period also witnessed politics of godfatherism between the Governor 
Fashola and his godfather – Tinubu the former governor of Lagos State. The Assembly 
whose members were largely sponsored by Tinubu could not but get itself immersed in 
the game thereby derailing from its constitutional role of citizens‟ representation through 
legislation.  
 
The ineffectiveness of the Lagos State House of Assembly in the performance of its 
constituent representational role through legislation is perhaps captured by Governor 
Babatunde Fashola statement to the State Assembly; 
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I anticipate that deliberations in the House will translate to better service 
delivery to our people. Legislative work is a career nurtured to serve the 
common and public good rather than a desire to prosper individual interest 
(Nigerian Tribune, 2012). 
 
 In this nature of governance where most bills passed by the legislature are executive bills 
and the legislature could not serve as mature and autonomous point of deliberation in the 
law making process, the legislature as a matter of fact, could be regarded as a mere 
extension of the executive domain and the government cannot be deemed democratic. 
 
The Seventh Lagos State Assembly inaugurated on June 4, 2011, however, appeared to 
have made a clean brake from business as usual. Within the first year of its inauguration, 
the House passed 9 bills and 42 resolutions with 21 motions. Executive dominance 
though, was evident in these legislations, motions and resolutions of the assembly 
enabled the legislators to perform representational roles. It is pertinent to note that the 
legislature influences government policies through motions and resolutions (Usman, 
2010), however, motions and resolutions are suggestions and persuasions to the executive 
and do not have the force of law (NDI, 2000; Omoleye, 2011). While the implementation 
of the motions and resolutions are subject to the discretion of the executive, they can 
effectively raise awareness on issues that could influence the executive‟s actions on those 
issues. Through sponsoring and passing of motions therefore, the Assembly could deliver 
to the electorates, the benefit of representative democracy.  
 
Conversely in Ogun State however, the Fourth Ogun State Assembly existed during the 
administration of Governor Segun Osoba (1999-2003) under one-party hegemony. 
Alliance for Democracy (AD) controlled both the government and majority of the seats in 
the State legislative assembly. Legislative process of law-making in the State during this 
period was dominated by the executive. For instance, 30 bills were passed by the Ogun 
State Fourth Assembly most of which were sponsored by the executive. During this 
period however, the Ogun State Assembly, rather than merely existing as a ratifying 
assembly, executive bills were often subjected to debates both on the floor of the House 
and when referred to standing committees before such bills were passed. Furthermore, 
out of the 30 bills passed by the Fourth Ogun State Assembly, 7 of them appeared to be 
bills initiated in response to the motions and resolutions of the legislature.  One of such 
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bills was the bill for a law to provide for remuneration of certain public/political office 
holders in the Executive/Legislative arms of the Local Government levels in Ogun State 
which was assented to on 2/3/2001. The bill was initiated by the executive in response to 
a resolution of the House following an executive bill assented to on 17/10/2000 to 
provide for the remuneration of certain public office holders in the Executive Arm in the 
State and other matters incidental thereto. Incidentally however, the Fourth Ogun State 
Assembly seemed to lack the legislative capacity, the wherewithal in terms of experience, 
professional staff, adequacy of facilities and technology to carryout research on bills in 
order to make meaningful contributions or amemdments (if necessary) before passage. 
Thus more often, debates on executive bills were not more than legislative routine that 
would have no substantial impact on those bills. In these circumstances therefore, the 
Fourth State House of Assembly could only play marginal role in law-making process of 
the State.  
 
The Fifth Assembly of Ogun State (2003 – 2007) existed under executive subjugation.  
During this period, the Ogun State House of Assembly, which was 100%, controlled by 
PDP - the government party, existed as a mere rubber stamp assembly. The Governor 
often manipulated the internal processes of the State Assembly through the Speaker of 
the House, Hon. Titi Oseni to favour executive bills. Investigations revealed that Titi 
Oseni‟s emergence as the Speaker was instigated by the Governor (Ogunsakin, 2003). In 
this situation, selfish policies and programmes of the executive had smooth sails with the 
legislature merely giving the legal right necessary for him to execute those policies. One 
of such bills was the bill for law to transfer landed properties vested in Ogun State 
Properties and Investment Corporation (OPIC) to the Ogun State Bureau of Lands and 
Survey passed 9/01/2006 and assented to on 27/2/2006. Findings revealed that through 
this law, the Governor was able to acquire vast landed properties of the State for private 
use. Another of such obnoxious bills was the bill for law to amend the Appropration law, 
2004 by transferring the sum of N776.458 million from capital expenditure to recurrent 
expenditure as well as re-align the total budget. The bill was passed by the assembly on 
16/11/2004 and assented to on 30/12/2004. It must be noted that recurrent expenditure for 
that year‟s budget was 46% (including N4 billion for public debts charges, loan 
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repayments including interest due), while capital expenditure was about 53% (N16 billion 
out of the total of N30 billion). Transferring from capital expenditure to meet recurrent 
expenditure that was already half of the total expenditure would suggest less emphasis by 
the Governor, on the state‟s much needed development. During this period (2003 -2007), 
the State legislature was incapacitated and incarcerated to perform its law making 
responsibility. It was weak in initiating private member‟s bills and in scrutinizing 
executive bills. This is evidenced by the trivial role and influence it played in the 42 bills 
passed throughout the duration of the Fifth Assembly. Out of these bills only 2 were 
private members bills. They include the bill to establish the House of Assembly Service 
Commission and for other matters connected therewith and a bill to make provision for 
the Ogun State House of Assembly to be self accounting and for the other connected 
matters passed on 2/10/2003 and 4/11/2003 respectively. Findings revealed that these 
laws were assented by the Governor but he did not implement them because they could 
have substantial effects on his government. While the self accounting law would 
guarantee the financial autonomy of the State Assembly, the Service Commission law 
would enable the House to have firm control of its staff and other machinery of operation. 
The two laws would therefore, strengthen the legislature‟s independence and reduce its 
manipulation by the executive in the State.  The weakness of the legislature in 
contributing meaningfully to law-making process is therefore, a demonstration of 
executive dominance in the policy direction of the State between 2003 and 2007. 
 
It was not surprising, that when Titi Oseni was impeached as the Speaker of the Sixth 
Assembly of Ogun State and Tunji Egbedokun was unanimously elected on May 15, 
2009, by a vote of 24 out of 26 members of the assembly, Governor GbengaDaniel tried 
everything he could to make the House reverse the impeachment (Fabiyi and Falola, 
2009). When he could not succeed, he resorted to using intrigues and instruments of state 
power at his disposal to get Egbedokun illegally impeached by 9 out of the 26 members 
of the State Assembly contrarily to the constitutional requirement of two-third members 
of the House.  
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The Sixth Assembly (2007 -2011) could not pass meaningful legislations or deliberate on 
issues that would have moved the gateway state forward. Several requests were pending 
before the Assembly which it could not deliberate upon because of the crisis in the House 
and its supsequent proscription by the Federal Government for almost a year. During this 
period of the crisis, several bills including bills for the N100 billion bond, confirmation of 
some executive nominees and the Supplementary Appropriation could not be passed by 
the House. In fact, the 2011 Appropriation bill was passed into law within 35 minutes of 
delibration by 9 (belonging to the G-11) out of the 26-member State Assembly. Within 
that short session (September 6, 2010), the Assembly impeached Tunji Egbedokun as the 
Speaker, “elected Mr. Soyemi Coker as the new Speaker, “debated” and passed the 
appropriation bill and 20 other bills. The session held under tight security with the 
presence of heavily armed policemen and the State Security Service (SSS) because the 
assembly was under proscription. The Mace - the symbol of the Assembly‟s power was 
not present at the deliberation. It is instructive to note that on September 6, 2010, the 
Assembly was closed down by the Presidency following the crisis in the House and was 
not reopened until May 31, 2011 almost a year after. The proscription no doubt had 
negative implication for the amount of time in session (the constitutional stipulation of 
181 days sitting) reguired for the House to conduct its legislative activities. Equally, the 
judicious deliberations required for passage of bills would not but be circumvented on the 
altar of partisan politics.  
 
The Ogun State Seventh Legislature was inaugurated in June 7, 2011 by the newly 
elected Executive Governor - Senator Ibikunle Amosun. While the memory of the drama 
that ensued at the twilight of the past administration still lingered in the mind of political 
observers, the 7th Assembly of the State led by the Speaker - Hon. Suraj Adekunbi 
seemed to have awakened to its constitutional legislative duties of making legislations 
that would have enduring impact on the democratic governance in Ogun State. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the Assembly, as at May 2, 2012, has sat for 188 legislative 
days against the statutory 180 days per annum and within the period, has passed 12 bills 
and 86 motions. This seemed to demonstrate a clean break from the past and signified the 
willingness of the State Assembly to serve the people of the state by working round the 
222 
 
clock to ensure that bills are passed to laws in the overall interest of the state. It seemed 
to contradict the much touted rubber stamp image of the House given the fact that the 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) which controlled the executive also controlled 
majority seats in the State Assembly. Following the defection of three members of the 
opposition in the House to the ruling ACN, the ruling party now had a comfortable 
majority seat in the Assembly.  
 
Moreover, the manner and procedure with which the 7th Assembly handled the executive 
bill number 20/OG/2012 may have shown the maturity and professionalism of the 
lawmakers. The bill titled “A bill for a law to provide for the raising of loans through 
issuance of bonds, notes and other securities and for connected purposes” was forwarded 
by the Governor seeking it to be passed into law (OGHA, 2012. Vol.1). The reminiscence 
of the past experience of the state on bond which were usually marred by bad politicking 
and corruption, would have informed the House to thoroughly scrutinize the bill before 
passage.   
 
It is instructive to note that Section 10 and 11 of the bill has implication of usurping the 
power of the legislators on public fund management. Specifically, section (10) authorises 
the Government, through Ogun State Debt Management Office with the approval of the 
Executive Council, to raise loans for both economic and social development purposes 
while Section 11 (1) authorises same to issue any instrument or any other form of debt 
securities and raise and borrow any sums of money required to finance the capital budget 
of the government or to refinance the obligations of the Government in respect of its 
public investment projects. Section 11 (2) however, authorises the Governor to direct the 
Accountant-General, to issue on behalf of the government, the appropriate irrevocable 
undertaking or such other undertakings and or documents or authorizations as may be 
required for the purpose of raising any loan or borrowing any sum of money. With the 
provision of this sections therefore, the approval of the legislature would no longer be 
reguired for the government to secure loan. The Assembly, though populated by ACN 
members, rather than allowing party politics and parochial interests to allow the bill have 
a smooth sail, subjected it to due process. After thorough debates on the bill, the House 
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submitted that the executive bill, though supported by the House as it would provide the 
framework for accessing and repayment of loans, should be amended to retain the 
legislative‟s powers over public funds.  
 
5.10.3.3. Investigation Process 
The legislature exercises its oversight functions over the conducts and activities of the 
executive through investigative process (Esebagbon, 2005). Section 128 and 129 of the 
1999 constitution confers on the House of Assembly, the power to investigate the conduct 
of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged or 
intended to be charged with the duty of or responsibility for executing or administering 
laws enacted by that House of Assembly and disbursing or administering moneys 
appropriated or to be appropriated by the House of Assembly. The purpose of 
investigation, according to this section, is to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in 
the execution or administration of laws within the legislative competence and in the 
disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.  
 
Investigative or oversight function is carried out through confirmation, scrutinizing, 
monitoring and supervising and it may occur during the budget process, during 
confirmation of executive nominees presented for appointment into offices, during the 
normal course of a legislative session, or on special occasions, it reviews the executive 
programme or some of its establishments/agencies, it may be through public hearing, 
tours of project sites and invitation of people relevant to the subject under investigation 
(Okosi-Simbine, 2010). The legislature‟s oversight responsibility is usually carried out by 
legislative committees set up to monitor or investigate the activities of any government 
ministry, parastatals, departments and agencies and can summon witnesses to testify 
before it (Fasagba (2009). The essence is to ensure that public policies and expenditures 
are justified to achieve intended objectives.  Legislative oversight is an enormous task 
and therefore demands adequate proficiency. 
 
The Fourth Lagos Legislative Assembly (1999 – 2003) performed its investigative roles, 
especially the confirmatory and screening roles, following its inauguration on June 2, 
224 
 
1999. The experience required for this assembly to effectively carryout this responsibility 
was however, lacking. This is evidenced by the fact that only one (1) (Hon. Fabikun 
Adeniyi Segun) out of the fourty (40) members of the assembly had a previous 
experience of legislative business, being a member of the 3rd Lagos State  Assembly that 
existed during the aborted Third Republic. In addition to lack of experience, the AD 
which was the ruling party also controlled 37 out of the 40 seats in the assembly. 
Furthermore, findings revealed that though various committees existed in the Assembly, 
they seemed to lack institutional capacity to operate. Moreover, the supporting staff of 
these committees and other administrative staff of the Assembly were under the executive 
who reserved the power to deploy and redeploy them at will. No commission existed to 
oversee the recruitment, deployment and operation of its staff which would have 
strengthened the independence of the Assembly. It was on this note that the Lagos State 
Legislative Service Commission Law was passed in 2001, but the Governor did not 
implement it. These factors made the Fourth Assembly easy victim of executive 
manipulation in the performance of its oversight role in the State. The first assignment of 
the House was the confirmation of the state executive council nominees sent to the House 
by the state governor. All the nominees were confirmed without grilling. Throughout its 
duration, the assembly seemed not prepared to investigate or scrutinise government 
activities.  
 
The investigation of the allegation of perjury and forgery of the credentials of Governor 
Tinubu, that qualified him to run for the 1999 gubernatorial election in the State depicts 
the bungling approach given to the crucial responsibility of investigation by the Fourth 
Lagos State Legislative Assembly and confirms the extent to which executive‟s 
interference hindered the effective performance of the oversight role of the Assembly. In 
this case, Honourable Thomas Ayodele Fadeyi, representing Mushin Constituency 2 
raised a motion on the floor of the House on Tuesday, September 21, 1999, for the 
investigation of an alleged perjury and forgery by the Governor in respect of discrepancy 
in his date of birth as contained in the profile published during his inauguration (LSHA, 
1999, Vol. 2). The publication declared that he was born in 1952 while the date of birth 
on his transcript from Chicago State University stated that he was born in 1954. It was 
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also alleged that the governor did not attend Government College, Ibadan as was stated in 
his profile and INEC FORM CF. 001. Furthermore, that he did not attend University of 
Chicago as he claimed in INEC FORM CF. 001 and an affidavit sworn to at the Ikeja 
High Court of Justice on 29th December 1998. Following the motion therefore, an ad-hoc 
committee chaired by Hon. Babajide Omoworare was set up to investigate the allegation. 
In his defence before the committee however, Governor Tinubu attributed the alleged 
discrepancies in the documents to needless errors and genuine errors resulting from the 
acrimonious primaries of the Alliance for Democracy in Lagos State and its attendant 
crisis. In a flippant manner however, the ad hoc committee or the Lagos State House of 
Assembly did not make any attempt at verifying those documents presented by the 
Governor with the various institutions they were purported to have emanated from. 
Rather, the House relied on oral evidence of the Governor. Besides, no effort was made 
to further probe the possibility of Tinubu, having dropped out of Government College for 
financial problem, could complete his secondary education from Richard Daley College, 
Chicago within two years (1969 -1971) and also could earn a Bachelors of Science 
Degree with distinction in Business and Administration, majoring in Accounting within 
two year (1977 -1979) while at the same period, working as a student. No effort was also 
made to verify the possibility of Tinubu to transfer credit hours from a secondary school 
to a university, the possibility of teaching in a university as an undergraduate student. 
Furthermore, Tinubu‟s claim to have left Nigeria for the US in 1970, contradicted his 
earlier claim that he was at Richard Daley College from 1969 to 1971 (Anukwenze, 
1999). All these obvious incoherencies and loopholes were accepted by the committee 
without questions or independent confirmation. It would appear therefore, that the House 
compromised its power of investigation on the matter.  
 
The experience of the 5th and the 6th Assembly was not different largely because 
members have largely been the obedient „boys‟ of the Governor and ACN leader, 
Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Since the obedient boys would need the support of the 
Governor and the leader of ACN for the funding of their constituency projects and for 
them to be reelected into the House or achieve their political ambitions, they had to 
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rubber stamp and okay every government project and activity in the State without 
meaningful scrutiny. 
Investigation however, revealed that the 7th Lagos State Assemblies seemed to have 
demonstrated that it would be able to effectively perform its statutory functions 
independent of executive manipulation. Following its inauguration on June 4, 2011, the 
House has been able to resolve some petitions forwarded to it such as  the Lagos Butchers 
Association, Ikosi Fruit Market, Ladipo Spare Parts Market, Abila community land 
dispute, and cases of hoodlums turning recreation centres to hide out, the suspension of 
demolition of Onigbongbo Market among others. Executive nominees forwarded to it 
were interrogated on several issues before their comfirmation. It has also set up 
committees to study projects being handled by each ministry and agencies of the state 
government. For this purpose, the House would not sit every Wednesday and Friday as 
members utilized these days to monitor the projects. One major reason for this paradigm 
shift seemed to be the bold step taken by the Governor –Fashola to toe the path of good 
governance as against being continuously tied to the politics of clientelism structured by 
his godfather - Tinubu.  
 
In respect of the legislator‟s role of screening and approving executive nominees for 
political positions, the legislature, by virtue of Sections 271 (1), 197 (c) and 198 of the 
1999 Constitution is empowered to give legitimacy to the actions of the executive 
through screening and approval of people nominated by the Chief Executive for public 
offices such as Commissioners, Chief Judge of the State and Chairmen and members of 
statutory bodies or Commissioners and Special Advisers. This crucial legislative process 
of the Lagos State House of Assembly was however, not independent of the executive‟s 
interference between 1999 and 2011. During the period under study, screenings of people 
nominated for political offices were often conducted in a manner which suggested lack of 
seriousness. In fact, during screening processes, merit, competence and quality of persons 
nominated for political office were usually sacrificed at the altar of party consideration. 
Candidates were sure to scale through legislative screening process in as much as such 
nominated persons are endorsed by the ACN leadership which was under the grim 
control of the incumbent governor.  
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A case of executive‟s interference in the legislative process of scrutiny and approval of 
nominees of the Governor for political positions by the Lagos State House of Assembly 
in the state is seen in the ratification of the appointment of Mr. Femi Pedro as the deputy 
governor of the state on January 14, 2003. In fact, speculations had earlier seen his 
ratification proceedings as a hurdle that might enmesh the State House of Assembly in 
crisis. Femi Pedro who was presented by Governor Tinubu to party delegates however, 
scaled through the ratification huddle. During the ratification sitting, it was only Mr. Ola 
Animasaun (Ikorodu 1 Constituency) who attempted at cross examining the nominee. 
Animasaun averred that the choice of Femi Pedro from Lagos Island was an act of 
injustice to the other four divisions that make up the state. Also citing section 177 and 
section 187(2) of the 1999 Constitution, which deals with the qualification of the 
governor and his deputy, Animasaun contended that Governor Ahmed Tinubu erred in 
picking a non-party man as his running mate at the next round of polls. His objection was 
however, overruled by the Speaker who also stopped him from cross-examining the 
deputy governorship nominee. Going by the attitude of the House towards Pedro‟s 
ratification, Animasaun observed that the Assembly had been turned into a clearing house 
by the executive (Aderibigbe and Babalola, 2003). It would appear that the House‟s 
legislative process of scrutinizing Femi Pedro for the position of the Deputy Governor of 
the state had been influenced by the Governor. Thus, the process of cross-examining the 
nominee which was expected to be a rigorous exercise by the House was taken as a mere 
routine constitutional requirement for legitimizing the governor‟s desire.  
 
In fact, it was not until a regime change following the 2007 elections that led to the 
emergence of Babtunde Fashola as the Governor of the state that the Sixth Lagos State 
House Assembly could independently perform its role of scrutinizing and approving 
governor‟s political nominees without executive‟s interference. For instance, in July 2007 
the state‟s legislators, while scrutinizing the Governor‟s cabinet nominees, rejected the 
nomination of Chief Enoch Ajiboso and Mr. Ademorin Kuye out of the 22 
commissionership nominees sent to it for approval. According to the Speaker of the 
House, Hon. Adeyemi Ikuforiji, the decision of the House to reject Ajiboso was 
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predicated on a pending petition against him while Kuye‟s rejection was because he did 
not satisfy the conditions stipulated by the House (Vanguard, 06/07/2007). 
The Sixth Lagos State House of Assembly also performed its oversight function in the 
instance of the disbursement of funds to Local Government Areas. The House faulted the 
modalities for the distribution of funds to the councils  and so set up an Ad-hoc 
Committee to determine whether the state government complied fully with the allocation 
formula in the disbursement of funds to Local Government Areas as stipulated in the 
state‟s Joint Local Government Account Committee Law of 2003. After thorough 
investigation, the House submitted that the funds were disbursed in a way contrary to the 
constitutional provisions and extant laws of the state. It therefore, directed the 
Commissioner for Finance - Adetokunbo Abiru to stop further payments in respect of 
Joint Account Allocation Committee (JAAC), except the payment of salaries of 
pensionable and non-pensionable staff, pending a resolution of the House in order to 
prevent further breaches of the law. Furthermore, the House directed the Accountant-
General of the state to furnish the House with the reports in respect of payment made to 
each Local Government in the state from 2009 in compliance with section 9 of the JAAC 
law (LSHA, 2010. vol.2). 
 
In a similar dimension, the oversight function of the Ogun State House of Assembly 
between 1999 and 2011 was largely not independent of executive‟s interference. The 
period between 1999 and 2003 witnessed the predominance of one party (AD) under 
Governor Osoba. During this period, the Fourth Ogun State Assembly seemed to lack the 
institutional capacity and the wherewithal both in terms of experience, professional staff, 
adequacy of facilities and technology to carryout impactful investigations that could lead 
to meaningful oversight of the executive. Moreover, a high level of party loyalty existed 
in AD which controlled the executive and absolute majority seats in the State Assembly. 
These factors tended to limit the legislature‟s power and motivation to assert its 
independence and to discharge its oversight role over executive policies and programmes 
in the State. For instance, the governor unilaterally suspended both the executive and 
legislative arms of three local government councils of the state on February 15, 2002 and 
imposed permanent secretaries, who were his cronies and stooges, as Sole Administrators 
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for those local councils. This contemptuous flouting of the constitution by the executive 
could only happen in an environment where the oversight role of the legislature has been 
subjugated. 
 
The Fifth Ogun State Assembly was inaugurated on June 4, 2003 by Governor Gbenga 
Daniel (OGD). The assembly however, witnessed the desire of the executive to exercise 
total control over the state‟s legislature. This led to the emergence of Titi Oseni as the 
Speaker of the state‟s legislative assembly against the preferences of majority of 
members. During this period, obnoxious policies and programmes of the OGD 
government got approvals of the legislature without any meaningful scrutiny or oversight 
role. The continuous subjugation of the State Assembly by the Governor however, 
insinuated crisis in the Sixth Legislative Assembly of the State. The lawmakers had felt 
that the Speaker of the House, Hon. Titi Oseni has been incarcerated by the Governor. In 
order to regain the independence of the House therefore, the lawmakers instigated a 
regime change in the House. Thus, Titi Oseni was impeached from the speakership 
position and Hon Tunji Egbedukun elected as the new Speaker. Following the 
impeachment of Mrs. Titi Oseni, crisis engulfed the House leading to polarization into 
two factions – the pro-Gbenga G-11 and the anti-Gbenga G-15. It is pertinent to state that 
the crisis was not without external influence arising from leadership tussles within the 
State Chapter of the PDP and personality clash among the political juggernauts in the 
State. The protracted crisis no doubt hampered the constitutional requirement of 181 days 
sitting for the House and prevented it from carrying out its oversight function on the 
executive. Furthermore, the House of Assembly Service Commission Bill which was 
passed into law in the state was not implemented by the governor (Ali, 2009). Its 
implementation would have given the State Assembly the power to oversee the 
recruitment, deployment, and operation of its administrative staff and thereby 
strengthened its independence in carryout its oversight role. The capacity of the 
legislature to effectively oversee the activities of the executive was greatly undermined 
by the non existence of a House of Assembly Commission. The supporting staff of the 
House some of who are also members of the various House committees for investigations 
was under the control of the executive who often deployed and redeployed them to do its 
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bidings. This informed most of the frustrations often expressed by the legislature 
sometimes in the form of open confrontation with the executive. Moreover, the 
administration of OGD lacked transparency as information about programmes being 
reviewed were often deliberately concealed. It was not surprising therefore, that the 
assembly at one time, declared that it was not aware of how the governor expended the 
money it approved for the state (Adamolekun, 2008). It is pertinent to note that such 
claim is an indication of failure of the assembly to perform its oversight responsibility to 
the people of Ogun State.  
On the 6th of September 2010, nine (9) (belonging to the G-11) out of the 26-member of 
the State Assembly impeached the Speaker of the House, suspended all members of the 
G15 and elected Hon. Soyemi Coker as the new speaker. The new leadership at the same 
meeting which lasted for 35 minutes passed over 20 bills and approved the N100 billion 
bond bill, ratified the governor‟s political nominees including the nominees for the State 
Independent Electoral Commission, passed the supplementary budget and revoked the 
earlier suspension of two Honourable members of the House among other resolutions.  
It is conclusive from the analysis in this section, that excessive domination of the 
legislature in the policy making process and oversight undermines the fundamental role 
of the later as citizens‟ representative in the modern democracy. The health of democracy 
declines when the legislature lacks the capacity to effectively oversee the executive or 
influence policy. The analysis of executive‟s domination in the legislative processes of 
the House of Assembly in Lagos and Ogun States therefore, gives credence to our 
proposition in this research that executive‟s interference in the legislative process 
undermines the legislature‟s roles of citizens‟ representation through legislation and 
oversight and such political governance cannot be deemed democratic.  
5.10.4. Pattern of Legislature-Executive Relations in Lagos and Ogun States 
between 1999 and 2011 
The focus of this section is the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and 
Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. The patterns of executive-legislative relations found 
in literature were listed and respondents were asked to signify those they believed existed 
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in Lagos and Ogun States. The percentage distributions of the responses in the two states 
are presented in Table 5.11 followed by brief interpretations.  
5.3.2 Table 5.11. Frequency Distribution of the Pattern of Legislative-Executive 
Relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
Lagos State Strongly 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Undecided 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Polarized Relationship 16 13 29 24 15 12 28 23 22 18 
Rubber Stamp Assembly 30 60 33 26 8 6 8 6 46 37 
Gridlocks on policies of 
government 
40 32 29 23 9 7 10 8 37 30 
Disagreement on political 
appointments  
50 40 33 26 8 6 8 6 26 21 
Disagreement on Budget and 
financial matters 
29 23 70 56 8 6 10 8 8 6 
Struggle for political power 34 27 42 34 12 10 20 16 19 15 
Overbearing executive 20 16 15 12 20 16 40 32 27 22 
Legislative arrogance 41 33 37 30 15 12 19 15 13 10 
Ogun State Strongly 
agree 
Agree  
Undecided 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Polarized Relationship 68 54 20 16 11 9 22 18 4 3 
Rubber Stamp Assembly 23 19 79 65 9 7 5 4 5 4 
Gridlocks on policies of 
government 
54 45 27 22 11 9 28 23 1 0.8 
Disagreement on political 
appointments  
61 50 42 35 6 5 8 7 4 3 
Disagreement on Budget and 
financial matters 
18 20 72 60 8 7 13 11 10 8 
Struggle for political power 31 26 45 37 19 16 16 13 10 8 
Overbearing executive 19 23 25 21 14 12 29 24 34 28 
Legislative arrogance 38 31 30 25 11 9 28 23 14 12 
Source: Field Reports, 2012 
 
Table 5.11 shows the frequency distribution of respondents on the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States. The table indicates that 13% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that the relationship between the executive (Governor) and 
the Lagos State House of Assembly between 1999 and 2011 was the polarized type. 24% 
merely agreed while 12% were undecided.  23% however, disagreed and 18% strongly 
disagreed that polarised relationship existed between the legislature and the executive in 
Lagos State between 1999 and 2011. Contrarily, in Ogun State, 54% of the respondents 
strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the State between 
1999 and 2011 was the polarised type. 16% of the respondents merely agreed. 9% of the 
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respondents were however, undecided. 18% of the respondents merely disagreed and 3% 
strongly disagreed. This analysis indicates that while majority of the respondents in 
Lagos State disagreed that polarised legislature-executive relations existed in the State 
between 1999 and 2011, contrarily, majority of the respondents in Ogun State agreed that 
polarized legislature-executive relations existed in the state between 1999 and 2011.  
 
Respondents also expressed their positions on whether or not the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States was characterized by rubber stamp 
assembly between 1999 and 2011. From Table 5.11, 60% of the respondents in Lagos 
State strongly agreed that legislature-executive relations in the state were characterized 
by rubber stamp assembly. 26% simply agreed. 6% of the respondents were undecided. 6 
% of the respondents however, strongly disagreed and 37% disagreed that rubber stamp 
assembly characterized legislature-executive relations in Lagos State. In Ogun State on 
the other hand, 19% of the respondents in Ogun State strongly agreed that the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 was that of rubber 
stamp legislature. 21% merely agreed while 12% were undecided. 24% of the 
respondents however, disagreed and 28% strongly disagreed with the notion. Thus, in this 
analysis, majority of the respondents in Lagos State agreed that legislature-executive 
relations in the state were characterized by rubber stamp assembly. In Ogun State 
however, majority of the respondents disagreed that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the State between 1999 and 2011 was characterized by rubber stamp 
assembly.  
 
On whether policies of government constituted area of legislature-executive conflict in 
Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011, 32% of the respondents strongly agreed 
and 23% merely agreed that policies of government constituted area of legislature-
executive conflict in Lagos State. 7% of the respondents were undecided while 8% and 
30% expressed mere and strong disagreement respectively.  In Ogun State, 45% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that policies of government constituted area of legislature-
executive conflict in the state between 1999 and 2011 while 22% merely agreed. 9% 
were undecided. 23% disagreed while only 1% of the respondents strongly disagreed. It 
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is concluded from this analysis therefore, that majority of the respondents in Lagos State 
disagreed that gridlocks on government policies characterized legislature-executive 
relations the State. Contrarily, majority of the respondents in Ogun State agreed that 
policies of government constituted issues of legislature-executive conflicts in the state. 
 
Table 5.11 also shows the distributions of respondents‟ responses on whether political 
appointments constituted an area of legislature-executive conflict in Lagos and Ogun 
States between 1999 and 2011. The table shows that 40% of the respondents strongly 
agreed that political appointments constituted area of legislature-executive conflicts in 
Lagos State between 1999 and 2011. 26% of the respondents merely agreed while 6% 
were undecided. 6% of the respondents however, disagreed while 21% expressed their 
strong disagreement with the notion. Similarly in Ogun State, 50% of the respondents 
strongly agreed that political appointments constituted an area of legislature-executive 
conflict in the State between 1999 and 2011 and 35% of the respondents merely agreed 
with the notion. 5% were undecided. 7% of the respondents disagreed while 3% strongly 
disagreed that political appointments constituted areas of legislature-executive conflicts 
in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011. This analysis indicates that in Lagos State, 
majority of the respondents disagreed that political appointments constituted legislature-
executive conflicts in the State. In Ogun State however, majority of the respondents 
agreed that political appointments constituted an area of legislature-executive conflict in 
the state between 1999 and 2011. 
 
In addition, Table 5.11 also contains the distribution of respondents‟ responses on 
whether budget and financial related matters constituted area of conflicts between the 
executive and the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. The table 
shows that 60% of the respondents strongly agreed that budget and financial matters 
constituted area of legislature-executive conflicts in Lagos State. 26% merely agreed with 
the notion. 6% were undecided.  6% of the respondents however disagreed while 37% 
strongly disagreed. Similarly, in Ogun State, 19% of the respondents strongly agreed and 
65% merely agreed that budget and financial matters constituted area of legislature-
executive conflicts in the State. 7% of the respondents were undecided. 4% merely 
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disagreed while 4% strongly disagreed. This frequency distributions hence, revealed that 
majority of the respondents in both Lagos and Ogun States agreed that budget and 
financial matters constituted area of legislature-executive conflicts in Lagos and Ogun 
States between 1999 and 2011. 
 
The frequency distribution table also indicates that  23% of the respondents strongly 
agreed that legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 
2011 were characterized by struggle for political power. 56% of the respondents also 
concurred with the notion while 6% were undecided. 8% of the respondents merely 
disagreed while 6% of the respondents strongly disagreed. In Ogun State, 20% strongly 
agreed that legislature-executive relations in the state were characterized by struggle for 
political power between 1999 and 2011, while 60% merely concurred with the notion. 
7% were undecided. 11% disagreed and only 8% of the respondents strongly disagreed 
with the notion.  It is clear from this analysis that majority of the respondents in both 
Lagos and Ogun States believed that legislature-executive relations in each of the two 
states were characterized by struggle for political power between 1999 and 2011. Only 
few of them disagreed with this notion. 
 
Table 5.11 shows the frequency distribution of the respondents on whether legislature-
executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States were characterized by overbearing 
executive between 1999 and 2011. In the table, 27% of the respondents strongly agreed 
that legislature-executive relations in Lagos State were characterized by overbearing 
executive while 34% merely agreed with the notion. 10% of the respondents were 
undecided. 16% merely disagreed and 15% strongly disagreed with the notion that 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos State were characterized by overbearing 
executive. In a similar dimension, 26% of the respondents in Ogun State strongly agreed 
that legislature-executive relations in the state were characterized by overbearing 
executive while 37% merely agreed. 16% of the respondents in the state were undecided. 
13% disagreed and only 8% strongly disagreed with the notion. This analysis shows that 
majority of the respondents in both Lagos and Ogun States agreed that the nature of 
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legislature-executive relations in each of the two states between 1999 and 2011 were 
characterized by overbearing executive. 
Table 5.11 shows that 33% of the respondents strongly agreed that legislature-executive 
relations in Lagos State were characterized by legislative arrogance while 30% merely 
agreed. 12% were undecided. 15% disagreed and 10% strongly agreed. In Ogun State, 
31% of the respondents strongly agreed, while 25% merely agreed that legislature-
executive relations in the state were characterized by legislative arrogance. 9% were 
undecided. 23% merely disagreed while 12% strongly disagreed. This shows that 
majority of the respondents in both states agreed that legislature-executive relations in the 
states were characterized by legislative arrogance between 1999 and 2011.   
 
Table III below is the statistical test of the nature of legislature-executive relations in 
Lagos and Ogun States. The table is followed by result interpretation and analysis. 
 
Table 5.12: Descriptive Statistics of the Pattern of Legislative-Executive Relations in 
Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
 
Lagos State  
 
N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Polarized Relationship 125 301.00 2.408 
Rubber Stamp Assembly 125 202.00 1.6160 
Gridlocks on policies of government 125 444.50 3.5560 
Disagreement on political appointments  125 407.00 3.2560 
Disagreement on Budget and financial matters 125 272.00 2.1760 
Struggle for political power 125 210.00 1.6800 
Overbearing executive 125 225.00 1.8000 
Legislative arrogance 125 198.00 1.5840 
Ogun State  
 
N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Polarized Relationship 121 176.00 1.4545 
Rubber Stamp Assembly 121 398.00 3.2892 
Gridlocks on policies of government 121 189.00 1.5619 
Disagreement on political appointments  121 301.00 2.4876 
Disagreement on Budget and financial matters 121 164.00 1.3553 
Struggle for political power 121 173.00 1.4300 
Overbearing of the executive 121 149.00 1.2314 
Legislative arrogance 121 284.00 2.3471 
Source: Field Data, 2012  
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Table 5.12 shows the test results on whether or not polarized legislature-executive 
relations existed in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. The result shows a 
mean of 2.408 for Lagos State. It is instructive to note that this does not show a strong 
disposition towards polarized legislature-executive relationship in the State. This 
indicates that legislature-executive relationship in the state though not healthy but not too 
conflictual. Anyaegbunam (2010) refers to this pattern of relationship as mild hostility. In 
Ogun State however, the test result revealed a mean of 1.4545 thus accepting that 
legislature-executive relationship in the state was conflictual or polarized. Furthermore, 
while the test indicated that legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 
and 2011 were characterized by rubber stamp assembly, in Ogun State, the reverse was 
the case. This is indicated by a mean of 1.6160 and 3.2892 for Lagos and Ogun States 
respectively.   
 
 The mean of 3.5560 indicated on the test result table for Lagos is an indication that 
legislature-executive relations in the state were not characterized by gridlocks over 
policies of government. Contrarily, the result shows a mean of 1.5619 indicating that 
gridlocks on policies of government characterized legislature-executive relations in Ogun 
State. The high mean value 3.5560 and 2.4876  for Lagos and Ogun States respectively, 
indicate that while legislature-executive relations in Ogun State was characterized by 
disagreement over political appointments, in Lagos State however, legislature-executive 
relations was void of gridlocks over political appointment. The low mean for Ogun State 
is a result of the indication by majority of the respondents in the state that gridlocks on 
political appointments characterized legislature-executive relations in the State. On the 
issue of public finance, the test results of 2.1760 and 1.3553 for Lagos and Ogun States 
respectively suggest that issues of public finance characterized legislature-executive 
relations in the two States.  In a similar dimension, the test result shows that struggle for 
political power characterised legislature-executive relations in both states. This 
conclusion is based on the mean of 1.6800 and 1.4300 for Lagos and Ogun States 
respectively. It is instructive to note that the low mean values for the two states were the 
result of high percentage of respondents in both states who agreed that legislature-
executive relations in the states were characterized by struggle for political power.  
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Similarly, it is also conclusive from the test result that in Lagos and Ogun States, 
legislature-executive relations were characterized by overbearing executive. The decision 
is based on the mean value of 1.8000 and 1.2314 for Lagos and Ogun respectively. 
 
Finally, the test result indicated in Table 5.12, reveals that legislative arrogance 
characterized the pattern of legislature-executive relations in both Lagos and Ogun States. 
This decision is based on the statistical mean of 1.5840 and 2.3471 for Lagos and Ogun 
States. The findings in the above analysis are discussed in detail below. 
 
5.10.5. Discussion of Findings on the Pattern of Legislature-Executive Relations in 
Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
The relationship between the legislature and the executive is central to Nigeria‟s 
constitutional and political system. Nigeria adopted the executive presidential and 
gubernatorial system of government in the 1979 Constitution following the restoration of 
civil rule and the system was replicated in 1999 Constitution of the Fourth Republic. 
Pursuant to the adoption of the presidential system, therefore, no one arm of government 
is superior to the other; neither is any subordinate to the other. Each organ is independent 
within its own sphere of influence. While Section 4 (6) of the 1999 Constitution vests the 
legislative powers of a State of the Federation in the House of Assembly of the State, a 
unicameral legislature, Section 5 (2) on the other hand, vests the executive powers of a 
State in the Governor of the State. Separation of powers of the executive and the 
legislature though, is the hallmark of Nigeria‟s presidential system, the division of 
powers is not meant to encourage isolation of any arm of government. It involves a 
sharing of the powers of government, a system of checks and balances which allows each 
arm of government to defend its position in the constitutional framework of government. 
For the purpose of government however, these two institutions of government are 
expected to operate in an atmosphere of cordial relationship. In this way, the purpose of 
government is fulfilled through their contributions as partners in progress. The pattern of 
this relationship in Lagos State between 1999 and 2011 is discussed below. 
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5.10.5.1. Lagos State  
Nigeria‟s return to civil rule in 1999 marked the re-emergence of party politics in Lagos 
State after 16 years of military dictatorship in the country. The nature of party system in 
the state however, was one-party hegemony in which one party controlled both the 
government and the State House of Assembly despite the multiparty system guaranteed 
by the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. Since 1999, the gubernatorial seat and majority seats 
in the Lagos State House of Assembly have solely been controlled by the ACN and the 
AD whose rubble the former evolved from. With the multi-party structure in the country, 
the PDP and APP seemed to be the only opposition parties in the State.  
The Afenifere (Yoruba Socio-political group) led by a respected Yoruba leader, Pa 
Abraham Adesanya together with his lieutenants, formed the AD in 1998. Findings 
revealed that the Afenifere and the AD leadership had wanted to tenaciously trail the 
sound party organizations and discipline and the progressive welfare-oriented ideology 
(democratic socialism) of Late Chief Awolowo and on this basis, maintained discipline 
and party loyalty among members. But while Chief Awolowo believed in the principles 
of transparency, rule of law, wide consultation with the civil society and respect for a 
fair and free electoral process at party level as the means of achieving his democratic 
socialism, the Afenifere and AD failed to follow these democratic ideals. Instead, the 
group and the party resorted to manipulative hegemony and imposition. The ACN that 
emerged from the wreckage of AD and Afenifere, rather than repairing these anti-
democratic tendencies, has since its formation perpetuated this ethos of manipulation, 
imposition, patrimonialism, clientelism and godfatherism.  
The Fourth Legislative Assembly of Lagos State (1999 – 2003) was inaugurated by the 
Governor of the State on 2nd of June, 1999. The Assembly was made up of 40 elected 
members representing 40 State constituencies. The Alliance for Democracy (AD) 
controlled 37 seats while the remaining 3 seats belonged to the All People‟s Party (APP). 
Senator Bolaji Ahmed Tinubu also became governor of the state through the AD. With 
this composition, the AD had a comfortable control of both the executive and the 
legislature.  
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The pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2003 revealed 
more of cooperative legislature-executive relations than conflictual relations. 
Anyaegbunam (2010) refers to this pattern of legislature-executive relations as cordial 
relationship between the executive and legislature in which disagreements over policies 
are resolved through consultation and understanding. This cooperative approach was 
dictated by the subjugation of the legislature under the executive and the predominance 
of one party i.e., AD in the executive and the legislature. The effectiveness of the AD 
leadership to mediate between the two arms of government through party loyalty also 
contributed to this pattern of relationship. Thus, throughout the period there was hardly 
an open confrontation between the Governor and the State House of Assembly.  
 
The cordial legislature-executive relations in the State was however, threatened in 2001 
when the Governor delayed the implementation of the salary fixed for the House by the 
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). The Lagos State 
House of Assembly demanded for N8.7 million each which was the total sum of arrears 
accrued to them, if the State Government had started the payment from May 2000 when 
the salary was fixed. While the Governor agreed on initial payment of N1.5million each 
and the remaining to be paid at a latter time, the Assembly insisted on collecting 
N2.5million each as initial payment. It contended that if other States in the federation 
which were poorer than Lagos State could afford to pay the approved salary, Lagos State 
Government had no excuse for failing to pay. The Governor on the other hand, argued 
that the state was not financially buoyant to pay the approved salary (Ajayi, 2001).  
 
In order to press for their demand, the Assembly on November 27, 2001 adjourned 
sittings indefinitely pending when the State Government would be ready to accede to 
their demand. According to our interview with Dr. Williams Idowu, the action of the 
legislature in this regards depicts share legislative arrogance, a new paradigm of 
legislative politics in Nigeria. The legislature in Ngeria now sees itself as omnipotent and 
whose interests the executive must accede to if the later must have its policies approved 
by the former.  
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It is perhaps, important to note how crucial this particular period of the year that the 
House decided to press for their demand. It was the period that the State Government 
would forward to the State House of Assembly, the 2002 Appropriation Bill for approval. 
It would thus, appear that the legislators had found this period auspicious for them to 
compel the State Government to accede their demand if he must enjoy the cooperation of 
the House on the impending 2002 Appropriation Bill. On the other hand, acceding to the 
demand of the House by the Governor at this point in time would also mean buying their 
favourable disposition to the 2002 Appropriation Bill. The intrigues played out. The State 
Government approved the initial payment of N2.5 million each for members of the House 
in addition to selling their official Honda Civic cars to them for N700, 000 and the three 
bedroom flat allocated to each of  them at Moshood Abiola Garden for a cost of N3.5 
million each (Ajayi, 2001). In turn, on December 29, the State House of Assembly 
approved the 2002 Appropriation Bill of N52.868 billion sent to it by the Governor 
(Lagos State House of Assembly, 2002). The total sum which comprised of N34.866 
billion recurrent costs and N18.002 billion capital expenditure was merely deliberated 
upon for the purpose of conferring the legitimacy required for implementation and 
acceptability of the estimates in a democratic environment. This was evident by the zero 
amendment to the proposed estimate. 
 
The Fifth Lagos State House of Assembly (2003 – 2007) had almost all its seats 
controlled by the ACN. The Lagos State House of Assembly election that took place on 
May 3, 2003 saw the party won 39 out of the 40 seats in the State House of Assembly. 
Only one member (Hon. Ajose Julius representing Badagry 11 Constituency) was elected 
from the platform of the People‟s Democratic Party (PDP). With this composition, ACN 
had absolute majority in the State Assembly. Senator Ahmed Tinubu was also reelected 
on the platform of ACN in that 2003 election. The success of the ACN in the 2003 
elections of the State was attributed to the powers of the incumbent governor. With his 
towering political base and huge clientelistic influence, Tinubu was pivotal for any ACN 
member who sought to clinch power in the State.  
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This landslide victory in the House of Assembly invariably put the party at an edge to 
produce the next Speaker of the House.  At the inauguration of the Fifth Lagos Assembly 
on Monday, 2nd of June, 2003, Hon Waheed Jokotola Pelumi from Epe Constituency 11 
was elected Speaker of the Assembly. He was however, impeached on 29th of December 
2005 following his disagreements with other members of the House (Olumide, 2011).  
 
The period witnessed executive hegemony whereby the Governor, using the vast state 
resources - financial, material and managerial at his disposal, exercised domineering 
influence in his relationship with the State House of Assembly and influenced legislative 
actions and decisions to get bills, policies and programmes of the government approved 
with little or no objection. As the ACN party leader and the major financier (though 
unofficial) of the party, he controlled the primaries and the selection of candidates in an 
atmosphere of lack of party democracy. Findings revealed that most members of the State 
legislature were sponsored into the House by the Governor. These anti-democratic 
tendencies thus made the legislators and the ruling ACN leadership subservient to the 
Governor. The over-dependence of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) on the powers 
of the incumbent governor enabled the executive to use party loyalty as a tool for 
manipulating the legislature. This perhaps, is in agreement with Derbyshire (1999) who 
averred that increasing party strength has become a major reason for the decline in the 
power of the legislature in relation to that of the executive. As Cheibub (2002) observed, 
party discipline in which members of the ruling party in the legislature are expected to 
vote in line with the direction of the party programme being executed by the executive, is 
an important factor in analyzing legislature-executive relations. Party loyalty constitutes 
great significance in the performance of the Lagos State House of Assembly and its 
relationship with the executive in the State. An instance of Party discipline and 
supremacy in Lagos State politics was the forceful relinquishing of the Speakership 
position by the Lagos East to the Lagos West on the order of the ACN party leadership. 
This was contrary to the zoning arrangement of the party. In a related issue, the 
unanimous decision by members of the Lagos State House of Assembly, to re-elect 
Adeyemi Ikuforiji as Speaker of the House was not without the influence of the ACN 
party leadership which was under the control of the incumbent governor. In such 
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instance, the State Assembly would operate as mere extension of the executive domain 
and would thus enhanced the executive‟s success in getting his agenda approved by the 
state legislative body. As Bowling and Ferguson (2001) and Morehouse (1998) averred, 
where the chamber(s) of the legislature is controlled by the chief executive's party, 
executive legislative success should be enhanced because it gives the executive a built-in 
core of support.  
 
While one party dominance and exercutive intemperance seemed to enhance smooth 
operation of government in Lagos State, it however, gave rise to the existence of rubber 
stamp assembly whereby the legislature tended to agree with every directive of the 
executive. Party loyalty among members of the AD and subsequently ACN government 
party in the State legislative assembly tended to subvert the legislature‟s motivation to 
criticize the activities of the government. For instance, The N48.5 billion Appropriation 
for 2001 was rubber stamped by the State House of Assembly without impactful debate 
on the bill. In the same year 2001, the State Legislative House seized the opportunity of 
the period that the Governor needed the cooperation of the House on the 2002 
appropriation bill, to demand from the Governor, the payment of the salaries fixed for its 
members by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. The State 
House of Assembly still bowed to the executive‟s power and approved the sum of 
N52.868 billion for the 2002 fiscal year as presented to it by the Governor. In that year‟s 
appropriation, N34.866 billion was approved recurrent costs and N18.002 billion for 
capital expenditure (Odugbesan and Aborisade, 2001). 
 
 A close observation of the budget would suggest that the huge estimate for recurrent 
expenditure vis-à-vis that of capital expenditure required thorough legislative‟s 
investigation. This is because by the estimate, the recurrent expenditure for that year 
would be about 66%, thus suggest lack of serious concern for capital projects and hence 
less development for the state. Instead of doing that, the Assembly merely rubber 
stamped the estimate for the Governor. Following the routine exercise of passing 
appropriation bill by the State House of Assembly, the N7billion supplementary 
appropriation bill presented to it in 2003 was approved hook line and sinker without 
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meaningful debates on the bill. The bill was sent to the Assembly on September 16, 2003 
and was approved on 29th of September, 2003 (Aina, 2003). The list of Commissioners 
sent by the Governor to the State House of Assembly was also routinely approved 
without any impactful scrutiny (Banjoko, 2003). Investigations revealed that nominees 
only had to take a bow before the House and then proceed out of the House without any 
probing interogation.  
 
It is pertinent to note that the period between 1999 and 2007, the minority party in the 
house could not provide viable opposition or influence on the decision of the assembly 
whether good or bad and rarely criticized the policies of the ruling party. This culminated 
in lack of credible opposition as the majority party, by its assertive posture, often 
ultimately lent support to the policies and actions of the executive. Despite this 
cooperation between the majority and opposition parties the minority parties found no 
accommodation with the executive. It is perhaps crucial to stress the role of the 
opposition parties in the legislative assembly. The opposition parties have the role of 
challenging legislation forwarded by the government, advocate an alternative set of 
priorities or different way to address the issue being deliberated or introduce amendments 
to bill (NDI, 2000). By so doing, the bills finally passed in the assembly and 
consequently, government policies are more citizens centered as required in democratic 
governance. While there were some motions or suggestions emanating from members of 
the opposition party on the floor of the house, they had very little or zero chance of 
consideration or acceptance by the AD and later the ACN controlled government. 
 
As part of its oversight and representative function, the legislature, through its 
committees attends to petitions from aggrieved or oppressed members of the public 
whose rights might have been infringed upon either by government or other members of 
the public (Omoleye, 2011). Petition constitutes one of the medium of public 
participation in policy-making in the form of complaints, grievances or requests 
addressed to the legislature on issues related to legislation, public policy or programmes 
and activities of the government for consideration in expectation that it will influence 
government decisions (Macintosh 2004).  Public petition is part of the representational 
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roles of the legislature. This important legislative role of receiving public petition on the 
floor of the house so as to secure justice or correct the wrongs perpetrated by government 
officials or to prevent abuse of executive power appeared neglected by the Lagos State 
Assembly within the period under study. Usually, in response to prayers contained in 
complaints or petitions, relevant committees are mandated by the House to carry out 
necessary investigations with a view to resolving the matters. While the State House of 
Assembly usually received public petitions at the Assembly complex, such petitions were 
however, left unattended to as the Speaker would only pacify the aggrieved groups with 
promises that would not be followed up by sending such to committee for investigation. 
For instance, the Sixth Assembly received a petition on Thursday, 18th Sempter, 2008 
from one, Beku Onimoba family of no. 130 Igando Road, Lagos State alleging an 
unlawful and illegal acquisition of the family‟s property by the former governor of Lagos 
State. The petition was only read by the Deputy Clerk without any further action on it by 
the State Assembly (LSHA, 2008, vol. 2). 
 
According to some of our interviewees, the cordial working relationship enjoyed by the 
State executive and the legislature under Senator Bola Tinubu‟s administration has 
contributed to the development of the state specifically in the area of transportation and 
education. During his eight-year period of office, he made large investments in education 
in the state (Dike, 2007). He also initiated new road construction, required to meet the 
needs of the fast-growing population of the state (Babafemi, 2005). The loss of the 
oversight function of the State legislature to the overwhelming influence of the executive, 
however had implications for the cost of governance in the State. Most of the contracts 
awarded by the State Government within that period were either awarded to companies 
belonging either to the Governor or his relations at very ridiculous amounts. 
 
By the supreme‟ mandatory provisions of Section 182 of the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, a Governor of Nigeria is, subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution, entitled to a maximum of four years in office in his first 
term and may be re-elected for a second term of another four years. In all, a governor has 
a maximum of eight years or two terms of four years each in office.  By this provision 
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therefore, the term of office of Senator Bola Tinubu constitutionally ended in 2007 
having served in that capacity for two consecutive terms of four years each in office from 
1999 to 2007. The 2007 elections brought a regime change in the state albeit, the 
elections were marred with imposition, political violence and intra-party conflicts.  
Following the 2007 elections, Babatunde Raji Fashola, former Chief- of-Staff under 
Tinubu‟s administration emerged as the next Governor of the Centre of Excellence from 
the platform of the ACN. The politics of patronage and godfatherism between him and 
Bola Tinubu, the former governor of the state no doubt, paved way for his emergence as 
the Governor of the State. The elections also ushered in the Sixth House of Assembly of 
Lagos State which was inaugurated by the Governor on Monday 4th of June, 2007. In the 
assembly, 17 legislators were successfully returned while the rest 23 were new members. 
The Action Congress of Nigeria continued to enjoy a convenient majority in the House 
with 37 members while Peoples‟ Democratic Party (PDP) had 3 members. Following the 
elections of the principal functionaries of the House, Hon Adeyemi Ikuforiji re-emerged 
as the Speaker of the House. 
The relationship between the Governor and the Sixth Lagos Assembly at the beginning of 
the new dispensation followed the previous pattern of one- party hegemony as ACN 
controlled both the executive and a comfortable majority in the State House of Assembly. 
It also witnessed the previous pattern of legislature-executive cordial relationship 
consequential upon the fact that Fashola administration basically continued the 
programmes and policies of his predecessor and godfather–Bola Tinubu and largely on 
Fashola‟s continued faithful servanthood to him by maintaining his (Tinubu) laid down 
structure of the politics of patronage and clientelism and as well by keeping tenaciously 
to the dictate of his godfather in the politics of patrimonalism in which government 
machinery is treated as a type of income-generating property which would ensure that the 
political godfather is well placed financially such that he could always allow the effects 
to trickle down. 
 
The tone of legislature-executive relations in the State however, took a new dimension to 
mild hostility in 2010. This pattern of legislature-executive relations ensued over issues 
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bothering on the performance of the oversight function of the State House of Assembly 
on the government. It is pertinent to note that this fundamental role of the legislature in a 
democratic system was conspicuously neglected by the Fourth and Fifth Lagos State 
House throughout the eight (8) years of Tinubu‟s administration. The Sixth Lagos State 
Legislative Assembly now seemed to be awake to its oversight role of controlling and 
monitoring public funds and of investigating into public complaint or activities of the 
executive. The attempt by the Sixth Assembly to perform its oversight role resulted in 
mild hostility between it and the executive in the State.  
 
One of such instance of mild hostility between the legislature and the executive under 
Fashola administration was on the 2010 appropriation bill which the Governor presented 
to the Lagos House of Assembly on the 17th of November, 2009 with an expectation that 
it will be approved by 1st January, 2010. The draft budget however, did not get the 
approval of the State House until March, 2010. When it was finally approved, the budget 
estimate of N429. 59 billion that was presented to the House by the state government was 
reduced by N40 billion based on the recommendation of the House Committee on 
Economic Planning and Budget. The sum of N389.5 billion was therefore, approved for 
the fiscal year. The reason for the reduction according to the House, was to block some 
leakages noticed in the previous year‟s budget in that while N41.523billion was released 
for personnel cost in year 2009, the actual expenditure for the year was N31.142billion. 
In view of this, the House reduced the personnel cost from N55.07 billion to N45.077 
billion; overhead cost from N67.002 billion to N66.559 billion and capital expenditure 
from N250.778bn to N224.196bn. The House, however, increased the capital expenditure 
of the state Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives by N1418billion and added 
N3.2billion to the overhead cost of the State House of Assembly. Hon. Kolapo 
Osunsanya, the Chariman of the Committee noted that the reason for increasing the 
overhead cost of the House was because the Assembly was grossly under-funded. 
Interview conducted with some members of the Appropriation Committee indicated that 
the change in the parliamentary budget derived from the need to provide enough 
resources for the constitutional role assigned to the parliament. This is because no 
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parliament can engage effectively with the constitutional role without having the 
prerequisite resources to do so.  
 
It is pertinent to note that the role of the legislature and the executive in public finance is 
critical to the success of any government. While revenue and expenditure of government 
were unilaterally and arbitrarily decided under the military regime, in the democratic 
dispensation, particularly, the Fourth Republic requires that both the executive and the 
legislature involve in the budgetary preparation, approval, implementation and 
evaluation. While the executive prepares and drafts Appropriation Bills and the 
accompanying draft estimates, the legislature sanctions such appropriations before they 
are implemented by the executive. The budget process therefore, involves the 
participation of both the executive and the legislature and constitutes one of the 
constitutional provisions for separation of powers and checks and balances in Nigeria‟s 
presidential system.  
 
The Lagos State House of Assembly, by virtue of the 1999 Constitution, has the power to 
approve the annual bills without which the executive cannot embark on any 
appropriation. According to Section 120 (3) and (4) of this constitution, no money shall 
be withdrawn from any public fund of the State, unless the issue of those moneys has 
been authorized by a Law of the House of Assembly of a State. The House also has the 
power to examine details of sums granted to statutory corporations of other State 
government agencies to meet public expenditure and to invite such bodies where need be 
to give clarifications before the House or to brief the appropriation House Committees on 
their activities. While the exercise of this power by the Lagos State House of Assembly 
over the 2010 appropriation was not disputed by the executive, the bone of contention 
however, was that the changes made to the estimate by the House were not discussed 
with the executive before voting. 
 
It is important to note that the policy direction of a state is determined by the budgeting 
system. The extent to which the legislature can amend the budget will have direct 
implications for delivering democratic goods to the people. The reduction of the 2010 
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budget by a whopping sum of N40billion could be seen from the perspective of 
legislature exerting its dominance on the affairs of the state through its constitutional 
legislative oversight function. Such action however, if not done base on objective 
analysis of the macroeconomic variables prevalent in the state, but on parochial and 
political scheming, had the tendency of circumventing the interests of the governed who 
the legislature purported to have represented by its decision. Although the Speaker, Mr. 
Adeyemi Ikuforiji, attributed the delay to the determination of the House to tackle the 
exigencies surrounding the bill, including the fact of its being the last full one under the 
four-year tenure of the Fashola administration, the budget was significantly delayed due 
to the stand-off between the State Assembly and the government (Akoni and Akanmu, 
2010). Conversely, the 2011 budget of N445.180 billion was passed speedily on 27th of 
January, 2011 with a marginal increment by N5.595 billion and on Jan 31, 2011, the bill 
totaling N450.775 billion was signed into law without any legislative-executive rancour 
that marred the passage of that of 2010.  
 
Another instance of legislature-executive conflicts emanating from the performance of 
the legislature‟s oversight roles in Lagos State was in the instance of the disbursement of 
funds to the local government councils of the State. The House faulted the modalities for 
the distribution of funds to the councils and therefore, set up an Ad-hoc Committee to 
determine whether the state government complied fully with the allocation formula in the 
disbursement of funds to the local councils as stipulated in the state Joint Local 
Government Account Committee Law of 2003. It submitted that the pattern of 
disbursement was done in contravention of the constitutional provisions and extant laws 
of the state. On this platform, the House directed the Commissioner for Finance, 
Adetokunbo Abiru to stop further payments in respect of Joint Account Allocation 
Committee pending a resolution of the House in order to prevent further breaches of the 
law. Furthermore, the House directed the Accountant-General of the state to furnish the 
House with the reports in respect of payment made to each Local Government in the state 
from 2009 in compliance with section 9 of the JAAC law. 
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Another instance of acrimony between Lagos State Governor, Raji Fashola, and the State 
House of Assembly was on the allegation of financial impropriety levied against the State 
Government in January 2010 by the “True Face of Lagos” (Durojaiye, 2010). Based on 
allegations of staggering financial impropriety raised against the State Governor by a 
group known as True Face of Lagos, the Lagos State House of Assembly initiated a 
proceeding to probe the State Governor (Lagos State House of Assembly, 2010).  It 
however, took the intervention of the Court under Justice Habeeb Abiru to, on March 6, 
2010, stop the House from proceeding on the planned probe. Justice Abiru hinged his 
judgment on the fact that the House unconstitutionally and illegally set up a six-man 
committee to investigate the allegations against the governor and some members of the 
House without first publishing the resolution in its journal or gazette. Justice Abiru 
declared that such action was a breach of the provisions of Section 128(1) of the 1999 
Constitution. He faulted the action of the House for acting on mere allegations published 
in the advertorial by a group, which he described as faceless instead of a petition 
addressed directly to the Assembly (Akpeh, 2010). Moreover, the allegations were 
published in the morning of 28th of January, 2010 and it was on the same day that the 
House passed the resolution to set up a committee to investigate the issues of financial 
impropriety raised in the publication. Again, it was not a case of the House reacting to 
public outcry against the allegations and no reason was adduced by the House for this 
urgent action. 
 
The Lagos State House of Assembly however, launched another investigation into 
possible mishandling of public funds by Fashola. A seven-man Ad-hoc committee was 
for this purpose, set up by the Lagos State House of Assembly (Lagos State House of 
assembly, 2010). The Ikeja High court under Justice Opeyemi Oke, on Wednesday, May 
4, 2010 again, renewed the earlier court order restraining the panel and its agents from 
proceeding with the investigation. The Lawmakers through its counsel, Mr. Oludipe from 
the Lagos State Multi Door Court House, however promised amicable resolution of the 
dispute noting that the parties in the suit were one family who were at the vanguard of 
improving Lagos state (Akintunde, 2010).  
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Findings of this research revealed various schools of thought concerning the motive of 
the investigation panel. One school of thought considered the investigation as part of the 
steps in the plot to impeach the state governor following his disagreement with his 
godfather, former governor of the State, Bola Tinubu (Obasa, 2009). There are 
insinuations that the disagreement between the godson and godfather was because the 
former did not allow the latter to have an unfettered access to the state vault (Affe, 2009; 
Ajayi, 2010). This school of thought raised a very important eyebrow on why the Lagos 
State House of Assembly has not probed the 8-year rule of the supposed godfather. 
 
It is pertinent to note that many of the published allegations of staggering financial 
impropriety by the True Face of Lagos against the Lagos state government span back to 
the Tinubu administration of which Fashola was a part.  It would appear therefore, that 
the legislature in the state performed the oversight function whimsically, when it suits, it 
colludes with the executive for selfish gain, when the executive fails to reward it for 
lokking the other way, it threatens it with impeachment, a legislative action that has 
become instrument of blackmail in the current experiment with democracy in Nigeria. 
The statement of Justice Abiru while handing down his verdict on the court case, perhaps 
shed more light in this regard. According to him;  
The group, „The True Face of Lagos‟, had not hitherto been known for or 
associated with the struggle for good governance and probity in government 
expenditure in Nigeria. Yet, the House decided to set up a committee, 
expending tax payers‟ money and the time meant to be used for making laws 
for the good of the people of Lagos State to investigate the allegations without 
stating any cogent reason in the House proceeding for that day, why it deemed 
the allegations important enough to direct that they be investigated (Odiogor, 
2010). 
 
It would then mean that the State House decided to carry out its oversight role, not in the 
spirit of good governance but as a vendetta for other ulterior motives. This investigation 
followed the plan in December 2009 by the state legislature to impeach the governor   
primarily because of his disagreements with his godfather, Tinubu the former governor of 
the State. Ironically, a similar situation played itself out between Tinubu and his deputy, 
Femi Pedro, in the run-up to the gubernatorial elections in 2007. The disagreement 
between the two made the governor to instigate the State House to impeach his deputy. 
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Another school of thought concerning the motive behind the investigation held that the 
House decided to probe the allegation as part of its constitutional role of overseeing the 
government. According to this school of thought, the fact that Fashola was being rated as 
one of the performing Governors in the country does not automatically exonerate him 
from the legislative oversight role. The legislature, through its oversight functions, holds 
the government and its agencies accountable to the public. Since the government has the 
responsibility to appropriate and allocate funds to the various government institutions for 
its operations, it naturally follows that the legislature must oversee these institutions to 
ensure that the public get value for their money and also ensure that these institutions are 
run in accordance with the laws of the land. To this school of thought,   accountability in 
governance is the hallmark of political advancement. The unfolding political drama 
between the executive and the legislative arms of Lagos State government is therefore an 
advancement of democracy in the State. 
As pointed out by Oarhe (2010), in political patronage and clientelism, relationships can 
become strain if the distribution of resources is lopsided and no longer mutually 
satisfying. Conflict between the patron and client thus arises quite often from control of 
state resources or political influence in government appointment rather than ideological 
difference. Rancor therefore, broke out between Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Fashola 
who may have decided to reduce Tinubu‟s control of the state‟s political apparatus and 
distanced himself from running the State government in the old ways of starching state 
funds to the private accounts of party faithfuls especially, Tinubu his godfather. For 
instance, findings revealed that Fashola decided to review the tax consultancy regime 
foisted on the state by Tinubu‟s administration, which ensured that Alpha-Beta 
Consulting Limited, the Lagos State Government appointed consultant agent to control 
and monitor the collection of State revenue takes home 10% of the states earnings on a 
monthly basis. It is pertinent to note that major programmes and constructions projects in 
the State were awarded to Alpha-Beta Consulting Limited, HITECH Construction 
Company and the Lekki Concession Company (LCC) (Tinubu is alleged to be holding 
lion shares of these companies) with the contract sum shrouded in secrecy.  
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Moreso, Fashola‟s demonstration of single mindedness on the critical issue of funding of 
ACN activities in the country did not go down well with Tinubu and the ACN as the 
Party needed more funds to perpetually keep PDP away from gaining political dominance 
in Lagos and other ACN controlled States. Furthermore, it would appear that Governor 
Fashola whose administration has focused on infrastructural development seemed to have 
reneged on the lobbying approach of his predecessor and emphasized due process 
approach. The implication is that lawmakers in the State House, political leaders and the 
traditional institution in the state would no longer have special favours going towards 
them from the State funds, unlike in the Tinubu era. They would have no influence on the 
budgets in a way that would afford them political patronage.  
 
The decision by the Fashola government to abate the politics of patronage and 
godfatherism would seem not to be of mean consequence especially in a political 
landscape where the godfather is the de facto leader and the determinant of all issues in 
the party (ACN) that lacked internal democracy and was, on the basis of that, 
instrumental to the victory of almost all members of the House of Assembly. Members of 
the House owed their allegiance to him more than the Assembly and continued to see 
Fashola as his (Tinubu) Chief-of-Staff even two years after he became the governor. 
Consequently therefore, every ploy had to be engaged by the godfather to either get 
Fashola impeached or stopped from going for second term as governor in 2011 and the 
State legislature seemed to be the potent instrument to achieve this plot. The politics of 
godfatherism thus pitched the legislature against the governor in an acrimonious 
relationship characterized by struggle for political power rather than being responsible 
partners in governing. 
 
Fashola‟s government however, continued to gain public sympathy and support 
consequential on some measure of achievements he made in his first two years in office. 
To the average Lagosian who believed that he has performed creditably in the past 1000 
days in office, the attempt to investigate or impeach the governor, was an act of political 
prejudice (Odiogor, 2010). Within the two years, Fashola received the 2009 Yikzak 
Rabin Centre for African Development, Governor of the Decade for Peace Award and he 
253 
 
is the recipient of the 2010 Award of Excellence in Leadership and of the Martin Luther 
King Jnr. Foundation. Fashola also received the 2009 Good Governance Award from the 
United Kingdom-based African Business Magazine. He is The Guardian, The Vanguard 
and The Sun newspapers‟ Man of The Year for 2009. He is the Daily Champion Man of 
the Year for 2010. He is also the 2010 Award winner of the City People Magazine Best 
Governor of the Year and Best Southwest Governor of the Year. These accolades seemed 
to be evidence of his good governance and dropping him from being the gubernatorial 
candidate of the ACN for the 2011 elections would appear not healthy for Tinubu and 
ACN‟s ambition to maintain firm control of Lagos State. This was because Fashola could 
decamp to Labour Party, and then use power of incumbency and the goodwill he had 
earned as one of the best performing governors in the country to return himself as 
Governor in 2011. In fact findings revealed that Fashola was already laying the 
foundation for the Labour Party‟s political strength in the State as an alternative platform 
to contest for the gubernatorial position in the 2011 election should ACN denied him the 
party‟s candidature.  
 
The primary election of ACN in the State that held on January 19, 2011 followed the 
usual manipulations and imposition of candidates by the party leadership for the House 
and the National Assembly membership as delegates were not free to vote for candidates 
of their choice (Akoni and Olowoopejo, 2011). Only candidates who would likely give 
their unflinching support to Ikuforiji‟s retention as the Speaker were returned to the 
House. The April 26, 2011 gubernatorial poll however saw Fashola re-elected in an 
overwhelming victory for a second term in office and expectedly, at the inauguration of 
the Seventh Lagos State Assembly on June 4, 2011, Adeyemi Ikuforiji was also reelected 
as the Speaker.  
The pattern of relationship between Fashola and the Seventh Lagos Assembly 
inaugurated on June 2011 was still young for drawing conclusions at the time of this 
research. It is pertinent to note however, that the two powers seemed to have chosen the 
path of harmonious relationship for the smooth operation of the government. For 
instance, the legislature, in a three-day exercise, screened and approved without rancor, 
the executive nominees sent to it by the Governor (Akoni, Akanmu and Olowoopejo, 
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2011). The smooth process that greeted the approval process was contrary to earlier 
speculations that the list of nominees presented by the governor might enmesh the 
Governor and the State House of Assembly in crisis. This is because of the 
disagreements between the Governor and his godfather - Tinubu on the choice of some 
of the nominees. Investigation revealed that Fashola‟s choice of technocrats as 
members of his cabinet was contrary to the directive of Tinubu and ACN party leaders. 
It was alleged that Tinubu was not happy that such list was sent to the State House of 
Assembly by the Governor without concluding with him and had therefore instructed 
members of the House to reject the list, pending his approval (Awosiyan, 2011). On the 
contrary, the Assembly screened and approved the nominees on their merit instead of 
primordial sentiment. With this action, the State Assembly demonstrated signs of 
maturity and readiness to gain its independence. The State Assembly also approved the 
2012 appropration bill sent to it on November 14, 2011 by the Governor. The initial 
sum of N485.292 forwarded by the executive was amemded to N491.827 by the House 
after constructive debate and scrutiny on the bill (LSHA, 2011, vol. 2). It is instructive 
to note that despite this increase of the estimate with about N6billion, the decision did 
not generate any rancor between the Governor and the State Assembly. 
On a conclusive note, the analysis of the pattern of legislature-executive relationship in 
Lagos Statebetween 1999 and 2011 revealed more of a master-servant relationship and 
overbearing executive in an environment where politics of patronage determined the level 
of cordiality enjoyed with the legislature and which also reduced the legislature to a 
rubber stamp assembly. It also revealed the extent to which the politics of godfatherism 
in an atmosphere of party politics that lacks internal democracy have exerted pressure 
and strains on the institutions of governance hence threatened the basic underlies of 
presidentialism.  
 
5.10.5.2. Ogun State. 
The return of Nigeria to civil rule in 1999 saw Aremo Segun Osoba as governor of the 
state on the platform of AD. Osoba was the governor of the State in the botched third 
republic on the ticket of the SDP. The Fourth Legislative Assembly that existed during 
this period had majority of its members controlled by the government party - AD. The 
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pattern of interactions between the legislature and the executive during this period 
revealed cooperative and harmonious relationship. The fact that the same party controlled 
both the executive and the legislature would have prompted the relatively stable and 
harmonious pattern of legislature-executive relations during this period. Investigations 
however, revealed that more importantly, the pattern of relationship was not just because 
of the majority government that existed during this period but because of the pivotal role 
played by Afenifere, the Yoruba Socio-political group led by a respected Yoruba leader, 
Pa Abraham Adesanya, who together with his lieutenants, formed the AD in 1998. 
Findings revealed that the Afenifere and the AD maintained discipline and party loyalty 
among members with the view of tenaciously toeing the path and legacy of the late sage, 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, whose parties – AG and UPN were reputed for sound 
organizations and discipline. Aligning to the tenets of Chief Awolowo therefore, 
Afenifere encouraged a harmonious and consensus legislature-executive relations in 
Ogun State between 1999 and 2003.  
 
The one party monopoly in the State and the consensus approach to legislature-executive 
relations however encouraged executive hegemony in the decision making process of the 
state and weakened legislative oversight powers over the executive. This is evident in the 
action of the governor when he (Olusegun Osoba) unilaterally suspended both the 
executive and legislative arms of Ijebu North East, Yewa North and Ijebu Ode local 
government councils of the Ogun State on Friday, February 15, 2002 without 
consultation with the State House of Assembly. The Governor thereafter imposed 
permanent secretaries, namely Ademola Olusanya, Alhaji Kola Olaniyan and Mr. Festus 
Akindele as Sole Administrators on these local governments. It is instructive to note that 
Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees the existence of local government by 
democratically elected local government councils. Through the effective mediatory role 
and conflict resolution of the Party leadership however, such actions of the executive did 
not degenerate into discord between the two arms of government.  
 
The presence of strong executive leadership in the state during this period also weakened 
legislative role in appropriation, hence the executive usually had the appropriation bills 
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legitimized by the legislature. Deliberations on executive bills during this period were 
mere constitutional routine exercise that had no significant influence on the bills 
forwarded by the government. In most cases, the State House of Assembly merely 
deliberated on executive bills for the purpose of conferring the legitimacy required for 
implementation and acceptability of the bills in a democratic environment. For instance, 
the State House of Assembly unanimously passed the year 2001 Appropriation Bill 
totaling N19.7 billion as presented by the Governor Olusegun Osoba to the House (House 
Bill 14, Ogun State Appropriation Bill Year 2001). This was done without the State 
House having any meaningful influence on the bill despite that it took the House 3 
months to consider and approve it.  
 
The nature of cooperative legislature-executive relations during Aremo Segun Osoba 
administration however, is believed by majority of our respondents to enhance stability 
and good governance in the State as it enabled the governor to implement his 
programmes particularly, in the area of rural development such as electricity, provision of 
pipe- borne water and road development, among others. Osoba‟s AD administration and 
the Fourth Assembly of Ogun State however ended in 2003. At the 2003 polls in the 
State, Osoba lost the gubernatoral election due to a combination of political treachery, 
manipulations and contrived acts of propaganda by his opponents (Odunaro, 2011).  
 
During the first tenure of Governor Gbenga Daniel‟s PDP led government (2003 – 2007) 
the intragovernmental relations between the executive and legislature revealed 
cooperative approach dictated by the predominance of one party in the executive and 
legislature. The House, during this period, was largely compliant with the executive 
approving every bill and request thrown at it by the governor. The period witnessed the 
emergence of the executive domination of the legislative arm of the state government and 
a lack of concern for keeping with the dictates of the principles of separation of power as 
expected of a presidential system of government. The nature of States political milieu 
encouraged flagrant disregard for the rule of the game, such that executive‟s interference 
in the workings of the legislature pervaded system. 
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The second tenure of Gbenga Daniel‟s administration however, marked the period of 
legislature-executive strife that threatened the political stability of a state that was once 
known for its peaceful coexistence. The fact that the PDP controlled both the executive 
and the legislature in the State did not automatically meant an easy passage of executive 
bills, neither did it lead to an easy implementation of the government programmes and 
activities. This situation is similar to the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the 
former Bendel State where the Unity Party of Nigeria controlled both the executive and a 
comfortable majority in the State House of Assembly (Mbah, 2007), and despite that, the 
conflict between the two arms of government saw the governor of the State impeached 
(Oyediran, 1980). This scenario and that of Ogun State under examination is suggestive of 
the dynamic and complex nature of legislature-executive relations at the state level of 
Nigeria‟s presidential system.   
 
One of the areas of legislature-executive polarity in the state bothered on fiscal autonomy 
for the state legislature. In order to enhance the financial autonomy of the Ogun State 
House of Assembly, a bill tagged the Self-Accounting Law of Ogun State and Autonomy 
of the Ogun State House of Assembly (Law No.5 of 2003) was passed. The House also 
passed the House of Assembly Service Commission in 2003 (OGHA, 2003, vol. 1).  By 
this, the State Assembly Account is to be established and maintained and the Clerk of the 
House becomes the accounting officer. The Bill however, limits the self-accounting 
status of the House to recurrent expenditure and shall not include control over revenue, 
which is to be paid into the consolidated fund of the state. Despite that these bills have 
been assented to by the Governor, they were not implemented thereby starving the 
Assembly of funds (Ali, 2009). It is pertinent to note that these two laws if implemented 
would enhance legislative independence in the State. The refusal of the Governor to 
implement these laws would mean his deliberate intrigues to perpetually keep the 
legislature under subjugation and manipulations of the executive.  
 
Our interview with Mr. Femi Ademosun, the Director, Bills revealed that since the 
removal of Titi Oseni from the speakership position of the State Assembly, the Governor 
continued to deliberately starve the state legislative assembly of the required fund for 
running the institution. He pointed out that the State Assembly had no control over its 
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budget and finances but was under the whims and caprices of the Governor who likewise 
used the instrument to manipulate the former.  In fact, at some point, the House had to 
adjourn its plenary sessions indefinitely on the grounds that it could no longer muster 
enough funds to run the affairs of the House (OGHA, 2009, vol.2). Our interview with 
Former Chairman, House Committee on Information, Dr. Olatokunbo Oshin revealed that 
the failure of Governor Gbenga Daniel to implement the Self-Accounting Law of Ogun 
State and his continued subversion of the autonomy of the Ogun State House of 
Assembly instigated the state lawmakers against him (governor). 
In January, 2009, the Speaker of the House Hon. Tunji Egbetokun wrote to the executive 
in respect of the self-accounting laws of the state, requesting for the lump sum of N138 
million for the recurrent and capital expenditure appropriated for the House. The request 
was however, turned down by the Governor claiming that he had been complying with 
the self accounting law by releasing to the State House, on monthly bais, from the 
appropriation. The Governor alleged that the N138 million that the State House claimed 
as allocations for Constituency Projects was actually demanded as bribe to end the face-
off between him and the State. The legislature described the allegation as frivolous, 
libelous and wicked against the House (Salaudeen, Leke and Ernest Nwokolo, 2009). 
According to the then Chairman, House Committee on Information, Dr. Olatokunbo 
Oshin; 
the N138 million is the statutory right of the House according to Law No.5 
of 2003 tagged Ogun State House of Assembly Accounting Law. The 
amount included N78 million constituency project allowance and other 
running cost of the House. This is a far cry from what Governor Daniel 
claimed as overnight and travel allowances within Nigeria. He does not 
stay in the hotel; he stays in his personal houses. So how much is N138 
million for 26 members? But, because he knows that when we are self-
accounting there will be a lot to expose, he is against it (Nwokolo, 2009). 
The objection of the Governor to pay the money further worsened the polarized 
relationship between the executive and the legislature in the State and made the House to 
pass a resolution to impeach the governor if he would not implement the said laws and 
other issues as required of him by the constitution (OGHA, 2009). According to the 
legislators interviewed, the legislature‟s financial autonomy is imperative for it to carry 
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out the onerous responsibilities placed upon it as the people‟s representative and 
therefore, the true eye, ear and voice of the people in the polity. By virtue of this role, the 
legislature performs the critical roles of constituency representation, law making and 
oversight on the operations of government. These fundamental roles of the legislature in a 
democratic polity inform the need for the organ of government to be financially self-
directed and not to be tied to the apron strings of the executive. The implementation of 
the Self Accounting Law is indispensable for legislative independence in the State and 
would enhance the Assembly to perform its responsibility without fear or favour and 
without actually compromising its stand on issues that pertain to the extension of the 
frontiers of citizenship. As noted by Professor Lai Olerede; 
the legislature has often been attached to the executive and the legislature can 
become arm twisted when it knows very well that it will have to go to the 
executive to seek for approval on what to spend and what it can spend on. 
This limits its capacity and freedom to be truly autonomous and truly 
independent, especially being independent of the executive branch of 
government (Cited in Nigeria Observer, 2012). 
 
Financial autonomy will therefore, detach the state legislature from being sycophant and 
agent of the governor and strengthen its oversight responsibilities. 
 
Another instance of legislature-executive conflict in Ogun State bothered on the 
performance of the oversight functions of the State House of Assembly. Legislature-
executive acrimony ensued in the state over the plan by the State Governor – Otunba 
Gbenga Daniel to raise N100 billion loan from the Nigeria capital market (Oni, 2010). 
This exercise was considered grisly by the state legislature as it was capable of 
mortgaging the future of the state by placing the state treasury in the hands of banks 
waiting in the wings to take control of its purse for a prolonged period of time. Moreover, 
the timing of the plan was considered worrisome in that the governor had few months 
before the expiration of his tenure. Thus such action would appear strategic by the 
Governor to empty the state treasury before his departure from office. Further, the 
governor would be buying himself political immunity by moving to the Senate. All these 
issues would have insinuated the state legislature‟s (especially the G15) unfavourable 
disposition towards the N100 billion loan (Adeniji, 2010). 
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It is perhaps worthy of note that the idea of government securing such a huge amount of 
money to embark on development project at a time the tenure of such government was 
about to terminate and without the possibility of being re-elected, really deserved 
thorough legislative scrutiny. This is because one wonders why such plan was not 
embarked upon but delayed to the period when the tenure of such government was almost 
winding up. Such plan if not properly scrutinized but simply rubber stamped could just 
mean an open cheque for such government to loot the resources of the state.   
 
The disagreement over the reduction of the amount in the 2010 appropriation bill 
submitted to the State House by the executive was another instance of legislature-
executive conflict in the State. The power game between the two arms of the government 
was on the power of the legislature to amend the budget as submitted by the executive. 
The State Assembly, after its deliberations on the appropriation bill, reduced the 2010 
estimate from N100.73billion proposed by the State Governor to N88.09billion following 
the report presented by the Chairman, House Committee on Finance and Appropriation, 
Chief Adekunle Adegboyega. The assembly expunged the inclusion of the N28billion to 
be raised through bonds from the proposed capital receipt of the state for the year and the 
N9.8billion earmarked for servicing the bond. The House, however, increased allocation 
to the House from N760m to N1bn and allocation to the Ministry of Works from 
N1.8billion to N2.5billion. On this note, the Assembly approved N42.461billion for the 
state capital expenditure and N36.99billion as recurrent expenditure for 2010 after three 
months of delay (OGHA, 2010, vol. 3). On the contrary, the executive viewed such 
reduction as ridiculous and capable of impeding the developmental process. He delayed 
the signing of the state 2010 appropriation bill for three weeks after the State House of 
Assembly passed it with the argument that some grey areas needed to be resolved with 
the State Assembly before the passage (Adeniji, 2010).  
 
It is perhaps vital to stress that appropriation law serves as a legal instrument for raising 
funds necessary for the operations of the government. The process involves both the 
executive and the legislature. While orderly government requires that the executive 
should propose the estimate, the proposal is subjected to legislature‟s investigation and 
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approval. Through amendment process, the legislature oversees the affairs of the 
government and exerts citizen‟s influence on the budget. As noted by (NDI, 2000) the 
budget process represents one of the vital checks and balances of democracy. The crisis 
between the Ogun State House of Assembly and Governor Gbengal Daniel however 
added personal, ethnic and diabolically obscurantist complications to legislature-
executive relations in the state.  
 
Having completed eight years of two terms tenure in the Governor‟s House, Gbenga 
Daniel‟s PDP led government ended in 2011. With the vast resources of the State in 
terms of manpower base and industries, with good governance, so much would have been 
achieved in the state in the area of infrastructural development, job creations, provision of 
basic amenities and of course, dividends of democracy. Unfortunately, the reverse 
seemed to be the case in the Gateway State especially when the few amenities provided 
by this administration are compared with the cost of governance in the State. 
 
The Seventh Legislative Assembly of Ogun State was inaugurated by the state governor, 
Senator Ibikunle Amosun, on 7 June, 2011 with Honourable Suraj Ishola Adekunbi, 
representing Egbado North I State Constituency, elected as the Speaker. The Assembly 
consisted of twenty-six (26) members out of whom the ACN initially had seventeen (17) 
while the PDP had six (6) members and the Peoples Party of Nigeria (PPN), three (3) 
members. Three (3) members (Hon. Babatunde Egunjobi, Hon. Harrison Adeyemi and 
Hon. Sola Sonuga) however, defected to the ACN. Their defection followed the inability 
of the PDP leadership at the national level to resolve the crisis rocking the state chapter of 
the party since 2008 (Olatunji, 2012). The defection thus brought the number of ACN 
members to twenty (20) out of the twenty-six (26) members of the House.  
With this composition of the Assembly, it seemed that the Amosun ACN‟s led 
administration would have no need engaging in high level lobbying in the House in order 
for any bill, resolution or any legislative action to favour his administration. This is based 
on the simple fact that the ruling ACN had the required two-third majority to have a bill 
and resolution passed in any legislative action after the debate or consideration of any 
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matter on the floor of the House. Against this inconsequential minority opposition in the 
House, it would appear that the Ogun State Seventh Legislative Assembly would be a 
rubber stamp assembly for the ACN controlled government, considering what it was 
known for especially during the first term of the former Governor, Otunba Gbenga 
Daniel. Contrarily, the nature of legislature-executive relations in the state within the few 
months (2011 -2012) that Amosun administration began, seemed to have taken a different 
dimension, following legislative independence and its awakening to its pivotal role of 
citizens‟ representative in an atmosphere of healthy intra-governmental relations in the 
State.  
This is evidenced in the consensus manner with which the two organs of government 
handled their differences on executive bill number 20/OG/2012 titled “A bill for a law to 
provide for the raising of loans through issuance of bonds, notes and other securities and 
for connected purposes” (OGHA, 2012. Vol.1), already reported earlier in this study. In 
the cause of considering the bill on the floor of the House, the Assembly noted that bond 
is a vital instrument through which an economy of the state could be boosted and agreed 
that the bill would provide the framework for accessing and repayment of loans. It 
however observed that a wholesale approval of such bill has implication of usurping the 
power of the legislators over public fund management. The House therefore passed a 
resolution that the bill should be amended by the Governor to retain the legislative‟s 
powers over public funds as a condition for its passage by the House. 
 
Furthermore, a close observation of the nature of legislature-executive relations in Ogun 
State under the new dispensation of Amosun led government, was the influence of the 
opposition parties. The opposition parties in the House seemed to be presenting 
constructive oppositions to the decisions and activities of the assembly and the executive. 
It is instructive to note that following the defection of three (3) members of the PDP in 
the House to the ACN ruling party, six (6) members of the House belonged to the PDP 
and PPN. The ACN ruling party with 20 members now had comfortable two-third (2/3) 
majority in the State House of Assembly. Despite that the opposition parties do not have 
the one-third (1/3) members in the House, they seemed to have provided viable 
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oppositions and critique to the proposals and policies of the ruling party. For instance, 
members of the opposition parties shunned a special meeting convened by the Governor 
on July 31, 2012 in the governor‟s office at Oke-Mosan, Abeokuta. The nine Assembly 
members are the Minority Leader, Job Akintan; the PDP Whip, Olusola Sonuga; PPN 
Whip, John  Obafemi; Babatunde Edunjobi (Yewa South); Abiodun Akovoyon (Ipokia 
Idiroko); Salmon Adeleke (Imeko/Afon; Bowale Solaja (Ijebu NorthI); Joseph 
Adegbesan (Ijebu North II); and Adeyemi Harrison (Ogun Waterside). Finding revealed 
that they disregarded the meeting as a protest against the outcome of the July 21 local 
government election in the state which process they viewed as lacking credibility.   
Furthermore, a major circumstance that led to the Assembly‟s decision to mandate the 
Governor to review the executive bill 20/OG/2012 on raising of loans reported earlier in 
this study was the influence of members of the opposition party in the House. The 
Minority Leader of the House, Job Akintan representing Egbado North II State 
Constituency on the PDP platform, and other members of the opposition parties 
maintained their opposition to the wholesale approval of the bill and were able to make 
the difference by scuttling the easy process envisaged for a majority bill even when they 
were in the minority. They made reference to Section 120, 121 and 122 of the 
constitution which confers power on public finance to the House of Assembly and as 
such argued that a decision to hurriedly pass the bill would cede the powers of the 
legislature on public finance to the executive (OGHA, 2012, vol.1). The House, on the 
bases of this, referred the bill back to the Governor for amendments to reflect the 
retention of the powers of the State House on public funds.  
It is interesting to note at this juncture that, with the ensuing development in the 
legislature-executive relations in Ogun State there seemed to be a paradigm shift in that 
the Ogun State 7th Legislative Assembly seemed to be awake to its role as the people‟s 
representatives through legislation and a veritable watchdog over government emerging 
despotism and financial impudence in the State.  
In concluding this section, it is imperative to note that the analysis of the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States has been characterised by the 
desire of the executive to continue to control the legislature and the latter‟s strive for 
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independence. This seemingly mutual inclusive interplay tended to have pitched the 
executive and the legislature in a perpetual struggle for political power. This finding is in 
tandem with the second preposition of this study that the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States has been more of power struggle 
than being responsible partners in governing. 
 
5.10.6. Factors Responsible for the Pattern of Legislature-Executive Relations in 
Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
This section dwells on the presentation and analysis of empirical data obtained from 
Lagos and Ogun States on the factors responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the two states between 1999 and 2011. Table 5.12 is the frequency 
distribution of responses from the respondents in both Lagos and Ogun States. The table 
is followed by brief descriptive analysis for the purpose of clarity. 
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Table 5.13: Factors Responsible for the Pattern of Legislature-Executive Relations 
in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
 
 
Lagos State 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Undecided 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
External Interference  36 29 41 33 9 7 21 17 18 14 
Influence of political party 70 56 26 21 7 6 18 14 4 3 
Partisan/factional politics 6 5 27 22 14 11 60 48 18 14 
Attempts to personalize political 
authority 
24 19 75 60 10 8 3 2 13 10 
Lack of professionalism and 
underdeveloped nature of the 
legislators 
32 26 26 21 18 14 21 17 27 22 
Personality /egoistic rivalry 29 23 75 60 11 9 6 5 4 3 
Corruption/Personal/ parochial 
advantage lack of transparency 
and accountability 
17 14 80 64 15 12 5 4 8 6 
Godfatherism 48 38 40 32 20 16 13 10 4 3 
Ethnicity 16 13 16 13 21 17 50 40 22 18 
 
Ogun State 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
External Interference  33 27 45 37 15 12 19 16 8 7 
Influence of political party 61 50 42 35 6 5 8 7 4 3 
Partisan/factional politics 62 51 27 22 15 12 16 13 1 0.8 
Attempts to personalize political 
authority 
29 24 67 55 8 7 14 12 3 3 
Lack of professionalism and 
underdeveloped nature of the 
legislators 
21 17 60 50 9 7 21 17 10 8 
Personality /egoistic rivalry 17 14 60 50 15 12 23 19 6 5 
Corruption/Personal/ parochial 
advantage lack of transparency 
and accountability 
22 18 91 75 0 0 3 3 5 4 
Godfatherism 57 47 49 40 2 2 10 8 3 3 
Ethnicity 25 21 44 36 4 3 47 39 1 1 
Source: Field Reports, 2012 
Table 5.12 indicates the percentage distribution of responses on the factors responsible 
for the patttern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States. The table 
shows that in Lagos State, 29% strongly agreed, 33% simply agreed, 7% were undecided 
17% disagreed and14% strongly disagreed that executive‟s interference in the affairs of 
the legislature was responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
State. Similarly, in Ogun State, 27% of the respondents strongly agreed while 37% 
simply agreed, 12% were undecided, 16 simply disagreed and 7% strongly disagreed. It is 
observed from this analysis, that majority of the respondents in both Lagos and Ogun 
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States agreed that executive‟s interference in the legislative affairs of the House of 
Assembly in the two states was a factor responsible for the pattern of the legislature-
executive relations in the states.   
 
From Table 5.12 above, 56% of the respondents strongly agreed; 21% agreed; 6% were 
undecided; 14% disagreed and 3% strongly disagreed that political party plaid influential 
role in determining the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 
1999 and 2011. In Ogun State however, 50% of the respondents strongly agreed and 35% 
merely agreed that political party plaid influential role in determining the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in the state.  5% were however, undecided. 7% of the 
respondents disagreed and 3% strongly disagreed. This analysis indicates that majority of 
the respondents in both Lagos and Ogun States agreed that that political party plaid 
influential role in determining the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the two 
states between 1999 and 2011.  
 
The table also contains frequency distribution of respondents‟ position on whether 
partisan/factional politics was responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. In Lagos State, 5% of the 
respondents strongly agreed while 22% merely agreed. 11% were undecided. 48% 
disagreed while 14% strongly disagreed that partisan/factional politics was responsible 
for the pattern of the legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 and 
2011. In Ogun State however, 51% of the respondents strongly agreed and 22% simply 
agreed while 12% were undecided. 13% simply disagreed and 0.8% strongly disagreed 
that partisan/factional politics was responsible for the pattern of the legislature-executive 
relations in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011. It is conclusive therefore, that while 
majority of the respondents in Lagos State disagreed that partisan/factional politics was 
responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 
2011, in Ogun State on the contrary, majority of respondents agreed that 
partisan/factional politics was responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the State between 1999 and 2011. 
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Table 5.12 also depicts the pecentage distribution of respondents on whether or not, 
attempt to personalize political office was a factor responsible for the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. The 
table shows that 19% of the respondents in Lagos State strongly agreed while 60% 
simply agreed that attempt to personalize political office was one of the factors 
responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 
and 2011. 8% of the respondents were however undecided. 2% simply disagreed and 
10% strongly disagreed. Responses from Ogun State also followed a similar dimension. 
24% of the respondents strongly agreed and 55% simply agreed that attempt to 
personalize political office was a factor responsible for the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011. 7% of the respondents were 
undecided. 12% simply disagreed and 3% indicated their strong objection. This analysis 
shows that majority of the respondents in Lagos State and in Ogun State agreed that 
attempt to personalize political office was a factor responsible for the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in each of the two states between 1999 and 2011. 
 
Respondents were also asked to indicate their agreement or otherwise on whether on not 
lack of professionalism and underdeveloped nature of the legislators were responsible for 
the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 
2011.  Table 5.12 shows that 26% of the respondents in Lagos State strongly agreed and 
21% simply agreed that lack of professionalism and underdeveloped nature of the 
legislators were responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
State between 1999 and 2011.  14% of the respondents were however undecided while 
17% disagreed and 22% strongly disagreed. In Ogun State, 17% of the respondents 
indicated a strong agreement and 50% simply agreed. 7% were undecided while 17% 
merely agreed and 8% indicated strong disagreement. This analysis shows that majority 
of the respondents in both states agreed that lack of professionalism and underdeveloped 
nature of the legislators were responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations 
in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. It is also observed that the level of 
agreement with this notion was very high in Ogun State as compared with Lagos State. 
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The percentage of respondents that agreed in Lagos State was 46% while that of Ogun 
State, 81%. 
 
Personality/egoistic rivalry was another factor tested in the survey. Table 5.12 indicates 
that 23% of the respondents in Lagos State expressed strong agreement with the position 
that personality/egoistic rivalry contributed to the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the state between 1999 and 2011. 60% simply agree while 9% were 
undecided. 5% however, simply agreed and 3% strongly agreed.  Ogun State also shows 
a similar outcome. 14% of the respondents strongly agreed that personality/egoistic 
rivalry contributed to the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 
1999 and 2011, 50% simply agreed, 12% were undecided, 19% disagreed and 5% 
strongly disagreed. It is observed from this analysis therefore, that majority of the 
respondents in both Lagos and Ogun States agreed that personality/egoistic rivalry was 
among the factors responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
and in Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. 
 
The percentage distribution of respondents on whether or not corruption and lack of 
transparency and accountability affected the pattern of legislature-executive relations in 
Lagos and Ogun States is depicted in Table 5.11. The table shows that 14% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that corruption and lack of transparency and accountability 
constitute factors responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
State between 1999 and 2011. 64% of the respondents simply agreed while 12% were 
undecided. 4% however disagreed and 6% strongly disagreed. In Ogun State on the other 
hand, 18% of the respondents strongly agreed while 75% simply agreed. 3% of the 
respondents however, disagreed and 4% strongly disagreed that corruption and lack of 
transparency and accountability were responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in Ogun State. It is therefore observed from this analysis that majority of the 
respondents in the two states are of the view that corruption and lack of transparency and 
accountability were responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. 
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Another factor tested in this survey is political godfatherism. Respondents were asked 
whether political godfatherism was a factor responsible for the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. The percentage 
distribution of respondents‟ responses is illustrated in Table 5.12. The table shows that 
38% of the respondents strongly agreed that political godfatherism was a factor 
responsible for the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 
and 2011 while 32% merely agreed. 16% were undecided. 10% disagreed and 3% 
strongly disagreed. In a similarly dimension, 47% of the respondents in Ogun State 
strongly agreed that political godfatherism was a factor responsible for the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011 while 40% merely 
agreed. 2% were undecided while 8% disagreed and 3% strongly disagreed. A very 
germane observation in this analysis is that the percentage of respondents who affirmed 
that political godfatherism was a factor responsible for the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 seriously 
outnumbered those who disagreed.  
 
The impact of ethnicity on the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and 
Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 was also surveyed. Percentage response of the 
respondents is depicted in Table 5.12. Percentage distribution of respondents in Lagos 
State indicates that 13% strongly agreed and 13% merely agreed that ethnicity affected 
the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state. 17% was however, undecided. 
40% disagreed and 18% strongly disagreed. Contrarily, in Ogun State, 23% of the 
respondents strongly agreed while 40% simply agreed that ethnicity impacted on the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011. 17% 
were however undecided. 10% disagreed and 10% strongly disagreed with the 
conception. An important deduction from this analysis is the fact that while majority of 
the respondents in Lagos State are of the view that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in Lagos State between 1999 and 2011 was not a result of politics of ethnicity, 
in Ogun State however, majority of the respondents affirmed that ethnic politics impacted 
on the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011.  
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5.14: Descriptive Statistics of the Factors Responsible for the Pattern of Legislature-
Executive Relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
 
Lagos State  
 
N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
External Interference  
125 341.00 2.7281 
Influence of political party 
125 168.00 1.3441 
Partisan/factional politics 
125 302.00 2.4120 
Attempts to personalize political authority 
125 217.00 1.7360 
Lack of professionalism and underdeveloped nature of the 
legislators 
125 204.00 1.6320 
Personality /egoistic rivalry 
125 218.00 1.7440 
Corruption/Personal/ parochial advantage lack of transparency 
and accountability 
125 259.00 2.0720 
Godfatherism 
125 233.00         1.8640 
Ethnicity 
125 412.00 3.2960 
Ogun State  
 
N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
External Interference  
121 202.00 1.6719 
Influence of political party 
121 241.00 1.9917 
Partisan/factional politics 
121 229.00 1.8926 
Attempts to personalize political authority 
121 145.00 1.1980 
Lack of professionalism and underdeveloped nature of the 
legislators 
121 293.00 2.4198 
Personality /egoistic rivalry 
121 233.00 1.9240 
Corruption/Personal/ parochial advantage lack of transparency 
and accountability 
121 142.00 1.1707 
Godfatherism 
121 262.00 2.1680 
Ethnicity 
121 197.00 1.6281 
Source: Field Data, 2012 
 
Table 5.14 is the result of the statistical test on the factors responsible for the pattern of 
the legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. The 
test reveals a mean of 3.1280 and 2.7281 on the impact of external interference on 
legislature-executive relations in for Lagos and Ogun States respectively. This indicates 
that external influence affected the pattern of the legislature-executive relations in the two 
states. The result also indicates that the nature of political party in the state affected the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations. This is indicated by a mean of 1.3441 and 
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1.9917 for Lagos and Ogun States respectively. On the impact of partisan or factional 
politics on the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state, the test reveals a 
mean of 2.4120 and 1.8926 for Lagos and Ogun States respectively. This means that 
factional or partisan politics contributed to the pattern of legislature-executive relation in 
the two states. Similarly, the test also signifies that lack of professionalism and 
underdeveloped nature of the legislators affected the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the two states. This is shown by the mean of 1.6320 and 1.1980 for Lagos and 
Ogun States respectively. With the mean values of 1.7440 and 1.9240 for Lagos and 
Ogun States respectively, it is conclusive that personality and egoistic rivalry also 
contributed to the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the two states.  Another 
factor that affected the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States 
is personal interests and corruption among the organs of government. This is shown by 
the mean values of 2.0720 and 1.1707 for both Lagos and Ogun States respectively. 
Godfatherism also contributed to the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the two 
states. This can be seen from the mean of 1.8640 and 2.1680 for Lagos and Ogun States 
respectively. The last factor tested in this study is the impact of ethnicity. The test 
however reveals that while ethnicity was responsible for the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in Ogun State, ethnic politics had little or no impact on the pattern of 
executive-relations in Lagos State. These findings are discussed in detail in the next 
segment. 
  
5.10.7. Discussion of Findings on the Factors Responsible for the Pattern of 
Legislature-Executive Relations in Lagos State between 1999 and 2011 
 
The relationship that exists between the executive and the legislature is largely structured 
by constitutional prerogatives vested in the legislature and the executive (National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), 2000). The constitution sets the powers and limits  of both the 
executive and the legislature and as well determines the interactions that should exist 
between the two powers. In the presidential system of government, there exists a 
separation of the powers of the executive and the legislature in an atmosphere of checks 
and balances.  There are however, numerous informal rules and conventions that equally 
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affect the nature of legislature-executive relations. The findings of the factors responsible 
for the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State include the following;  
 
5.10.7.1. One-Party Hegemony 
Political parties are the connecting link between divers groups of people and government 
and are seen to have tremendous impact on intra-governmental relations in a democratic 
political system. This stems from the fact that the Chief Executive and members of the 
legislature belong to and emanate from political parties. While Nigeria operates a 
multiparty system, there exists a one-party hegemony with one party in control of both 
the government and the State House of Assembly of Lagos State. Lagos State was under 
the control of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) between 1999 and 2003 and Action 
Congress of Nigeria from 2003 and was still in control of the state the year this study was 
conducted. The landslide victory recorded by these political parties in the House of 
Assembly elections in Lagos State invariably put the parties in control of the majority of 
the seats in the legislative assemblies. Ordinarily, where the chief executive‟s (Governor) 
party controls a majority of members of the legislative assembly as the case of Lagos 
State, much of the problems of minority government arising from presidentialism would 
have been overcome as a higher degree of unity and cooperation would have naturally 
been embedded in the party‟s programmes, visions and mission. Thus a high level of 
party loyalty is expected of members of the ruling party in the legislative assembly. Party 
loyalty in which the decisions of the ruling ACN party leadership are expected to be 
acceded to by members in the State Assembly has been of great significance to the 
performance of the Lagos State House of Assembly and its relationship with the 
executive in the State. The analysis of the impact of party loyalty and supremacy on 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos State above supports Lijphart (1999) postulation 
that in a presidential system, the strength and cohesion of the Chief Executive‟s party in 
the legislature will determine his power relative to the legislature. 
 
In addition, the ACN ruling party over depended on the powers of the incumbent 
government. Most of the legislators in the state are therefore, loyal to the Governor and 
the ruling party (ACN) than to the State Assembly and their zealousness to win next 
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election and maintain their positions makes them uncritical of executive policies. The 
ever loyalty of members of the ruling party to the Governor enables the executive to use 
political parties as tools for manipulating the legislature and further reduces the degree of 
independence that the legislators are expected to enjoy. This further reinforces strong 
executive leadership in the state. This situation is in congruence with Derbyshire (1999) 
who averred that increasing party strength has become a major reason for the decline in 
the power of the legislature in relation to that of the executive. 
 
5.10.7.2. Lack of Party Democracy 
Closely related to the above factor is the lack of internal democracy in the AD and ACN 
party that have been controlling the State since 1999. The ACN primary elections were 
often characterized by manipulations and imposition of candidates. Finding revealed that 
as the ACN party leader and the major financier (though unofficial), Tinubu controlled 
the primaries and the selection of candidates for political positions. In this circumstance, 
only candidates considered loyal to him were often compensated with the party 
candidatures to the State House and the National Assembly. For instance, the 2007 
primary ACN election was marred with politics of manipulation and imposition, the 
emergence of Fashola as the AC governorship candidate was riddled with manipulation 
and imposition (Ojedokun, 2010). In the 2011 ACN primaries also, findings revealed that 
Tinubu fielded his wife Remi Tinubu as the party senatorial candidate for Lagos Central, 
his daughter Sade Tinubu for Agege Lagos State House of Assembly, his son in-law 
Oyetunde Ojo for House of Representative and Lola Akande, his sister-in-law for House 
of Assembly. Most members of the State legislature were often hand-picked by the ACN 
leadership.  In the 2011 House of Assembly election, only candidates who would support 
the re-election of Ikuforiji were given the party‟s candidature and members of the party 
were not allowed to vote for candidates of their choice. Consequently, Ikuforiji returned 
unopposed as the Speaker of the 7th Lagos Assembly. As Omoweh (2012) rightly 
observed, a few and rich politicians have captured and privatized the political parties to 
meet their narrow gains, thereby re-orienting the parties away from their basic functions 
of  interest articulation, aggregation and political education. The subversion of internal 
democracy often made the legislature subservient to executive manipulations.   
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5.10.7.3. Attempts by Political Office Holder to Personalize Political Authority 
The attempt by political office holders to personalize political authority is a fundamental 
factor responsible for nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State. This is a 
precarious nature of Nigerian politics in which most of elite perceive that the system 
serves their interests and hence circumvent the democratic system. The attempt to 
personalize political office is observed in Lagos State between 1999 and 2007 in which 
the Governor used his power of incumbency and patronage to suppress and manipulate 
the legislative assembly for personal interests and political ambitions.   
 
 The impact of selfish advantage on legislature-executive relations in Lagos State could 
perhaps also be deduced from a statement in the address of the Executive Governor of the 
State Rhaji Babatunde Fashola at the inauguration of the 7th Lagos State House of 
Assembly. According to him, “Legislative work is a career nurtured by experience and 
passion to serve the common and public good rather than a desire to prosper individual 
interest” (Ajayi, 2011). The desire to prosper individual interests accounts for high level 
of corruption in both arms of government. This is because of the erroneous perception 
that politics and politicking in Nigeria as a whole is an avenue for the pursuit of 
economic gain. The many alleged cases of corruption against the Speaker, Adeyemi 
Ikuforiji and Tinubu by the EFCC and the indictment of the True Face of Nigeria against 
the State government over financial impropriety, all points to the level of corruption in 
Lagos State which also worsened the legislature-executive relations in the State. 
 
5.10.7.4. Lack of Professionalism and Underdeveloped Nature of the Legislators 
Legislative professionalism generally refers to the enhancement of the capacity of the 
legislature to perform its role in the policy-making process with an expertise, seriousness, 
and effort comparable to that of other actors in that process (Mooney, 1994). Legislative 
professionalism influences the behaviour of political actors within and outside of 
legislatures. The degree of legislative professionalism shapes the internal structure and 
composition of a legislature, influences membership diversity and the presence of divided 
government and party composition, membership stability and turnover and contributes to 
the legislative-executive relations (Rosenthal 1998; Ferguson, 2003; Moncrief, Niemi, 
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and Powell 2004; Squire 2007).  One of the factors that determine the level of legislator‟s 
professionalism is availability of infrastructure and the length of legislative working 
experience (King, 2000; National Assembly, 2009).  
 
The problem of inexperience of the legislators is a direct effect of the prolonged absence 
of the legislature in Nigeria‟s political development. The long period of time that the 
military, occupied Nigeria‟s political process, the executive arm functioned alongside a 
castrated judiciary, while the legislature had no place in military government. For almost 
three decades under different military regimes, the legislative institutions in Nigeria 
suffered various forms of subjugation and proscription. In such a situation, the 
legislatures could not but be seriously weakened as institution of governance while on the 
other hand the executive continued to wax stronger. Even when the legislature was 
permitted to exist under schemes of diarchy during the aborted third republic, the organ 
of government remained within the stranglehold of the military rulers who used the 
legislature to create some sense of legitimacy for their administrations (Awotokun, 1998).  
 
Consequently, while the continuity of the executive had enabled it to develop and mature, 
the legislature is often filled with inexperience legislators who sometimes are made up of 
mostly party loyalists and rascality each time the institution was restored after successive 
military rules. The impact of military on legislative underdevelopment is encapsulated by 
Hon Adeyemi Ikuforiji who noted that; 
We all know the truth about the Nigerian democratic setting. The 
legislature in the country is 13 years old, while the executive is as old as 
Nigeria, if we look back to where we started in 1999, it is laughable. We 
have been having the executive arm of government since the 
amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914. The truth of the matter is that a 98 year 
old papa who had been put under the oversight of a 13 years old boy, you 
do not expect the child to carry out his duty without fumbling, stumbling 
or boxing himself to a corner (Obineche, 2012).  
The inertia suffered by the legislative institution of Nigeria during the decades of military 
administration did not only robbed the institution the advantage of experience which is 
the cornerstone of the enviable tradition of legislative effective performance, supremacy 
and significance in the governance of the advanced democracies, but also culminated in 
the absence of legislative culture.  
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The low level of experience by the legislators is one of the major factors responsible for 
the nature of legislature-executive relations in the State. The extent of inexperience in the 
Lagos State House of Assembly especially at the dawn of the Fourth Republic was 
encapsulated by the Speaker of the House - Adeyemi Ikuforiji who noted that; 
The fact is that if we look back to where we started in 1999, you will 
discover that those people who came out to be lawmakers were jobless 
people. Most Nigerians did not believe that the military was going to hand 
over power. Most professionals and business men just stayed back, so a lot 
of job seekers came out as politicians and tried their luck. Those who 
succeeded just became our legislators. Of course they did not have 
anybody to learn from, they started from the beginning and they groped in 
the dark, and when their tenure was up, most didn‟t make it back and the 
learning curve continued for many. So the legislature is in a precarious 
situation more than any arm of government in the country and has many 
curves which are totally different from others (Obiagwu, 2012:1). 
 
The observation made by Ikuforiji is evidenced by the fact that the Lagos State Fourth 
Legislative Assembly (1999 and 2003) had only one returned member from the defunct 
3rd Assembly in the person of Hon. Fabikun Adeniyi Segun from Isolo/Ilasa/Ejigbo 
Constituency but represented Oshodi/Isolo Constituency 11. The implication was that it 
took quite a while for the members of the assembly to acquire legislative skills. There 
was however, an improvement in the Fifth Lagos State Legislative Assembly (2003-
2007) as seventeen (17) members were re-elected while twenty-three (23) members were 
new legislators. In the 2007 elections, the 17 members that re-contested were returned to 
the House, thus the Sixth Legislative Assembly did not witness any change in terms of 
the ratio of returnees to newly elected members. The seventh Lagos State House of 
Assembly which started from June 2011 however, has twenty-two (22) returnees with the 
rest eighteen (18) members newly elected members (Omoleye, 2011). This limited 
experience on the part of the legislature, accounted for the subservience of the State 
House of Assembly to executive apron string in Lagos State.  
 
5.10.7.5.Godfatherism Factor 
The factor of godfatherism also impacted on the nature of legislature-executive relations 
in Lagos State. The legislative arrogance of the 6th and 7th Legislative Assembly of Lagos 
State has its root in politics of godfatherism that brought both Fashola, the Chief 
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Executive of the State and Ikuforiji, the Speaker of the State House of Assembly to power 
in the state. The scuffle between Governor Fashola and the State House of Assembly was 
alleged to have been instigated by the ACN leadership in an attempt to undermine 
Fashola because of the brawl between him (Fashola) and his godfather, former governor 
Tinubu.  The Speaker of the House Adeyemi Ikuforiji was sponsored to ensure that 
Babatunde Fashola was either impeached or that he (Fashola) was denied the second term 
ticket as the state‟s Governor in the 2011 elections. Findings revealed that Ikuforiji was 
used successfully by Tinubu to checkmate Fashola during his first term in office. Ikuforiji 
used every available opportunity including the Town Hall Meetings organized by the 
Lagos State House of Assembly to haunt and harassed the governor (Obasola, 2009). In 
one of the meetings, he lambasted Fashola not to be carried away with the applause he 
was receiving from the public, telling him to concentrate on governance (Ajayi, 2011). 
The politics of godfatherism is attributable to the pattern and character of funding and 
campaign financing. Through this, the godfather is able to control the party and imposed 
anti-democratic whims and caprices evidenced by the imposition of virtually all principal 
officers and candidates for public offices in the party.  
 
5.10.7.6. Personality Clash/Egoistic Rivalry 
Another factor that accounted for the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
State particularly between 2007 and 2012 was personality clash or egoistic rivalry 
between Tinubu and Fashola on one side and between the Speaker- Ikuforiji and Fashola 
on the other hand. Investigation revealed that Tinubu was becoming exasperated over the 
many accolades and praises being showered upon Fashola as the best performing 
governor. These numerous praises was beginning to overshadow the success story of 
Tinubu as a former governor of the State. This led to using the legislators especially those 
loyal to him to attempt at rubbishing the political career of Fashola. The other form of 
personality and egoistic clash was between Ikuforiji the Speaker and Fashola the 
governor.  According to some of our interviewees, the legislators especially the Speaker 
of the House – Ikuforiji still continued to see Fashola as Tinubu‟s Chief of Staff even two 
years after Fashola became the governor of the State and would use every available 
opportunity to lambast him.  
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5.10.8. Discussion of Findings on the Factors Responsible for the Pattern of 
Legislature-Executive Relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
 
Our findings on the major factors responsible for the nature of legislature-executive 
relations in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011 are discussed below. 
 
5.10.8.1. Ethno-religious Politics 
One of the major causes of legislature-executive conflicts in Ogun State was ethnic 
politics. In fact, the crisis centered on the politics of which of the three major ethnic 
groups – Egba, Yewa/Awori and IJebu would produce the governor in 2011 elections. 
The story has been that the Egbas dominated the political affairs of the state and had 
wanted the next governor after Gbenga Daniel in 2011 to come from the ethnic group. 
Along this political thinking therefore, Senator Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello and Speaker Dimeji 
Bankole had plans for the governorship position. Gbenga Daniel on the other hand, was 
scheming to ensure that his successor came from the Yewas/Awori ethnic group. This 
ethnic politics virtually put leaders of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in the 
State and Governor Gbenga Daniel at loggerheads after the 2007 general elections. 
Prominent among those who opposed Daniels plot were the former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Dimeji Bankole, Senator Iyabo 
Obasanjo-Bello, Dr. Doyin Okupe and other eminent citizens of the state, especially 
those from Ogun Central Senatorial zone and the Egbas.  
 
The protracted crisis affected legislature-executive relations in the state as it polarized the 
State House of Assembly along two major groups. One, was a group of fifteen members 
popularly referred to as G15 and the other group made up of eleven members - G11. The 
G 15 was led Speaker Tunji Egbetokun and was antagonistic to Governor Gbenga Daniel. 
The G11 however, comprised of legislators who were sympathetic to the governor.  This 
crisis led to the impeachment of the former Speaker Titi Oseni a pro-Gbenga Daniel 
lawmaker. The G 15 instigated her removal and installed Egbetokun as the Speaker. The 
executive‟s scheming however saw Egbedokun impeached by 9 members of the House 
and installed Coker as the new speaker.  In an environment where access to political 
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position such as the governorship of a state is seen as a means of controlling state 
resources for selfish gains, such political crises would defy all resolution mechanisms. 
Thus, the intervention of the PDP national leadership, prominent traditional rulers in the 
state including the Alake of Egbaland, the Awujale of Ijebuland and others to settle the 
rift achieved no success.  
 
Closely related to the impact of ethnicity on the nature of legislature-executive relations 
in Ogun State is religion factor. Investigations revealed that past governors in the State 
have always been Christians. The Muslims both in the State House of Assembly and as 
well in the State at large therefore wanted a person from the Muslim faith to be the next 
governor of the state after Otunba Gbenga Daniel. Thus Muslim leaders started devising 
means of ensuring that their aspiration was realized and hence started working through 
some members of the State House of Assembly against the incumbent Governor 
 
5.10.8.2. Executive’s interference 
One of the major causes of the polarised legislature-executive conflicts in Ogun State was 
executive‟s interference in the legislative business of the State House of Assembly. The 
interference was instigated by the morbid desire of the Governor to emasculate the state 
legislative assembly. The interference was evidenced in the emergence of Mrs. Titi Oseni 
as the Speaker of the Ogun State House of Assembly in 1999.  Oseni‟s victory against the 
other contender of the position - Mr. Fasiu Bakenne with 19 votes to 7 votes was alleged 
to be a result of intrigues played by the executive of the state (Ogunsakin, 2003). The 
continuous manipulations of the State Assembly by the executive led to a regime change 
which ousted Titi Oseni from the speakership position of the State House. Another case 
of executive interference in the business of the state legislative assembly was the 
impeachment of Egbedokun as the Speaker of the House under a questionable 
circumstance by 9 lawmakers (belonging to the G11) out of the 26 members of the State 
assembly. The presence of heavily armed policemen, men of the State Security Service 
(SSS) at the meeting are suggestive of the governor‟s meddlesomness in the process. The 
continuous interference in the legislative business of the State assembly polarized the 
House into G11 (Governor‟s loyalists) and the G15 (antagonists of Gbenga antics).  
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5.10.8.3. Lack of Party Discipline 
Another major factor for legislature-executive polarization in Ogun State between 2003 
and 2011 was the weak party discipline among the Government party members in the 
Ogun State House of Assembly. Ogun State was under the firm grip of the AD between 
1999 and 2003 and PDP between 2003 and 2011. The landslide victory recorded by PDP 
in the 2003 and 2007 elections in the State invariably put the party in control of both the 
executive and the majority of the seats in the legislative assemblies. Ordinarily, since the 
Governor and the majority members of the Ogun State House of Assembly belonged to 
PDP, much of the problems of minority government arising from presidentialism would 
have been overcome as a higher degree of unity and cooperation would have naturally 
been embedded in the party‟s programmes, visions and mission.  Lack of party discipline 
however, featured prominently among members of the party in the Ogun State legislative 
assembly. One of the fallouts of this was factionalization within the party. As noted by 
Anifowose and Akinbobola (2005), in any human organization, discipline includes the 
means available to group leaders to induce members to act according to rules laid down 
by the leaders. The whole concept of discipline then implies some kind of hierarchical 
relations or chain of command between the group‟s leader and members. Members of the 
government party (PDP) in the Ogun State House of Assembly were however devoid of 
this fundamental cord of party unity.  
 
 Although the ruling PDP was able to secure electoral majorities in the state between 
2003 and 2011, its members lacked party discipline and the party was unable to define a 
strong identity around ideology or programmes. The PDP though firmly controlled 
political activities in Ogun State, its members in the House however, often voted 
differently from the governor‟s positions, and would oppose their party if the 
organizational position differed from their constituents‟ views or personal interests. Thus, 
it was routine for members of the party to cross party lines on a given vote, typically 
following the interests of their, ethnicity, religion or following other members of a 
borderline group within their party. The turbulence within the party system also worked 
against the establishment of strong internal leadership in the state. Despite the feuds in 
PDP in the state, Otunba Gbenga Daniel completed his second tenure. This was possible 
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because, as Guillaud, (2008) noted, in a presidential system, if party members refuse to 
vote inline with the party in the legislature, such action can not necessarily bring down 
the government. 
 
5.10.8.4. Intra-party Conflict 
The internal crisis among the powerful financial and political oligarchs in the Ogun State 
Chapter of PDP are attributable to the pattern and character of legislature-executive 
relations especially between 2003 and 2011 when Ogun State was controlled by PDP. 
Intra-party conflict in the State chapter of PDP started after the 2007 general elections 
when the governor was alleged to have perfected strategies to take over the party 
allegedly to manipulate it to further his political interest ahead of the governorship 
election in 2011. This drew prominent members of the party, specifically, former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, Chief Jubril Martins Kuye, Dr. Doyin Okupe, Chief 
Adebayo Dayo, Brigadier General Tunji Olurin  and other eminent citizens of the state in 
the state into the fray putting virtually leaders of the ruling PDP and Governor Gbenga 
Daniel at loggerheads. In an environment where access to political positions are seen as a 
means of controlling state resources for selfish gains, such political crises would not but 
defied all resolution mechanisms. Thus, intervention of the national leadership of the 
party could not abate the crisis. The crisis of who was the party gubernatorial flag bearer 
fractionalized the Dayo Soremi led executive committee of the party between Chief 
Adebayo Dayo, Chief Jubril Martins Kuye, Prince Buruji Kashamu, Sarafa Tunji Isola 
and Governor Gbenga Daniel. While the Dayo faction was recognised by the Independent 
National Electoral Commission, the PDP headquarters recognised Tunji Olurin. 
Following this Governor Daniel and his followers formed the Peoples Party of Nigeria 
(PPN). Different versions of the party‟s primaries where held with different individuals 
as the party‟s gubernatorial flag bearer. It took the intervention of the judiciary to declare 
the “authentic” party primary and gubernatorial candidates. The inability of the party to 
resolve its internal crisis led to its poor performance in the 2011 elections in the State. 
The failure of PDP in the elections demonstrated the incapability and the internal 
organizational shambles of the party. Right from the party‟s primaries and congresses, 
elections were marred by conflict, divisions, blackmails, violence and litigations. The 
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crisis and factionalisation within the party snowballed to polarization and critical 
divisions within the organs of government especially the State legislative assembly and 
the executive. 
 
5.10.8.5. External Influence 
Another factor that instigated the acrimonious relationship between the executive and the 
legislature in Ogun state was external influence. It was gathered from the interview that 
we conducted that external influence particularly from the ACN leadership who was bent 
on ensuring that the party took over the state in the 2011 elections fueled the legislature-
executive crises in the State. Investigation revealed that the the ACN leadership was 
sponsoring some members of the State Assembly against the Governor as a ploy to 
discredit PDP government in the State.  
 
5.10.9. Implications of the Pattern of the Legislature-Executive Relations on the 
Governance of Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
The focus of this section is the examination of the implications of the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. This 
section draws strength from issues in the previous sections as well as from the interview 
and questionnaire conducted on our respondents. While interviewees were asked to 
explain the impact of the nature of legislature-executive relations during the various 
administrations of the States, with respect to questionnaire, respondents were asked to 
indicate their responses on a number of implications of the nature of legislature-executive 
relations in the States. Table 5.15 shows the frequency distribution of the respondents‟ 
reactions on the subject matter. 
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Table 5.15: Implications of the Pattern of the Legislature- Executive Relations on 
the Governance of Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
 
Lagos State 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree  
Undecided 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Ineffective decision making 
process 
26 21 60 48 2 2 24 19 13 10 
Delays in passage of 
appropriation bills  
24 19 15 12 11 9 24 19 26 21 
Ineffective legislative oversight 45 36 25 20 6 5 33 26 16 13 
Slows down economic activities 
in the State 
25 20 51 41 7 6 23 18 19 15 
Wastage of state resources  21 17 60 48 11 9 7 6 20 16 
Instability 20 16 19 28 3 2 24 50 40 22 
Ethno-cultural rivalry and 
divisions 
2 2 8 6 13 10 85 68 17 14 
Despotic rule 24 19 26 21 11 9 24 19 15 12 
Healthy for democratic 
development in the State 
18 14 31 25 9 7 39 31 28 22 
 
Ogun State 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Undecided 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Ineffective decision making 
process 
57 47 45 37 2 1 7 6 10 8 
Delays in passage of 
appropriation bills  
28  25  7  21  19  
Ineffective legislative oversight 36 30 45 37 1 1 13 11 16 13 
Slows down economic activities 
in the State 
40 34 37 31 2 2 30 25 12 10 
Wastage of state resources  43 36 24 20 7 6 20 17 27 22 
Instability 36 30 42 34 6 5 15 12 22 18 
Ethno-cultural rivalry and 
divisions 
50 41 30 24 8 7 28 23 5 4 
Despotic rule 40 36 30 24 4 3 9 7 17 14 
Healthy for democratic 
development in the State 
18 15 25 20 4 3 28 23 46 38 
Source: Field Reports, 2012 
The percentage distribution of responses on the implication of the pattern of legislature-
executive relations on decision making process of Lagos and Ogun State government is 
illustrated in Table 5.13. The table shows that 21% of the respondents in Lagos State 
strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations between 1999 and 2011 
adversely affected decision making process in the state, 48% merely agreed while 2% 
were undecided. On the other hand, 19% of the respondent disagreed and 10% strongly 
disagreed. Similarly, in Ogun State, 47% of the respondents strongly agreed that the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State between 1999 and 2011 adversely 
affected decision making process in the state. 37% agreed while 1%, undecided. 6% 
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however disagreed and 8% strongly disagreed. Observation of this analysis therefore 
indicates that majority of the respondents in Lagos State and in Ogun State agreed that 
the pattern of legislature-executive relations in these states between 1999 and 2011 
adversely affected decision making process in each of the two states.  
 
Another implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun 
states between 1999 and 2011 surveyed was delay in passage of appropriation bills. 
While 36% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 20% simply agreed that the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 and 2011 caused delays in 
the passage of appropriation bills in the state. 5% were undecided. 26% merely disagreed 
while 13% strongly disagreed. In Ogun State on the other hand, 30% strongly agreed, 
while 37% merely agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations between 1999 
and 2011 in the state caused delays in the passage of appropriation bills within that 
period. 1% however, was undecided. 11% on the other hand, disagreed while 12% 
strongly disagreed. This analysis indicate that majority of the respondents held that the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State and in Ogun State between 1999 
and 2011 affected timely passage of appropriation bills. 
 
In Table 5.15 also, the percentage distribution of respondents on the implication of the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations on legislative oversight in Lagos and Ogun 
States are presented.  The table indicates that in Lagos State, 36% of the respondents 
strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State hindered 
effective legislative oversight in the state. 20% merely agreed while 5%, undecided. 26% 
on the other hand, disagreed and 13%, strongly disagreed. In a similar dimension, 30% of 
the respondents in Ogun State strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in Ogun State hindered effective legislative oversight in the state. 37% merely 
agreed while 1%, undecided. 11% of the respondents however, disagreed and 13% 
strongly disagreed. This illustration implies that majority of the respondents both in 
Lagos and Ogun States agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in each of 
the two states hindered effective legislative oversight in the states. 
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Table 5.13 also contains responses of the respondents in Lagos and Ogun States on the 
implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State between 1999 
and 2011 on the economic activities in the states. In Lagos State, 20% of the respondents 
strongly agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state adversely 
affected economic activities in the state within the period of study. 41% just agreed and 
6% were undecided. 3% however, disagreed and 18% strongly disagreed. Responses in 
Ogun State on the other hand, show that 34% of the respondents strongly agreed and 31% 
simply agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State between 
1999 and 2011 had adverse effects on the economic activities of the state. 2% was 
undecided. 25% of the respondents disagreed and 10% strongly disagreed. An important 
observation on this illustration is the fact that majority of respondents in Lagos and Ogun 
States agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the two states between 
1999 and 2011 had adverse effects on the economic activities in the states. 
 
The percentage response of the respondents on the implication of the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in Lagos State and Ogun State on the states‟ resources is 
illustrated in the Table5.13. In the table, 17% of the respondents in Lagos State strongly 
agreed and 48% simply agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the 
state between 1999 and 2011 encouraged wastages of the state resources. 9% were 
undecided. On the contrary, 6% of the respondents disagreed and 16% strongly 
disagreed. In Ogun State, however, 43% strongly agreed and 20% merely agreed that the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 encouraged 
wastages of the State resources within that period. 6% were however, undecided. 
Contrarily, 17% disagreed and 22% strongly disagreed. This analysis indicate that 
majority of the respondents agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in 
Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 encouraged wastage of resources in the 
two states. 
 
The percentage distribution of the respondents in Lagos and Ogun States on the 
implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the states between 1999 and 
2011 on the political stability of the two states is depicted in Table 5.15. The table reveals 
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that 16% of the respondents in Lagos State strongly agreed and 19% merely agreed that 
the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 caused 
political instability in the state. 2% were undecided. 50% on the other hand, disagreed 
while 22% strongly disagreed. In Ogun State, 30% of the respondents strongly agreed 
that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 had 
adverse effects on the political stability of the state. 34% merely agreed while 5% were 
undecided.12% however, disagreed while 18% strongly disagreed. A pertinent 
observation in this analysis is that while majority of the respondents in Lagos State 
disagreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 
2011 encouraged wastages of the state resources within the period, on the contrary, 
majority of the respondents in Ogun State agreed that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 encouraged wastage of the state resources 
within the period of study.   
 
Table5.13 also shows the percentage distribution of responses from the respondents on 
whether the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 
1999 and 2011 provoked ethno-cultural rivalry and divisions in the two states. It is seen 
in the table that 2% of the respondents in Lagos State agreed that the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 provoked ethno-
cultural rivalry and divisions in the state.  6% simply agreed while 10% were indifferent.  
68% merely disagreed and 14% strongly disagreed that the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 provoked ethno-cultural rivalry 
and divisions in the state. Responses from Ogun State however, took a different 
dimension. In the state, 41% of the respondents strongly agreed that the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in the state between 1999 and 2011 provoked ethno-
cultural rivalry and divisions in the state while 24% merely agreed. 7% were however, 
undecided. 23% of the respondents disagreed and 4% strongly disagreed. It is seen from 
this analysis, that while majority of the respondents in Lagos State objected that the 
pattern of legislature-executive relations in the state encouraged ethno-cultural divisions 
within the state, respondents in Ogun state held a contrary idea. The analysis shows that 
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majority of the respondents in the state agree that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the state encouraged ethno-cultural rivalry and divisions in the state. 
 
Table 5.15 also illustrates the percentage distribution on whether or not the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations encouraged despotic rule in Lagos and Ogun State between 
1999 and 2011. In Lagos State, 19% of the respondents strongly agreed that the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in the state encouraged despotic rule between 1999 and 
2011. 21% merely agreed while 9%, undecided. On the contrary, 19% disagreed and 12% 
strongly disagreed. In Ogun State on the other hand, 36% strongly agreed that the pattern 
of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State encouraged despotic rule between 1999 
and 2011. 24% merely agreed while 3% were undecided. 7% however, disagreed and 
14% strongly disagreed. 
 
With respect to the implication of the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
and Ogun States on the democratic development of the two states, Table 5.13 indicates 
that 14% of the respondents strongly agreed that the pattern was healthy for the 
democratic development of Lagos state between 1999 and 2011 and 25% merely agree. 
7% were however indifferent. 31% disagreed while 22% strongly disagreed. In Ogun 
State however, a total of 15% of the respondents strongly agreed that the pattern of 
legislature-executive relations in the state was healthy for the democratic development of 
the state while 20% simply agreed.  3% of the respondents were indifferent.  23% 
disagreed and 38% strongly disagreed that that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations in the state was healthy for the democratic development of the state between 
1999 and 2011.  It is observed from this analysis that majority of respondents in Lagos 
and Ogun States disagreed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the states 
was healthy for the democratic development of the states.   
 
Table 5.16 below shows the descriptive statistical test result of the implications of the 
nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos State and Ogun State.  
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Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics on the Implications of the Nature of the 
Legislature-Executive Relations on the Governance of Lagos and Ogun States 
between 1999 and 2011 
 
Lagos State  N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Ineffective decision making process 
125 272.00 2.1760 
Delays in passage of appropriation bills  
125 439.00 3.5081 
Ineffective legislative oversight 
125 228.00 1.8273 
Slows down economic activities in the State 
125 302.00 2.4160 
Wastages of State resources  
125 165.00 1.3201 
Instability 
125 310.00 2.4760 
Ethno-cultural rivalry and divisions 
125 343.00 2.7440 
Despotic rule 
125 267.00 2.394 
Healthy for democratic development in the State 
125 262.00 2.9601 
Ogun State  N Sum Mean 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
ineffective in decision making process  
121 198.00 1.5868 
Delays in passage of appropriation bills  
121 242.00 2.0000 
Ineffective legislative oversight 
121  1.8676 
Slows down economic activities in the State 
121 251.00 2.0760 
Wastages of State resources  
121 222.00 1.8314 
Instability 
121 382.00 1. 7015 
Ethno-cultural rivalry and divisions 
121 206.00 2.6446 
Despotic rule 
121 237.00 1.9578 
Healthy for democratic development in the State 
121 354.00 2.9231 
Source: Field Data, 2012 
  
The data in Table 5.16 is the statistical test result of the implications of the implications 
of the pattern of the legislature-executive relations on the governance of Lagos and Ogun 
States between 1999 and 2011. The test reveals that the pattern of legislature-executive 
relations the two states had a negative consequences on the decision making process in 
the states. This is revealed by mean values of 2.1760 and 1.5868 for Lagos and Ogun 
States respectively. While the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State 
delayed the process of passing bills to law, the reverse was the case in Lagos State. This 
is depicted by the value of 3.5081 and 2.000 respectively. Another implication of the 
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pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States is ineffective 
legislative oversight. This depicted by 1.8273 and 1.8676 mean value for the two states. 
The result also showed that the pattern of legislature-executive relations slowed down 
economic activities in Ogun. The mean value as indicated by a mean of 2.4160 and 
2.0760 for Lagos and Ogun States respectively. Another major implication of the pattern 
of legislature-executive relations in both states is wastages of state‟s resources. This 
conclusion is drawn from the mean value of 1.3202 for Lagos State and 1.8314 for Ogun 
State. Similarly, political instability is another consequence of the pattern of legislature-
executive relations in both Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011. This can be 
seen from the mean value for the two states in Table 5.16. The table shows a mean of 
2.4760 for Lagos State and 1.7015 for Ogun State.  
 
While the pattern of legislature-executive relations has no implication on ethnic divisions 
in Lagos State as indicated by the mean of 2.7440, in Ogun State however, the test result 
of a mean of 2.1446 shows that the pattern of legislature-executive relations had great 
consequence for ethno-cultural rivalry and divisions for the State. The result however 
accepted that the pattern of the relationship between the executive and the legislature 
during the period of study (1999 -2012) created despotic rule in the two states. Finally, on 
whether the pattern of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States was 
healthy for Nigeria‟s presidential system, Lagos State reveal a mean of 2.9601while 
Ogun State, 2.9231. This indicates that the pattern of the relationship in both states was 
not healthy for Nigeria‟s presidential system. The findings above are discussed in detail 
in the next segment. 
 
5.10.10. Discussion of Findings on the Implications of the Pattern of Legislature-
Executive Relations in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 
 
Decision making in the presidential democracy is designed to be the concerted efforts of 
the executive and the legislature. While policy decisions are in most cases, initiated in the 
form of bills by the executive, the legislature, as the people‟s representative, thoroughly 
debates and approves such initiatives and through that process, brings the interests of the 
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people to bear on the decisions and policies of the government. Lagos and Ogun States 
however, witnessed excessive executive interference, domination and hegemony in 
decision making process between 1999 and 2011. The legislative assemblies in these two 
states operated mostly as mere rubber stamp assemblies. The lack of adequate capacity 
and level playing field for the legislative assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States to 
substantially impact on the policies of government had the tendency of subverting 
democratic governance in the States.  
 
The development, delibration and passage of appropriation bills involve joint 
participation by the executive and the legislature. While the executive dominates the 
budgetary process, the legislature exerts its influence through debates and amendment 
process. As noted by NDI (2000), this process represents vital checks and balances in 
modern democracy. Conversely, the presence of strong and domineering executive vis-a-
viz weak legislative institutions in the states during the periods under study hindered the 
fundamental requirement of legislative influence on appropriation bills in a democratic 
environment.  
 
Furthermore, the Governors‟ nominees for political appointment in the States were in 
most cases, not subjected to thorough scrutiny before approval. In this situation, 
miscreants and party faithfuls were in most cases appointed into governmental positions 
with no regards to merit and competence of the nominees. This practice portends great 
consequences for effective governance in the State. Moreso, the role of opposition party 
in the legislature which would have served as a watchdog through constructive criticisms 
of the policies and programmes of the ruling party was eroded. This factor has 
implication of turning the legislature to a mere rubber stamp and a clearing house for 
decisions made elsewhere which could be precarious for the representativeness of the 
people in governance.  Under these circumstances of no balance of power between the 
executive and the legislature, but largely exclusive rule by the executive, Lagos and Ogun 
States within the period under study had the tendency of operating largely under despotic 
rule. 
291 
 
The nature of legislature-executive relations in the two states under studies also had 
implications on the oversight functions of the legislature. The legislative assemblies in 
the two states obviously appeared lacking in capacity and political will to perform their 
oversight function over the sophisticated and and domineering executive. Thus, activities 
of governments and the implementation of policies and programmes in the states during 
that period were often not investigated to ascertain the extent to which they complied 
with the legislatures‟ approval and represented the peoples‟ interests. Executive 
subjugation incarcerated the legislature and hence hindered it from effectively performing 
its oversight function through scrutiny and investigations. Since the strength of a 
democracy declines dramatically when the executive branches excessively dominates the 
legislature (NDI, 2000), democratic governance in both Lagos and Ogun States within the 
period under study was very weak because the governments in both States operated 
largely with legislative institutions that lacked the capacity to effectively influence policy 
and oversee the executive. 
 
The acrimonious legislature-executive relations delayed decision making processes. 
During the period of legislature-executive fluid in Ogun State, so many bills were 
delayed. For instance, the self-accounting law No. 5 of 2003, law on the autonomy of the 
legislative arm, and the law on Ogun Border Communities Commission formulated to 
protect some communities in Yewa part of the state from incessant incursion of Fulani 
cattle rearers were passed but not implemented by the government. Appropriation bills 
also suffered delay before passage. As earlier documented in this work, at some point, 
Nine (9) members belong to G11 of the Ogun State House of Assembly had to break into 
the Legislative Assembly Complex that was proscribed by the Federal Government and 
passed the appropriation bill including some other bills that were pending on the floor as 
a result of the legislature-executive acrimony. Similarly, as earlier reported in this study, 
approval process of the Lagos State 2009 appropration bill suffered unwarranted delay 
due to the frosty relationship between Fashola and the State Assembly during that period. 
It is very germane to state that delay in policy decision making process has the 
consequence of subverting the very essence of adopting presidential system in Nigeria 
which is dispatch in policy decisions by a single executive.  
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Besides, delay in the passage of appropriation bills also had implications on slowing 
down economic activities in the states. For an economy largely driven by public sector 
spending, delay in the passage of government appropriations would definitely have great 
consequences on economic planning and activities of both private and public sector 
organisations. 
 
Acrimonious relationship between both arms particularly in Lagos State during Fashola‟s 
administration and Ogun State under Governor Gbenga Daniel had implications on the 
quality of decisions in the States. Because of the acrimony, very little time was spent on 
the nitty-gritty of law making. Bills were not thoroughly debated by the legislature before 
passage into laws. In fact, as previously reported in this study, Ogun State Assembly 
suffered almost a year proscription by the Federal Government due to the acrimonious 
legislature-executive relations in the State. Similarly, in Lagos State, the inability of the 
State legislature to really devote time for their fundamental aasignment of legislation is 
evidenced in the statement by Justice Habeeb Abiru when he stopped the State Assembly 
from probing the Governor. According to him the actions of the lawmakers amounted to 
mere wasting of the tax-payers‟ money and the time meant to be used for making laws for 
the good people of Lagos (Akpeh, 2010). The great consequence of the legislature-
executive hostile relationship is poor decisions and the policies of government in the two 
states between 1999 and 2011. 
 
The loss of the State legislature‟s oversight power to the overwhelming influence of the 
executive also manifested in the inability of the legislature to conduct investigations into 
the management of public funds by the government of Lagos and Ogun State. For 
instance, in November 2000, the Lagos State Government appointed Alpha-Beta 
Consulting Limited, a firm in which the governor of the state is a director, as the sole 
agent to control and monitor the collection of State revenue with the total commission of 
10 % paid to the revenue consultants. According to the World Bank Report (2007) this 
cost of the government's revenue collection as a percentage of the total revenue, is 
exorbitantly on the high side. The report also noted some important deviations of actual 
expenditure from the budget approved by the State House of Assembly especially for 
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capital expenditures. All these financial actions of the government could not be check-
mated by the State Assembly.  
 
There are various cases and allegations of corrupt charges by the EFCC on the past 
governments in each of the two states. Such cases of corrupt practice in Ogun State 
include using the state funds by the Governor for personal projects such as expending a 
whopping sum of four million (N4, 000,000.00) to eight million naira (N8, 000,000.00) 
every three months for the school fees of his children he relocated from Atlantic Hall, 
Nigeria to Caterham School, Surrey, England soon after he became governor in 2003 
(Akomah, 2011). Other financial inproprieties of the Gbenga Daniel include among 
others, building of exotic private houses in Ijebu Ode, Shagamu (nicked named 
Buckingham Palace), Abeokuta and Maryland, Lagos, acquisition of an eight bedroom 
mansion named GAITERS located in Bishop Walk, Croydon CRO 5BA Croydon. It was 
alleged that the mansion which he acquired on December 17, 2004, cost a princely sum 
of over three million pounds (₤3,000,000.00 or N729, 000,000.00) to acquire and furnish 
(Elendu, 2006; Akinrefon, 2012). Furthermore, the  report of the five-member Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry on Lands submitted to Ogun State Government on 18th January 
2012 reveled that Otunba Gbenga Daniel fraudulently acquired several government lands 
including the land on which he built the church in honour of his father, the Most Rev. 
Abraham Adebola Daniel (Ogun State Government, 2012). Otunba Gbenga also sold 
three state-owned hotels, popularly called Gateway Hotels, located in different towns in 
the state without following due process. The Ogun State House of Assembly described 
the sales of the hotels as illegal and not in the interest of the state (Akomah, 2011).  
 
According to the report released by Saturday Punch on August 4, 2012, Lagos and Ogun 
States are among the most indebted states in the country. Lagos topped the list of external 
debtors with $517,677,672 as of June 30, 2012 while Ogun State is the fourth with 
$96,285.547 as of June 30, 2012. These external debts especially in Ogun State, were 
said to be inherited from past administration (Saturday Punch, 2012). The Governor of 
Ogun State, Ibikunle Amosun had also alleged that the past administration of Gbenga 
Daniel had plunged Ogun State to a debt burden totalling N87 billion.   
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The analysis above indicated the extent of corruption permitted by lack of effective 
legislative oversight on the government in Lagos and Ogun State particularly, the 
administrations of Bola Tinubu and Gbenga Daniel. The analysis also demonstrated the 
concomitance of the inability of the legislatures to perform their oversight role on 
wastages and economic mismanagement in the two states. Lastly, it demonstrated what 
the the nature of legislature-executive relations in the two States portend for high cost of 
governance. 
 
Another major consequence of the nature of legislature-executive relations in Ogun State, 
especially between 2007 and 2011 was ethno-religious rivalry which threatened the very 
unity of the once peaceful State. Rather than fostering the unity of the various groups and 
sections in the State, legislature-executive relations in the state tended to divide the 
people along ethno-cultural and religious lines. Members of the State House Assembly 
and prominent politicians in the state who were drawn into the fray seemed to take the 
tone of ethnic politics between the Ogun Central Senatorial zone and the Egbas on one 
side and the Ijebu/Remo and Yewas/Awori of Ogun East Senatorial zone on the other.  
 
The acrimonious relationship between the executive and the legislative in Ogun State 
however went beyond mere physical conflict and transcended to blackmails and 
diabolical practices such as blood oath taking. It was alleged that the G 15 members of 
the House of Assembly had to take a blood oath at a shrine in Ijebu-Igbo to ensure a 
united front against Governor Gbenga Daniel. It was alleged that each participant 
submitted to the death of their first born, should they renege on the prescribed course of 
opposition against the Governor. The oath was said to have been sponsored by some 
politicians including the father of a prominent politician in Abuja, a Senator, a former 
South-West governor, a former minister and another prominent politician in Ogun State 
(Nigerian Compass, 29/6/09). In a counter allegation however, Mr. Wale Alausa 
representing Ijebu-Ode State Constituency, whose nude picture appeared in the Nigerian 
Compass newspaper, admitted swearing to an oath but alleged it was under the 
intimidation and threat of Governor Gbenga Daniel to him and his father - Agboola 
Alausa, the chairman of the Ogun East senatorial district of the PDP. According to the 
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allegation, the governor had mounted pressure on him to renounce his membership of the 
G-15 since it was contrary to the oath he earlier took. According to the report, most 
government officials, council chairmen, all the members of the Fifth Legislative House 
and other political appointees also took the secret oath of allegiance to Governor Daniel 
(Ogunbayo, 2009). It is important to note that such diabolical practice portends great 
danger for nation building and was capable of destroying democratic practice. 
 
Political disorder, lawlessness, intimidation, instability and security breakdown constitute 
another consequence of the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun 
States. In Ogun State for instance, a substantial part of the second tenure of Gbenga 
Daniel‟s administration operated without a legislature following the closure of the House 
of Assembly on September 7, 2010 by the Presidency over altercations between two 
factions, the Group of 11 and Group of 15, which led to a fracas on the floor of the House 
as members from the two camps in the State Assembly engaged in open and physical 
assaults during which some of them were critically injured. In a various disturbing 
avowal for instance, Oba Michael Sonariwo, Akarigbo of Remo was quoted in the 
Vanguard Newspaper of August 6, 2008, to have stated that if lawmakers in Ogun State 
would not stop causing trouble for the governor, he would not hesitate to call on the 
people of the state to lynch them. It is important to note that such statement coming from 
an eminent traditional ruler is a threat to live and stability of the State. 
 
The overbearing executive pattern of executive legislative relations in Lagos and Ogun 
States created political instability.  In fact, executive meddlesomeness in the business of 
the legislature led to the instability in the leadership of of the legislative assemblies of the 
two States previously reported in this study. Executive manipulations did not only caused 
instability in the two states, but also reduced the Governors particularly Tinubu in Lagos 
State and Gbenga Daniel in Ogun State to a near-absolute and arbitrary ruler. 
 
5.11. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos 
and Ogun States. Specifically, we have observed the extent of legislative independence in 
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the two states. We have also investigated the contending issues in the legislature-
executive relations and the various factors that instigated the nature of the relationship. 
The implications of such relationship in the governance of Lagos and Ogun States have 
also been analysed. It is noted that the ability of any democratic government to deliver 
the concrete benefits of good governance to the citizens is determined by the smooth 
functioning of the executive and the legislative institutions of governance in an 
environment devoid of arbitrariness, tyranny and recklessness. This is affirmed by the 
principle of separation of the powers which constitute the basic features of the 
presidential system that Nigeria adopted following the promulgation of the 1979 
Constitution of Nigeria. As averred by Appadorai (1975), such separation is necessary for 
the purpose of preserving the liberty of the individuals and for avoiding tyranny, since no 
one of arm of government is to have controlling power over the other.  
 
The analysis of the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States 
between 1999 and 2012 however, has largely been that of over-bearing and reckless 
executive arm which, with the state resources at its disposal meddled with the internal 
business of the states legislative assemblies for the purpose of manipulating them for 
political and selfish ambitions. The legislative institutions on the other hand appeared not 
too sure of its place and relevance in democratic governance. Attempt by the legislature 
to untie itself from the whims and caprices of the executive often resulted to legislature-
executive conflicts. While the constitution is explicit on the power relations between the 
executive and the legislature, various socio-political and economic factors mutually 
determine the nature of legislature-executive relations in Lagos and Ogun States of 
Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Summary 
The focus of this study is the anatomy of legislature-executive relations in the 
presidential system of government with particular reference to Lagos and Ogun States, 
Nigeria. The study therefore, investigates the extent to which the legislatures in Lagos 
and Ogun States were able to perform their constitutional functions independent of 
executive‟s interference. It examines the pattern of legislature-executive relations in the 
two states from 1999 to 2011 and interrogates factors responsible for such experience. 
Furthermore, the implications of the pattern of the relationship were examined with a 
view to proffer solutions for healthy legislature-executive relations in the two states. To 
this end, the study was divided into six (6) chapters. 
 
It was observed in the first chapter that Nigeria at the dawn of independence opted for 
parliamentary constitutional structure in which the executive and the legislature were 
fused both in powers and in personnel. The executive was part of, and derived its power 
from, being included in the legislature. This system was however, regarded as 
confrontational and conflict generating as the Prime Minister shared power with the 
President and there was no complete separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature, hence, the system was exposed to instability and consequently led to the 
collapse of the First Republic. The restoration of civil rule in 1979 after decade of 
military dictatorship saw the adoption of another system of government predicated on a 
presidential single executive system of democratic governance. In this new system, there 
is a clear separation between the executive and the legislature with each deriving their 
legitimacy from electorate‟s mandate and from the constitution. Neither is any organ of 
government superior nor subordinate to the other. Each organ is therefore, independent 
within its own sphere of influence though in an environment of checks and balances. For 
the purpose of government however, these two institutions of government are expected to 
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operate in an atmosphere of cordial relationship. Various viewpoints have however, been 
expressed on the nature of legislature-executive relations in the presidential system, as to 
whether confrontational or cordial, by virtue of its institutional framework of separate 
origin and survival of the executive and the legislature. Different views also permeate 
literature on the implications of the nature (cooperative or conflictual) of the relationship 
on governance. Against the backdrop of this therefore, certain questions were raised in 
order to determine the nature and implications of the pattern of relationship between the 
executive and the legislature in the presidential system. Lagos and Ogun States of 
Nigeria‟s presidential system were chosen as testing ground for the issues raised. 
 
A review of extant literature was extensively carried out using a thematic approach in 
chapter two of the study. The essence is to situate the study in proper context and to 
create a bond between it and related previous studies and as well to identify gaps in 
knowledge with respect to the study of the subject matter and to appropriately intervene 
by providing the missing link and by updating and contributing to the existing body of 
knowledge in the field. The review gave us insight into political institutions, forms, 
model and operations of government and other issues that are relevant to the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature in a presidential political system. Attempt was 
also made to situate the study within an appropriate theoretical framework. In the light of 
this, the study observed from the previous studies on legislature-executive relations, a 
consistent exemplification of the formal institutional structure of legislature-executive 
relations by researchers while the informal structure and its implications have largely 
been neglected over the years. The need for an understanding of the extent to which 
institutional designs determine legislature-executive relations in the face of informal 
practices therefore, calls for a more in-depth and holistic study of legislature-executive 
relations. This is with a view to determining the degree to which both institutional and 
informal factors largely insinuated by Nigeria‟s socio-political and economic 
environments, uniquely and correlates to, influence legislature-executive relations.  
 
Chapter three took a theoretical examination of legislature-executive relations in a 
presidential structure of government with the purpose of ascertaining how presidential 
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institutional factors shape legislature-executive relations. It observed that institutional 
arrangement of separate origin and survival of executive and legislative branches portend 
implications for legislature-executive relations in a presidential system. Thus in a 
presidential system of government, the terms of both the legislature and the executive are 
fixed and are not contingent on mutual confidence. The President and the legislature have 
their own electoral mandates, being separately elected, thus, a system of mutual 
independence of the executive and the legislature. Case study analyses of legislature-
executive relations in the presidential model of government across the globe revealed that 
the characteristic separate origin and survival of the executive and the legislature in the 
presidential system insinuates a mutual interdependence between the two branches of 
government. The system of checks and balance at the face of separation of powers 
escalated by party fragmentation, a concomitant of multipartism, that characterize a 
presidential system of government however, often create deadlock and gridlock between 
the legislature and the executive. In the face of this therefore, the Chief Executive would 
have to seek for paraconstitutional means of getting legislation in the parliament passed 
in favour of his preference. This makes the presidential system to behave like 
parliamentary system. The ability of the executive to do this is enhanced by his power to 
distribute pork. This scenario is common among the various countries that operate 
presidential form of government.  
 
The origin and development of the executive and the legislative institutions in Nigeria is 
the focus of chapter four. The origin and nature of Nigeria‟s Presidential System with 
reference to the powers of the executive and the legislature was also examined. In 
addition, the chapter examined the nature of legislature-executive relations in the 
Nigeria‟s presidential system beginning from the Second Republic when the constitution 
of the country was first drafted in favour of presidentialism. It observed that the roles of 
the executive and legislative institutions of governance are established to complement 
each other under the presidential constitutions of Nigeria. The presidential practice since 
its adoption in the country however, continued to witness legislature-executive gridlocks, 
deadlocks and stalemates over important policy issues. The legislative institution of 
Nigeria is adjudged to have been unable to adequately perform its constitutional roles in 
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the face of executive dominance in the Nigeria‟s presidential model. Recent performance 
of the legislature of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria however, gives a glimmer of hope for 
sustainable democracy in the country as a gradual decline in executive dominance in 
Nigeria is discernable.  
 
The data gathered from the field on the extent to which the legislatures in Lagos and 
Ogun States were independent of the executive‟s meddlesomeness in performing their 
constitutional functions, the pattern of legislature-executive relations, the factors 
responsible for such pattern of relationship and the implications on governance in the two 
states were presented and analysed in chapter five. One striking findings of this research 
is that though constitutional prerogative defines the nature and character of the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States of 
Nigeria‟s presidential system, such formal prerogative is at the mercy of the socio-
political and economic dynamics of the states. 
 
Findings revealed that the continued interference by the executive in the legislative 
process of the House of Assemblies in both Lagos and Ogun States weakened the ability 
of the legislative bodies to effectively perform their fundamental roles of citizens‟ 
representatives through legislation and oversight functions. The cordial legislature-
executive relationship in Lagos was propelled by overbearing executive with the ability, 
through access to the state resources for patronage politics, to perpetually subjugate the 
legislature under its whims and caprices and thus reduced it to a rubber stamp assembly 
for conferring the legitimacy required to function in a democratic environment. The 
cordial relationship however, became strained under a new administration following a 
resources distribution that was no longer mutually satisfactory to both parties. The 
concomitance of the strain was legislature-executive gridlock that was based not on the 
legislative assertiveness of its representational role in governance. Findings also revealed 
the extent to which the politics of godfatherism, in an atmosphere of party politics that 
lack internal democracy, have exerted pressure and strains on the executive and the 
legislative institutions of governance, hence threatened the basic underlies of the 
presidential political system.  
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The relationship between the executive and the legislature in Ogun State on the other 
hand, revealed a struggle for legislative independence in an environment of executive 
despotism.  The resultant acrimonious relationship soon turned farcically diabolic such 
that was capable of destroying the very essence of governance as an apparatus for 
inducing peaceful, orderly society that guarantees security of live. Finding also revealed a 
case of the impact of external force of ethnicity and intra-party conflicts that resulted 
from the State Chapter of the PDP leaders‟ strive for political power, control and 
governance in the state, which injected into the body politics of Ogun State and infuriated 
the legislature-executive polarization in the state.  
 
Another major finding of this study is the systematic and gradual paradigm shift from the 
culture of overbearing executive especially in Lagos State to legislative omnipotence. 
The seemingly emerging legislative assembly now feels it must be oiled very well by any 
executive that wants to have smooth sales in Office. 
 
6.2. Policy Recommendations 
Financial autonomy is pivotal to legislative independence. Financial autonomy will be 
achieved through the implementation of the Self Accounting Law that have been passed 
by both Lagos State and Ogun State but which the State Government have not 
implemented. Implementation of the law will insulate the State House of Assembly in 
Lagos and Ogun States from the financial apron string of the Executive. The State 
Government in Lagos and Ogun should therefore, implement the Self Accounting Law 
without any further delay. 
 
The bill by the National Assembly to alter the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria to provide for 
financial autonomy of the State House of Assembly in the country is a good step in the 
right direction. The amendment will allow the funding of the State House of Assembly in 
the federation to be charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The first attempt at 
passing the bill by the National Assembly was halted by the inability to monster the 
support of two-third (2/3) of the State House of Assemblies in the Federation. The bill 
309 
 
has however, passed the second reading as at May, 2012. A joint session of all members 
of the House of Assemblies in the Federation should therefore, be conveyed to properly 
sensitize them with the need for financial autonomy for the legislature. The passage 
process should also be hastened to guarantee the constitutional financial autonomy of 
State House of Assembly in the country like the National Assembly. 
The most important means by which the legislature effectively and efficiently carries out 
its statutory oversight functions of supervising and scrutinizing the activities of the 
executive is the committee system. The capacity of the House Committees especially 
those with direct responsibility for oversight and accountability should therefore, be 
strengthened both in term of infrastructure and staff capacity building. The first step to 
this is to implement without further delay, the Service Commission Law by the 
government of Lagos and Ogun States. 
The Lagos State Town Hall Meetings serve as a veritable avenue for public participation 
in law making process by way of public hearing. Unfortunately however, this avenue was 
only a medium of intimidation and expression of grievances between the legislature and 
the executive in the State. A similar instance occurred in Ogun State when the State 
Assembly called Governor Gbenga Daniel to public debate on his proposed N100 million 
bond from the capital market. Gbenga Daniel however, did not turn up for the debate.  
The public can be involved in decison process involving passage of bills by way of public 
hearing. A periodic public hearing assembly should therefore, be established in Lagos 
and Ogun States solely for the purpose of engaging the general public in decision making 
process of the assembly.  
 
The constitution in Nigeria‟s context, is not a static but dynamic instrument of 
governance. Its application is subject to judicial interpretation, formal amendments, 
custom and usage which help to ensure flexibility in the changing and dynamic society. 
While the power of the State House of Assembly to approve appropriation bill is 
explicitly guaranteed by the constitution, the extent to which the House can unilaterally 
alter the estimate without consultation with the executive was the contending issue 
between the executive and the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States. The constitution 
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should therefore be amended to explicitly specify the expectations of both the executive 
and the legislature as regards legislative review of appropriation bill. 
 
The role of opposition party in the State House of Assembly is imperative to effective 
legislative oversight. The constructive criticisms of the opposition lawmakers enhance 
quality decisions of the legislative assembly. The scope of the opposition lawmakers 
should therefore, be widened by making members of the opposition parties automatic 
heads of committees responsible for investigation and oversight roles of the House of 
Assembly. 
 
The need for internal democracy among political parties in the states particularly the 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) being the ruling party in Lagos and Ogun States, is 
very germane to legislature-executive harmony in the presidential system of Nigeria.  The 
idea of imposition of candidates is not only inimical to democratic principles but capable 
of exasperating political crisis among the institutions of governance as was observed in 
Lagos State. To this end therefore, political parties should as a matter of policy, practise 
internal democracy in the process of fielding candidates for political positions. The 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should mandate political parties to, 
as a matter of urgency, institutionalize a guideline to be approved by the electoral body, 
for the operations and procedures for practising internal democracy. 
 
While the Lagos and the Ogun States House of Assemblies do go on excursion 
programmes and organize workshop for the purpose of acquiring legislative skills, such 
exercises are often done with a mindset devoid of business-like approach. A more 
rigorous town and gown, with academic institutions, exercise should be institutionalized. 
Therefore, a compulsorily state legislature-funded annual two-week rigorous training and 
refresher programme for the legislators should be established in collaboration with 
Universities within and around Lagos and Ogun States.  
 
Another recommendation is the presence of an empowered civil society that can demand 
that the executive always govern according to constitutional stipulations. Government 
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should partner with civil society organisations to embark on aggressive awareness and 
enlightenment campaign towards enlightening the general public on the need for public 
vigilance on the activities of government and their power as constituents to recall their 
representatives adjudged to be non-performing in the State Assembly.  
 
A mechanism for mediating between party members in the executive and the legislature 
should be instituted by political parties in Nigeria. Such mechanism should be 
constitutionally supreme over its members. Such mechanism must be able to legally 
mediate between party members in the legislative assembly and must be able to sanction 
such members whose activities in government are capable of breeding acrimony. 
However, such mechanism will have influential control over members in the legislature 
only if deflection from one party to another by members of the House is prohibited. Any 
serving member of the House who may wish to leave the party on which platform he or 
she was elected into the House should have his seat in the House vacated and then be 
subjected to competitive election. 
 
It is significant that both the executive and the legislature see their roles as mutually 
supportive. A separation of powers though, exists between the two organs, each needs the 
other to function properly. Thus a harmonious working relationship is the ideal that both 
should aspire and pursue.  
 
Political parties should be based on well defined ideology and concrete manifesto. These 
should be explicitly spelt out for members seeking for political position and which must 
be the legal compass for their actions in political offices. This will help both the 
executive and the legislature to pursue a joint agenda when elected.  
 
6.3. Conclusion 
The relationship between the legislature and the executive in the presidential system 
adopted in Nigeria is premised on separation of the powers, functions and personnel of 
the executive and the legislature under a mechanism of checks and balances. Following 
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the return to civil rule in 1999, the powers and functions of these organs are explicitly 
stated in the Nigeria‟s 1999 Constitution (Section 4 and 5).  
 
The success of the presidential system however, depends on healthy legislature-executive 
interactions predicated upon democratic ethos. While the institutional designs and legal 
frameworks of presidentialism make friction between the legislature and the executive 
inevitable, inter-branch conflicts can be healthy for democratic consolidation if such 
emanate from the attempt by each organ to assert its functions and position within the 
constitutional framework of government. Conversely, the political landscape of Lagos 
and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 revealed a political culture of personal 
aggrandizement, patronage, and political clientelism. This political culture continued to 
condition the character of the relationship between the legislature and the executive in a 
manner that is not only injurious to democratic consolidation, but also treacherous to 
political development. 
 
The realisation of democratic governance in the presidential system is determined by the 
extent to which the legislature independently and vibrantly performs its pivotal role of 
citizens‟ representation through legislation and oversight. The health of democracy 
declines when the level playing ground and the capacity for the legislature to effectively 
influence policy and oversee the executive are lacking. Executive‟s domination and 
meddlesomeness in the legislative processes and constitutional functions of the legislative 
assemblies in Lagos and Ogun States between 1999 and 2011 weakened the latter‟s role 
as citizens‟ representative in the modern democracy. More often, the legislatures in the 
two states existed as mere instruments in the hand of the executive for conferring the 
legitimacy constitutionally required for the implementation of its decisions and such 
political governance cannot be deemed democratic. The inability of the legislatures to 
meaningfully impact on policy process and perform their oversight role on the executive 
thus portends a reversal from democratic to dictatorial governance. 
 
The study on this note concludes that presidentialism has not ushered in the much 
envisaged democratic order and political stability through healthy legislature-executive 
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relations not much a problem with its institutional design, but due to the ubiquitous 
political culture that continued to motivate political actors in the States to struggle for 
political power in a manner contrary to lay down principles and institutional frameworks. 
As Omoweh (2012) averred, political leadership in Nigeria resorts to bloody violence at 
all levels of political competition in order to remain in power. Coupled with the state 
managers‟ tenuous relationship with production, politics has become the only lucrative 
business and the dominant means of accumulation in town. Hence, the political elites 
fight fiercely to penetrate the state, access its political power and retain it at a ll cost once 
it is captured. 
 
6.4. Contribution to Knowledge 
1. The study has shown that both the formal structure and the socio-political and 
economic dynamics of the states mutually reinforce to determine the nature of 
legislature-executive relations in the presidential system of Lagos and Ogun States in 
Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic. Constitutional prerogative is very important in 
determining the relationship between the executive and the legislature. In the 
presidential system of government, the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature is formally defined by the provision for a separation of the powers, 
persnonnel and functions of the two branches and a system of checks and balances 
between them. In Lagos and Ogun States of Ngeria however, such provision is largely 
at the mercy of the interplay of the socio-political and economic environment of the 
states in determining legislature-executive relations in the states.  
2. This study has also demonstrated that legislature-executive deadlock is found not 
only in presidential states with minority government. A presidential system with 
possible case of majority government such as Ogun State, where the government 
party also had absolute majority in the legislative house does not automatically 
transcend to having legislations in favour of the executive‟s preference or easy 
implementation of the executive programmes and activities. Both minority and 
majority government may be faced with legislature-executive gridlocks. In fact while 
that of the minority government can be self-explanatory, that of the majority 
government is very complex.  
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3. The study has also revealed that legislature-executive relations in a presidential 
system may be viewed not only from the theoretical perspective of the principles of 
separation of powers; in addition, it is also understood from the theoretical construct 
of structural-functionalism. The relationship between the executive and the legislature 
has, more often than not, been studied according to the Montesquieu formula of the 
separation of powers. The principle, as a theoretical framework, provides a useful 
guide to the distribution of legislative and executive powers. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical division of governmental functions seems impossible to apply with 
beneficial results in the formation of any concrete political organization. When 
interpreted too rigidly and applied universally, the principle leads to misconception 
rather than enlightenment. Structural-functionalism approach to the study of 
legislature-executive relations however, views that whatever the institutional 
trappings and cultural, ideological, economic, and even chronological and spatial 
differences, the legislature and the executive share in the performance of a number of 
crucial political functions in the polity. The study of legislature-executive relations 
from the theoretical framework of structural-functionalism gives context for and 
limits at some degree of reciprocal influence among these institutions of governance. 
 
4. This study has also demonstrated that conflict between the executive and the 
legislature in Lagos and Ogun States often ensue when the latter attempted to perform 
its oversight role on the former.  Legislative oversight is fundamental to democratic 
control of the executive in an increasingly large and complex government. The 
legislature, through its oversight functions, holds the government and its agencies 
accountable to the public, ensures that it is kept under scrutiny and prevented from 
abusing its power. However, the attempt by the legislature in Lagos and Ogun States 
to perform this crucial role of oversight by controlling and monitoring public funds 
and by investigating into public complaint or activities of the executive often resulted 
to hostility between it and the executive.  
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6.5. Suggestions for Further Study 
1. Further research in this area should be conducted in other states of the federation 
2. There is the need for further research on the impact of minority government on 
legislature-executive relations in a presidential system. 
3. A comparative study of the nature of legislature-executive relations in the Second and 
Fourth Republic will expand the frontiers of knowledge on the trends of legislature-
executive relations in the Nigeria‟s presidential system. 
4. There is also a need for research on the impact of the 1999 constitution on legislature-
executive relations in Nigeria‟s presidential system. 
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